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c. Several Instances of Substantive Application 
 
In the order of international commerce, the contracting parties articulate their knowledge of 
the particular circumstances of time and place through the contractual clauses and their choice 
of default rules. The decision maker applying lex mercatoria utilizes those articulated rules 
through the cooperation of the parties on the basis of the basic principles of freedom of 
contract and pacta sunt servanda, and procedural safeguards. To the extent that those rules 
require ex post interpretation, supplementation or intervention, the decision maker discovers 
established rules in the particular case through a technique of thought, which materializes 
with new constellations of circumstances within the substantive framework provided by the 
principle of good faith and fair dealing under lex mercatoria. The decision maker exercises an 
abstract reasoning in the specialized consolidations to find those established rules, without 
being bound by the formal consolidations under the national legal systems, unless they are 
incorporated by the parties into the articulated rules through a choice of law clause, or they 
indicate the reasonable expectations of the parties in a particular case pursuant to the 
established rules of conflict, in such areas of law where the approaches of national legal 
systems diverge significantly.  
 
While the materials subject to the specialized consolidations of the decision maker vary from 
case to case, the element of abstract reasoning in the specialized consolidations should always 
follow the abstract relations constituting the spontaneous order of international commerce in 
order to maximize the possibility of expectations of the elements of the order being fulfilled, 
matched and not conflicting. The decision maker, by following such abstract relations, should 
mentally reconstruct the tacit aspect of the knowledge of circumstances of time and place 
possessed by the parties, in order to control legal uncertainty arising from the articulated rules 
and to allocate the residual contractual rights, obligations and risks in accordance with their 
reasonable expectations. The importance of such abstract relations arises from the nature of 
the order of international commerce. The order of international commerce does not manifest 
itself to the contracting parties’ senses as a national legal order, but as the abstract relations 
within this spontaneous order. The decision maker applying lex mercatoria should act on the 
consideration that the success of parties’ actions in achieving their aims in the order of 
international commerce depends on their capacity to adapt their actions both to the particular 
facts which he knows and to other facts they do not or cannot know. Thus, the decision maker 
applying lex mercatoria should assume that the individuals are aware of the existence of this 
spontaneous order which, not having been made, does not have a particular purpose, as a 
necessary condition for the successful pursuit of their purposes. By this means, under lex 
mercatoria, the tacit knowledge of this order is brought to bear on the allocational ex post 
decision with regard to the residual contractual rights, obligations and risks. 
 
It is possible to identify three sources for abstractions that should motivate the reasoning of 
the decision maker in reconstructing the tacit knowledge of the parties and in applying to the 
substance of the dispute whatever rules or standards of contractual, national or transnational 
origin. These sources are national contract laws, international instruments relating to 
international commercial contracts, and contracting practices in the order of international 
commerce. The abstractions from these sources usually, but not necessarily, indicate the 
established rules in the order of international commerce. Even if the decision maker cannot 
articulate an established rule in the order of international commerce through such abstractions, 
the abstract reasoning is still important since it constitutes the background for the decision 
making on the basis of the application of lex mercatoria to the substance of the dispute either 
as lex fori or lex contractus. Thus, the abstractions need not be articulated by the decision 
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maker in the final award in each instance, but it should form the basis of specialized 
consolidations and the decision making under lex mercatoria. 
 
The first source of abstractions is the contract laws of the national legal systems, as the 
elements of the order of international commerce. In a particular case, the decision maker may 
focus on a certain group of national laws that are connected to the dispute in his specialized 
consolidations. However, as far as the element of abstract reasoning in the specialized 
consolidations is concerned, the decision maker applying lex mercatoria should consider the 
approaches of civil and common law of contract, since those two legal traditions have 
influenced profoundly and decisively the other sources of abstractions. In this regard, the 
dissertation focuses particularly on German and French laws as examples of civil legal 
systems, and English and US laws, as examples of common legal systems.  
 
The second source is the international instruments relating to international commercial 
contracts. The relevant international instruments in a particular case may vary significantly in 
each particular case. Even so, the CISG, as an instrument of deliberate balancing among the 
approaches of the civil and common law of contract, has been the most widely accepted 
convention regulating contracts in the order of international commerce.
1585
 Although its 
sphere of application is limited to international sale of goods, the decision maker applying lex 
mercatoria may consider its individual provisions as indicating the established rules of 
contract at an abstract level, in view of the consideration that the contract of sale is the 
backbone of international markets and the order of international commerce, and due to the 
participation of a wide range of the elements of the order of international commerce in its 
preparation.
1586
 The CISG has also influenced the abstract reasoning of the drafters of the 
international restatements of contract principles in their specialized consolidations to set forth 
“general rules for international commercial contracts” under UNIDROIT Principles or 
“general rules of contract law in the European Union” under the PECL. Thus, in the 
dissertation, the abstractions from the CISG, the UNIDROIT Principles and the PECL are 
considered as a factor that should determine the reasoning of the decision maker applying lex 
mercatoria.  
 
Finally, the international contracting practices should motivate, at an abstract level, the 
reasoning of the decision maker applying lex mercatoria. The abstractions of the decision 
maker in this regard may depend on his own experience in the order of international 
commerce, or the parties’ evidence of such practices. Such abstractions should not be treated 
as trade usages in the narrow or broad sense, but as indicating the abstract understanding or 
preferences of the drafters of international contracts. Although, in the order of international 
commerce, the contracting practices may diverge widely, depending on the type of contract, 
                                                 
1585
 As of 24 February 2012, the UNCITRAL reports that 78 States have adopted the CISG. 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG_status.html   
1586
 At the United Nations Diplomatic Conference which adopted the CISG, “62 states took part: 22 European 
and other developed Western states, 11 socialist, 11 South-American, 7 African and 11 Asian countries; in other 
words, roughly speaking, 22 Western, 11 socialist and 29 third world countries”. Eörsi, Gyula, A Propos the 
1980 Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, American Journal of Comparative 
Law, 31 (1983), at 335; The Conference also relied on the comments and proposals of the following international 
organizations: the Central Office for International Railroad Transport in Bern, the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO), the International Chamber of Commerce, the Asian African Legal Consultative 
Committee, and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), along with an analysis of these 
comments and suggestions by the UN Secretariat. Schlechtriem, Peter, Uniform Sales Law: The UN-Convention 
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Manz, Vienna, 1986, at 20-21  
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the bargaining power and strategies adopted by the parties during the negotiations, the 
decision maker applying lex mercatoria may still act on such abstractions that partly explain 
the mechanisms of contractual allocation of rights, obligations and risks in various situations, 
and reasons for recurrence of the certain types of clauses in contracting practices. In this 
regard, the dissertation concentrates on four specific types of model contracts provided by 
international organizations, which can be considered as reflecting the international contracting 
practices at an abstract level, and the characteristics of the transactions governed through legal 
uncertainty, due to their complex, innovative or long term nature. These are Fédération 
Internationale des Ingénieurs-Conseils (International Federation of Consulting Engineers, 
FIDIC) Conditions of Contract for Construction
1587
, the ICC Model Mergers & Acquisitions 
Contract, Share Purchase Agreement
1588
, the ICC Model Contract for the Turnkey Supply of 
an Industrial Plant
1589
, and the ICC Model Commercial Agency Contract.
1590
 These contracts 
essentially the product of the abstract reasoning of their drafters articulating such contract 
terms that provides a balanced framework, which facilitates and shortens the negotiating 
process. 
 
The FIDIC Conditions were first published in 1957, and based on the English Institution of 
Civil Engineers (ICE) Conditions. In subsequent editions, the FIDIC Conditions have become 
progressively more “international” in style and content, while retaining a common law 
orientation.
1591
 The FIDIC Conditions reflects the characteristics of the transactions governed 
through legal uncertainty, since the complexity and length of international construction 
projects and the numerous risks involved potentially give rise to many questions of allocation 
of rights, obligations and risks. The FIDIC Conditions are the best known and probably most 
widely used international standard form of construction contract conditions.
1592
 A number of 
the multilateral development banks have adopted the FIDIC Conditions as part of their 
standard bidding documents that they required their borrowers or aid beneficiaries to follow. 
During 2005, FIDIC licensed Multilateral Development Banks (MDB) to use a revised 
version of the Conditions of Contract for Construction. This is known as the MDB 
Harmonized Edition 2005, and is referred to in the dissertation as the FIDIC Conditions.
1593
 
The MDB Edition is only used for contracts that are financed by one of the participating 
banks.
1594
 The MDB Edition includes a number of changes to the 1999 Red Book. Some of 
these changes incorporate Clauses from previous MDB Contracts and the intention is to 
                                                 
1587
 Conditions of Contract for Construction for Building and Engineering Works Designed by the Employer, 1
st
 
Ed. (1999 Red Book) 
1588
 ICC Publication No. 656, 2004 
1589
 ICC Publication No. 653, 2003 
1590
 2nd ed., ICC Publication No. 644, 2002 
1591
 Seppälä, Christopher R., International Construction Contract Disputes: Commentary on ICC Awards Dealing 
with the FIDIC International Conditions of Contract, International Business Law Journal, (1999), at 700 
1592
 Seppälä, Christopher R., International Construction Contract Disputes: Second Commentary on ICC Awards 
Dealing Primarily with FIDIC Contracts, ICC International Court of Arbitration Bulletin, 19-2 (2008), at  41 
1593
 The MDB Harmonized Edition is first published in May 2005 and then revised in March 2006 and June 
2010. 
1594
 These are African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, Black Sea Trade and Development Bank, 
Caribbean Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Inter-American 
Development Bank, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (The World Bank), Islamic Bank 
for Development Bank and Nordic Development Fund. 
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standardize and reduce the need for further Particular Conditions.
1595
 It is argued that what 
was already the leading set of international construction contract conditions, has also become 
the rule for the major construction projects supported by the world's leading development 
financing institutions, and it is now much more than a device developed over time by parties 
to construction contracts.
1596
 
 
The ICC Model Mergers & Acquisitions Contract, Share Purchase Agreement, is prepared to 
assist parties and lawyers who are not specialized in the field of mergers and acquisition 
contracts to draft a simple contract covering the most common issues involved.
1597
 The 
complex nature of such contracts arises from the fact that the subject of the contract is the 
transfer of an enterprise, in particular when it takes place cross border.
1598
 Moreover, the steps 
leading up to the conclusion and performance of a share purchase agreement constitutes a 
considerably long process. In cross-border share purchase agreements, reliance on national 
rules governing sales is not recommended as national laws are considered to be far too 
unspecific for these deals. The CISG does not apply to share deals (Article 2(d)), and asset 
deals are only covered if more than 50 per cent of the value of the assets consist in goods 
within the meaning of the CISG. Thus, the parties to such transactions almost always use their 
freedom of contract in order to agree on specifically negotiated transaction terms.
1599
 On the 
other hand, the structure and contents of those transactions are strongly influenced by the 
models and forms developed within common law jurisdictions, which has caused the parties 
to use clauses and concepts which belong to the common law systems, independently from 
the law governing the contract.
1600
 
 
The ICC Model Contract for the Turnkey Supply of an Industrial Plant covers the contract for 
the supply of a complete plant or production line to be erected within facilities of the 
purchaser, where the supplier’s main obligation is to supply the equipment and to assist the 
purchaser during erection and start up. It is mainly a form of contract for the sale of 
equipment, with accessory obligations regarding erection, start up, training of personnel, etc. 
Thus, turnkey contract for a plant can be regarded as a contract for sale, which may be 
governed by the rules on sale contracts, and the CISG, although with peculiar characteristics, 
which are closer to a construction contract. The turnkey supply of a plant is a complex 
operation which entails a number of stages, which vary from contract to contract. The Task 
Force preparing the ICC Model Contract, in view of the difficulties to find common solutions 
that can be used for all contracts of the same type, tried to work out a flexible model that 
                                                 
1595
 For the review of the changes see Totterdill, B.W., FIDIC Users’ Guide: A Practical Guide to the 1999 Red 
and Yellow Books: Incorporating Changes and Additions to the 2005 MDB Harmonised Edition, ICE 
Publishing; Rev. ed., 2006, at 355 et seq. 
1596
 Molineaux, Charles, Moving Toward a Lex Mercatoria - A Lex Constructionis, Journal of International 
Arbitration, 14-1 (1997), at 59 
1597
 ICC Model Mergers & Acquisitions Contract, International Chamber of Commerce, ICC publication, 656, 
Paris, 2004, at 7 
1598
 Ehle, B. D., Arbitration as a Disputes Resolution Mechanism in Mergers and Acquisitions, Comparative Law 
Yearbook of International Business, (2005), at 287 
1599
 Peter, Wolfgang, Arbitration of Mergers and Acquisitions: Purchase Price Adjustment Disputes, Arbitration 
International, 19-4 (2003), at 492 
1600
 ICC Model Mergers & Acquisitions Contract, International Chamber of Commerce, ICC publication, 656, 
Paris, 2004, at 7 
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gives a general overview of the most common way of these contracts are carried out while 
taking into account the need for differentiation.
1601
  
 
The ICC Model Commercial Agency Contract is drafted to cover the long-term agency 
relations in the scope of international commerce and more particularly in a European 
context.
1602
 The Working Party aimed at putting at the disposal of parties engaged in 
international commerce a contract that can be used generally, without the need to adapt it to a 
specific national legislation and basing the model contract on neutral ground, detached from 
specific national legislations, while at the same time incorporating prevailing international 
standards as well as rules generally accepted in national legislations.
1603
 
 
In the dissertation, the arbitral awards are examined in the background of these sources of 
abstractions that should determine the reasoning of the decision maker applying lex 
mercatoria. Where possible and relevant, the arbitral awards and dissenting opinions are cited 
extensively in order to demonstrate to what extent the approaches of the arbitrators reflect the 
abstract reasoning and the principled decision making set forth by this theory of lex 
mercatoria in relation to some selected issues that concern the substance of the disputes 
arising from international contracts. The analysis of arbitral awards in this background also 
seeks the signs of the impression of splitting the difference and puts forward some possible 
explanations for such an impression in the context of those selected substantive issues. The 
selected instances of substantive application of lex mercatoria include; (i) duty of cooperation, 
(ii) duty to achieve a specific result and duty of best effort, (iii) force majeure, (iv) hardship, 
(v) right to terminate the contract, and (vi) damages for non-performance.  
 
                                                 
1601
 ICC Model Contract for the Turnkey Supply of an Industrial Plant, ICC publication, 653, Paris, 2003, at 10-
13 
1602
 Bortolotti, Fabio, Towards a New Lex Mercatoria regarding International Commercial Agency: The ICC 
Model Commercial Agency Contract, International Business Law Journal, (1995), at 685 
1603
 Bortolotti, Fabio, (ed.), The ICC Agency Model Contract, A Commentary, ICC Publication No. 512, Paris, 
1993, at 1 
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i. Duty of Cooperation 
In the order of international commerce, the knowledge of the particular circumstances of time 
and place potentially puts every individual in an advantageous position over all others in that 
he possesses unique knowledge. The individuals enter into contracts to utilize such 
knowledge in achieving their various purposes in the spontaneous order of international 
commerce, which enables them to make feasible plans. However, once the individual enters 
into a contract, there appears the possibility of conflict between the interests of the individual 
and the interests of both parties in their contractual relationship. This is because once the 
rights, obligations and risks are specifically allocated through the rules that are articulated by 
the parties, each party has less incentive to bear the costs of accommodating the other’s 
subsequent request for adjustments in the initial allocation, and each party thus confronts the 
question of whether to act cooperatively or to respond to immediate self-interest and evade 
the responsibility.
1604
  
The articulated rules should encourage both parties to undertake active or passive cooperative 
actions. Those actions can be in the form of an active conduct, such as duties of notification or 
negotiation, or a passive conduct, in the sense of refraining from performing particular acts 
that can be detrimental in achieving the contractual purpose, such as duties of non-
competition. However, the transaction, to which lex mercatoria is applicable, is inherently 
incomplete. When parties enter into such a transaction, certain aspects of which are governed 
through legal uncertainty, frequently there will be questions of residual contractual 
obligations arising from the unspecified instances of cooperation for the successful 
performance of contractual obligations or for achieving the purpose of the contract, or the 
closer confidence generated between the parties throughout the contractual relationship. 
1. Sources of Abstractions 
a. National Laws 
 
It is argued that the duty of cooperation represents an emerging general principle of law.
1605
 
However, the civil and common law systems have contrasting views as to the duties of 
cooperation between the contracting parties. The civil law systems attach a strong role for the 
duty to cooperate on the basis of the principle of good faith. Under German law, the duty to 
cooperate is one of the ancillary duties that are read into a contract on the basis of Section 242 
of the German Civil Code, which provides that the contracting parties must perform their 
obligations in accordance with good faith in light of common practice. Ancillary duties are 
additional duties that are not directly related to the performance of the primary obligations. 
They can be either in the form of application of judge-made law or they can be supplemented 
to the contract from specific provisions of the Civil Code.
1606
  
 
                                                 
1604
 Scott, Robert E., Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, California Law Review, 75-6 (Dec., 
1987), at 2008 
1605
 Vogenauer, Stefan & Jan Kleinheisterkamp (eds.), Commentary on the UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts (PICC), Oxford University Press, 2009, at 542; Bonell, Michael Joachim, 
An International Restatement of Contract Law: the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts, Transnational Publishers, 3
rd
 ed., 2005, at 146 
1606
 Kornet, Nicole, Contract Interpretation and Gap Filling: Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives, 
Intersentia, 2006, at 118 
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The principle of good faith under Section 242 of the German Civil Code provides the basis for 
various, independently enforceable duties to cooperate with respect to the performance of the 
contract, whenever one party’s duty to perform cannot be realized without the cooperation of 
the contracting partner. For instance, if the validity or feasibility of a contract depends on a 
public permission being obtained, there is a duty for both parties to cooperate with respect to 
the application for the permission and to refrain from doing something that could jeopardize 
the permission being granted. The parties are also under a duty to cooperate to adapt the 
contract if this is required by the public permission. Similarly, the parties are under a duty to 
cooperate to adapt the contract in the case of changed circumstances. The boundaries of the 
contractual duty to cooperate are usually defined by the criterion of the reasonableness for the 
party who must perform the duty. Reasonableness is determined on the basis of the 
contractual purpose and the interests of the other party.
1607
 
 
Under French law, Article 1134 (3) of the Civil Code provides that contracts must be 
performed in good faith. Although the traditional approach to this provision was that good 
faith required merely that one keep to one’s agreements and that they be interpreted according 
to the parties’ true intentions rather than the words which they used, the good faith has 
gradually acquired a greater significance and practical importance in the modern law.
1608
 It 
has become generally accepted in French law that good faith in performance has acquired two 
particular expressions in the case law: a “duty of loyalty”, which sanctions bad faith in the 
sense that a party to a contract deprives the other of the intended benefit of performance of the 
contract, and a “duty of cooperation”, which ensures the greatest effectiveness a contract to 
the benefit of both parties according to its nature.
1609
 However, both the notion of good faith 
and its use in those particular expressions by the courts remain contested in French law. Some 
consider Article 1134 (3) as a technical provision, possessing no significance of substance, 
and even useless, given that Article 1135 requires the courts to supplement the parties’ 
agreement with legal, customary and equitable obligations, and they contend that the attempts 
to give it a more substantial significance threatens the legal certainty. On the other hand, there 
are others, who emphasized the cooperative nature of contacts, according to which the 
contractors form a sort of microcosm and the contract is a sort of partnership where each must 
work towards a common purpose which is the sum (or more) of individual purposes pursued 
by each. Thus, the majority of the French doctrine holds more moderate positions.
1610
 It is 
admitted that the contracts often appear as the result of a tension between antagonistic 
interests and the striking of a balance between divergent interests, so that the duty of good 
faith does not oblige a person to protect the interests of another person to the detriment of his 
own interest.
1611
 
 
The US legal system is not at odds with the implication of duty to cooperate in contract, since 
the duty to cooperate is linked to the overarching duty of good faith and fair dealing and, thus, 
                                                 
1607
 Ibid., at 127-128; Lando, Ole & Hugh Beale (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Parts I and II, 
Kluwer Law International, 2000, at 121  
1608
 Bell, John, Sophie Boyron & Simon Whittaker, Principles of French law, Oxford University Press, 2
nd
 ed., 
2008, at 332-333 
1609
 Whittaker, Simon & Reinhard Zimmermann, Good faith in European Contract Law: Surveying the Legal 
Landscape, in Reinhard Zimmermann and Simon Whittaker (eds.), Good faith in European Contract Law, 
Cambridge University Press, 2000, at 37 
1610
 Ibid., at 38 
1611
 Bell, John, Sophie Boyron & Simon Whittaker, Principles of French law, Oxford University Press, 2
nd
 ed., 
2008, at 333-334 
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it can be applied as a term implied in law, one imposing an obligation of good faith.
 1612
 The 
obligation of good faith and fair dealing, which exists in all contracts, requires in some cases 
only absence of interference in the other party's performance, but in others, affirmative 
conduct to cooperate in enhancing the other party's interests under the contract.
1613
 On the 
other hand, English law does not require the attention of a party to the interests of other, 
which amounts to absolute “good faith”, and the courts have traditionally been much more 
reluctant to impose a duty of cooperation on the parties to commercial contracts.
1614
 Under 
English law, the duty to cooperate can be read into the contract as a term implied in fact. For 
instance, a term of this sort was implied as a relatively limited obligation to either secure 
reasonably safe conditions or to warn the other party if such conditions are not provided, 
where this is necessary in order to give “business efficacy to the contract” on the basis of the 
presumed intentions of the parties.
1615
 English law imposes an implied duty to cooperate 
where this is necessary in order to give business efficacy to the agreement since, without it, 
the purpose of the contract would be defeated. While “necessity” is the prime factor to be 
taken into account, English law does not demand cooperation merely because that would be 
reasonable.
1616
 The English courts refused to give the duty to cooperate the status of a rule of 
law. Each contract must be looked at and considered in itself.
1617
 Thus, the question is one of 
whether a term can be implied in fact, which depends on the “intentions of the parties” in that 
case.
1618
 
 
The reason for the reluctance of the English law is probably the consideration that the duty to 
cooperate, as a rule of law, implies an approach which regards contracts as “common 
projects”1619 of the parties, so it is deemed at odds with the paradigm of market-individualism 
under the traditional English contract law, which regards contracting as self-interested 
dealing.
1620
 It is argued that as the traditional model of dealings has been gradually replaced, 
                                                 
1612
 Patterson, Edwin W., Constructive Conditions in Contracts, Columbia Law Review, 42 (1942), at 928-942; 
Summers, Robert S., “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, Virginia Law Review, 54 (1968), at 241; Summers, Robert S., The Conceptualization of 
Good Faith in American Contract Law: A General Account, in Reinhard Zimmermann & Simon Whittaker (eds.) 
Good faith in European contract law, Cambridge University Press, 2000, at 124 
1613
 Hadjiyannakis, Helen, The Parol Evidence Rule and Implied Terms: The Sounds of Silence, Fordham Law 
Review, 54 (1985), at 35-36 
1614
 The strongest recognition has been in relation to contracts of employment; see Secretary of State for 
Employment v. ASLEF (No.2) [1972] 2 Q. B. 455 (C A.); Lando, Ole & Hugh Beale (eds.), Principles of 
European Contract Law, Parts I and II, Kluwer Law International, 2000, at 121  
1615
 The Moorcock (1889) 14 P.D. 64 (C.A ) 
1616
 Burrows, J. F., Contractual Co-operation and the Implied Term, Modern Law Review, 31 (1968), at 404 
1617
 Mona Oil Equipment Co. v. Rhodesia Railways Ltd. [1949] 2 All E.R. 1018, Devlin J.: “I can think of no 
term that can properly be implied other than one based on the necessity for co-operation. It is, no doubt, true that 
every business contract depends for its smooth working on co-operation, but in the ordinary business contract, 
and apart, of course, from express terms, the law can enforce co-operation only in a limited degree-to the extent 
that is necessary to make the contract workable. For any higher degree of co-operation the parties must rely on 
the desire that both of them usually have that the business should get done.” 
1618
 Burrows, J. F., Contractual Co-operation and the Implied Term, Modern Law Review, 31 (1968), at 406 
1619
 Official Comment to Article 5.1.3 of the UNIDROIT Principles; see also UNIDROIT 1987 – Study L – Doc. 
39, Rome, April 1987at 8 
1620
 Brownsword, Roger, Contract Law, Co-operation, and Good Faith: the Movement from Static to Dynamic 
Market Individualism, in Simon Deakin and Jonathan Michie (eds.) Contracts, Co-operation, and Competition: 
Studies in Economics, Management, and Law, Oxford University Press, 1997, at 262 
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in practice, by a model of cooperative dealing, which is characterized by values of trust and 
continuity, English law has gradually recognized that contract law can also perform other 
functions such as fostering cooperation and preventing opportunistic behavior. However, 
contract law is still predominantly seen as a risk allocation device and, those other functions 
are seen as ancillary.
1621
 Thus, the duty to cooperate under English law could not achieved the 
status of an implied term in law, and its application is limited to its possible implication in the 
contract as an implied term in fact in a particular case. 
b. International Instruments 
 
It is argued that a general duty of the parties to cooperate can possibly be derived from the 
CISG as one of the underlying principles pursuant to Article 7.
1622
 While the CISG does not 
contain a general provision, it envisages several specific instances of cooperation between 
buyer and seller. The duty of cooperation can be deduced from the duties provided in the 
CISG, such as the duty to preserve goods to be returned according to Articles 85 and 86, the 
duty to accept cure according to Articles 34, 37 and 48, the duty to mitigate the loss resulting 
from the breach under Article 77. These duties as well as Article 32 on shipping 
arrangements
1623
, Article 54 on the payment of the price
1624
 and Article 60 on buyer’s 
obligation to take delivery
1625
 can be interpreted to express the general principle that every 
party is obliged to enable the other party to perform and not to jeopardize the contractual 
purpose. 
 
Article 5.1.3 of the UNIDROIT Principles explicitly provides that each party shall cooperate 
with the other party when such cooperation may reasonably be expected for the performance 
of that party’s obligations. In the Official Comment, it is stated that a contract is not merely a 
meeting point for conflicting interests but must also, to a certain extent, be viewed as a 
“common project” in which each party must cooperate.1626 The Official Comment clearly 
relates the duty to cooperate to the principle of good faith and fair dealing under Article 1.7. 
                                                 
1621
 Cafaggi, Fabrizio, Creditor’s Fault: In Search of a Comparative Frame, EUI Working Papers Law No. 
2009/15, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1551825, at 11 
1622
 Ferrari, Franco, Uniform Interpretation of the 1980 Uniform Sales Law, Georgia Journal of International and 
Comparative Law, 24 (1994), at 226 referring to “the principle according to which the parties must provide the 
cooperation needed "in carrying out the interlocking steps of an international sales transaction”; Bonell, Michael 
Joachim, Article 7, in C. Massimo Bianca & Michael Joachim Bonell (eds.), Commentary on the International 
Sales Law: the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention, Milan, Giuffrè, 1987, at 81 referring to “the rule according to 
which each party is bound to cooperate with the other to the extent that such cooperation is necessary in order to 
enable that other party to properly perform his contractual obligations” Enderlein, Fritz & Dietrich Maskow, 
International Sales Law: United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: 
Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods: Commentary, Oceana Publications, 
1992, at 60: “The obligation of the parties to co-operate in performing the contract, in particular in the case of 
disturbances, with the aim of minimizing the effect of such disturbances on the party who caused it or at whose 
place it occurred, can be synthesized from a number of articles.” 
1623
 Honnold, John O., Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 United Nations Convention, Kluwer 
Law International, 3
rd
 ed., 1999, at 246: “Paragraph (3) articulates a duty of cooperation that, in most cases, 
probably could be established as an aspect of applicable usages or practices.” 
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The breach of the duty of cooperation constitutes non-performance since, according to Article 
7.1.1, non-performance is defined as the failure by a party to perform any of its obligations 
under the contract. As a consequence, the aggrieved party can invoke any of the remedies 
available under Chapter 7 of the UNIDROIT Principles if their specific requirements are met. 
 
The duty of cooperation under the UNIDROIT Principles has two dimensions, as the 
instances of active or passive cooperation.
1627
 First, each party is under a duty to remain 
passive if a particular action might hinder the performance of the other party. For example, 
the duty of cooperation is violated if a party buys all available goods of a certain kind, thereby 
depriving the other party of its ability to perform its obligation to supply the first party with 
these goods.
1628
 The second dimension of the duty to cooperate provides that each party is 
under a duty to engage in actions if such actions are required to enable or facilitate the other 
party’s performance. The Official Comment to Article 5.1.3 provides two examples: the duty 
to mitigate harm in the event of non-performance of the other party (Article 7.4.8) and the 
duty to assist the other party in obtaining a public permission (Articles 6.1.14-6.1.17).
1629
 
 
There are also references to Article 5.1.3 in the comments of other provisions of the 
UNIDROIT Principles. Article 5.1.3 applies if a party that is aggrieved by non-performance 
receives effective notice of cure from the non-performing party under Article 7.1.4, and 
requires the aggrieved party to permit any inspection that is reasonably necessary for the non-
performing party to effect cure.
1630
 Article 5.1.3 also requires that the assignor of a right is 
obliged to take all the steps necessary to permit the assignee to enjoy the benefit of accessory 
rights and securities that are transferred to the assignee under Article 9.1.14.
1631
 In addition, 
the duty of cooperation requires a party to inform the other party of a move of its place of 
business subsequent to the conclusion of the contract, as provided in the Official Comments 
to Article 6.1.6 regarding place of performance.
1632
 According to the Official Comments to 
Article 6.2.3 on the effects of hardship, the duty to cooperate requires that the request for 
renegotiations by the disadvantaged party and the conduct of both parties during the 
renegotiation process should be carried out in a constructive manner, in particular by 
refraining from any form of obstruction and by providing all the necessary information.
1633
 
 
The Official Comment to Article 5.1.3 provides that the duty of cooperation must have certain 
limits, which should be based on the reference to reasonable expectations, so as not to upset 
the allocation of duties in the performance of the contract. Thus, the duty to cooperate only 
exists to the extent that “co-operation may reasonably be expected”. An early draft of Article 
5.1.3 suggested the imposition of duty to cooperate with the other party whenever “such 
cooperation is necessary for the performance of that party’s obligations”, similar to the 
English approach to contractual cooperation as an implied term in fact.
1634
 The Working 
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Group questioned the appropriateness of the “necessity” criterion, which limits the duty of 
cooperation only to those cases where such cooperation was necessary for the performance of 
the other party’s obligation, and concluded that the formula could be construed in the sense 
that what is ultimately required by a party is not to hinder the other party’s performance 
thereby excluding cases requiring a more active cooperation. Thus, the Working Group 
eventually agreed to rephrase the provision and introduced the criterion of reasonable 
expectations.
1635
 It is argued that this criterion is objective, requiring an assessment of the 
question whether the “co-operation may be reasonably expected for the performance of the 
other party’s obligation”, and not whether the “other party may reasonably expect the 
cooperation.”1636 However, there is no difference between those two questions, as the criterion 
cannot be entirely objective and the decision maker should also take into account the nature 
and purpose of the contract and the parties’ intentions in evaluating their specific allocations 
and reasonable expectations. Thus, the Official Comments to Article 5.1.3 provide a reference 
to the specific allocations in the context of the contract in determining the standard of 
reasonableness in a given case on the basis of whether the imposition of duty of cooperation 
would “upset the allocation of duties in the performance of the contract.”1637  
 
Article 1:202 of the PECL provides that “Each party owes to the other a duty to co-operate in 
order to give full effect to the contract.” This rule is included in the “Section 2: General 
Duties”, which consists of two provisions, the other one being the principle of good faith and 
fair dealing. The failure to cooperate when it is required under Article 1:202 constitutes a 
breach of the contract and consequently gives rise to all remedies the PECL provide for non-
performance. Article 1:301 of the PECL, which defines “non-performance”, explicitly 
includes “failure to co-operate in order to give full effect to the contract” as an instance of 
non-performance.
1638
 Therefore, the appropriate remedies are those that are set out in Chapter 
9, which consists of performance, withholding performance, termination of the contract, price 
reduction and damages.
1639
 
 
In the Official Comments to the PECL, it is explained that the duty to cooperate requires one 
party to allow the other party to perform its obligations and thereby earn the fruits of 
performance stipulated in the contract.
1640
 The illustrations of the comments provide specific 
instances that may arise from this general duty of cooperation. For instance, the duty to 
cooperate may impose an obligation to apply for a building license on an owner who has 
contracted to have office building erected, regardless of whether or not its contract with the 
contractor imposes on it an express obligation to apply for the license since, if the owner does 
not request it, the contractor cannot perform its obligation. The duty to cooperate may also 
concern a collateral duty if infringement of it prevents the other party’s performance, such as, 
a buyer’s undue failure to accept delivery of the seller’s goods is a breach of the duty to 
cooperate. The general duty to cooperate may give rise to the duties of information. In the 
official comments to Article 1:202, it is stated that a party has to inform the other party if the 
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other party in performing the contract may not know that there is a risk of harm to persons or 
property.
1641
 
 
As to the limits of duty to cooperate, the Official Comments to Article 1:202 of the PECL 
provides that the duty to cooperate is imposed only for the purpose of giving full effect to the 
contract. It is stated that a party does not infringe the duty to cooperate by failing to perform 
an act which it has not undertaken to perform and is of no interest to the other party. 
Moreover, the Official Comments further state that a party may refuse to cooperate, where its 
cooperation is dependent on an unfulfilled obligation by the other party in accordance with 
the right to withhold performance, under by Article 9:201(1), and in cases within Article 
9:201(2) regarding anticipated non-performance by the other party.
1642
 
c. Contracting Practices 
 
In international contracting practice, it is possible to find many instances of duty of 
cooperation in the contractual clauses. With regard to construction contracts, it is argued that 
the duty to cooperate is often implicit, yet seriously important and derived from the principle 
of good faith and fair dealing.
 1643
 The duty arises mainly as an obligation of each party to 
facilitate contract performance of the other party and to disclose relevant information. The 
FIDIC Conditions confirm the importance of cooperation between the parties. The FIDIC 
Conditions include a spirit of good faith in the contract, to the extent which was necessary to 
ensure that the progress of the construction works will not be adversely interfered with. There 
are specific clauses under the FIDIC Conditions, which ensure the cooperation between the 
Employer and the Contractor for the successful completion of the Works.  
 
In a construction contract, the employer usually furnishes the work site, and it is in a better 
position to conduct subsurface investigations and to co-ordinate activities contractually with 
other contractors to promote co-operation between them and politically with government 
agencies to obtain permits.
1644
 As the access to and possession of the site is essential for the 
completion of the works, the construction contracts commonly require the employer to give 
the contractor such possession, occupation or use as is necessary to enable it to perform the 
contract.
1645
 Rules relating to “possession” or “use” or “access” or “occupation” are used in 
construction contracts to describe the contractor’s right to enter the site.1646 According to Sub-
Clause 2.1 of the FIDIC Conditions, the Employer shall give the Contractor right of access to, 
and possession of, all parts of the Site within the time stated in the contract or, if no such time 
is stated in the contract, within such times as may be required to enable the Contractor to 
proceed in accordance with the program submitted. If the Employer fails to comply with this 
form duty of cooperate, the Contractor is entitled to an extension of time, if completion is or 
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will be delayed, and payment of any cost plus profit, which shall be included in the Contract 
Price. However, the Employer may withhold any such right or possession until the 
Performance Security has been received. This reflects the position of the Official Comments 
to Article 1:202 of the PECL, which refers to the right of the party undertaking the duty of 
cooperation to withhold performance due to non-performance by the other party of one or 
more obligations in accordance with Article 9:201 of the PECL. 
 
The possession of site may not be exclusive to the contractor in some cases. According to 
Sub-Clause 4.6 of the FIDIC Conditions, the Contractor shall, as specified in the Contract or 
as instructed by the Engineer, allow appropriate opportunities for carrying out work to the 
Employer’s Personnel, any other contractors employed by the Employer, and the personnel of 
any legally constituted public authorities, who may be employed in the execution on or near 
the Site of any work not included in the Contract. Additionally, services for these personnel 
and other contractors may include the use of Contractor’s Equipment, Temporary Works or 
access arrangements which are the responsibility of the Contractor. On the other hand, Sub-
Clause 2.3 requires that the Employer shall be responsible for ensuring that the Employer’s 
Personnel and the Employer’s other contractors on the Site cooperate with the Contractor’s 
efforts under Sub-Clause 4.6, and take actions similar to those which the Contractor is 
required to take under Sub-Clause 4.8 (Safety Procedures) and Sub-Clause 4.18 (Protection of 
the Environment). The Contractor may rely on Sub-Clause 8.4 (Extension of Time for 
Completion) for any delay, impediment or prevention caused by or attributable to the 
Employer, the Employer’s Personnel, or the Employer’s other contractors on the Site.1647 
Pursuant to Sub-Clause 2.2, the Employer shall provide, at the request of the Contractor, such 
reasonable assistance as to allow the Contractor to obtain copies of the Laws of the Country 
relevant to the contract and with any applications for permits, licenses or approvals required 
by these Laws, which are not necessarily the same as stated as being the governing law of the 
Contract. Thus, Sub-Clause 2.2 explicitly require the parties, as reasonable merchants, to take 
into account and cooperate with each other to act in compliance with the mandatory rules of 
the national laws other than the one chosen by the parties as the governing law. According to 
the Sub-Clause 2.4, the Employer shall submit, before the Commencement Date and 
thereafter within 28 days after receiving any request from the Contractor, reasonable evidence 
that financial arrangements have been made and are being maintained which will enable the 
Employer to pay the Contract Price punctually in accordance with Clause 14 (Contract Price 
and Payment). Additionally, before the Employer makes any material change to his financial 
arrangements, the Employer shall give notice to the Contractor with detailed particulars.  
There are many clauses under the FIDIC Conditions, which provide other duties to inform in 
order to foster cooperation between the parties for the successful progress of the Works. 
Pursuant to Sub-Clause 1.8, if a party becomes aware of an error or defect in a document 
which was prepared for use in executing the Works, that party shall promptly give notice to 
the other party of such error or defect. Sub-Clause 19.2 provides for duties to inform the other 
party in cases of force majeure. Sub-Clause 4.10 requires the Employer to make available to 
the Contractor all relevant data in the Employer’s possession on sub-surface and hydrological 
conditions at the Site, including environmental aspects. In general, under various specific 
clauses, the Contractor, being in a better position to obtain the knowledge with regard to the 
works, is put under the obligation to supply information and notices required for the execution 
and completion of the Works and also for alerting the Employer, whenever an event occurs 
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and is likely to increase the cost of the Work or the time for completion.
 1648
 The parties’ 
failure to give such information, notices or alerts would be a breach of the terms of the 
contract, and may give rise to the Employer’s claim for deduction in the Contract Price and 
Payment Certificates and/or extension of the Defects Notification Period under Sub-Clause 
2.5, or to the Contractor’s claim for additional payment and/or extension of the Time for 
Completion under Sub-Clause 20.1. 
Other clauses that promote the cooperation between the parties can be found in the ICC 
Model Contracts on the turnkey supply of an industrial plant, mergers and acquisitions and 
commercial agency. All those ICC Model Contracts provide for a general clause on good faith 
and fair dealing. According to Article 2 of these model contracts, in carrying out their 
obligations under these agreements, the parties will act in accordance with the principles of 
good faith and fair dealing. It is further provided in Article 2 that the provisions of these 
agreements, as well as any statements made by the parties in connection with this agreement 
shall be interpreted in accordance with the principles of good faith and fair dealing.
1649
 In the 
commentary to the ICC Model Commercial Agency Contract, it is explained that particular 
application of this principle will appear in the specific provisions of the model contract, but 
the concept of this principle is broader than any of the specific applications in the model 
contract, as the principle supplements those provisions. According to the commentary, Article 
2 imposes upon each party a duty to observe reasonable standards of fair dealing and to show 
due regard for the interests of the other party and requires an interpretation in good faith 
which promotes the general principles on which the model contract is based.
1650
  
In the ICC Model Contract for the Turnkey Supply of an Industrial Plant, there are many 
contractual clauses which can be deemed as specific instances of duty of cooperation between 
the parties.
1651
 Particularly, Article 4.8, titled “Purchaser’s duty to cooperate”, provides, in 
general terms, that the Purchaser shall take all reasonable steps in order to assist the Supplier 
in performing obligations under this Contract. The second paragraph provides that the 
Purchaser shall obtain import permits and/or licenses required for any part of the Equipment 
in accordance with the applicable Incoterm and, to the extent applicable, building permits and 
operating permits, and he shall, at the Supplier’s request, assist the Supplier in obtaining 
(temporary) import permits and/or licenses for Supplier’s Erection Equipment, visa and/or 
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work permits required in the country where the plant is to be installed for Supplier’s 
personnel and any further authorizations, consents and/or approvals necessary for the 
performance of this Contract. Other instances of duty to cooperate can be found in Article 33 
on Force Majeure which, in particular, provides the duty of the party invoking force majeure 
to notify the impediment, which causes the failure to perform, without undue delay and to 
take all reasonable means to limit the effect of the impediment or event invoked upon the 
performance of its contractual duties, and in Article 34.2 on the parties’ duty to keep in strict 
confidence all confidential information obtained from each other in the course of performance 
of the contract and to use confidential information only to the extent necessary to fulfill its 
obligations under the contract and for the use of the plant.   
The duty of cooperation can also be found in the ICC Model Mergers & Acquisitions 
Contract, Share Purchase Agreement. The complex nature of the cross-border share purchase 
agreements and the lengthy process leading up to their conclusion and performance require a 
certain degree of cooperation between the buyer and the seller. In most recent instances of 
merger and acquisitions, the cooperation between the parties starts, after the signing of a letter 
of intent, with a specific investigation, called “due diligence”. Before acquiring shares in a 
company, the buyer or his agents investigate the legal, financial and operational situation of 
the target company.
1652
 Originally, “due diligence” was a qualification of the manner in which 
the buyer had to carry out these investigations, but, gradually, the practitioners have used this 
expression to define the investigation itself.
1653
 In the course of this investigation, many 
documents may be reviewed by the audit team, usually in a data room, where all data useful 
for investigation are gathered for reasons of confidentiality. The seller is under the duty to 
disclose the documents relating to the business activities, corporate structure, assets and 
liabilities of the target company, and the buyer is under the duty to investigate them, and both 
of the parties are under the duty of confidentiality. The findings of the audit team as a result of 
their investigations affect the purchase price and they are recorded in the representation and 
warranties part of the final contract, and, sometimes in a disclosure letter annexed to the final 
contract, as a shield from attack as to the validity of purchase price based on mistake or 
misrepresentation.
1654
 As the completeness of the information provided by the seller has great 
importance for structuring the transaction, a cooperative behavior between the parties is 
needed and often regulated explicitly in the contract. In the absence of explicit provisions, the 
duties of cooperation may be implied through the obligation of the buyer to conduct due 
diligence investigations carefully and respectfully with regard to the confidentiality of the 
information, and the obligation of the seller to disclose sensitive information or certain 
difficulties at that stage, without being expressly asked to do so by the buyer, in order to avoid 
the issues of mistake or misrepresentation.
1655
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The final contract, i.e. the share purchase agreement, also requires continuing cooperation 
between the buyer and seller in order to enable the closing, which means the completion of 
the sale and purchase of the shares of the target company by the parties’ performance of their 
respective obligations, namely the shares or title documents are delivered against the 
payment. In this regard, Article 5 of the ICC Model Mergers & Acquisitions Contract requires 
that as from the date of execution of this agreement and until closing, the seller shall conduct 
the business of the company or cause the business of the company to be conducted in the 
ordinary course and notify the buyer of any material adverse change in the business 
operations, properties, prospects, assets or condition (financial or other) of the company, or 
any event, development or circumstances that may result in such a material adverse change. 
Moreover, share purchase agreements in some cases explicitly require the parties to cooperate 
with each other in satisfying conditions precedent to closing, particularly in obtaining notices, 
filings and consents required prior to the closing from any regulator in connection with the 
execution of the agreement and the performance of the obligations, including the notification 
of the agreement to the competition authorities, as well as in other closing actions.
1656
 
The ICC Model Mergers & Acquisitions Contract requires cooperation between the parties 
after the closing as well. According to Article 10 regarding claim procedure, whenever the 
buyer becomes aware that an event has occurred from which there may arise an obligation of 
the seller due to the breach of a warranty, the buyer shall, as soon as practicable, give claim 
notice to the seller. Then, in handling the event, the buyer shall keep the seller fully and 
promptly informed and consult in good faith with the seller before taking any material steps 
or decisions in order to allow the seller to make all recommendations and suggestions to the 
buyer in due time, and to this effect, the buyer shall give the seller reasonable access to 
relevant documentation and the seller shall provide full cooperation upon the buyer’s 
reasonable request. Moreover, some other clauses reflect the negative aspect of cooperation 
after closing to avoid the unfair competition of the seller. Article 13.1 provides a non-
competition clause, which prevents the seller from engaging in any activity and performing 
any services, which may be directly or indirectly in competition with the target company’s 
business as per the closing date for a certain period of time which should be determined in 
accordance with the relevant mandatory rules of national laws. Similarly, Article 13.2 
provides a non-solicitation clause, which prevents the seller from directly or indirectly 
soliciting, recruiting or discussing employment arrangements with any employee of the target 
company without prior consent of the buyer for a period of two years. 
International commercial agency contracts also require a significant amount of cooperation 
between the parties, due to their long term nature and the closer confidence generated between 
the parties. The cooperative nature of these transactions was taken into account in the drafting 
of the ICC model commercial agency contract, which aims to provide a balanced agreement, 
respecting the legitimate interests of both parties, instead of giving a better protection to the 
principal or the agent.
1657
 In the commentary, it is stated that both parties must act with 
diligence and good faith.
1658
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Under the ICC model commercial agency contract, the agent has duties of both active and 
passive cooperation. Article 9 of the ICC model commercial agency contract states the agent’s 
obligation to keep the principal informed about his activities, market conditions and the state 
of competition within the territory and to answer any reasonable request for information made 
by the principal. The general purpose of this obligation is to enable the principal to evaluate 
the operations and to adapt his strategies to the particular conditions accordingly.
1659
 
According to the second paragraph of Article 9, the agent shall keep the principal informed 
about the laws and regulations of the territory relating to the products and his activity. Thus, 
Article 9 aims to protect the principal’s interests in the territory through cooperation of the 
agent, who is in a better position to obtain information about the situation in the territory.
1660
 
Moreover, Article 10.1 provides that the agent shall not transmit orders from customers of 
which he knows or ought to know that they are in a critical financial position, without 
informing principal in advance and shall give reasonable assistance to the principal in 
recovering debts due. Article 11.4 requires the agent to notify the principal of any 
infringement of the principal’s trademarks, trade names or symbols that comes to his notice. 
Article 12 requires the agent to immediately inform the principal of any observations or 
complaints received from customers relating to products and to cooperate with the principal in 
dealing with those complaints. 
Article 5 of the ICC Model Commercial Agency Contract, titled “undertaking not to 
compete”, imposes on the agent not to prejudice the principal’s interests by the sale of 
competing products. Article 5 provides the agent’s obligation not to represent, manufacture or 
distribute competing products during the term of the contract without the prior written 
authorization of the principal. It further provides that the agent should inform the principal in 
advance of his activities of representing, distributing or manufacturing other products which 
are not competing with the principal’s product unless it is unreasonable to expect that the 
principal’s interests may be affected.  
The principal has also duties of both active and passive cooperation under the ICC Model 
Contract on Commercial Agency. Article 4 provides that the principal must inform the agent 
without undue delay of his acceptance or rejection of the agent’s orders and principal may not 
unreasonably or contrary to good faith reject the agent’s orders.1661 Article 14 declares the 
principal’s duty to provide the agent with all necessary information relating to the products as 
well as with the information needed by the agent for carrying out his obligations under the 
contract. The principal is also required to inform the agent if he expects that his capacity of 
supply will be significantly lower than that which the agent could normally expect. Finally, 
according to Article 16, the agent is entitled to all the information, particularly extracts from 
the principal’s books, in order to check the amount of commission due to him.1662  
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On the other hand, Article 13 provides that the principal shall not, during the life of the 
contract, grant any other person or undertaking within the agreed territory the right to 
represent or sell the contractual products. In the commentary, it is explained that in principle it 
is agent’s interests to obtain full exclusivity in order to benefit from all the fruits of the 
operations in his territory, and contracts providing that the agent has no exclusive rights at all 
are very rare. The latter situation may be justified in cases, such as when the agent refuses to 
accept a non-competition obligation.
1663
 According to the second paragraph of Article 13, the 
principal is entitled to deal directly with any customers in the territory provided that he 
informs the agent, who will be entitled to commission. 
2. Arbitral Decision Making 
 
While the civil law systems seems more permissive to the implication of a duty to cooperate 
in the contract under the overarching principle of good faith and fair dealing, which is 
generally followed by the international restatements of contract principles, the common law 
systems traditionally limit the extent of the duty to cooperate to the terms implied in fact in 
order not to disturb the contractual equilibrium. On the other hand, despite the influence of the 
common law systems, the contracting practices relating to the transactions governed through 
legal uncertainty demonstrate the importance of cooperation and the variety of clauses that 
impose duties of cooperation on both parties. Such practices can be construed as reflecting the 
change from the classical paradigm of self-interested dealing to a model of cooperative 
dealing. In civil law systems, due to the variety of situations, in which the contractual 
cooperation may be imposed on the parties through the principle of good faith on the basis of 
cooperative dealing, the legal sources of duties of cooperation are generally derived from the 
legal doctrine and case law, while the legislative acts being limited to providing general 
principles and placed in secondary position. However, even in the national legal systems 
admitting the principle of good faith and the international restatements, the decision maker is 
generally required to give effect to the risk allocation agreed by the parties in the contract and 
to evaluate the impact of implication of the various duties of cooperation into the contract, 
given the serious consequences of such implication, on the basis of the discretionary power of 
the decision maker, in terms of contractual liability and availability of remedies to the parties.  
 
a. Basis of Cooperation  
 
The basic principle of good faith and fair dealing has generally been considered as the basis of 
various duties of cooperation between the parties at the stage of negotiations as well as 
throughout the life of the contract. These duties are based on similar premises and are defined 
by the same considerations.
1664
 In particular, they are based on loyalty, and considered as 
allowing the solution of any difficulties connected with the fulfillment of the contract and in 
carrying out its purpose.
1665
 It is argued that the principle that each party to a contract owes a 
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duty not to cause prejudice but rather to cooperate with its partner in order to solve the 
complex problems which arise in long-term contractual relationships has been repeatedly 
affirmed by international arbitral tribunals.
1666
 In ICC Case No 2443, the arbitral tribunal 
stated that the parties must be aware that only a loyal, complete and continuing cooperation 
between them may assist in resolving, beyond the difficulties inherent to the performance of 
each contract, the many problems arising from the extreme complexity and entanglement of 
the litigious obligations, and this obligation to cooperate, which the modern doctrine rightly 
found on the good faith that has to govern the performance of any obligation, must be 
complied with.
1667
  
 
In ICC Case No 9797, the sole arbitrator held that one of two business units consisting of 
member firms of a global consulting firm that were linked to each other through a number of 
Member Firm Interfirm Agreements had acted contrary to the member firms’ implicit 
obligation to cooperate and to pursue their professional practice in accordance with the 
principle of good faith and fair dealing. The arbitrator found the member firms of one of the 
business units were responsible for breaches of such obligations as hiring away the personnel 
of the member firms of other business unit, and misleading their clients in order to sell their 
own services and trading on their credentials and expertise. Although the agreements did not 
contain any express provisions prohibiting such conducts, the arbitrator held that the 
contractual agreements among the parties forbid the member firms to engage in uncooperative 
acts to benefit themselves at the expense of other member forms and such acts were “contrary 
to the member firms’ implicit obligation … to pursue their professional practice in accordance 
with the principle of good faith and fair dealing inherent to international contracts” and 
referred to Article 1.7 of the UNIDROIT Principles. 
1668
  
It is argued in the doctrine that “The needs of international trade give rise . . . to the creation 
of a-national rules which, taking account of the hazards and costs of international commercial 
operations, impose co-operation in good faith upon the parties whose scope exceeds that 
normally required by national law in internal operations”1669 In ICC Case No 5030, the 
arbitral tribunal underlined a general obligation to behave with loyalty in the contractual 
relationship, which, in its view, constitutes naturally an essential principle in international 
economic relations.
1670
 However, the implication of a duty to cooperate may have serious 
consequences, such as obstructing the exercise of the contractual rights as agreed by the 
parties or leading to significant changes in the available remedies. In ICC Case No 10346, the 
arbitral tribunal, referring to Article 1175 of the Italian Civil Code, the legislation which the 
applicable Colombian law took as its model for the subject of obligations and contracts, and 
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Article 1.7 of the UNIDROIT Principles, stated that “the party, specifically the creditor, who 
has not acted with the diligence, measures and foresight which are required of him, as the case 
may be, is not only disqualified from alleging a breach of contract and seeking compensation 
for damages which, in the event that they have been suffered, would be due to his own fault, 
but, on a preventative and more direct basis, assumes the consequences of his dishonesty or 
turpitude and the attendant liability towards the other party…”1671 Thus, in supplementing the 
contract with the duties of cooperation, the decision maker applying lex mercatoria should 
refrain from relying entirely on the concept of good faith and fair dealing without further 
justification and provide sufficient insight into the abstract reasoning that forms the basis of 
his specialized consolidations. 
The ICSID case, between Klöckner v. Cameroon, where the obligation to keep other party 
fully informed, as expressed in the award as “the duty of full disclosure”, was applied in the 
context of a long-term contract, demonstrates the problems arising from such a wide 
consideration of the duty of cooperation in an arbitral award. The dispute arose out of a 
number of agreements, under which Klöckner undertook to supply and erect a fertilizer 
factory in Cameroon, supported by feasibility and profitability studies prepared by Klöckner. 
Klöckner would be responsible for technical and commercial management of the factory for at 
least five years, and become a 51% shareholder in the joint venture operating company 
(“SOCAME”). The Cameroonian Government undertook to furnish a developed site for the 
factory as well as to guarantee payment of a loan, arranged by Klöckner, covering the price of 
the factory. After 18 months of unprofitable and sub-capacity operation, the factory was shut 
down in 1978. After a failure to attempt by Cameroon to start up the factory in 1980, the 
Government ultimately decided to close the factory in 1981. Klöckner filed a request for 
ICSID arbitration claiming the balance of the price for supplying the factory, namely 80 per 
cent of the price.
 1672
 The award declared the debt of the Cameroonian Republic cancelled by 
reason of Klöckner's failure to perform its contractual obligations.  
Klöckner and Cameroon had not agreed on the applicable law in the agreements, but it was 
not contested by the parties during the proceedings that the applicable law should “naturally” 
be “the civil and commercial law applicable in Cameroon”. However, the sources of this law 
could not be determined without difficulty because the United Republic of Cameroon had a 
dual judicial heritage from both France and the United Kingdom during the colonial era. Since 
the SOCAME factory project and finalization of relevant agreements took place in the eastern 
part of the country, the tribunal held that only that part of Cameroonian law that was based on 
French law should be applied in the dispute. On the basis of this law, the tribunal defined a 
“duty of full disclosure to a partner” without referring to any precise legal texts.1673  
The tribunal considered that, “[d]uring the critical period before and during the construction 
of the factory, Klöckner failed to meet its obligation to deal frankly with its Cameroonian 
partner.”1674 The tribunal stated: “This was a joint venture between Klöckner, a multinational 
European Corporation, and a developing country. The plant to be built was an example of 
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imported modern technology and engineering. Cameroon had no experience in manufacturing 
fertilizer products. The factory was to be acquired with the Government's guarantee of 
payment; its output being of major importance for the country's agriculture, and agriculture 
being in turn the very foundation of Cameroon's economic ambitions. Cameroon counted on 
Klöckner to supply all that was necessary to ensure the success of the project… Klöckner 
claimed to be capable of supplying all the knowhow, all the material, and all the management 
skills necessary to ensure the project's success, the Government’s only role being to supply a 
site and to guarantee payment of the contract price. In this operation, the Government trusted 
Klöckner. Klöckner … promised its partner, if not an unconditional guarantee of the factory's 
profitability at all times, at least very pronounced frankness and loyalty. Klöckner had a 
particularly strong obligation to keep Cameroon informed of any facts that might have a 
crucial influence upon the Government's decision to assume, and to continue assuming, the 
very onerous financial engagements upon which Klöckner now seeks to rely. Klöckner failed 
to live up to these obligations. We do not hold that this failure was due to a fraudulent intent. 
But we conclude that Klöckner demonstrated less than a full measure of frankness, of candor, 
vis-à-vis its partner, and that what it did not disclose to its partner may have been decisive in 
the Government's decision whether or not to pursue the project. We thus hold that Klöckner 
did not respect its duty of confidence and loyalty vis-à-vis its partner in this joint venture.”1675  
According to the tribunal, Klöckner failed to make adequate efforts to deal frankly with its 
partner, because it could have said that the conditions of financing had become tougher, and 
prices had changed since the initial agreement. The tribunal considered that “It is impossible 
to determine whether the Government would have decided to halt the project if Klöckner had 
revealed clearly and fully to the Government that the economic hypotheses of 1971 [at the 
signing of the basic agreement], with respect to the relative prices of raw materials and 
finished products as well as to the definitive price of the factory, were no longer valid.”1676 
However, the tribunal was sure that if Klöckner had taken back its initial representations 
concerning the profitability of the factory to take account of the new realities of the 
international fertilizer market, Cameroon could have reconsidered and avoided the costly and 
unwise investment.
1677
 
The tribunal stated that “We take for granted that the principle according to which a person 
who engages in close contractual relations, based on confidence, must deal with its partner in 
a frank, loyal and candid manner is a basic principle of French civil law, as is indeed the case 
under the other national codes which we know of. This is the criterion that applies to relations 
between partners in simple forms of association anywhere. The rule is particularly appropriate 
in more complex international ventures, such as the present one. We have not established that 
there is a law applicable to such contracts. We do not intend to apply new or exceptional legal 
principles to turn-key operations only because they concern projects affecting the economic 
and social development of a given country. But we are convinced that it is particularly 
important that universal requirements of frankness and loyalty in dealings between partners be 
applied in cases such as this one, where a multinational company seeks and freely undertakes 
the obligation to supply an overall package of feasibility, analysis, design, management, 
bidding, construction and marketing for an industrial plant, and obtains in return the 
agreement of the Government to pay for the factory, whether or not it is profitable. In the 
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present case, as we have suggested, we do not feel that Klöckner has dealt frankly with 
Cameroon. At critical stages of the project, Klöckner hid from its partner information of vital 
importance. On several occasions it failed to disclose facts which, if they had been known to 
the Government, could have caused it to put an end to the venture and to cancel the contract 
before the expenditure of the funds whose payment Klockner now seeks to obtain by means of 
an award. When a partner in a financially complex international venture learns of certain facts 
which could influence the attitudes and the actions of the other partner with respect to the 
project; when the first partner fails to disclose this information to the other; and the second 
thereupon continues with the project and incurs additional costs, the first partner has not acted 
frankly and loyally vis-à-vis his partner, and he cannot rightly present a claim to funds whose 
expenditure would perhaps never have been necessary if he had been frank and candid in his 
dealings. In a very significant sense, the fault is his. The fact that the funds were spent 
becomes his responsibility and not that of his partner. In this respect, we decide that Klöckner 
violated its fundamental contractual obligations and may not insist upon payment of the entire 
price of the Turnkey Contract.”1678 
The tribunal found that the government was well founded in retaining payments under the 
exceptio non adimpleti contractus by reaching “the conclusion that Klockner violated its duty 
of full disclosure,” and therefore “it is not entitled to the contract price, that it is entitled to 
payment for the value of what it delivered and which Klockner used, and that Cameroon has 
already paid enough. . . .”1679 In the application of the exceptio non adimpleti contractus, the 
tribunal first analyzed and discussed French case law and commentary, while also noting “in 
view of the parties' divergence as to applicable law… that English law and international law 
reach similar conclusions”.1680 The tribunal held that “In the present case, taking into account, 
on the one hand, the significant payments effected by Defendant, and, on the other hand, the 
significance of Claimant's failures to live up to contractual undertakings, it is appropriate to 
conclude that the amount paid corresponds equitably to the value of Klöckner's defective 
performance… and we have thus concluded that Klöckner is entitled to what it has already 
received, but to nothing more.”1681 The tribunal also denied Cameroon’s counter-claim for 
damages for reparation of all losses attributable to its participation in the project, lucrum 
cessans, and non-financial damages. The tribunal stated that “There is no justification for 
charging Claimant with the losses incurred by the Government in a joint venture where the 
two parties participated, or should have participated, with open eyes and full understanding of 
their actions. One could hardly accept that a State, having access to many sources of technical 
assistance, could be entitled to compensation for the fact that it was misled by a private 
company proposing a particular contract… Klöckner's responsibility for the defects in the 
supply of the factory and in its technical and commercial management have been sufficiently 
sanctioned by the rejection of its claim under the unpaid promissory notes. For the same 
reasons, there is no ground in this case to allocate lucrum cessans or compensation for any 
non-financial damages.”1682 
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D. Schmidt, who was appointed by Klöckner as a member of the tribunal, criticized the award 
in his dissenting opinion.
1683
 With regard to the “duty of full disclosure to a partner”, the 
dissenting arbitrator noted that “it is not reasonable to claim that the Government of 
Cameroon was not aware of "the relative prices of raw materials and finished products", when 
in fact that Government was in total control of the fertilizer market through its power to 
deliver import licences for fertilizers, through its calls for international tenders, through its 
control of the whole fertilizer distribution network in Cameroon, and through the fixing by 
administrative order of the sale price for fertilizers in Cameroon. One may well wonder what 
conceivable information Klöckner could have revealed to the Government of Cameroon 
which that Government did not know already, with regard to fertilizer prices”.1684 According 
to the dissenting arbitrator, the award also suffered from an obvious self-contradiction in its 
reasons since, on the one hand, the award confirmed the full awareness on the part of the 
Government of Cameroon and its access to many sources of technical assistance in rejecting 
the Government’s counter-claim, which was precisely based on the alleged non-disclosure of 
Klöckner and, on the other hand, the alleged non-disclosure was instrumental in the rejection 
of the main claim of Klöckner.1685 
Klöckner applied for the annulment of the award under Article 52 of the ICSID Convention, 
alleging, among others, that the tribunal had manifestly exceeded its powers due to a violation 
of Article 42(1) of the Convention. Klöckner maintained that the tribunal had to render its 
award by applying Cameroonian law based on French law, since this, as the tribunal itself 
held, was the law applicable to the present dispute, but the tribunal “ignored this principle and 
went beyond its powers.”1686 The ad hoc Committee noted that, in imposing “the duty of full 
disclosure to a partner”, “the Tribunal does not claim to ascertain the existence (of a rule or a 
principle) but asserts or postulates the existence of such a "principle" which (after having 
postulated its existence) the Tribunal assumes or takes for granted that it "is a basic principle 
of French civil law".”1687 The Committee emphasized the contrast between the section on the 
“duty of full disclosure”, which contained no reference whatsoever to legislative texts, to 
judgments, or to scholarly opinions, and the section on the exceptio non adimpleti contractus, 
which contained a great number of references to scholarly opinion as well as, directly or 
indirectly, to case law. The Committee stated that although the principle of good faith is “at 
the basis” of French civil law, as of other legal systems, this elementary proposition does not 
by itself answer questions, such as whether the "duty of full disclosure" exists in Cameroonian 
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or Franco-Cameroonian law, and how is it implemented and within what limits.
1688
 According 
to the Committee, “in the absence of any information, evidence or citation in the award, it 
would seem difficult to accept, and impossible to presume, that there is a general duty, under 
French civil law, or for that matter other systems of civil law, for a contracting party to make 
a “full disclosure” to its partner.” The Committee stated that “the Award's reasoning and the 
legal grounds on this topic (to the extent that they are not in any case mistaken because of the 
inadequate description of the duty of "full disclosure") seem very much like a simple 
reference to equity, to "universal" principles of justice and loyalty, such as amiable 
compositeurs might invoke.” Considering that the duty of full disclosure was apparently the 
main ground of the decision, the Committee found it impossible to explain how the award can 
base such a duty on a simple postulate or a presumption that there is a "basic principle," 
without any argumentation whatsoever, and without touching on rules defining how this 
"principle" is to be applied, i.e., the respective rights and duties of the debtor and the creditor, 
the duty of disclosure, of frankness and loyalty, in general and in this particular case, as well 
as the legal effects of a breach of this duty. The Committee concluded that “in its reasoning, 
limited to postulating and not demonstrating the existence of a principle or exploring the rules 
by which it can only take concrete form, the Tribunal has not applied "the law of the 
Contacting State."”1689 The Committee held that, however justified its award may be, the 
tribunal “manifestly exceeded its powers” within the meaning of Article 52(l)(b) of the ICSID 
Convention as the tribunal acted outside the framework of Article 42(1) by applying concepts 
or principles it probably considered equitable.
1690
 
It is argued with regard to Klöckner award that although French law provides in certain 
situations, such as those concerning consumer contracts, “that the party in dominant position 
has an obligation to give certain information to the other contracting party. . . it would be 
wrong to assume that in regard to contracts which are conducted at arm's length, there would 
be a general duty of "full disclosure" such as the one advocated by the majority of the tribunal 
going beyond the elementary requirements of good faith”1691. Essentially, in the reasoning of 
the tribunal in Klöckner case, the existence of a North-South relationship between a company 
from an industrialized country and a developing state was apparently sufficient to trigger the 
wider application of the principle of good faith, leading to the imposition of a duty of “full 
disclosure” on the former. However, such reasoning seems excessive for its inference by 
which a developing state is likened to a layman, while the company from an industrialized 
country to a technician. The context of the contract may contradict such presumptuous 
inferences as to the professional competences of the parties, as underlined by D. Schmidt in 
his dissenting opinion, and as can be observed from the ambiguous opinion of the majority of 
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the tribunal as to the abilities of the Government to obtain the relevant information. Although, 
the contracts which require long-term cooperation between the parties can give rise to specific 
instances of duties of cooperation, the question of whether the parties' obligations should be 
assessed differently in economic development contracts is too controversial to generate 
general principles of law.
1692
 
It is true that the transactions governed through legal uncertainty, which are characterized by 
their long duration, complexity or innovative features, create between the parties such close 
links that imply that there is a duty upon them to cooperate towards a common aim so as to 
permit to each party to attain its own objectives. The parties acknowledge the importance of 
their cooperation in achieving the objectives set out by their transactions by specifying the 
instances of required cooperation in the contractual clauses to the extent they are willing to 
incur transaction costs, thereby regulating the consequences of duty to cooperate. Thus, it is 
observed, in international contracting practice, that there are many specific instances of duty 
of cooperation in the clauses of transactions governed through legal uncertainty. However, in 
supplementing the contract with duties of cooperation or interpreting the scope of such duties 
as articulated in the contract in order to ascertain the meaning and content of the contract, the 
decision maker applying lex mercatoria should take into account not only the basic principle 
of good faith and fair dealing, but also those of freedom of contract and sanctity of contract.  
 
The decision maker applying lex mercatoria should not reduce the constituent elements of the 
duty of cooperation solely to the nature and purpose of the contract in question and the status 
of the parties as loyal partners. These elements may indicate the conditions and degree of the 
parties’ reasonable expectation of cooperation throughout the life of the contract to achieve its 
purpose, but the context of the contract and other objective considerations, such as the 
relevant trade usages and contracting practices, are also important factors in the ex post 
supplementation of an incomplete contract with the duties of cooperation. The decision maker 
should also refer to the articulated rules, which may include the rules of a national law chosen 
by the parties, or the rules of a national law, which is found to be applicable by the decision 
maker and which can be relevant to the identification of the established rules and the 
reasonable expectations of the parties in the particular case. As the ad hoc Committee in 
Klöckner case pointed out, “Of course, one can only applaud the Award's emphasis on the 
importance of loyalty in dealings, especially in international contracts of the sort which gave 
rise to the present arbitration, but such approbation cannot exempt the Committee from 
ascertaining whether the conditions of Article 42 of the Washington Convention have been 
met.”1693  
On the other hand, in the ICSID case between MINE v. Guinea, the tribunal relied on the 
principle of good faith under French law, rather than the applicable Guinean law, in imposing 
a duty of cooperation in the form of a passive behavior, which precluded Guinea from secretly 
negotiating and entering into contracts with third parties, the effect of which would frustrate 
the purpose of its agreement with MINE, yet such application was not regarded by the ad hoc 
Committee as a violation of Article 42 of the ICSID Convention. The dispute concerned the 
“Convention” for ocean transportation of bauxite and the establishment, for thirty years, of a 
mixed-economy company, called SOTRAMAR, in which MINE and Guinea were 
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shareholders. The purpose of SOTRAMAR was to combine MINE’s international shipping 
expertise with Guinea’s freight rights, which it obtained under Article 9 of the agreement 
between Guinea and Harvey Aluminum Company, giving Guinea the right to transport up to 
50% of the exported tonnage, provided Guinea could do so at freight rates not in excess of 
market rates.
1694
 SOTRAMAR would carry out the transportation of 50 % of the Guinean 
bauxite that had been sold to several western companies (the "Bauxite Receivers"). 
SOTRAMAR encountered serious difficulties in obtaining contracts of affreightment with the 
Bauxite Receivers. The parties established the SOTRAMAR Shipping Committee to negotiate 
with the Bauxite Receivers, which resulted in the acceptance by the latter of freight rates 
which, according to MINE, would be profitable to SOTRAMAR. However, according to 
MINE, SOTRAMAR had not received authority from Guinea to conclude contracts of 
affreightment and the purpose of SOTRAMAR was frustrated. Later, MINE became aware 
that Guinea was negotiating about the Article 9 freight rights with a third party, AFROBULK.  
MINE initiated arbitration proceedings, arguing that Guinea breached the Convention when it 
secretly negotiated and subsequently contracted with AFROBULK. Guinea contended that it 
lost all confidence in MINE’s professional ability, arguing that it was MINE which had 
breached the Convention by failing to conclude contracts of affreightment and that Guinea's 
arrangement with AFROBULK was a legitimate measure in mitigation of damages.
1695
 The 
tribunal rejected Guinea's defense, and found that that MINE did not breach the Convention in 
failing to conclude contracts of affreightment. The tribunal noted that Guinea did not try to 
renegotiate the agreement, or to substitute another company for MINE in SOTRAMAR. The 
tribunal considered that, before concluding an agreement with AFROBULK, Guinea never 
suggested to MINE either that SOTRAMAR should negotiate with third party carriers to 
exercise the Article 9 freight rights, or that the sort of arrangement, which was ultimately 
concluded with AFROBULK, was one that SOTRAMAR ought to consider on a short term 
basis. According to the tribunal, there was little doubt that MINE could easily have negotiated 
such an arrangement on behalf of SOTRAMAR if Guinea had expressed the desire. Although 
Guinea described the AFROBULK arrangement as a temporary measure designed to permit 
SOTRAMAR to become a functioning and operational organization, the tribunal found that 
Guinea’s entering the AFROBULK agreement was contrary to the spirit and express 
provisions of the Convention, because SOTRAMAR was the only organization represented to 
the Bauxite Receivers as authorized user of the Article 9 freight rights.
1696
 The tribunal held 
that “Guinea’s conduct in secretly negotiating the AFROBULK arrangement, and in denying 
its existence to MINE thereafter, exhibits bad faith on its part, violating the principle of good 
faith set forth in [Article 1134 of] the French Civil Code”.1697 The tribunal concluded that 
“Guinea prevented SOTRAMAR from performing under the Convention, and thereby 
breached the Convention when Guinea entered the AFROBULK agreement”.1698  
                                                 
1694
 Ad Hoc Committee, Maritime International Nominees Establishment v. Republic of Guinea, Decision 
partially annulling the award, December 22, 1989, ICSID Review—Foreign Investment Law Journal, 5 (1990), 
at 106 
1695
 Ibid., at 110 
1696
 ICSID Award January 6, 1988, Maritime International Nominees Establishment (MINE) v. The republic of 
Guinea, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, 14 (1989),  at 87 
1697
 Ibid., at 87-88 
1698
 Ibid., at 88 
 490 
 
Guinea requested the annulment of the award pursuant to Article 52 of the ICSID Convention. 
Guinea argued, among others, that the tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers by 
violating its obligation to decide the dispute “in accordance with such rules of law as may be 
agreed by the parties”, and that the tribunal “failed to apply any law whatsoever, much less 
correct law” as to the liability, although the Convention provided that Guinean law was the 
applicable law.
1699
 Guinea stated that “Most notable is the almost total lack of citation to legal 
authorities. The single legal reference is contained in one footnote, citing an article of the 
French Civil Code as it appears in Louisiana law.”1700 The ad hoc Committee first stated that 
“the parties' agreement on applicable law forms part of their arbitration agreement. Thus, a 
tribunal's disregard of the agreed rules of law would constitute a derogation from the terms of 
reference within which the tribunal has been authorized to function. Examples of such a 
derogation include the application of rules of law other than the ones agreed by the parties, or 
a decision not based on any law unless the parties had agreed on a decision ex aequo et bono. 
If the derogation is manifest, it entails a manifest excess of power.” However, the tribunal 
also noted that “disregard of the applicable rules of law must be distinguished from erroneous 
application of those rules which, even if manifestly unwarranted, furnishes no ground for 
annulment”.1701 The Committee stated that it is aware of the fact that Guinean law is 
independent of French law, although derived from it. According to the Committee, although 
certain discrepancies may be found between French law as applied in France, and local 
Guinean law, this was not the case as far as Article 1134 of the "Code Civil" is concerned.
1702
 
The Committee stated that “There is thus no basis for saying that the Tribunal failed to apply 
any law. Admittedly, the Tribunal erred in citing Article 1134 of the French Civil Code. The 
Committee notes, however, that the relevant provision of the applicable Guinean law is 
contained in the "Code Civil de l'Union Française" with the same number and the same 
contents as Article 1134 of the French Civil Code. For this reason, the Committee does not 
consider that this error warrants annulment.”1703 Thus, the Committee concluded that the 
tribunal did not fail to apply the "correct" law and did not manifestly exceed its power. 
Guinea also complained that the tribunal failed to deal with its arguments on the limits of 
good faith and on its right to conclude the agreement with AFROBULK in response to 
MINE's prior refusal to go forward without Guinea's relinquishing its contractual rights. 
However, the Committee noted that this complaint was based on the assumption, contrary to 
the tribunal's finding, that MINE was in breach of the Convention and it was in effect an 
appeal against the tribunal's decision on breach of contract, but appeal is excluded by the 
ICSID Convention. 
1704
 
In practice, the arbitrators often apply the principle found in the applicable national law, such 
as Article 1134 (3) of the French Civil Code, as well as those of many codifications in civil 
law systems, according to which “contracts must be performed in good faith” in 
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supplementing the contracts with various duties of cooperation.
1705
 However, such activities 
of supplementation should not lead to a wider consideration of good faith obligations in 
contravention to the nature of the contracts and the parties in the order of international 
commerce, such as those that can be relevant in the context of contracts between parties of 
unequal bargaining power or professional competence. It is observed that there is a tendency 
among arbitrators in international commerce to consider that the law should only protect 
parties to the extent that they are not under a duty to protect themselves.
1706
 As long as the 
facts of the case are carefully examined and accounted for in the application of the principle 
of good faith, as in the ICSID case between MINE v. Guinea, the decision maker applying lex 
mercatoria does not have to find every instance of required cooperation in the specific rules 
contained in a particular national law or derived from trade usages in the narrow sense. In this 
regard, the decision maker may rely on their abstract reasoning, as a result of the power of 
discretion granted by the standard of good faith. However, the exercise of abstract reasoning 
in a manner that severs the links between the standard and the realities of the case, as in the 
ICSID case between Klöckner v. Cameroon, resembles the activities of amiable composituers 
or arbitrators in equity, who exercise their authority to act contra legem, when, according to 
their sense of equity, the enforcement of the contract leads to an inequitable result.  
 
The general preference of arbitrators for the application of standards can be observed in the 
application of both the applicable national law and the UNIDROIT Principles.
1707
 This 
probably results from the fact that the general principles or standards allows for solutions 
better adapted to the particular circumstances of the case. However, in the application of the 
principle of standard of good faith to supplement the contract with various duties of 
cooperation, the decision maker applying lex mercatoria should constantly keep in mind the 
underlying bargain, purpose and nature of the contract through a contextual approach. In ICC 
Case No 9593, the arbitral tribunal supplemented the contract with an implied duty to 
cooperate on the part of the supplier, since the relevant exclusive distributorship agreements 
failed to deal with the contingency of the transitional period in the contractual relationship.
 
The dispute arose from a number of exclusive distribution agreements concluded between an 
Ivorian distributor and a joint venture supplier of UK/Japanese origin. As a result of the 
distributor’s failure to make payment punctually, the supplier decided to terminate the 
agreements. The distributor initiated arbitration proceedings, arguing that the defendant’s 
termination of the agreements was unfounded and alleging the defendant’s failure to perform 
its contractual obligations in good faith and general lack of cooperation. The contracts 
contained a choice of law clause in favor of Ivorian law. The arbitral tribunal stated that 
“Pursuant to Article 13(5) of the ICC Rules, the Arbitral Tribunal shall also take into account 
the provisions of the contract and the relevant trade usages. In doing so, the Arbitral Tribunal 
will pay particular attention to the specific nature of the Agreements and to the context within 
which they were entered into.”1708  
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The tribunal referred to Article 1156 of the Ivorian Civil Code, which required the tribunal to 
look for the real intent of the parties and not only the literal wording of the agreements. The 
tribunal also stated that the custom to be taken into consideration by the arbitral tribunal 
within the framework of Article 1135 of the Ivorian Civil Code is to be found within the 
usages of international trade. The tribunal derived from Article 1134 (3) of the Ivorian Civil 
Code, which requires that contracts be performed in good faith, the obligation to cooperate in 
good faith to reach the common goals contractually agreed upon. Given that the Ivorian Civil 
Code was largely drawn from the French Civil Code, the tribunal cited the famous formula of 
French doctrine, which presents the contracts as a sort of microcosm, where each party must 
work towards a common purpose.
1709
 According to the tribunal, the French courts have 
decided that good faith and loyalty oblige a party to a contract to facilitate the performance of 
its obligation by the other party on the basis of the identical text of Article 1134 (3) of the 
French Civil Code. The arbitral tribunal considered such obligation to cooperate in good faith 
in the performance of the contract, as a fundamental element of the usages of international 
trade applicable to this case and cited several ICC awards in support of this opinion. The 
arbitral tribunal also referred to Article 5.1.3 of the UNIDROIT Principles, as “a comparative 
study”, in order to confirm its conclusion that “[t]he obligation to cooperate in good faith in 
the performance of a contract [amounts] to a general principle applicable to international 
trade”.1710  
 
On the basis of these considerations and the facts of the case, the arbitral tribunal found that, 
the relations between the parties required a close cooperation and an adaptation period, as 
they had decided to create a new structure in the frame of an already existing long term 
relationship, in which, the claimant had not scrupulously complied with its contractual 
obligations. Although the agreement authorized the defendant to terminate for “serious 
breach” as defined by the agreement and the tribunal was convinced that a number of the 
breaches relied upon by the defendant did take place, the tribunal interpreted the termination 
clause of the agreement to the effect that, when the parties entered into the agreement, their 
real intention, to which the tribunal had to give particular relevance pursuant to Article 1156 
of the Ivorian Civil Code, was that, even if the claimant was in breach of his contractual 
obligations, many breaches, even repeated, would not be considered as serious breaches 
allowing termination before the expiry of a period of two years of adaptation period. The 
agreement also allowed the defendant to terminate the contract immediately in case of failure 
by the claimant to make any payment due to it by the due date. The tribunal held that the 
exercise of such a right was available only if the breach of claimant was indisputably 
established, if it was not caused by other breaches on the part of the defendant and if the 
defendant did not exercise its right abusively. The tribunal found that the defendant by its 
general behavior did not cooperate with the claimant in a way which would have allowed the 
claimant to strictly comply with all of its obligations. Thus, the tribunal considered that the 
claimant's delays as regards payments were not clearly established as the claimant's defaults, 
since they were caused, in part, by the defendant’s behavior. The tribunal concluded that 
“where there was no certainty that Claimant was in breach of its obligations of payment, 
where the real intent of the parties was that no termination would take place before two years 
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of the life of the Agreements in most of the cases of breach and where Claimant's breaches 
were largely caused by Respondent's attitude and by the latter's breach of its duty to 
cooperate, the Arbitral Tribunal decides that the termination of the Agreements by 
Respondent was not justified and, therefore, abusive.” 1711 
 
In an ad hoc award of 2001 rendered in Costa Rica, the case concerned an agreement between 
a French corporation and a Costa Rican corporation to participate together in a public 
contracting procedure for the construction and exclusive operation, for a ten-year period, of 
centers for technical revision of vehicles in Costa Rica. The French corporation had not joined 
the other party’s appeal against the award of the project to a third party, as a result of which 
the Costa Rican corporation was unable to conclude the procedures. The Costa Rican 
corporation initiated the arbitral proceedings alleging the defendant’s breach of the joint 
venture agreement. The parties had agreed that any dispute should be resolved “on the basis 
of good faith and fair usages and with regard to the most sound commercial practices and 
friendly terms”. The tribunal deemed itself enabled to apply UNIDROIT Principles on the 
basis of the consideration that “Not only national statutes and jurisprudence are applicable to 
this case, but also regulations of international trade that are essentially conformed by the 
principles and usages generally admitted in commerce which the parties agreed upon in the 
tenth clause of the letter of intent stating that they would act, amongst themselves, on the 
basis of good faith and proper customs and with regard to the most sound commercial 
practices and friendly terms.”1712  
 
The ad hoc tribunal held that each party must act in a way that does not damage the other 
party and that parties must comply with the obligation of cooperation that modern doctrine 
derives from the principle of good faith, which must govern the performance of every 
contract. Additionally, the tribunal noted that ICC Case No 9593 had provided that, according 
to the UNIDROIT Principles, the usages of international trade require good faith in the 
fulfillment of contractual obligations. The tribunal stated that “The defendant’s refusal to 
appeal constitutes conduct that is inconsistent with its previous participation in the Public 
Contracting Procedure along with the plaintiffs; procedure during which a relationship of trust 
had been generated between the parties in regards to the fulfilment of the letter of intentions 
and the joint venture agreement. The conduct shown by the defendant during its own 
performance of its contractual duties reveals the scope of its obligations; hence, this conduct 
prevented the defendant from taking a course of action inconsistent with it, such as refusing to 
participate in the appeal against the improper adjudication of the Contracting Procedure to a 
third party.”1713 Thus, the tribunal considered that, the French corporation had been in breach 
of its implied duties of cooperation, where the parties had failed to deal with the contingency 
of an appeal procedure in the contract. The tribunal held that a relationship of trust had been 
generated between the parties in regards to the fulfillment of the letter of intent and the joint 
venture agreement during the course of performance of contractual duties, which revealed the 
scope of implied obligations of the parties. The tribunal awarded damages for the loss of the 
opportunity of gaining the probable profits of the interrupted projects.  
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In ICC Case No. 12127, the tribunal considered that the contractual clauses in a license 
agreement, which regulated the consequences of termination, survived the termination of the 
contract and, thus, extended the duration of the agreement thereby leading to the implication 
of a duty of cooperation on the basis of the principle of good faith even after the agreement 
was effectively terminated. The claimant, French licensor, and defendant, US licensee, 
entered into an exclusive license agreement covering the procedures, know-how and 
techniques to manufacture the product under the US patents, as well as the right to sell the 
product in the United States and Canada. The agreement provided that it was governed by the 
laws of France. After the termination of the contract, a research institute contacted a customer 
of the defendant, and wished to obtain samples in order to include the product in an important 
comparative study. The customer referred the institute to the defendant, but the latter did not 
respond to the institute. The institute then contacted another customer of the defendant, and 
the second customer provided samples of the product. In the arbitral proceedings, the claimant 
contended that it should have been informed by the defendant of the institute’s requests for 
the purpose of the study, later publication of which showed the product performing poorly.
1714
  
 
Although the contract did not expressly provide for a clause obliging the licensee to inform 
licensor of facts and circumstances pertinent to the trade mark and patent’s protection, the 
tribunal believed that the defendant was effectively under such an obligation for two reasons. 
First, in the tribunal’s opinion, such a clause is essential to any trade-mark and patent license 
agreement, and can as such be considered as an implied term of the contract. Secondly, the 
tribunal considered that such information obligation is a general consequence of Article 1134 
of the French Civil Code, according to which contracts have to be performed in good faith. 
The tribunal observed that “case law and doctrine are well settled that good faith performance 
implies a certain degree of spontaneous co-operation between the parties” and “such 
cooperation imposes upon each party to inform the other party of any non-confidential 
information pertinent to the contract and useful to its interests.”1715 The tribunal also pointed 
out that French case law does not limit such information obligation to the pre-contractual 
stage, but extends it to the whole life of the contract. According to the arbitral tribunal, the 
fact that the letters from the institute were received by the defendant after the contract’s 
termination did not release respondent from its obligation to disclose them to claimant. The 
tribunal considered that the right granted to the defendant by the contract, to sell its inventory 
after termination, implied that the contractual obligations be also respected after termination 
and until the last inventory sales. Thus, at the moment the defendant received the institute 
letters, it was still bound to perform the contract in good faith, and the tribunal held that its 
failure to forward these letters to the claimant constituted a breach of the contract.
1716
 
 
b. Costs of Cooperation  
 
The decision maker supplementing the contract with duties of cooperation should respect the 
specific allocations agreed by the parties in the contract and their reasonable expectations in 
the context of a particular contractual equilibrium. Thus, the decision maker should assess the 
consequences of implication of a duty to cooperate on the basis of the reasonableness of the 
costs and the interests of both parties in the realization of contractual purpose, and not focus 
solely on imposing such duties on one party thereby disregarding the possible implication of 
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corresponding duties for the other party in the particular circumstances of the case. The 
decision maker may apportion the burden and costs of duty to cooperate between the parties if 
required by the circumstances of the case. It is observed that arbitrators consider the 
maintenance of contractual and financial equilibrium throughout the contractual relationship 
as essential, since without such equilibrium the contract becomes one based on 
speculation.
1717
 
In ICC Case No 3779, the dispute concerned three sale agreements, between a Swiss seller 
and a Dutch buyer, according to which the merchandise coming from a Canadian factory was 
to be delivered to Rotterdam. However, only the first two contracts were signed by the parties 
and executed. The third contract was not signed and before shipment from Canada took place, 
it was cancelled by the buyer, who complained that the merchandise delivered under the first 
two contracts was not in accordance with the quality prescribed in the contract. It appeared 
that the goods were in accordance with the contractual requirements when analyzed under the 
North American method, but not when the European analytic method was used. The seller 
claimed indemnification in respect of the cancellation of the third contract. The sole arbitrator 
determined that Swiss law was applicable to the contract. He found that both parties acted in 
good faith. The seller had immediately declared his willingness to submit samples drawn by 
both parties to a test by a component laboratory to be chosen by both parties, and to accept 
cancellation of the remaining contracts, if analysis proved that the buyer’s allegations had 
been well-founded. The buyer had also immediately reported quality problems, and restricted 
himself to refusing to give any forwarding-instructions or to receive the goods ordered, but 
not yet loaded on board.
1718
  
The arbitrator noted that the dispute essentially arose from a misunderstanding. When the 
seller initially gave a description of the goods, no mention was made of a method of analysis. 
The buyer supposed that, since the description was given by a European firm, the European 
methods were to be applied, whereas, when the quality problems emerged, the seller 
announced the North American method of analyzing, which, according to him, is 
internationally accepted. The arbitrator stated that, although North American method is better 
known in the international industry concerned than a French method, it cannot be considered 
to be implicitly understood, at least, not on the European market. According to the arbitrator, 
the seller should have mentioned that the contractual description was to be interpreted 
according to the North American method. The arbitrator considered that, according to the 
traditional rule of interpretation, “in dubio contra proferentem”, the seller was obliged to state 
clearly what obligations he was undertaking. On the other hand, the arbitrator noted that the 
buyer knew very well that goods were of Canadian origin, so that the error was also due to his 
negligence, for he should have asked about the meaning of the symbols used in the 
contractual description of the merchandise, of North American origin. The arbitrator thus 
examined “the dialectics between the right of being informed, and the obligation of informing 
oneself.” The arbitrator held that the error of the buyer was due to a negligence shared with 
the claimant, but the North American method being more frequently used than the other 
methods, the negligence of the seller as to the information seemed less than that of the 
buyer.
1719
 The arbitrator stated that, in Swiss law, the erring party can ask for invalidation of 
the contract even if the error is due to his own negligence, but is obliged to pay compensation, 
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and this responsibility presupposes a fault on his part, due to his own negligence, such as the 
fact that the buyer did not sufficiently ask for information about the goods. The arbitrator also 
stated that Swiss law provides, in principle, that the erring party does not owe any 
indemnification to his co-contractor if the latter could have known the error, but adjudication 
of a reduced indemnification in the case of a joint fault appears to be justified and desirable. 
The arbitrator held that, “Taking into consideration the respective faults, it is equitable to 
adjudicate an indemnification reduced by two fifth, the [buyer] being responsible for 3/5 for 
the misunderstanding, and the [seller] for 2/5.”1720 
The principle of good faith and fair dealing in general and the duty to cooperate in particular 
require each party not to create or utilize a beneficial situation for himself or disadvantageous 
situation for the other party in contravention of the underlying purpose of the contract. In 
some arbitral cases, this implies a duty to keep other party informed as a specific instance of 
duty to cooperate in order to enable the performance of the contract and achieve its purpose. 
However, it is difficult to propose the existence of an established rule in the order of 
international commerce that provides an unqualified general duty to inform under the heading 
of cooperation between the parties, with the exception of the duty to give reasonable notice of 
termination, delay or defects.
1721
 In essence, obtaining information involves costs that are not 
expressly included in the contract price.
1722
 Under the transactions governed through legal 
uncertainty, the parties can usually be considered as being partners in a joint project and 
bound by a certain degree of loyalty on the basis of the principle of good faith and fair dealing 
under lex mercatoria. When the individual interests of parties diverge from their interests in 
the success of that joint project, the duty to cooperate could be implied on the basis that it 
furthers the successful completion of the contractual undertakings, provided that the costs of 
the duty are reasonable in the sense that, under a contextual approach, they are deemed to be 
covered by the underlying bargain according to the presumed intentions of the parties. The 
presumed intentions of the parties may require the decision maker to impose a duty of 
cooperation on the party that can perform this duty at minimal cost or to apportion the costs of 
cooperation between the parties by imposing duties of cooperation on both of the parties. 
Thus, a duty to inform arises if non-disclosure would impede or seriously affect the 
performance of the contract or an entitlement of one of the parties. On the basis of the 
particular circumstances of the case, this duty will be subject to the reasonableness of costs, 
the requirements of confidentiality and the corresponding duty of the other party to perform 
reasonable diligence in seeking out such information. 
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In line with this understanding, when supplementing the contract with a duty of cooperation, 
the decision maker applying lex mercatoria should take into account the equilibrium of 
contract and refrain from disturbing the bargain with the unreasonable costs of an implied 
duty to cooperate. This is particularly relevant to the consideration of the duty of renegotiation 
as an instance of the general duty to cooperate. In ICC Case No 2291, the arbitrator had to 
determine the price for transportation of a machine from France to Africa. The French 
transportation company claimed an increase of the transportation price since the quantity and 
weight of the pieces to be transported was larger than originally expected. The arbitrator, 
applying lex mercatoria, stated that any commercial transaction is founded on the balance of 
reciprocal performances and that to deny such principle would transform a commercial 
transaction into a hazardous and speculative contract. According to the arbitrator, it is a rule 
of lex mercatoria that the performances are balanced in financial terms, and that is why, in 
almost all international contracts, the price is established on the basis of the circumstances 
existing at the time of the conclusion of the contract, and it will vary according to the 
parameters that reflect changes in values of the different components of the product or 
performance.
1723
 The arbitrator considered that as the contract must be interpreted in good 
faith, each party has the duty to behave in a manner that avoids causing prejudice to the other 
party, while the reasonable renegotiation being customary in international economic 
transactions. 
1724
 It is argued that the renegotiation of the contract is considered by the 
arbitrator as a natural consequence of the parties’ obligation to cooperate.1725 However, when 
arriving at that conclusion, the arbitrator took into account the adaptation clause providing for 
a price revision. The tribunal did not imply a duty to cooperate in the form of renegotiation in 
the case of changed circumstances, in a manner that would disturb the equilibrium of contract, 
but held that the parties have to display a normal and usual diligence in negotiations, which is 
reasonable for safeguarding their interests, particularly by trying not to make rushed and 
unreasonable offers, with a potential to surprise the co-contractor.
1726
  
Thus, the decision maker applying lex mercatoria should not consider that a mere change of 
circumstances implies a duty to renegotiate the contract, which is silent in that respect, solely 
on the basis of the idea that long-term contractual relationships require closer cooperation 
between the parties. In ICC Case No 2478, although the contract contained an adaptation 
arrangement providing an obligation to negotiate with a view to agreeing on measures to be 
taken in order to re-establish a contractual equilibrium in the event that the French franc or the 
U.S. dollar (the contract currencies) would be devalued or revaluated, the arbitral tribunal did 
not extend this arrangement to a duty to renegotiate in case of the fluctuations of prices on the 
world oil market, as the tribunal did not consider this arrangement as a price revision 
clause.
1727
 In ICC Case No 2404, the arbitral tribunal stated that the principle rebus sic 
stantibus should be applied with care and prudence, especially if the intention of the parties 
has been clearly expressed in a contract. Since the parties to international commercial 
contracts are presumed to undertake their engagements with full knowledge, the absence of an 
adaptation clause in the contract to take account of the changed circumstances led the tribunal 
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to reject the application of the principle rebus sic stantibus. The silence of the parties was 
interpreted as a decision by the parties to run a commercial risk.
1728
  
In an ad hoc arbitration case, a Yugoslav pipeline enterprise undertook to extend up to the 
Yugoslav-Hungarian border an oil pipeline that was to be built from a Yugoslav seaport and 
to transport crude oil from the Yugoslav seaport to the Hungarian border. The Hungarian state 
enterprise undertook to use, as oil importer, the services of the Yugoslav pipeline enterprise 
on a long term basis and to have the stipulated quantities of crude oil transported by the 
pipeline within stipulated time limits and for the stipulated fee. A dispute arose between the 
parties, and the Yugoslav pipeline enterprise brought a claim for penalties, since much smaller 
quantities of crude oil than stipulated were transported. As a defense the Hungarian state 
enterprise invoked change of circumstances because of the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war, 
claiming that there was a general deterioration on the oil market, which resulted in a 
restriction of oil consumption and thereby also of transportation.
1729
 The ad hoc arbitral 
tribunal considered the reasoning of the Swiss Federal Court, which held in a decision of 
September 18, 1981 that “In long-term contracts the parties must reckon with the fact that 
circumstances which existed at the time of contract formation can subsequently change. If 
they explicitly or obviously (sinngemäss) refrain from excluding the influence of such 
changes on their mutual contractual obligations, then it corresponds to the essence of the 
contract that it must be fulfilled the way it has been concluded. In this case, each party must 
basically bear the risks stemming from changed circumstances.” The tribunal considered that 
the shortage on the crude oil market and the rise in oil prices were foreseeable at the time of 
contracting. On the basis of the contractually established equilibrium between the parties, the 
tribunal concluded that it cannot supplement the contract with implied terms, which would let 
only one contracting party feel the consequences of changed circumstances.
1730
  
On the other hand, in ICC Case No 10346, the arbitral tribunal found, on the basis of the 
contract, the applicable national law and the UNIDROIT Principles, an implied duty of 
renegotiation, as an instance of cooperation between the parties, to revise their contract for 
obtaining the public registration, which was required for the enforceability of the contract. 
The claimant, a Colombian company, and the defendant, another Colombian company, 
entered into a contract, under which the claimant was to sell electrical energy to the 
defendant, so that the latter could ensure the public supply of electricity in a part of Colombia. 
However, the agreement was never performed as the contract was not registered with the 
Sistema de Información Comercial (SIC), and the claimant initiated arbitration proceedings 
against the defendant for breach of contract. The contract only made reference to the 
obligation to register in clause 18 when, in an impersonal way, it provided: “This contract 
shall be deemed to be perfected by the duly legalized signatures of the parties, but to be 
enforceable it requires registration with the SIC.”1731 The defendant contended that the 
contract was null and void for lack of registration. The contract contained a choice of law 
clause in favor of Colombian law, and the arbitral tribunal decided to apply Colombian law as 
well as the provisions of the contract and the relevant trade usages in accordance with Article 
17.2 of the ICC Rules of Arbitration.  
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The tribunal observed that the final efficacy of the contract was subject to a condition whose 
performance depended on positive joint action by the parties, namely the amendment of the 
corresponding terms of the agreement, in view of the position taken by the director of the 
public registry. According to the tribunal, the registration was not an essential part or 
prerequisite of validity, nor even a procedure to publicize the contract, but rather, an 
administrative requirement for its enforcement. The tribunal interpreted the clause 18 of the 
contract to the effect that the registration was a joint task of the parties, in line with Article 
871 of the Colombian Commercial Code and, “with the so-called "duty to collaborate" which 
is a rule of conduct that is clearly a "responsibility" which is discharged by the performance 
of the necessary acts, and whose omission, depending on the circumstances, may simply mean 
that the party concerned cannot attribute to the other party the adverse consequences of the 
omission and, therefore, claim breaches against that party which are only attributable to the 
party concerned itself.” The tribunal also referred to Article 5.1.3 of the UNIDROIT 
Principles, which provides the general principle of the duty of cooperation between the 
parties.
1732
According to the tribunal, there was the unquestionable and clear duty, at the root 
of the relationship between the parties, in the first instance, by reason of their own interest, 
but at the same time by reason of a real obligation towards the other party, to do everything in 
their power to adjust the provisions of the contract to the requirements of the resolutions of 
the Energy and Gas Regulation Commission and the director of the SIC, in view of the fact 
that if this step was not taken, all possibility of the performance of the contract was blocked, 
giving rise to the obligation to make full compensation.
1733
 The tribunal found that the 
claimant clearly tried to obtain registration of the contract in the SIC and did everything 
within its power, but the defendant had not performed the duty to collaborate that it was 
obliged to exercise jointly with the claimant in order to adjust the provisions of the contract to 
the requirements of the public authority thereby obtaining the registration of the contract.
1734
  
When there is a duty to negotiate, the arbitral tribunals generally hold that the parties are not 
obliged to agree, which would involve unreasonable costs on the part of the parties, but the 
negotiations must be conducted in good faith, particularly in a cooperative manner. In the 
Aminoil award, the tribunal stated with regard to a renegotiation clause that “The question 
here involved - one of those that are central to the present litigation - is a difficult one, known 
to all legal systems. An obligation to negotiate is not an obligation to agree. Yet the obligation 
to negotiate is not devoid of content, and when it exists within a well-defined juridical 
framework it can well involve fairly precise requirements.”1735 In this regard, the tribunal 
stated later in the award that “the general principles that ought to be observed in carrying out 
an obligation to negotiate, - that is to say, good faith as properly to be understood,” require 
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“sustained upkeep of the negotiations over a period appropriate to the circumstances; 
awareness of the interests of the other party; and a persevering quest for an acceptable 
compromise.”1736   
In the Wintershall v. Qatar case, the ad hoc tribunal interpreted Qatar’s obligations of 
cooperation in the form of notification and negotiation under the Exploration and Production 
Sharing Agreement (EPSA), to the effect that they required an extension of the performance 
periods applicable to Wintershall to exercise its contractual rights. According to the EPSA, 
Wintershall obtained a 30-year exclusive right to explore, drill and produce petroleum in the 
Contract Area in 1976. Wintershall was required to relinquish 50% of the Contract Area after 
five years, and another 20% after eight years. If neither “Crude Oil in Commercial Quantities” 
nor “economically-utilizable non-associated Natural Gas” were found within eight years, 
Qatar was entitled to terminate the EPSA. If non-associated natural gas were discovered, 
Wintershall was permitted to produce it either pursuant to further contractual arrangements to 
be mutually agreed, or by exercising the "go it alone" option set out in EPSA. Wintershall 
never discovered crude oil in commercial quantities. However, because of a boundary dispute 
with Bahrain, the Emir instructed Wintershall not to drill in the Structure A area, which was 
regarded by Wintershall as the area most likely to contain crude oil. The Emir advised 
Wintershall that an extension of the exploration period would be studied by Qatar. In 1980, 
Wintershall notified Qatar of its discovery within the Contract Area of non-associated natural 
gas in substantial quantities, which it believed to be economical. Qatar and Wintershall 
considered several projects for the use of natural gas from the Contract Area as well as natural 
gas from an adjacent area in which a wholly-owned corporation of the Government of Qatar 
held the petroleum rights. No agreement was ever reached for projects in either of these areas. 
During the course of the discussions concerning those projects, Qatar sent Wintershall a telex 
informing that “the term of [EPSA] expired on 18th day of June 1985”, and “accordingly, this 
agreement is terminated with effect from this date.” However, neither party treated the EPSA 
expired or terminated. Wintershall did not relinquish any more of the Contract Area, paid the 
annual rental fee and continued to assert rights under the EPSA, while Qatar did not require 
relinquishment by Wintershall, accepted the annual rental fee and maintained that EPSA 
continued in existence. Wintershall, and other claimants with an interest in the EPSA, invoked 
the arbitration clause and claimed that Qatar breached the EPSA, by denying permission to 
explore the Structure A area, and by failing to agree on further contractual arrangements for 
the use of the non-associated natural gas.
1737
 
The tribunal determined that the law of Qatar was the governing substantive law. The tribunal 
found that there was neither breach by Qatar of the EPSA nor expropriation by Qatar of the 
claimants’ contractual rights and economic interest under the EPSA, including the claimants’ 
alleged loss of rights in respect of the Structure A area.
1738
 According to the tribunal, the 
Government had no duty to agree to further contractual arrangements for the utilization of the 
non-associated natural gas in the Contract Area. The tribunal held that the duty to negotiate in 
good faith does not include an obligation on the part of the defendant to reach agreement with 
respect to the proposals made by the claimants and, to the extent that there was a duty to 
negotiate under Qatari law, the tribunal found that the refusal by the defendant to accept 
proposals by the claimants was made in good faith and justified by normal commercial 
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practice.
1739
 With respect to the natural gas project proposed for the adjacent area, the tribunal 
considered that claimants’ rights under the EPSA did not extend outside the Contract Area, so 
that claimants’ proposals were no more than mere offers, and their acceptance by Qatar was 
not required. According to the tribunal, the Government did not agree to any plan or project 
for the joint development of the adjacent area, and Qatar had no legal duty to unitize the area 
or to accept claimants’ proposals for joint development.1740 
The tribunal considered that the refusal by the Government to permit exploration in Structure 
A Area was not a violation of the claimants’ contractual rights under the EPSA, as the 
Government was expressly authorized to limit the claimants’ operations under the EPSA. 
However, the government failed to advise the claimants of its dispute with Bahrain regarding 
this area prior to the signing of EPSA.
1741
 According to the tribunal, the application of the 
relinquishment provisions of the EPSA to the Structure A area under these conditions would 
result in an unduly harsh application of the EPSA provisions. The tribunal noted that, in 
effect, the Emir indicated that a harsh application of the relinquishment provisions would not 
at that time be insisted upon by the defendant. Thus, the tribunal declared that, in order for the 
claimants to exercise their rights under the EPSA in respect of this area, the relinquishment 
provisions would apply to Structure A area only from the date that the claimants are permitted 
to exploit this area under the EPSA provisions.
1742
 The tribunal also held that there was no 
misrepresentation by the defendant as to the Structure A area. However, in view of the 
defendant’s failure to disclose to the claimants the details regarding its dispute with Bahrain 
regarding this area, the tribunal concluded that the parties did not intend to apply, and that it 
would be inequitable to interpret as applicable, the relinquishment provisions of the EPSA to 
the Structure A area until the claimants are permitted by the defendant to develop the 
Structure A area under the EPSA Provisions.
1743
 The tribunal declared that the EPSA 
remained in force, as the defendant did not exercise its right to terminate and interpreted the 
telex of the Government as a notice that relinquishment was required rather than 
termination.
1744
 
The tribunal also declared that the relinquishment provisions of the EPSA were extended on 
the basis of its interpretation of the obligations of the parties under the EPSA. Referring to 
Article 49 of the Qatari Civil and Commercial Code, which provided that a contract shall be 
performed in accordance with its contents and in a manner consistent with the dictates of good 
faith, and it shall not only bind a contracting party to the content thereof, but it shall also 
extend to all its requirements in compliance with law, usage and equity depending on the 
nature of the obligation, the tribunal concluded that an appropriate and equitable interpretation 
of the Government’s obligations under the EPSA required an extension of the performance 
periods applicable to the claimants if they exercise their “go it alone” option or their rights to 
exploit the Structure A area, as well as the defendant’s obligations under the EPSA to 
cooperate in the exercise of these rights of the claimants.
1745
 The tribunal determined that to 
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give effect to the intention of the parties that the claimants would be entitled to a realistic 
opportunity to exercise “go it alone” option, there must be a term in which those rights may 
be exercised, and concluded that the selection of an eight-year term was a reasonable 
application of the tribunal’s duty under Qatari law to construe the meaning of the contract in 
good faith.
1746
 The tribunal considered that the claimants were justified in assuming that the 
conclusion of a joint venture in the Government’s area was probable. Although, such an 
assumption by the claimants would not require the Government to enter into a joint venture in 
the Government area, the failure of the Government effectively to terminate this possibility 
prevented the claimants from taking full advantage of the “go it alone” option and, 
accordingly, the tribunal felt that a proper and equitable interpretation of the “go it alone” 
option required the extension of the term for exercising this option.
1747
 Thus, the tribunal held 
that, under the EPSA as it remained in force, the time for relinquishment of the 50 percent of 
the Contract Area still held by the claimants, if not in production, was extended to eight years 
from the date of the final award for the purpose of permitting the exercise by the claimants of 
their “go it alone” option, and that, if this option is exercised by the claimants, both the 
claimants and the defendant should perform their obligations as provided in the EPSA in good 
faith in accordance with Article 49 of the Qatari Code.
1748
  
In his separate opinion, Ian Brownlie, a member of the tribunal, did not consider that the 
remedial conclusions in the decision of the Tribunal in relation to Structure A had an adequate 
legal basis.
1749
 He noted that the approach to remedies adopted by the tribunal derived from 
the conclusion that the relinquishment provisions of the EPSA applied to Structure A only 
from the date the claimants were permitted to exploit this area under the EPSA provisions. He 
agreed with the conclusion, but only on the basis of the waiver by the conduct of the 
Government of the literal application of the relinquishment provisions of the EPSA. He did 
not agree with the proposition of the majority that the Government was under an obligation to 
inform Wintershall about the disputes concerning the Structure A area, by referring to the risk 
allocation agreed by the parties and the corresponding obligation of Wintershall to perform 
reasonable diligence in seeking out information. He stated that “Given the reasonably clear 
provisions of [the EPSA], the Government was not placed under a duty to inform the 
claimants about disputes. It is a matter for the appreciation of the Government whether to 
exercise the power to lay down operating limits within the Contract Area. In any event, the 
evidence shows that the Government made no effort to conceal the facts and, further, that the 
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material facts could have been discovered by means of a very simple process of inquiry and 
research.”1750 Thus, he concluded that “the decision of the Tribunal that the relinquishment 
provisions of the EPSA apply to Structure A ‘only from the date the claimants are permitted 
to exploit this area under the EPSA provisions’ is not supportable on the basis of the 
application of the EPSA and therefore can be justified exclusively on the basis of the conduct 
of the Government in not seeking to apply the relinquishment provisions in respect of 
structure A.”1751 In response, other members of the tribunal stated that “Professor Brownlie’s 
interpretation of … the EPSA is inequitable, for under his own reasoning, any reservation by 
the Respondent … could be applied at any point in time and, in effect, negate the entire 
agreement; whereas, in our opinion, if in fact the Government exercised its discretion not to 
inform claimants about disputes, the Tribunal could not in all equity at a later date apply the 
relinquishment provisions of EPSA strictly.”1752  
Professor Brownlie also noted that “The date at which the dispute affecting Structure A will 
be resolved is unknown, and it is common experience that disputes concerning title may take 
many years to settle…. [and] the remedy proposed would present the very elements of 
uncertainty and complication”. He expressed his opinion that “the appropriate remedy in 
accordance with the provisions of Articles 86 and 99 of the Qatari code would be the payment 
of equitable compensation”.1753 Other members of the tribunal stated that, as the value of the 
claimants’ rights under the EPSA was dependent on the discovery of oil in the Structure A 
area, specific performance would be a more equitable remedy than the equitable 
compensation, which would presumably assume such discovery. They pointed out that should 
the tribunal order payment, such payment, dependent as it would be on a finding of oil, would 
be an unjust enrichment in good faith of the creditor. The majority indicated that both parties 
could elect to value at the present time this right, and reach a settlement, appropriate under the 
circumstances, but if the claimants did not have the right in the alternative to require specific 
performance, a cash valuation at this time would not reflect the true value of the claimants’ 
rights under the EPSA in the Structure A area.
1754
 
It appears from the facts stated in the award that under the specific allocations of contractual 
rights, obligations and risks agreed by the parties, the Government was entitled to limit 
Wintershall’s operations under the EPSA, Wintershall was permitted to produce natural gas in 
the Contract Area either pursuant to further contractual arrangements to be mutually agreed, 
or by exercising the "go it alone" option, the Government was under no obligation to inform 
Wintershall of disputes concerning Structure A area, and the relevant information was fairly 
accessible for Wintershall. In this context, the tribunal decided to extend the relinquishment 
periods of the EPSA, on the grounds that the failure of the Government to inform Wintershall 
of territorial disputes prevented Wintershall from exercising its rights under the EPSA in 
respect of Structure A area, and the failure of the Government effectively to terminate the 
negotiations relating to the natural gas project prevented the claimants from taking full 
advantage of the “go it alone” option.  
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The Government’s subsequent conduct, namely the statements and the general treatment of 
the agreement as effective even if it was terminated, created the expectation of Wintershall 
about the possible extensions in the exploration periods in relation to Structure A area due to 
the territorial dispute. By its subsequent conduct, the Government can be considered as having 
undertaken to cooperate with Wintershall through further negotiations in finding a solution 
with regard to the exploitation of Structure A area with Wintershall. However, as 
acknowledged by the tribunal, the Government cannot be considered as in breach of its 
obligation to negotiate relating to a joint venture for the use of natural gas from the Contract 
Area. In fact, Wintershall was prevented from taking full advantage of the “go it alone” option 
as a result of its own choice under the EPSA, which permitted Wintershall to produce either 
pursuant to further contractual arrangements to be mutually agreed, or by exercising the "go it 
alone" option. Thus, it seems unclear how the Government was able to breach the EPSA, 
while complying with its duty to negotiate in good faith without being obliged to agree, 
merely by failing to terminate the negotiations, which were initiated as a result of 
Wintershall’s choice and not the Government’s. Apparently, the tribunal, merely on the basis 
of abstract considerations of equity, implied a residual obligation for the Government to 
terminate those negotiations after an uncertain amount of time, as an element of its duty of 
negotiation, to enable Wintershall to exercise its “go it alone” option. 
Under its reasoning, the tribunal felt itself competent to substantially adjust the terms of the 
contract between the parties through equitable considerations, and its conclusions resembled 
an estimate of the decision maker as to an agreement that the parties would have reached had 
they renegotiated the contract to find an acceptable solution for Structure A area, and for 
extending the contractual periods to entitle Winterhshall to a realistic opportunity to exercise 
“go it alone” option in relation to the natural gas project. The tribunal’s conclusions could 
have more accurately reflected the reasonable expectations of the parties, had it ruled that the 
Government was only in breach of a duty to negotiate, which arose from its subsequent 
conduct, to find an acceptable solution for Structure A area. Subsequently, rather than 
imposing the speculative outcome of such negotiations that had not taken place on the parties 
through specific performance on the basis of the principle of good faith under Qatari law, the 
tribunal could have held that the Government failed to perform its duty to negotiate arising 
from its subsequent conduct due to its delay in initiating those negotiations, and thus became 
liable for compensating the damages of Wintershall. Given that the Government was not 
bound to agree to the extension of exploration or relinquishment periods, the order of specific 
performance in the form of extending those periods seems inappropriate, since it forced the 
tribunal to indirectly yet actively to restructure the agreement in contravention to the idea of 
reasonableness of the costs of implied duties of cooperation, which should have been 
determined through a contextual approach that takes into account the underlying bargain and 
the specific contractual rights, obligations and risk allocations.  
3. Concluding Remarks 
The general idea underlying the duty of each party to cooperate in the performance of the 
contract, which is most strongly asserted in the national legal systems of the civil law 
countries, is that an individual who engages in a contractual relationship must deal with its 
partner in a frank and loyal manner, as required by the principle of good faith. Similarly, 
under lex mercatoria, the conditions and degree of cooperation between the parties are 
determined on the basis of the basic principle good faith and fair dealing. However, given the 
significance of the parties’ knowledge of particular circumstances of time and place in the 
order of international commerce, which is given effect to by the basic principles of freedom of 
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contract and pacta sunt servanda, the implication of duties of cooperation under the basic 
principle of good faith and fair dealing should not disregard the specific contractual rights and 
obligations, as articulated by the parties, which indicate the limits and allocation of costs of 
cooperation that is required by residual rights and obligations according to the reasonable 
expectations of the parties to a particular contract.   
The duty to cooperate under lex mercatoria appears as a general implied term covering many 
instances of good faith duties, enabling the decision maker to exercise an abstract reasoning 
that forms the basis of his specialized consolidations about the required cooperative behavior 
of parties in a particular case. This general duty to cooperate may be specified as the duty to 
inform the other party at various events or stages of the contract, the duty to take measures in 
order to prevent or limit the effects of an event, and to mitigate any loss which may be caused 
by it, the duty to negotiate with the other party in good faith in order to adapt the contract to 
certain circumstances, the duty to allow the other party to check books on which payments 
must be computed, the duty to obtain certain authorizations, duty to keep certain information 
confidential, the duty not to compete with the contractual partner or solicit its employees. 
Those specific duties mainly arise from the abstract considerations of the closer confidence 
generated between the parties throughout the contractual relationship, the successful 
performance of contractual obligations, and the purpose of the contract. 
 
In supplementing the contract with duties of cooperation, the decision maker applying lex 
mercatoria should adopt a contextual approach in evaluating the required behavior from the 
parties to a particular contract in order not to disturb the contractual equilibrium. The 
supplementing rule must enable the correspondence of expectations of the parties under the 
circumstances, and the costs of cooperation required by that rule must be reasonable and 
appropriate for the underlying bargain, purpose and nature of the transaction. When the 
parties may not be able to provide contractual clauses for each instance of required 
cooperation, the decision maker at the enforcement stage deals with the resulting legal 
uncertainty by supplementing the contract with such duties to cooperate that allocate the 
residual obligations in accordance with the underlying bargain and the established rules 
discovered through the basic principle of good faith and fair dealing. Under lex mercatoria, 
the knowledge of the established rules indicating the required cooperation is brought to bear 
on the allocational ex post decision, given that the principle of good faith and fair dealing 
ultimately relates to the capacity of the contracting parties to adapt their conduct both to the 
particular facts which they know and to other facts they are presumed to know tacitly through 
abstractions. The principle of good faith and fair dealing requires the ex post decision maker 
to mentally reconstruct this tacit knowledge of the parties through a contextual approach and 
to tell them what ought to have guided their expectations by revealing the established rules of 
cooperation in the particular circumstances which they ought to have known and which 
become applicable as a result of the conclusion of their particular contract.  
 
Such tacit knowledge can convert incomplete knowledge, which inheres in the facts of the 
case and the articulated rules, into a workable format. On that basis, the decision maker will 
be able to determine the degree of cooperation expected from each of the parties and the 
content of the required cooperative behavior in accordance with their reasonable expectations. 
However, the decision maker applying lex mercatoria should not solely rely on the abstract 
concept of good faith in supplementing the contract with various duties of cooperation, in a 
manner similar to an amiable composituer or arbitrator in equity, which runs the risk of 
exceeding his scope of delegation in the control of legal uncertainty. Under lex mercatoria, 
the allocation of residual contractual obligations under the considerations of the costs of 
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cooperation may lead to the impression of “splitting the difference” in some cases, where the 
extent of a party’s duty of cooperation is limited by the other’s corresponding duty of 
diligence. However, what motivates the abstract reasoning under lex mercatoria will not be 
the illusory aim of satisfying both parties by giving something to both parties, but the concern 
for accuracy in giving effect to the reasonable expectations of the parties by the decision 
maker’s exercise of equity infra legem in the residual allocations of risks and obligations, as 
authorized by the articulated or established rules in the particular case. 
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ii. Duty to Achieve a Certain Result and Duty of Best Efforts 
 
Under lex mercatoria, the issues regarding the liability for non-performance, such as 
conditions of liability and burden of proof, depend on the articulated rules as agreed by the 
parties in their contractual clauses and the rules of a national law chosen by the parties to 
govern the substance of the dispute, pursuant to the basic principles of pacta sunt servanda 
and freedom of contract. However, the way the parties articulate the contractual obligations in 
the contract may override the default rules of the chosen national law as to the contractual 
liability. The interpretation of contract may indicate the regime of contractual liability in the 
particular case. The decision maker should look into the common intentions of the parties 
with the aid of, where necessary, extrinsic factors and interpretative presumptions in order to 
ascertain the intensity of contractual obligations, as articulated by the parties, pursuant to the 
basic principle of good faith and fair dealing. These considerations will lead the decision 
maker either to determine that the obligation in question is an undertaking to achieve a certain 
result, or an undertaking of best efforts, and such a characterization may resolve many 
questions relating to liability for non-performance. The same considerations are also relevant 
to the supplementation of the contract with individualized terms in the ascertainment of the 
content of contract, which precede the application of the default rules provided for an internal 
order of an organization, even if the supplementation of the contract with such terms is to be 
made on the basis of those default rules. In supplementing the contract with individualized 
terms under lex mercatoria, the decision maker should consider the intensity of the residual 
contractual obligations through a contextual approach. This approach enables the decision 
maker to determine the conditions of contractual liability as well as the burden of proof under 
lex mercatoria, in accordance with the reasonable expectations of the parties. 
 
1. Sources of Abstractions 
a. National Laws 
 
The general assumption under common law systems is that there is no requirement of fault for 
establishing contractual liability. Thus, in England, it was held that “in relation to a claim for 
damages for breach of contract it is, in general, immaterial why the defendant failed to fulfill 
his obligations and certainly no reference to plead that he had done his best.”1755 Similarly, in 
the US, there is no reference to fault in the definition of breach given in Section 235 (2) of the 
Restatement Second Contracts, which provides that “When performance of a duty under a 
contract is due any non-performance is a breach.” It is stated that the US contract law is, “in 
its essential design, a law of strict liability, and the accompanying system of remedies 
operates without regard to fault.”1756  
 
As common law considers the contract predominantly as a means for risk allocation, the 
contractual liability arises where, under the contract, a party has taken the risk of certain 
events, and the relevant risk materializes, even if those events are beyond his control and 
occur without his fault. Nonetheless, the liability under common law is not absolute but only 
strict. It does not depend on fault, but it is subject to the doctrine of supervening impossibility 
or frustration.
1757
 Moreover, this general principle of strict liability is subject to significant 
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exceptions, in which fault becomes an element of contractual liability. For instance, the party 
is only under a duty of diligence, when he has to make arrangements or to obtain an approval 
in order to bring about the occurrence of a condition, on which the principal obligations 
depend. In these cases, the party under obligation is not liable if, in spite of making reasonable 
efforts, he fails to bring about the specified event.
1758
  
 
Another exception to the strict liability regime under common law arises in the field of the 
contracts for the provision of services where, both strict liability and liability based on fault 
are recognized. For instance, the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that “Architects, doctors, 
engineers, attorneys, and others deal in somewhat inexact sciences and are continually called 
upon to exercise their skilled judgment in order to anticipate and provide for random factors 
which are incapable of precise measurement. The indeterminable nature of these factors 
makes it impossible for professional service people to gauge them with complete accuracy in 
every instance . . . . Because of the inescapable possibility of error which inheres in these 
services, the law has traditionally required, not perfect results, but rather the exercise of that 
skill and judgment which can reasonably be expected from similarly situated professionals.” 
1759
 On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Kansas pointed out that the “work performed by 
architects and engineers is an exact science; that performed by doctors and lawyers is not,” so 
one “who contracts with an architect or engineer for a building of a certain size and elevation 
has a right to expect an exact result.”1760  
 
In English law, Section 13 of the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 provides that a 
person who supplies a service in the course of a business impliedly undertakes to carry out the 
service with reasonable care and skill. For instance, the standard for construction contracts 
with regard to the contractor’s obligation of carrying out of the work is one of care.1761 
Mainly, the contractor’s obligation is to execute and complete the works and remedy any 
defects therein, in conformity with the provisions of the contract. As far as this obligation 
relates to the supervision of the supply of works and materials by others, the contractor is 
expected to exercise a reasonable degree of professional care and skill. However, Section 16 
(3) (a) provides that nothing in this part of the Act prejudices any rule of law which imposes 
on the supplier of services a duty stricter than that imposed by Section 13. Under common 
law, if the contractor undertakes obligations relating to the design of the works, the standard 
of liability becomes strict. The expectation of the parties in such cases is that the contractor’s 
design will serve the agreed or contemplated purpose, not merely that he will take reasonable 
care to do so. In general, where the other party makes known the result that he desires the 
service to achieve, there is an implied warranty under English law that the services are of such 
nature that they might reasonably be expected to achieve the result. This is strict liability, 
since the other party bargains not for skill but for an end-result, and the duty to achieve that 
result is not performed merely by exercising due care and skill.
1762
  
 
Under the contractual liability regime of common law systems, the party under an obligation 
to perform is, in principle, considered as guaranteeing the result and has to achieve the result 
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of such performance. Such a party may protect himself from the strict liability regime by 
expressly contracting “best efforts” clauses. In the introductory note to Chapter 11 of 
Restatement Second Contracts, it is stated that “Contract liability is strict liability. It is an 
accepted maxim that pacta sunt servanda, contracts are to be kept. The obligor is therefore 
liable in damages for breach of contract even if he is without fault… The obligor who does 
not wish to undertake so extensive an obligation may contract for a lesser one by using one of 
a variety of common clauses: he may agree only to use his “best efforts”.”1763 The contracting 
practice in common law jurisdictions reflects an attempt of drafters to expressly regulate the 
element of fault in establishing contractual liability through “best effort” clauses and their 
variants thereby broadening the scope of fault under the default liability regime.  
 
In both England and the US, there are various judicial decisions in relation to the concept of 
“best efforts” and its variants: the tendency being to prefer “best endeavors” in England and 
“best efforts” in the US.1764 Under common law, although the judges traditionally start their 
examination of the meaning of a word or phrase with their objective and natural meaning, 
they have not been able to use such a literal approach without difficulty in the cases of “best 
endeavors”.1765 This is mainly because of the uncertain nature of the standard, which was 
criticized by Goff J. in the case Bower v Bantam Investments Ltd., who stated that, “I ask 
myself, could anything be less specific or more uncertain? There is absolutely no criterion by 
which best endeavors and practicability are to be judged.”1766 
 
Under English law, the leading authority with regard to “best endeavors” clauses is the 
decision of Sheffield District Railway Co. v Great Central Railway Co. from 1911. The 
decision reflects the general attitude of courts to adopt a literal approach as far as possible, 
and to consider the promisor’s commercial interests in determining the limits of the duty. In 
Sheffield District Railway Co. v Great Central Railway Co., the court had to consider an 
agreement that required Great Central Railway Company to use their best endeavors to 
develop the through and local traffic of Sheffield Railway, which it was alleged that they had 
failed to do. The court stated that “We think "best endeavors" means what the words say; they 
do not mean second-best endeavors. We quite agree with the argument … that they cannot be 
construed to mean that the Great Central must give half or any specific proportion of its trade 
to the Sheffield District. They do not mean that the Great Central must so conduct its business 
as to offend its traders and drive them to competing routes. They do not mean that the limits 
of reason must be overstepped with regard to the cost of the service; but short of these 
qualifications the words mean that the Great Central Company must, broadly speaking, leave 
no stone unturned to develop traffic on the Sheffield District line.” 1767 
 
In the case of IBM United Kingdom Ltd v Rockware Glass Ltd, the contract contained a 
clause requiring the purchaser to use its best endeavors to obtain planning permission. 
Buckley L.J. from the Court of Appeal stated that “in the absence of any context indicating to 
the contrary, this should be understood to mean that the purchaser is to do all he reasonably 
can to ensure that the planning permission is granted. If it were refused by the Local Planning 
                                                 
1763
 Restatement (Second) of Contracts ch. 11, introductory note (1981). 
1764
 Fontaine, Marcel & Filip De Ly, Drafting International Contracts: An Analysis of Contract Clauses, Brill 
Academic Publishers, 2009, at 208 
1765
 Varcoe-Cocks, M.D., Best Endeavours, The Law Society’s Gazette, (1986), at 1992 
1766
  [1972] 3 All ER 349 at 355 
1767
 (1911) 27 TLR 451 
 510 
 
Authority, and if an appeal to the Secretary of State would have a reasonable chance of 
success, it could not, in my opinion, be said that he had "used his best endeavors" to obtain 
the planning permission if he failed to appeal . . . I cannot find . . . any context which satisfies 
me that the words "use its best endeavors to obtain consent" could be construed otherwise 
than in accordance with what I take to be their clear, primary and natural meaning.”1768 In 
Midland Land Reclamation Ltd v Warren Energy Ltd, Bowsher J., delivering the judgment, 
held that the “best endeavors” obligation was not the next best thing to an absolute obligation 
or guarantee, but it “must at least be construed in the light of the art as it developed from time 
to time during the life of the contract”. He stated that “To be satisfied of a breach of a "best 
endeavours" clause by one party or the other, I would wish to hear evidence that in the light of 
the knowledge available at the time of the alleged default the party alleged to be in default 
was culpable.”1769 
 
Under a literal interpretation, the difference in language of the clauses suggests that the terms 
“reasonable endeavors” and “best endeavors” should have different meanings. However, in 
the case law of England, the difference is not perfectly clear as the decided cases suggest that 
it is simply a matter of degree, in the sense of the extent or number of the measures that have 
to be attempted by the party undertaking the obligations of such endeavors. In Overseas 
Buyers Ltd v Granadex SA, Mustill J. was doubtful that there was a difference between 
reasonable endeavors and best endeavors. He observed that “Perhaps the words "best 
endeavors" in a statute or contract mean something different from doing all that can 
reasonably be expected -- although I cannot think what the difference might be...”1770 In Pips 
(Leisure Productions) Ltd v Walton, the distinction between reasonable and best endeavors 
was also unclear in the statement that “I would construe a contract by the parties to ‘use their 
best endeavors’ to complete a purchase by a given date to mean what it says. ‘Best endeavors’ 
are something less than efforts which go beyond the bounds of reason, but are considerably 
more than casual and intermittent activities. There must at least be the doing of all that 
reasonable persons reasonably could do in the circumstances.”1771 On the other hand, Rougier 
J., in UBH (Mechanical Services) v Standard Life, appeared to consider that an obligation to 
use reasonable endeavors was less stringent than an obligation to use best endeavors and 
stated “that the phrase "all reasonable endeavors" probably lies somewhere between the two, 
implying something more than "reasonable" but less than "best" endeavors.” 1772 Similarly, 
Kim Lewison QC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, in Jolley v Carmel Limited, 
recognized that there was a spectrum of varying obligations where best and reasonable 
endeavors are at opposite ends, and “all reasonable endeavors” at somewhere in the 
middle.
1773
 More recently, in Yewbelle v London Green Developments, it was held that the 
obligation to use all reasonable endeavors required the party to go on using reasonable 
endeavors until the point had been reached when all reasonable endeavors have been 
exhausted, and to go on would be mere repetition, but the party was not required to sacrifice 
its own commercial interests.
1774
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In the case of Rhodia International Holdings Ltd v Huntsman International LLC, Rhodia had 
agreed to sell a chemical manufacturing business to a subsidiary of Huntsman. The sale 
agreement contained provisions governing the manner in which the parties agreed to transfer 
and novate a number of contracts from the seller to the purchaser. The agreement provided 
that both parties were obliged to use reasonable endeavors to obtain the consent of any third 
parties to the novation of their contracts to Huntsman, that Huntsman would supply to those 
third parties such information reasonably requested, including information about the financial 
position of its group, and that Huntsman would provide a parent company guarantee if 
reasonably requested by those third parties. One of the contracts to be transferred was an 
energy supply contract that Rhodia was a party to with Cogen. Pending consent, Cogen raised 
concerns over the financial position of Huntsman's subsidiary and sought a parent guarantee 
from Huntsman. Huntsman refused to give the guarantee and gave notice to Rhodia that the 
relevant agreement was to be excluded from the sale and purchase of the business. Julian 
Flaux QC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, considered that, “where the contract actually 
specifies certain steps have to be taken (as here the provision of a direct covenant if so 
required) as part of the exercise of reasonable endeavors, those steps will have to be taken, 
even if that could on one view be said to involve the sacrificing of a party's commercial 
interests”. 1775 Thus, he held that Huntsman was in breach of its obligations to use its 
reasonable endeavors to obtain the consent of Cogen, even if giving the guarantee would be 
sacrificing its own commercial interests. Although not relevant to the actual decision in the 
case, Julian Flaux QC also commented upon the difference between best and reasonable 
endeavors. He held that, “in so far as it was necessary to decide the point,… an obligation to 
use reasonable endeavors is less stringent than one to use best endeavors.” He rejected the 
argument that they mean the same thing and stated that “As a matter of language and business 
common sense, untrammeled by authority, one would surely conclude that they did not. This 
is because there may be a number of reasonable courses which could be taken in a given 
situation to achieve a particular aim. An obligation to use reasonable endeavors to achieve the 
aim probably only requires a party to take one reasonable course, not all of them, whereas an 
obligation to use best endeavors probably requires a party to take all the reasonable courses he 
can.” He also doubted that an obligation to use “all reasonable endeavors” was any different 
to an obligation to use “best endeavors”, and stated that “In that context, it may well be that 
an obligation to use all reasonable endeavors equates with using best endeavors and it seems 
to me that is essentially what Mustill J is saying in the Overseas Buyers case.” 1776  
 
Under common law, the duty of reasonable endeavors has also been considered by the Privy 
Council in supplementing the contract with implied terms in the case of Queensland 
Electricity Generating Board v New Hope Collieries Pty Ltd.
1777
 The case concerned a 15-
year coal supply contract between the Collieries and the Electricity Board. The price was 
agreed for the first 5 years with the agreement containing base prices, which were adjustable 
by reference to “escalation” and “price variation” provisions. For sales and purchases after the 
first 5 years, the general terms of the agreement were to continue but the base price and the 
price variation provisions were to be agreed by the parties. The agreement contained a 
comprehensive arbitration clause for the resolution of disputes or differences. It was argued 
by the Electricity Board that, after the first 5 years, the agreement constituted an 
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unenforceable “agreement to agree”. The argument was rejected by the Privy Council. In 
delivering the opinion of the Privy Council, Sir Robin Cooke noted that the terms of the 
agreement indicated that it was intended by the parties to have legal effect for more than the 
first 5 years. He stated that “What other reasons could there be for making such elaborate 
provisions, emphasizing its long-term nature? At the present day in cases where the parties 
have agreed on an arbitration or valuation clause in wide enough terms, the courts accord full 
weight to their manifest intention to create continuing legal relations. Arguments invoking 
alleged uncertainty, or alleged inadequacy in the machinery available to the courts for making 
contractual rights effective, exert minimal attraction… In accordance with the approach 
adopted in those cases, their Lordships have no doubt that here, by the agreement, the parties 
undertook implied primary obligations to make reasonable endeavors to agree on terms of 
supply beyond the initial five-year period and, failing agreement and upon proper notice, to 
do everything reasonably necessary to procure the appointment of an arbitrator. Further, it is 
implicit in a commercial agreement of this kind that the terms of the new price structure are to 
be fair and reasonable as between the parties.” 1778  
 
This decision seems difficult to reconcile with the decision of the House of Lords in Walford 
v. Miles, which refused to imply a term that the parties would negotiate in good faith.
1779
 The 
difference between an obligation to use “reasonable endeavors” to reach an agreement and an 
obligation to negotiate in good faith is not clear and the decision in Queensland Electricity 
was not mentioned in Walford. Nevertheless, the House of Lords stated in Walford decision 
that “The reason why an agreement to negotiate, like an agreement to agree, is unenforceable 
is simply because it lacks the necessary certainty. The same does not apply to an agreement to 
use best endeavors.” 1780 In the case Little v Courage Ltd, the Court of Appeal attempted to 
clarify this issue.
1781
 Millett LJ, who delivered the judgment of the Court, stated that unlike 
some systems of law, English law does not recognize a pre-contractual duty to negotiate in 
good faith, and will neither enforce such duty when it is expressly agreed nor imply it when it 
is not.
1782
 He pointed out that, in Walford decision, the reference to sufficient certainty in 
relation to best endeavors was too loosely expressed. He held that “An undertaking to use 
one’s best endeavors to obtain planning permission or an export license is sufficiently certain 
and is capable of being enforced: an undertaking to use one’s best endeavors to agree, 
however, is no different from an undertaking to agree, to try to agree, or to negotiate with a 
view to reaching agreement; all are equally uncertain and incapable of giving rise to an 
enforceable legal obligation.”1783 Thus, it seems that under English law, a contractual duty to 
use best endeavors to achieve a defined object is enforceable, while the courts will not enforce 
and, thus will not imply an obligation to use best endeavors to achieve an indefinite object, 
e.g. an obligation to use best endeavors to agree a mutually acceptable price.
1784
 On the other 
                                                 
1778
 Ibid.  
1779
 [1992] 2 A.C. 128 
1780
 [1992] 2 A.C. 128 
1781
 (1994) 70 P. & C.R. 469 
1782
 Ibid., at 475 
1783
 Ibid., at 476 
1784
 London & Regional Investments Limited v TBI plc [2002] EWCA Civ 355: It was held that an obligation to 
"use reasonable endeavours to agree the terms of a joint venture regarding Cardiff and Belfast Airports" was no 
more than an agreement to agree. It was therefore unenforceable. Multiplex Constructions (UK) Ltd v Cleveland 
Bridge UK Ltd [2006] EWHC 1341 (TCC): Mr Justice Jackson held that the obligation that the parties shall use 
reasonable endeavours to agree to re-programme the completion of the subcontract works and to agree a fixed 
lump sum and/or reimbursable subcontract sum for the completion of subcontract works was unenforceable. 
 513 
 
hand, the Scottish court recently expressed the view that “If the courts are prepared to police 
an obligation to use reasonable endeavours to obtain a planning permission or an export 
licence, as Lord Ackner suggested in Walford v Miles, or to use all reasonable endeavours to 
secure a planning agreement with a local authority (Yewbelle Ltd v London Green 
Developments Ltd [2008] 1 P & CR 17 (CA)), the court should be able to police the 
negotiation of a price so long as the object of the negotiations can be objectively 
ascertained.”1785 
 
In the US, one of the leading cases with regard to the interpretation of best efforts obligations 
is Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.
1786
 Falstaff brewery promised to “use its best efforts to 
promote and maintain a high volume of sales” of the products of the Ballantine Brewery after 
having acquired most of the distribution network and related assets of Ballantine. Falstaff also 
agreed to pay royalties to Ballantine on the sales achieved. Later, due to the losses it incurred 
as a result of this activity, Falstaff decided to promote its own beer instead of Ballantine’s. 
Thus, the sales and royalties of Ballantine decreased, and the former owner of Ballantine 
claimed that Falstaff breached its “best efforts” obligation. The Court of Appeals found 
Falstaff in breach of its “best efforts” obligation, and held that “Although we agree that even 
this did not require Falstaff to spend itself into bankruptcy to promote the sales of Ballantine 
products, it did prevent the application to them of … philosophy of emphasizing profit uber 
alles without fair consideration of the effect on Ballantine volume.” With regard to the burden 
of proof, the Court held that “Plaintiff was not obliged to show just what steps Falstaff could 
reasonably have taken to maintain a high volume for Ballantine products. It was sufficient to 
show that Falstaff simply didn't care about Ballantine's volume and was content to allow this 
to plummet so long as that course was best for Falstaff's overall profit picture, an inference 
which the judge permissibly drew. The burden then shifted to Falstaff to prove there was 
nothing significant it could have done to promote Ballantine sales that would not have been 
financially disastrous.”1787  
 
Judge Brieant at trial had determined the damages by subtracting Ballantine's actual sales 
from the sales that would have been made had Falstaff used its best efforts, by accepting the 
expert witness’ estimate based on the assumption that Ballantine's sales would have followed 
the same trend as two other small New York labels, Schaefer and Rheingold, which belonged 
to two different vertically integrated firms.
1788
 Although admitting that the award may 
overcompensate the plaintiff since Falstaff was not necessarily required to do whatever 
Rheingold and Schaefer did, the Court of Appeals held that this kind of uncertainty is 
permissible in favor of a plaintiff who has established liability in a case where a person 
violating his contract should not be permitted entirely to escape liability because the amount 
of damage which he caused is uncertain.
1789
  
 
This decision entailed many doctrinal comments. Goldberg criticized this decision on the 
ground that the court did not interpret “best efforts” clause in the context of a “one-shot sale 
of assets”. He argued that where the language is inherently ambiguous, the court should not 
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impose an irrational agreement upon the parties, but should use the context in interpreting the 
contract. The emphasis should not be on what these parties meant, but on what reasonable 
people in this situation should have meant.
1790
 He suggested that “best efforts” in this context 
means that Falstaff agreed that in its pursuit of "profit uber alles" it would not 
opportunistically divert sales from Ballantine to Falstaff. He observed from the facts of the 
case that Falstaff did not use the network to divert more sales than the parties should 
reasonably have expected, since Falstaff did not divert resources to the more profitable brand, 
but simply terminated a project that did not work.
1791
 
 
Farnsworth argued that, in the cases similar to Bloor v. Falstaff, the interests of the two 
parties in a best efforts obligation conflict when, it is in the interest of the promisor to 
maximize net profit while it is in the interest of the promisee to maximize gross receipts.
1792
 
Farnsworth observed that the courts sometimes imagine the promisor and the promisee as if 
united in a single person and ask what efforts a reasonable person in that situation would exert 
on his or her own behalf, which is likely response if, for example, the standard is applied to an 
agent.
 
Such an approach was elaborated by Goetz and Scott’s definition of best efforts, which 
is derived from an “economic conceptualization of the problem faced by two parties who are 
attempting to set a contractual volume in which they have joint interests.”1793 They defined 
the best efforts obligations on the basis of “joint maximization volume,” which “directs the 
outcome that maximizes the net gains that parties could achieve from their contractual 
relationship.”1794 They argued that the best effort standard should require the parties to share 
the risk of loss arising from the conflict, as in the case of the vertically integrated actor, who 
is both manufacturer and distributor. The vertically integrated actor would maximize his 
profits by continuing to produce and distribute so long as the sales price exceeds the sum of 
marginal manufacturing costs and marginal distribution costs. Accordingly, the best efforts 
obligations between two distinct parties might be defined as this point of joint maximization 
and would require one party to set that volume which maximizes the sum of his and the 
profits of the other party. However, they acknowledged that thus defined best efforts 
obligation inherently implies a serious monitoring problem, since the parties will not be able 
to discern the joint maximization volume when they cannot monitor each other’s costs.1795 
 
It is observed that US courts have sometimes responded to best efforts obligations by 
imagining a third person to be in the promisor's place to ask what efforts a reasonable person 
in that situation would exert, where similar instances can be found in the contracting practice. 
For instance, in extractive industries, leasing of mineral rights is sufficiently common practice 
that standards of best efforts are likely to have developed. It was held that a lessee who is 
bound to use best efforts under a mineral lease on a royalty basis “must conform to, and be 
governed by, what is expected of persons in the industry of ordinary prudence under similar 
circumstances and conditions, having due regard for the interest of both contracting 
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parties.”1796 Similarly, in cases involving an architect or lawyer, whose occupation is to make 
special skills available to those who do not possess those skills, the courts are less likely to 
imagine that promisor and promisee are united in the same person, and “best efforts” are to be 
interpreted by reference to the reasonable care and level of competence that one would 
normally expect from a professional in the field.
1797
  
 
This approach is also elaborated by Goetz and Scott in their alternative concept in 
determining best efforts obligations, which is called “diligence insurance”. Under this 
alternative, best efforts obligation requires the exercise of due diligence or reasonably prudent 
business conduct.
1798
 Long argued that diligence insurance should be the preferable standard 
of performance of best efforts obligations in the US.
 
He noted that industry practices could be 
used by the courts, where available but, if well-defined commercial norms existed, parties 
would incorporate them into their contracts by reference, thereby avoiding some of the 
uncertainty of best efforts.
 1799
 Thus, in his view, the standard of diligence insurance requires 
only that the promisor maximize his own profits, and his liability arises only when he, 
through incompetence or spite, fails to serve even his own interests. Long believed that, while 
joint maximization volume fails to secure the expectations of either party as neither knows 
what he is entitled to give or receive until an ex post judicial determination that will likely 
disappoint one if not both parties, diligence insurance minimizes uncertainty for both parties 
so that the gains resulting from increased certainty can be distributed through contract price 
adjustments to benefit both parties.
1800
 
 
In the US, the starting point for the implied terms of best efforts duties is the decision in 
Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon rendered in 1917.
1801
 Lady Lucy Duff-Gordon signed a 
contract with Wood giving the latter the exclusive right to market garments and other 
products bearing her endorsement for one year in exchange of half of all revenues thus 
derived.
1802
 Wood filed a lawsuit against Lucy claiming that Lucy had begun to design 
fashions without Wood's knowledge and without sharing profits with him. In response, Lucy 
claimed that their agreement failed for the lack of consideration since Wood had not made an 
express promise to do anything. Judge Cardozo, delivering the opinion of the Court of 
Appeals of New York, found consideration in Wood’s implied promise to use “reasonable 
efforts to bring profits and revenues into existence.”1803 Judge Cardozo stated that “[Lucy’s] 
sole compensation for the grant of an exclusive agency is to be one-half of all the profits 
resulting from the plaintiff's efforts. Unless he gave his efforts, she could never get anything. 
Without an implied promise, the transaction cannot have such business "efficacy as both 
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parties must have intended that at all events it should have" …. But the contract does not stop 
there. The plaintiff goes on to promise that he will account monthly for all moneys received 
by him, and that he will take out all such patents and copyrights and trademarks as may in his 
judgment be necessary to protect the rights and articles affected by the agreement… His 
promise to pay the defendant one-half of the profits and revenues resulting from the exclusive 
agency and to render accounts monthly was a promise to use reasonable efforts to bring 
profits and revenues into existence.”1804 Later decisions confirmed this method of implication 
of terms in fact, by using, without distinction, the expressions “best effort” and “reasonable 
efforts”, which were considered to be interchangeable.1805  Thus, this case has evolved into a 
term implied in law whereby the payment on a royalty or similar basis in return for an 
exclusive right gives rise to the implied duty of best efforts for the holder of such a right.
1806
 
 
In Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. Famous Music Corp., the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit dealt with the issue of burden of proof in the case of breach of an 
implied obligation of best efforts. In the case, a group of Catholic priests sold for a royalty the 
exclusive rights to manufacture and distribute records of their opera to Famous Music. 
Among its other obligations, Famous Music was to spend not less than $50,000 on promotion 
unless “in the sole option of Famous Music Corporation, such promotion shall cease to be 
effective and profitable.”1807 Famous Records invoked this clause to justify ending all 
promotional activities. The court held that, despite the terms of the provision, the decision 
was not at Famous Music’s complete discretion since it had assumed an implied obligation to 
use its “best efforts” to ensure the promotion of the opera, under the Wood doctrine, and mere 
“technical compliance” with the terms of the agreement did not discharge this obligation. 1808 
As in the case of Falstaff, the court considered that the burden of proof was on Famous 
Music, the promisor of the implied “reasonable effort” obligation, to prove that he had not 
failed in this obligation as it considered that the burden of uncertainty as to the amount of 
damage was upon the wrongdoer. 
 
In Zilg v. Prentice-Hall, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reached a 
different conclusion with regard to the burden of proof as a result of its endorsement of 
“diligence insurance”, in the form of a “good faith business judgment”, in determining the 
scope of implied best efforts obligation.
1809
 Zilg wrote a book, and entered into a contract with 
Prentice-Hall, which obtained the exclusive right “to determine the method and means of 
advertising, publicizing, and selling the work, . . . and all other publishing details, including 
the number of copies to be printed.”1810 The contract specifically gave the publisher the power 
in its discretion to decide on the number of volumes printed and the level of promotional 
                                                 
1804
 Ibid., at 91-92 
1805
 Long, Lawrence S., Best Efforts as Diligence Insurance: In Defense of "Profit Uber Alles", Columbia Law 
Review, 86-8 (Dec., 1986), at 1728 fn 6 
1806
 Section 2-306(2) of the UCC: A lawful agreement by either the seller or the buyer for exclusive dealing in 
the kind of goods concerned imposes unless otherwise agreed an obligation by the seller to use best efforts to 
supply the goods and by the buyer to use best efforts to promote their sale. Farnsworth, E.A., On Trying to Keep 
One's Promises: The Duty of Best Efforts In Contract Law, University of Pittsburgh Law Review, 46 (Fall 
1984), at 10 
1807
 557 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1977), at 920-923 n.8 (quoting contract). 
1808
 Ibid., at 923 
1809
 717 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 938 (1984) (Zilg lost a Supreme Court appeal) 
1810
 717 F.2d, at 674 
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expenditures. Following the extremely negative reaction of a book club, Prentice-Hall decided 
to decrease the size of the first printing and to cut the advertising budget. Zilg sued Prentice-
Hall for breach of contract claiming that the publisher had not tried hard enough to promote 
his book.
1811
 The Federal District Court found that the publishing contract required the 
publisher to “exercise its discretion in good faith in planning its promotion of the Book, and 
in revising its plans.” This obligation required that Prentice-Hall use “its best efforts ... to 
promote the Book fully and fairly.” The district court held that Prentice-Hall breached this 
obligation because it had no “sound” or “valid” business reason for reducing the first printing 
or the advertising budget.
1812
  
 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed with this conclusion. 
The court noted that “Zilg neither bargained for nor acquired an explicit 'best efforts' or 
'promote fully' promise, much less an agreement to make certain specific promotional 
efforts.”1813 The court contrasted this aspect with that in issue in Contemporary Mission, Inc. 
v. Famous Music Corp, which contained specific promotional obligations with regard to a 
musical group. The court held that “the promise to publish must be given some content and 
that it implies a good faith effort to promote the book including a first printing and advertising 
budget adequate to give the book a reasonable chance of achieving market success in light of 
the subject matter and likely audience.”1814 In order not to hamper the publisher's ability to 
rely upon its own experience and judgment in marketing books, the court concluded that 
“once the obligation to undertake reasonable initial promotional activities has been fulfilled, 
the contractual language dictates that a business decision by the publisher to limit the size of a 
printing or advertising budget is not subject to a second guessing by a trier of fact as to 
whether it is sound or valid”. Thus, in view of the court, “Once the initial obligation is 
fulfilled, all that is required is a good faith business judgment.” 1815  
 
The Court of Appeals determined that the burden of proof is not on the promisor of the 
“reasonable efforts” obligation, but on the promise. The court stated that “a breach of contract 
might be proven by Zilg in two ways. First, he might demonstrate that the initial printing and 
promotional efforts were so inadequate as not to give the book a reasonable chance to catch 
on with the reading public. Second, he might show that even greater printing and promotional 
efforts were not undertaken for reasons other than a good faith business judgment”. Zilg failed 
to produce such evidence. The court then concluded that Prentice-Hall had tried hard enough 
to perform its initial obligation on the basis of the testimony of Prentice-Hall’s expert witness, 
who testified that the promotional efforts were “perfectly adequate” even though they were 
“routine” and Prentice-Hall “did not follow through as they might.”1816 As this initial 
obligation had been met, the court held that all the publisher had to do was to exercise its 
discretion in good faith and Zilg failed to produce any evidence to show “that the motivation 
underlying [the publisher's later] decisions was not a good faith business judgment.”1817 
 
                                                 
1811
 Ibid., at 673 
1812
 Ibid., at 676 
1813
 Ibid., at 679 
1814
 Ibid., at 680 
1815
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1816
 Ibid., at 681 
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It appears that the US courts’ approach to implicit or explicit “best efforts” obligations has a 
great relevance to the burden of proof. Traditionally, under the common law, the party 
alleging the existence of the breach of contract should prove that a breach has occurred, and 
he is not under the burden to prove that the other party has been at fault in his breach.
1818
 The 
traditional strict liability regime prevents the party in breach from avoiding liability by 
proving that he was not at fault in the sense that he took all reasonable steps or performed his 
best or reasonable efforts to ensure the proper performance of his obligations.
 1819
 The duty of 
best efforts is one of the many exceptions to this liability regime. The US case law suggests 
that express or implied “best efforts” obligations alters the scheme of burden of proof in 
establishing the liability of the promisor in two ways depending on the approach adopted by 
the court with regard to its response to such obligations.  
 
First, if the court, as in Falstaff case, determines the scope of the best effort obligation on the 
basis of the joint maximization volume, i.e. the efforts of a reasonable person where the 
promisor and the promisee are united in a single person, then the promisee is only required to 
prove the existence of the non-performance, which seems conforming to the scheme of 
burden of proof under strict liability regime. However, there is uncertainty relating to the 
extent of damages arising from a best effort obligation thus determined due to the monitoring 
problems in determining the joint maximization volume. As this burden of uncertainty is 
imposed on the wrongdoer, i.e. the promisor, and not on the promisee who has already 
established liability, the promisor should prove that he has done its best under the 
circumstances in order to escape liability. Thus, the duty of best efforts, when determined on 
the basis of joint maximization volume, functions as a rebuttable presumption of fault, which 
can be found in the liability regime of civil legal systems. On the other hand, if the court 
understands the best efforts obligations as “diligence insurance” according to which, best 
efforts obligation requires the exercise of due diligence or reasonably prudent business 
conduct, as in the Zilg case, the promisee is required to prove that the promisor did not act 
with the required diligence in order to establish liability. 
 
It is argued that the duty of best efforts is the common law counterpart of the concept of 
“undertaking to appropriate means” (“obligation de moyens”) under French law.1820 French 
law distinguishes two kinds of contractual obligations between “undertakings to appropriate 
means” (“obligations de moyens”) and “undertakings to achieve a promised result” 
(“obligations de résultat”). This distinction has become a basic tool of analysis for lawyers not 
only in France but also in many civil law countries, including Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy 
and Quebec.
1821
 It is based on the observation that a contractual obligation can be assumed 
with different degrees of intensity. Sometimes, the promisor's obligation is to achieve a 
certain result. In other cases, the promisor's obligation is merely to use appropriate means to 
achieve a promised result, without guaranteeing the result; in other words, the promisor is 
                                                 
1818
 Section 235 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, comment b: “When performance is due, however, 
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 Farnsworth, E.A., On Trying to Keep One's Promises: The Duty of Best Efforts In Contract Law, University 
of Pittsburgh Law Review, 46 (Fall 1984), at 4 
1821
 Fontaine, Marcel, Content and Performance, American Journal of Comparative Law, 40 (1992), at 648 
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merely obliged to exert a certain degree of efforts to perform the obligation, but with no firm 
undertaking as to the achievement of any certain result.
1822
  
 
This distinction affects the conditions of contractual liability, and particularly the burden of 
proof. Under French law, any non-performance of a contractual obligation, when arising from 
a promisor, is a fault in the absence of an external cause, such as force majeure or fault of the 
victim, the proof of which is incumbent on the promisor.
1823
 If there is an undertaking to 
achieve a promised result, the promisee is only required to prove that the promised result has 
not been achieved in order to establish liability, in which the fault of the promisor is 
presumed, thereby leaving the promisor with the burden of trying to establish an exculpatory 
cause, such as force majeure or the interference of the other party or a third party making it 
impossible for it to fulfill its obligations. In the case of an undertaking to appropriate means, 
the promisee has to prove that the promisor did not act with the required diligence in the sense 
that the promisor behaved in a manner which did not correspond to what the promisee is 
entitled to expect.
1824
 As the basis for the development of the concept of obligations to 
appropriate means is the text of Article 1137 of the French Civil Code, regarding the safe 
keeping of objects, which referred to the “good family man”, the general trend is the adoption 
of an objective standard of diligence in evaluating the behavior of the debtor, but the specific 
circumstances of the debtor and the purpose of the contract is also taken into account.
1825
 
Thus, fault in the sense of “lack of diligence” needs to be proved to establish contractual 
liability for non-performance only where the obligation in question is classified as an 
undertaking to appropriate means, and there is no such need as regards the undertakings to 
achieve a promised result.
1826
 
 
Although constantly used by the lawyers in the French tradition, the distinction is not always 
clear, in practice. The characterization of a given obligation as an undertaking to appropriate 
means or to achieve a certain result will depend on various factors. The wording of the terms 
of agreement can be decisive. When the wording is uncertain, the court will characterize the 
obligation by taking into account the degree of risk that threatens the success of the 
performance promised; if it is a performance that normally ends with a positive result, the 
court will characterize the obligations as an undertaking to achieve a certain result, but if 
performance would normally involve difficulties and success cannot be guaranteed, the 
obligation will be characterized as an undertaking to appropriate means.
1827
  
 
Under French law, one of the fields that the distinction has become unclear is the 
interpretation of the letters of comfort. A letter of comfort is intended to reassure a party, 
contracting with a subsidiary, of the support that the parent company is prepared to give its 
                                                 
1822
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 See Article 1147 of the French Civil Code; Chappuis, Christine, Provisions for Best Efforts, Reasonable 
Care, Due Diligence and Standard Practice in International Contracts, International Business Law Journal, 
(2002), at 289 
1824
 Ibid., at 290 
1825
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Academic Publishers, 2009, at 220 
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 ed., 
2008, at 343 
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Academic Publishers, 2009, at 219 
 520 
 
subsidiary in the event it encounters financial difficulties. As the issuer of a comfort letter 
does not intend to give a guarantee to make payment itself once a particular condition is 
fulfilled, such as the inability of the subsidiary to pay its debts, the letter usually contains 
vague references, such as “best efforts”, in defining the support obligation of the parent 
company.
1828
 Sometimes, the parent companies undertake “to do all that is possible” or “to do 
everything in its power” with regard to its obligations under the letter of comfort. A variety of 
interpretations appeared in the French case law, where the obligation “to do all that is 
possible” is interpreted as an undertaking to achieve a promised result and the obligation “to 
do its best efforts” is characterized as an undertaking to appropriate means. The courts also 
examined the circumstances surrounding the signature of the agreement between the 
subsidiary and the third party. For example, if the parent company directly participated in the 
negotiation of the main agreement at the decision-making level, the third party would be 
entitled to believe that the parent company assumed a factual or legal ability to cause the 
debtor to fulfill its obligations as an undertaking to achieve a specified result.
1829
  
 
Although, fault-based regime of liability is generally adopted in civil law systems, the 
existence of fault is usually not relevant to the determination of liability since there is a 
default presumption of fault of the debtor, which enables the creditor to establish liability by 
proving the breach, damage and cause. For instance, the burden of proof with regard to fault is 
on the debtor under German law. While the German Civil Code of 1900 provided this burden 
of proof only in instances of impossibility and default (Sections 282 and 285), after the 
fundamental reform in 2002, the presumption of fault has become a general rule. This 
presumption follows from the negative wording of the central norm for damages for breach of 
contract in Section 280 (1) of the German Civil Code, the second part of which provides that 
damages are owed unless the debtor proves absence of fault, i.e. he has acted neither 
deliberately nor negligently.
1830
  
 
                                                 
1828
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 Riesenhuber, Karl, Damages for Non-Performance and the Fault Principle, European Review of Contract 
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Moreover, Section 276 (1) of the German Civil Code provides that a stricter type of liability 
may be inferred from the content of an obligation: for instance, from giving of a guarantee or 
the assumption of a procurement risk. Although, the reform of Section 276 was intended 
primarily to clarify the law, it is argued that the way in which the new rule is drafted leaves 
much leeway for a flexible adjustment of the standard of liability.
1831
 Section 276 (2) provides 
contractual liability for negligence. The negligence under this rule is defined as an objective 
standard in the sense that a person acts negligently if he fails to observe the relevant accepted 
standards of care, according to which the courts have applied an objective analysis to 
determine fault, considering the typical knowledge and ability of a person of the profession in 
question rather than the individual knowledge and ability.
1832
 It is argued that the presumption 
of fault and objective standard of care are the factors that bring German law rather close to a 
strict liability regime even where it formally provides exclusively for fault liability.
1833
 
 
Under German law, the distinction between undertakings to appropriate means and 
undertakings to achieve a promised result can be found with regard to the certain types of 
contracts, but it is not a central issue of the debate on contractual liability. The required 
performance of an undertaking can consist either of a result (“Erfolg”), such as in a works 
contract (“Werkvertrag”), or of an activity or effort (“Tätigkeit”), such as contracts for 
services (“Dienstvertrag”). 1834  Thus, the type and nature of contract is directly relevant to the 
determination of whether the debtor is obliged to produce a result or to exert his best efforts. 
With regard to works contracts, Section 633 of the German Civil Code provides that the 
debtor must procure the work for the creditor free of material defects and legal defects. 
Section 634 provides that if the work is defective, the creditor may resort to certain remedies 
that apply, regardless of fault, such as the right to demand that repairs be carried out or to 
bring an action for reduction of the price. Thus, German law imposes a guarantee obligation 
on the debtor in the works contract to perform a definite type of work but, to the extent that 
the creditor wishes to obtain damages and interest, the fault of debtor becomes relevant 
through the general presumption of fault. On the other hand, in the cases of contracts for 
services, the debtor mainly assumes an obligation of reasonable care and diligence.
1835
 It is 
argued that the “best efforts” clauses (“nach besten Kräften”) in contracts can be construed 
under German law as the parties’ intention to replace the objective standard of default liability 
regime with an assessment of the requisite degree of care to be made in a subjective manner, 
which may lead to an increase or to a decrease in liability or even to an exemption from 
liability, on the basis of the debtor's competence.
1836
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b. International Instruments 
 
The CISG provides for strict liability for non-performance under Article 74, independent of 
any fault of the party in breach, while there are exemptions from liability provided in Article 
79 for supervening impediments, and in Article 80 for non-performance caused by the 
aggrieved party.
1837
 Because of the importance of the CISG, the strict liability regime has 
remained on the international agenda, and it has been adopted by the international 
restatements of contract law.
1838
 Although, the distinction between undertakings to 
appropriate means and undertakings to achieve a promised result is not explicitly provided 
under the CISG, there are several provisions, which refer to concepts such as “reasonable 
steps” or “reasonable measures” in defining the obligations of the parties, instead of defining 
absolute undertakings.
1839
  
 
Following the example of the CISG, both UNIDROIT Principles and the PECL adopt the 
strict liability regime.
1840
 Both sets of principles take into account the variations, by implicit 
or explicit agreement, of the parties’ expectations with regard to the intensity or scope of 
obligations. Article 5.1.4 of the UNIDROIT provides that “To the extent that an obligation of 
a party involves a duty to achieve a specific result, that party is bound to achieve that result”, 
and “To the extent that an obligation of a party involves a duty of best efforts in the 
performance of an activity, that party is bound to make such efforts as would be made by a 
reasonable person of the same kind in the same circumstances.” In the Official Comments, it 
is explained that Article 5.1.4 provides the decision maker with criteria by which correct 
performance can be evaluated. Accordingly, the nature of the obligation determines the 
“degree of diligence required of a party in the performance of the obligation”.1841 The Official 
Comments state that “In the case of an obligation to achieve a specific result, a party is bound 
simply to achieve the promised result, failure to achieve which amounts in itself to non-
performance, subject to the application of the force majeure provision (see Article 7.1.7). On 
the other hand, the assessment of non-performance of an obligation of best efforts calls for a 
less severe judgment, based on a comparison with the efforts a reasonable person of the same 
kind would have made in similar circumstances. This distinction signifies that more will be 
expected from a highly specialised firm selected for its expertise than from a less 
sophisticated partner.”1842 This criterion is deemed as a contemporary rendition of the good 
family man’s behavior under French law.1843 Thus, in determining the scope of “best efforts” 
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obligations, the Article 5.1.4 refers to the general interpretative criteria of reasonableness test, 
which combines objective and subjective elements. It is also pointed out in the Official 
Comments that obligations of both types may coexist in the same contract, such as the case 
where a firm that repairs a defective machine may be considered to be under a duty of best 
efforts concerning the quality of the repair work in general, and under a duty to achieve a 
specific result as regards the replacement of certain spare parts.
1844
 
 
As the UNIDROIT Principles adopt the strict liability regime, it is stated in the Official 
Comments to Article 7.4.1 regarding right to damages that it is enough for the aggrieved party 
simply to prove the non-performance, i.e. that it has not received what it was promised, 
without proving in addition that the non-performance was due to the fault of the non-
performing party, but the degree of difficulty in proving the non-performance will depend 
upon the content of the obligation and in particular on whether the obligation is one of best 
efforts or one to achieve a specific result.
1845
 It is argued that the distinction between 
undertakings to appropriate means and undertakings to achieve a specific result does not 
perform a useful function and it is superfluous under the UNIDROIT Principles due to its 
strict liability regime.
1846
 This argument is based on the observation that this distinction is 
modeled on the basis of the French law of contract, which takes fault as an essential element 
of breach, while under the UNIDROIT Principles all liability is strict.
1847
 Therefore, it is 
argued that the distinction has lost its juridical significance.
1848
 Similarly, at various stages of 
the drafting process, the drafters, who prepared Chapter 5 of the Principles, expressed their 
“doubts about the usefulness” of the draft provisions from which Article 5.1.4 emerged.1849 
However, the distinction was maintained because the members of the Working Group 
considered it to be “both interesting and useful”, and because they hoped that it would draw 
the attention of the parties to the necessity of specifying in the contract which kind of 
engagement is envisaged.
1850
 It was also deemed useful for judges and arbitrators who, in the 
absence of clear language in the contract, are called upon to define the exact nature of the 
parties' duties.
 1851
  
 
The decision whether a particular duty is an undertaking to appropriate means or an 
undertaking to achieve a specific result depends on the application of the criteria provided in 
Article 5.1.5. Article 5.1.5 provides a non-exhaustive list of factors to be taken into account in 
determining the extent to which an obligation of a party involves a duty of best efforts or a 
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duty to achieve a specific result. The list includes factors such as (a) the way in which the 
obligation is expressed in the contract, (b) the contractual price and other terms of the 
contract, e.g. an unusually high price, penalty clause or hardship clause may indicate a duty to 
achieve a specific result in cases where a mere duty of best efforts would normally be 
assumed, (c) the degree of risk normally involved in achieving the expected result, e.g. when 
the performance of an obligation normally involves a high degree of risk, it is generally to be 
expected that result is not guaranteed, and (d) the ability of the other party to influence the 
performance of the obligation, e.g. if a party has a strong ability to influence the performance 
of the other party the latter does not normally intend to be under a duty to achieve a specific 
result.
1852
 As the determination of the scope of an obligation according to the distinction 
between a duty to achieve a specific result and a duty of best efforts is a form of the 
interpretation of the contract, Article 5.1.5 supplements the rules on contractual interpretation 
in Chapter 4 of the UNIDROIT Principles and the list of factors stated in Article 5.1.5 can be 
considered as “circumstances” within the meaning of Article 4.3.1853 
 
Although the PECL do not contain provisions similar to Articles 5.1.4 and 5.1.5 of the 
UNIDROIT Principles, some scholars interpret the PECL to mirror this approach as the 
drafters have assumed that the parties are free to contract accordingly.
1854
 The PECL refer to 
the distinction between obligations of best efforts and obligations to achieve a specific result, 
in the Official Comments. With regard to interpretation of contracts, the Official Comments to 
Article 5:101 draw attention to the possible necessity of deciding whether the debtor's 
obligation was one to produce a particular result (obligation de résultat) or only one to use 
reasonable care and skill (obligation de moyens) in determining the whether there has been a 
non-performance.
1855
 Similarly, the Official Comments to Article 6:102 endorse the 
distinction with regard to implied terms.
1856
 Moreover, the PECL mentions the distinction in 
the context of damages for non-performance. The Official Comments to Article 9:501 state 
that “Where a party’s obligation is to produce a given result, its failure to do so entitles the 
aggrieved party to damages whether or not there has been fault by the non-performing party, 
except where performance is excused (see Article 8:108 and Comment). Where a party’s 
obligation is not to produce a result but merely to use reasonable care and skill it is liable only 
if it has failed to fulfill its obligation, that is to say if it has not exercised the care and skill it 
has promised. In the absence of a clause specifying the required degree of care and skill, this 
is equivalent to the commission of a fault.”1857 
                                                 
1852
 Official Comments to Article 5.1.5 of the UNIDROIT Principles 
1853
 Although during the drafting process some members argued that there was no need for Art 5.1.5 because it 
might duplicate the general rules on interpretation, the majority of the Working Group insisted on retaining the 
article because of the difficulties associated with distinguishing the two types of obligations. UNIDROIT 1987 – 
P.C. – Misc. 11, Rome, July 1987, para 6 
1854
 Lando, Ole, Non-Performance (Breach) of Contracts, in in A.S. Hartkamp, E.H. Hondius, M.W. 
Hesselink,.E. du Perron & M. Veldman, (eds.), Towards A European Civil Code, Kluwer Law International, 
2004, at 509 
1855
 Lando, Ole & Hugh Beale (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Parts I and II, Kluwer Law 
International, 2000, at 287 
1856
 Ibid., at 303-304 
1857
 Ibid., at 434 
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c. Contracting Practices 
 
In international contracting practice, the parties frequently include in their contracts such 
clauses that refer to a vague standard in determining the conditions for fulfillment of a 
contractual obligation rather than directly providing specific conditions for success. These 
clauses refer to the standard of “best efforts” or one of its variants, such as “reasonable care”, 
“due diligence” and “standard practices”. When there is a relatively complicated obligation, 
when the result of the performance of an obligation is not within the promisor’s control, or 
when the scope of obligation is a result of the negotiating skills and bargaining power of the 
parties, the party prepared to undertake that obligation does not tend to promise a perfect 
result; rather he promises to perform a degree of effort, which is vaguely described in the 
relevant contractual clause, aiming at reaching that result. These clauses, referring to a great 
variety of standards, appear mainly in certain types of contracts, which have the 
characteristics of the transactions governed through legal uncertainty.
1858
 The incorporation of 
such uncertain standards in the formulation of contractual obligations gives rise to the residual 
questions.  
 
In the distribution agreements, the distributor often undertakes to promote sales of the 
products concerned and this obligation is usually defined by a reference to the standard of best 
efforts, best endeavors, or reasonable efforts.
1859
 An example provides that “The distributor 
agrees to use its best efforts to sell, promote, market and support the Products and to develop 
and maintain the reputation and goodwill of … and the Products in the Territory with 
Distributors’ customers.”1860 The ICC Model Commercial Agency Contract combines the best 
effort undertaking with the requirement of diligence in the same clause.
1861
 Article 3.1 
provides that “The Agent agrees to use his best endeavors to promote the sale of the Products 
in the territory in accordance with the Principal’s reasonable instructions and shall protect the 
Principal’s interests with the diligence of a responsible businessman.” The Model Contract 
refers solely to the standard of diligence in the context of the agent’s obligation to inform his 
principal, as an instance of cooperation between the parties. Article 9.1 provides that “The 
Agent shall exercise due diligence to keep the principal informed about his activities, market 
conditions and the state of competition within the Territory…” Article 7.2 of the Model 
Contract is explicit on the point that the best effort undertaking does not guarantee the result 
by providing that “The parties shall make their best efforts to attain the [sales] targets agreed 
upon, but the non-attainment shall not be considered as a breach of the contract by a party, 
unless that party is clearly at fault.”  
 
                                                 
1858
 These contractual types are distribution agreements, construction agreements, agreements for manufacturing 
of materials and parts for motor vehicles, research agreements, technical assistance agreements, trademark and 
patent license agreements, satellite launch agreements, letters of comfort, documentary credits, counter-trade 
agreements and share purchase agreements. See for examples; Fontaine, Marcel & Filip De Ly, Drafting 
International Contracts: An Analysis of Contract Clauses, Brill Academic Publishers, 2009, at 188-201  
1859
 Directive 86/653/EEC considers the agent’s obligation of proper efforts to promote the sales of the product 
as a specific instance of agent’s general obligation look after his principal's interests and act dutifully and in 
good faith. Council Directive 86/653/EEC of 18 December 1986 on the coordination of the laws of the Member 
States relating to self-employed commercial agents, Article 3.2 (a) 
1860
 Cited by Fontaine, Marcel & Filip De Ly, Drafting International Contracts: An Analysis of Contract Clauses, 
Brill Academic Publishers, 2009, at 188 
1861
 ICC Model Commercial Agency Contract, 2nd ed., ICC publication, 644, Paris, 2002 
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In construction contracts, it is often required that the work to be performed by the contractor 
with a given degree of care, which is expressed in a reference to “reasonable diligence” or 
“professional standards”.1862 There are also other clauses under the FIDIC Conditions, which 
contain references to “reasonable efforts”1863, “best endeavors”1864, “best efforts”1865 and “all 
reasonable endeavors”1866. The FIDIC Conditions 1987 edition provided in Sub-Clause 8.1 
that “The Contractor shall, with due care and diligence, design (to the extent provided by the 
Contract), execute and complete the Works and remedy any defects therein in accordance 
with the provisions of the Contract…”1867 The corresponding provisions of the FIDIC 
Conditions 1999 edition have eliminated this reference to the standard of “due care and 
diligence” in the descriptions of the Contractor’s obligations.1868 This change serves to tighten 
the responsibilities of the Contractor. Thus, it is argued that the sub-clause must be read as an 
absolute obligation.
1869
 It is further provided in Sub-Clause 4.1 (c) of the FIDIC Conditions 
1999 edition that, if the Contract specifies that the Contractor shall design any part of the 
Permanent Works, the Contractor shall be responsible for this part and it shall, when the 
Works are completed, be fit for such purposes for which the part is intended as are specified 
in the Contract. The introduction of this fitness for purpose obligation is a guarantee 
obligation and arises from the consideration that, in English law, which has influenced the 
drafting of the FIDIC Conditions, the fitness for purpose duty is stricter than the liability for 
reasonable competence to exercise due care, skill and diligence.
1870
 Under the ICC Model 
                                                 
1862
 For example, a contract provides that “The contractor shall, commencing within days of the Effective Date 
of the Contract, proceed with utmost diligence and care in carrying out all of the Services specified as his 
obligations in the Contracts” and another one provides that “The Consulting Engineer shall exercise all 
reasonable skill, care and diligence in the performance of the Services under the Agreement and shall carry out 
all his responsibilities in accordance with recognized professional standards.” Cited by Fontaine, Marcel & Filip 
De Ly, Drafting International Contracts: An Analysis of Contract Clauses, Brill Academic Publishers, 2009, at 
191 
1863
 Sub-Clause 4.7:” The Employer shall be responsible for any errors in these specified or notified items of 
reference, but the Contractor shall use reasonable efforts to verify their accuracy before they are used.” Sub-
Clause 4.8: “The Contractor shall:... (c) use reasonable efforts to keep the Site and Works clear of unnecessary 
obstruction so as to avoid danger to these persons”.  
1864
 Sub-Clause 6.12: “The Employer will, if requested by the Contractor, use his best endeavours in a timely and 
expeditious manner to assist the Contractor in obtaining any local, state, national, or government permission 
required for bringing in the Contractor’s personnel.” 
1865
 Sub-Clause 15.2: “[In the event of termination by the Employer], the Contractor shall use his best efforts to 
comply immediately with any reasonable instructions included in the[termination] notice (i) for the assignment 
of any subcontract, and (ii) for the protection of life or property or for the safety of the Works.” 
1866
 Sub-Clause 19.3: “Each Party shall at all times use all reasonable endeavours to minimise any delay in the 
performance of the Contract as a result of Force Majeure.” 
1867
 Part I, General Conditions, Article 8.1 of the FIDIC Conditions of Contract for Works of Civil Engineering 
Constructions, 1987 ed.  
1868
 Article 4.1 of the FIDIC Conditions of Contract for Construction, 1st ed., 1999, the FIDIC Conditions of 
Contract for Plant and Design-Build, 1st ed., 1999, and the FIDIC Conditions of Contract for EPC Turnkey 
Projects, 1st ed., 1999 
1869
 Glover, Jeremy, Simon Hughes, & Christopher Thomas, Understanding the New FIDIC Red Book: A Clause 
by Clause Commentary, Sweet & Maxwell, 2006, at 73 
1870
 In Greaves v Baynham Meikle (1975) 1 WL.R. 1095:  Lord Denning stated that: “Now, as between the 
building owners and the Contractors, it is plain that the owners made known to the Contractors the purpose for 
which the building was required, so as to show that they relied on the Contractors skill and judgment. It was 
therefore, the duty of the Contractors to see that the finished work was reasonably fit for the purpose for which 
they knew it was required. It was not merely an obligation to use reasonable care, the Contractors were obliged 
to ensure that the finished work was reasonably fit for the purpose.” In IBA v EMI and BICC, (1980) 14 
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Contract for the Turnkey Supply of an Industrial Plant, Articles 4.5 and 4.6 provide that the 
supplier guarantees that the plant, once erected and started up, will have the specified 
performance characteristics but, as to the design of the plant, the supplier only guarantees that 
the plant has been designed with due care and that it includes everything which is patently 
necessary for the plant to provide the operating characteristics as defined in the contract.  
 
In share purchase agreements, the “best efforts” clauses generally appear in relation to the 
parties’ duty of cooperation. The ICC Model Mergers & Acquisitions Contract, Share 
Purchase Agreement, refers to the standard of “best efforts” or its variants in regulating the 
duty to mitigate losses arising from a number of events. According to Article 10 regarding 
claim procedure, whenever the buyer becomes aware that an event has occurred from which 
there may arise an obligation of the seller as a result of the breach of a warranty, the buyer 
shall, as soon as practicable, give claim notice to the seller, and the buyer shall use reasonable 
endeavors to mitigate the losses. Moreover, according to Article 11.7, if a claim of the buyer 
for a warranty breach results from the liability of a third party, the buyer shall take such 
actions as it reasonably considers necessary to prevent or limit to the extent possible any loss 
or damage for which the seller may be liable, including taking such action to avoid, dispute or 
contest such liability as is reasonably practicable. According to Article 12.3 of the Model 
Contract, although any payment for warranty breaches shall be due immediately, the buyer 
shall use its reasonable endeavors to obtain postponement of payment when practicable, 
provided that the seller shall counter-guarantee without delay any required guarantees to the 
effect of such postponement. The parties to a share purchase agreement may also provide 
“best effort” duties in other instances of cooperation. For example, each party may be obliged 
by the contract in general terms to use its “reasonable endeavors to take, or cause to be taken, 
all actions, and to do, or cause to be done, all things necessary, proper or advisable and 
consistent with applicable Law, to perform its obligations under the agreement and to 
consummate the transactions contemplated as soon as reasonably practicable.”1871  
 
In the practice of share purchase agreements, the representation and warranties are sometimes 
preceded by the words “as far as the seller is aware” or “to the best knowledge of the 
seller”.1872 The sellers often take the position that they cannot provide unqualified 
representations with respect to matters that, they claim, are beyond their control.
1873
 The use 
of such expressions can be frequently found in the representations and warranties in such 
areas as environmental matters, compliance with laws, validity and renewals of permits and 
authorizations and intellectual property.
1874
 Similar to “best efforts” obligations, the inclusion 
                                                                                                                                                        
Building Law Reports 1; HL affirming (1978) 11 BLR 29, CA, the Court of Appeal stated that: “We see no good 
reason… for not importing an obligation as to reasonable fitness for purpose into these contracts or for importing 
a different obligation in relation to design from the obligation which plainly exists in relation to materials.” 
1871
 Article 6.1 (Consummation of Transactions) Execution version of a Share Purchase Agreement dated 12 
June 2006, on file with the author 
1872
 The ICC Task Force tried to avoid these wordings, but noted in the Model Contract that if the seller feels that 
he must limit his responsibility with respect to matters which are not totally under his control or with respect to 
which he has no precise information, he should use such wordings. ICC Model Mergers & Acquisitions Contract 
1 - Share Purchase Agreement, ICC Commission on Commercial Law & Practice, ICC Publication No. 656, 
2004 Edition, at 37 
1873
 Kuney, George W., To the Best of Whose Knowledge?, California Business Law Practitioner, (Spring 2007), 
at 58 
1874
 ICC Model Mergers & Acquisitions Contract 1 - Share Purchase Agreement, ICC Commission on 
Commercial Law & Practice, ICC Publication No. 656, 2004 Edition, at 14. An example would read, “There is 
no Legal Proceeding now in progress or pending or, as far as any Seller is aware, threatened against the 
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of such expressions seeks to affect the conditions of liability of the seller for breach of a 
warranty or representation. Under those clauses, the seller does not guarantee the exactness of 
its knowledge with regard to the relevant representations or warranties. When an unqualified 
representation or warranty is given, the seller who makes the representation or warranty takes 
the risk of unknown, yet related facts. In contrast, when such expressions are used, the seller 
may not be exposed to liability for those facts, depending on the definition of “knowledge”. 
Thus, the “best knowledge” reference may shift the risk of loss resulting from unknown 
defects from the seller to buyer.  
 
However, if the parties do not define what is meant by “knowledge” in the contract, it is not 
entirely clear whether the “best knowledge” reference should imply an absence of knowledge 
after a reasonable inquiry, or on the basis of what is at the time actually known to the seller. 
While some agreements define “knowledge” as actual knowledge without any investigation 
requirement, others define “knowledge” as the knowledge of an individual, who “could be 
expected to discover or otherwise become aware of [a particular] fact or other matter in the 
course of conducting a reasonably comprehensive investigation concerning the existence of 
such fact or other matter.”1875 If a dispute arises, the decision maker is invited to take into 
account these definitions, which reflect an understanding of the parties that they are not fully 
aware of the facts covered by the representation or warranty and that the parties share the 
resulting risk in a certain manner, which has most likely also had an effect on, and been 
reflected in, the bargain and the agreed purchase price.
1876
 If the contract does not define 
“knowledge,” the search for its meaning becomes contextual, and the decision maker should 
examine the risk allocation between the parties. On the one hand, the interpretation of 
“knowledge” in such clauses as the actual knowledge of the seller implies that willful or at 
least actual blindness will protect the seller from liability, and the buyer wholly assumes the 
relevant risk.
1877
 On the other hand, interpreting “knowledge” as involving an investigation 
requirement implies that the seller and buyer share the relevant risk on the basis of their 
respective duties of investigation since such an interpretation shifts some of the cost of “due 
diligence” from buyer to the seller, who has to take reasonable steps to investigate the true 
position to avoid liability for breach of relevant representation or warranty.
1878
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Operating Company, any Person for whose acts or defaults the Operating Company may be vicariously liable, 
the Sellers, or the assets or Business, and there are no circumstances reasonably likely to give rise to a claim or 
Legal Proceeding.” Article 5.12.2 of a Share Purchase Agreement dated 12 June 2006, on file with the author  
1875
 Committee on Negotiated Acquisitions, Model Asset Purchase Agreement with Commentary, ABA Section 
of Business Law, 2001, at 28-29 
1876
 ICC Model Mergers & Acquisitions Contract 1 - Share Purchase Agreement, ICC Commission on 
Commercial Law & Practice, ICC Publication No. 656, 2004 Edition, at 14 
1877
 Conner v Hardee’s Food Sys. (6th Cir 2003) 65 Fed Appx 19 (“Under Tennessee law, in the absence of 
actual knowledge that a particular statement is false, statements disclosed with the qualifier "to the best of one's 
knowledge" cannot give rise to a misrepresentation claim.”) 
1878
 William Sindall plc v Cambridgeshire County Council [1993] EWCA Civ 14 (“It is well established that a 
statement that a vendor is not aware of a defect in title carries with it an implied representation that he has taken 
reasonable steps to ascertain whether any exists… This may require him, in the first instance, to examine his title 
deeds and other records, inspect the property, and obtain legal advice. If there is anything to put him on inquiry 
as to the existence of a defect, he may have to pursue the matter further by questioning others, or examining their 
documents… the answer "Not so far as the Vendor is aware" represents not merely that the vendor and his 
solicitor had no actual knowledge of a defect, but also that they have made such investigations as could 
reasonably be expected to be made by or under the guidance of a prudent conveyancer.”)  
 529 
 
The interpretation of clauses containing a reference to “best efforts” or its variants is a 
difficult issue as they are not always used by the parties in contracts in full knowledge of the 
consequences of their choice of terminology under the relevant rules of interpretation.
1879
 
These clauses may give rise substantial ambiguity as to the required level of performance of 
the relevant obligation. Thus, the parties usually try to provide specific examples and combine 
them with the standard of “best efforts”.1880 These examples both specify certain instances of 
required behavior and guide the decision maker in interpreting the standard in order to resolve 
the ambiguity with regard to unspecified instances of required conduct in the form of residual 
contractual obligations.  
 
2. Arbitral Decision Making 
 
The national legal systems make a distinction between strict and fault-based liability in 
relation to the default regime of contractual liability for non-performance; in particular, civil 
law systems opting for fault-based liability in contract law while common law systems opting 
for strict liability. Under the national legal systems, the questions as to the conditions of 
liability and burden of proof are traditionally answered on the basis of whether the fault-based 
or strict liability governs the particular contract. However, it follows from principles of pacta 
sunt servanda and freedom of contract that the parties are able to regulate the intensity of the 
obligations undertaken in the contract thereby varying the default regime of contractual 
liability regime within certain limits. The effect of such variations on the issues of contractual 
liability of the parties should be taken into account by the ex post decision maker applying lex 
mercatoria. Consequently, the decision maker may primarily rely on the intentions and 
expectations of parties, and determine their risk allocation with regard to the performance of a 
particular obligation on the basis of its characterization as an undertaking to achieve a certain 
result or to use one’s best efforts. 
 
It is argued that the “best efforts” clauses in international contracts constitute the common 
denominator between the opposing national legal systems by bringing the French distinction 
between obligation de moyens and de resultat closer to the legal systems in which it is not 
practiced and smoothing away the opposition between strict and fault-based liability in 
contract law.
1881
 In essence, the national legal systems recognize and give effect to the 
intensity of the obligations undertaken in a contract. Many legal systems do not opt 
exclusively for fault liability or strict liability in contract law, but often adopt a more nuanced 
approach, which utilizes intermediate solutions such as reversing the burden of proof, using 
an objective standard of care and diligence, and distinguishing between different types of 
                                                 
1879
 Fontaine, Marcel & Filip De Ly, Drafting International Contracts: An Analysis of Contract Clauses, Brill 
Academic Publishers, 2009, at 226 
1880
 For example FIDIC Sub-Clause 4.15: “The Contractor shall use reasonable efforts to prevent any road or 
bridge from being damaged by the Contractor’s traffic or by the Contractor’s Personnel. These efforts shall 
include the proper use of appropriate vehicles and routes.” Another and more detailed example: “The contractor 
shall use every reasonable means to prevent any of the highways or bridges communicating with or on the routes 
of the Site from being damaged or Injured by any traffic of the Contractor or any of his Subcontractors and in 
particular shall select routes, choose and use vehicles and restrict and distribute loads that any such extraordinary 
traffic as will inevitably arise from the moving of plant and material from and to the Site shall be limited as far 
as reasonably possible and so that no unnecessary damage or injury may be occasioned to such highways or 
bridges.” Cited by Fontaine, Marcel & Filip De Ly, Drafting International Contracts: An Analysis of Contract 
Clauses, Brill Academic Publishers, 2009, at 193 
1881
 Chappuis, Christine, Provisions for Best Efforts, Reasonable Care, Due Diligence and Standard Practice in 
International Contracts, International Business Law Journal, (2002), at 297 
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contracts.
1882
 However, due to the diverse backgrounds and self-referential legal structures of 
the national legal systems, which give rise to the divergent formal consolidations of similar 
instances, the parties may not be in a position to expect their formulation of best efforts 
obligations will lead to the same conclusions as to the conditions of liability and burden of 
proof under different national legal systems. For instance, some “best efforts” obligations can 
be considered as absolute undertakings practically leading to strict liability or presumption of 
fault, such as the contractors’ obligation to design in a construction contract under English 
law, the considerations of joint maximization volume under US law, and the parent 
company’s obligation in letters of comfort under French law.  
 
Pursuant to the basic principles of pacta sunt servanda and freedom of contract, the rules of 
national legal systems, which determine the conditions of liability and burden of proof, should 
be considered by the decision maker applying lex mercatoria as part of the bargain if they are 
included by the parties in the articulated rules. However, under lex mercatoria, the questions 
of the conditions of liability and burden of proof are also matters of interpretation of contract, 
and require the decision maker to determine the common intention of the parties as to the 
intensity of contractual obligations, by exercising a contextual approach. Moreover, the 
decision maker should consider the intensity of residual obligations on the basis of the risk 
allocation and the reasonable expectations of the parties to a particular contract, in the 
supplementation of contract with individualized terms, which precedes the application of the 
default rules chosen by the parties.  
 
a. Interpretation of Best Efforts Obligations 
 
In the interpretation of the contract, the formulation of contractual clauses as to the intensity 
of obligations is not only relevant to the conditions of liability for non-performance, but also 
indicates the scope of contractual rights, obligations and risk allocations. In ICC Case No 
7639, the arbitral tribunal considered the formulation of contractual clauses and the principles 
of good faith and pacta sunt servanda, as general principles of equity under the applicable 
Qatari law, to determine the intensity of obligations and extent of rights of the parties. On 
those bases, the arbitral tribunal gave effect to the reasonable expectations in compliance with 
the free will of both parties as to the allocation of risks and with the abstract considerations of 
trade usage in the relevant field. The dispute arose from a sponsorship agreement between an 
Italian contractor and a Qatari engineering company, whereby the latter undertook to become 
the “sponsor” of the contractor, and to use its “best endeavours” to assist the contractor in the 
award of projects for works in Qatar by an employer and, if such contracts were to be 
awarded, the contractor undertook to pay the sponsor a fixed percentage of the original 
contract value. The agreement was governed by the law of Qatar. It was to remain effective 
for one year and could be renewed upon one-month written notice. Several weeks before the 
end of the first year, the contractor informed the sponsor that it did not wish to renew the 
agreement and the agreement expired. The agreement contained a “Duration Clause”, which 
provided that, notwithstanding its expiry, its provisions would continue to apply to any 
projects that may have been awarded pursuant to its provisions. Approximately one and a half 
years after the expiry of the agreement, two contracts were awarded by the employer to the 
contractor. A dispute arose between the sponsor and the contractor regarding the sponsor's 
entitlement to remuneration for these contracts. In the arbitral proceedings, the sponsor argued 
that, despite the expiry of the agreement, it was entitled to remuneration under the Duration 
                                                 
1882
 Grundmann, Stefan, the Fault Principle as the Chameleon of Contract Law: a Market Function Approach, 
Michigan Law Review, 107 (June 2009), at 1583 
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Clause for the award of the contracts, since both contracts had been awarded as a result of its 
efforts under the agreement.
1883
  
 
The tribunal noted that the sponsor accepted when signing the agreement, the risk of working 
and incurring expenses without receiving any consideration, if no contract was awarded to the 
contractor by the expiry date of the agreement under the “Obligation Clause”.1884 The 
sponsor’s risk in question was stressed further by another clause, which allowed the 
contractor to decide whether or not to submit a bid, whether or not to keeping in the running 
or withdraw it, whether or not to amend or revise, and whether or not to accept or refuse the 
award of a contract actually made by the employer. Thus, in arbitral tribunal’s view, the 
sponsor not only undertook the risk of non-award of the contract, depending on the 
employer’s decision, but also of non-award depending on a decision to be made by the 
contractor alone. The sponsor accepted the risk of not being paid nor reimbursed at all in case 
of the negative decision of the contractor. Under the Duration Clause, the sponsor would be 
entitled to its consideration even if the award was made after the expiry of the agreement only 
if the award could be proved to have resulted from the sponsor’s efforts during the validity of 
the agreement.
1885
 In this context, the tribunal considered that the sponsor was under the 
burden to prove that two contracts that were awarded by the employer to the contractor after 
the expiry of the term of the agreement were due to its positive efforts and labor exerted 
during the validity of the agreement. Considering that all the crucial events that lead to the 
awards took place after the expiry of the agreement and that there was no contractual intention 
in the agreement, which would entitle the sponsor to receive his consideration on the basis of 
his efforts exerted after the expiry of the agreement, the tribunal rejected the sponsor’s 
arguments. The tribunal examined the agreement in light of the mandatory provisions of the 
applicable national law, and did not find any rule that supported the sponsor’s claim for 
compensation.
1886
  
 
Although neither party requested, the tribunal decided to consider general principles of equity 
as part of its terms of reference, in its genuine and serious desire to be fair to both parties 
since, according to the tribunal, the principles of equity play a vital role in the operation of the 
applicable Qatari law. The tribunal also stated that it was motivated by a desire to achieve 
completeness and thoroughness in preparing its award. In essence, what the tribunal 
considered under the general principles of equity can be considered as an attempt to 
consolidate its conclusion with the established rules in order to accurately give effect to the 
reasonable expectations of the parties. Thus, the tribunal referred to the principle of good faith 
under Article 49 of the Civil and Commercial Law of Qatar, and to principle of pacta sunt 
servanda under Article 48. On the basis of these provisions, the tribunal noted that the sponsor 
undertook to use its “best endeavours”, in performing its obligations and “it did not guarantee 
results.”1887 Considering that the contractor never counterclaimed for damages for the 
sponsor's failure to produce positive results, the tribunal assumed that the sponsor did use its 
best endeavors during the agreement, to achieve the objectives of the agreement. However, 
the sponsor accepted to be paid upon achieving successful results i.e. the contractor being 
awarded a tender, during the validity of the agreement. The tribunal considered whether it was 
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 ICC Award in Case No. 7639, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, (1998), at 66-67 
1884
 Ibid., at 67 
1885
 Ibid., at 68 
1886
 Ibid., at 69-75 
1887
 Ibid., at 76 
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fair and reasonable to stipulate that the duration of the agreement was restricted to one year, 
or whether it was fair and reasonable to deprive the sponsor of payment, unless the award was 
proved to have been made during the one year specified. The tribunal noted that the specified 
duration of the agreement was freely entered into, and both parties must have felt the said 
duration was reasonable for their expectations under the circumstances prevailing at the time 
the agreement was signed. According to the tribunal, the provision, which granted payment to 
the sponsor only if the award was achieved within a certain time, was also reasonable and not 
contrary to equitable principles since, in its abstract reasoning, this is a common provision in 
sponsorship as well as in other agency contracts of this type. The tribunal considered that it is 
a common trade practice internationally to make payment to sponsor dependent on positive 
results, such as an award of a tender. The tribunal stated that “this trade usage provides 
certainty in the substance as well as in the duration of an agreement. The contractual practice 
which seems to prevail in the area, in the opinion of the Tribunal, does not conflict with the 
principles of good faith, as construed in the Agreement under consideration.”1888  
 
The tribunal also referred to Article 54 of the Qatari Civil and Commercial Law, which 
extends the interpretation and meaning of words and expressions, beyond the usual or strict 
construction and their appropriate circumstances. However, the tribunal considered that the 
Obligations Clause and the Duration Clause in the agreement were not vague or uncertain or 
incapable of precise meaning, which would throw some doubt on the genuine intentions of the 
parties. The tribunal concluded that “The above-mentioned Clauses of the Agreement are the 
outcome of the free will of both parties and their use is in compliance with the specific trade 
usage in this field and with equity accepted in Qatari Sponsorship contracts” and found that 
the claimant’s claims were not well founded as there was no violation of justice or equity in 
the behavior of the contractor towards the sponsor.
1889
 
 
Even if the text of the contract does not contain a reference to “best efforts”, the decision 
maker may interpret the contract through a contextual approach to the effect that some 
obligations contained in the contract should be characterized as undertakings to use best 
efforts. In ICC Case No 9797, the arbitral tribunal, applying “the general principles of law and 
the general principles of equity commonly accepted by the legal systems of most countries” to 
the substance of the dispute, had recourse to the UNIDROIT Principles in interpreting the 
contract with regard to the “best efforts” undertakings. The dispute took place between, on the 
one hand, the member firms of one of two business units of Andersen Worldwide 
Organization, as the claimants, and, on the other hand, the member firms of the other business 
unit and Andersen Worldwide Société Coopérative (“AWSC”) as the defendants. The 
claimants argued that the defendant member firms breached their material obligations by 
competing with the claimants, causing marketplace confusion and misappropriating the 
Andersen Consulting name, and that AWSC, as an administrative organ, breached its 
obligations by having failed to coordinate the activities of member firms of the two business 
units and to implement guidelines to ensure compatibility among them. AWSC argued that, 
with minor exceptions, Member Firm Interfirm Agreements (“MFIFAs”), which were entered 
into between AWSC and member firms, did not impose an obligation on AWSC to 
coordinate.
1890
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In the tribunal's view, the language of the organizational documents was not in accordance 
with AWSC's interpretation. The tribunal considered that member firm coordination was the 
cornerstone of the MFIFAs since, if adequate coordination were not well-founded and 
properly ensured in an organization comprised of more than one hundred member firms 
worldwide, cooperation would be seriously impaired. The tribunal considered that, according 
to the Paragraph 2.1 of the MFIFAs, a member firm appoints AWSC to arrange for the 
coordination of its professional practice on an international basis with that of the other 
member firms and legitimately expects its professional practice to be coordinated with that of 
the other member firms. The tribunal concluded that the explicit MFIFA provisions, 
interpreted in light of the purposes and policies set forth in the Preamble thereto and in the 
AWSC Articles and Bylaws, demonstrate that AWSC's essential obligation is to coordinate 
the member firms' diverse professional practices. According to the tribunal, those 
coordinating duties included specific functions, among others, developing compatible policies 
and professional standards for the member firms, developing annual operating plans to ensure 
the effective coordination of the member firms’ practices and determining the appropriate 
scope of practice for the member firms. By referring to Article 5.1.4 of the UNIDROIT 
Principles, the tribunal found that the wording of these purposes, policies and functions 
indicated that AWSC must exercise its best efforts to ensure cooperation, coordination and 
compatibility among the member firms' practices.
1891
  
 
The tribunal held that AWSC did not use its best efforts to ensure coordination, cooperation 
and compatibility among the practices of the member firms on the basis of two grounds. First, 
AWSC abandoned its responsibility to design and develop annual operating plans to assure 
the effective coordination of the practices of the member firms, which was explicitly 
stipulated in the MFIFAs.
1892
 Secondly, AWSC failed to take any course of action when the 
scope of practice conflict surfaced and extended. Although AWSC initially attempted to 
tackle the scope of practice conflict between the member firms by drawing internal guidelines 
for business unit cooperation, they were not properly implemented by AWSC and, under the 
pressing circumstances, the AWSC management was unable to agree on a course of action to 
address the scope of practice dispute or to draft a proposal for the consideration of the AWSC 
partners.
1893
 According to the tribunal, “AWSC's failure to exercise its best efforts to 
coordinate the member firms' practices substantially deprived Claimants of the cooperation 
they were entitled to expect under the MFIFAs.”1894   
 
The “best efforts” standards in the formulation of obligations under the contract, which is to 
be interpreted as a whole under lex mercatoria, indicate the burden of proof for establishing 
the liability for non-performance of those obligations. In the ICSID case between Joseph 
Charles Lemire and Ukraine, the claimant, a national of the United States, argued that the 
defendant had failed to make its best efforts to provide claimant with the licences for radio 
frequencies under the settlement agreement concerning the investment by the claimant of 
broadcasting stations in Ukraine. As to the applicable law, the tribunal held that since the 
parties, when negotiating the settlement agreement, incorporated extensive parts of the 
UNIDROIT Principles into their agreement, and included a clause which authorized the 
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tribunal to apply the rules of law the tribunal considers appropriate, the most appropriate 
decision was to submit the settlement agreement to “the rules of international law, and within 
these, to have particular regard to the UNIDROIT Principles.”1895 The settlement agreement 
provided that, by May 15, 2000, the defendant was to use its best possible efforts to consider 
in a positive way the application of the claimant’s company to provide it with the licences for 
11 radio frequencies. The tribunal noted that, the express terms of the provision required the 
defendant only to apply its best efforts, but not to achieve a result.
1896
 The tribunal referred to 
Article 5.1.4 of the UNIDROIT Principles and stated that “For Claimant to establish a 
violation of this best efforts obligation, it is not sufficient to prove that by May 15, 2000 the 
11 radio frequency licences had not been granted — the required test is that he produce 
evidence showing that Ukraine has failed to make such efforts as would be made by a 
reasonable government in the same circumstances.”1897 The tribunal observed that of the 11 
licences envisaged, six were granted by the State Committee before the deadline, another four 
within one month of the deadline and the last one within 2 ½ months of the deadline.1898 The 
tribunal held that “these delays do not amount to a violation of Ukraine’s best efforts 
obligation. There is often a gap between political decision and bureaucratic compliance. 
Paragraph 3 of Clause 13(b) explicitly requires that “the granting of licences … will be made 
in accordance with the requirements of Ukrainian legislation”. There is no evidence that 
Ukraine abated its pressure on the State Committee to perform. The State Committee issued 
the licences within time limits which are not unreasonable in the context of Ukrainian 
administrative practices.”1899 
 
It has been suggested that the use of word “best” in defining obligations by the parties 
requires the decision maker to take into account a subjective criterion, which depends on the 
capabilities of the promisor or the degree of efforts that it uses to carry on its own business, 
while the use of “reasonable” implies an objective criterion with reference to what will 
generally be considered necessary to be done in similar circumstances.
1900
 However, the 
wording of these obligations should not be decisive for the decision maker’s determination of 
the required level of performance of such obligations since, as a matter of interpretation, the 
context of contact might ultimately yield different consequences under different 
circumstances.  
 
The interpretation of the contact through a contextual approach, which combines subjective 
and objective considerations, was at the core of the reasoning of the arbitral tribunal in the Ad 
hoc Arbitration between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, and the Government of the United States with regard to their best efforts 
obligations, which concerned user charges in airports. In 1977, the Government of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Government of the United States 
signed in Bermuda an agreement concerning user charges in airports (Bermuda 2). In 1979, 
British Airports Authority announced very large increases in user charges for the charging 
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year 1980/81, which had the effect of increasing the charges payable by the US carriers at 
Heathrow by 60 to 70 percent. Although, a settlement was reached in 1983 between the 
British Airports Authority and Secretary of State for Trade, on the one hand, and the 
international airlines on the other, the differences persisted between the Governments of the 
Contracting Parties to Bermuda 2 regarding the user charges. In 1988, the US Government 
requested ad hoc arbitration pursuant to Bermuda 2 with respect to “the continuing dispute ... 
concerning the user charges imposed by the British Airports Authority … and the conduct of 
the British Government in relation thereto.”1901  
 
Article 10 of Bermuda 2 provided that “(1) Each Contracting Party shall use its best efforts to 
ensure that user charges imposed or permitted to be imposed by its competent charging 
authorities on the designated airlines of the other Contracting Party are just and reasonable. 
Such charges shall be considered just and reasonable if they are determined and imposed in 
accordance with the principles set forth in paragraphs (2) and (3) of this Article, and if they 
are equitably apportioned among the categories of users. (2) Neither Contracting Party shall 
impose or permit to be imposed on the designated airlines of the other Contracting Party user 
charges higher than those imposed on its own designated airlines operating similar 
international air services. (3) User charges may reflect, but shall not exceed, the full cost to 
the competent charging authorities of providing appropriate airport and air navigations 
facilities and services, and may provide for a reasonable rate of return on assets, after 
depreciation. In the provision of facilities and services, the component authorities shall have 
regard to such factors as efficiency, economy, environmental impact and safety of operation. 
User charges shall be based on sound economic principles and on the generally accepted 
accounting principles within the territory of the appropriate Contracting Party.”1902 These 
obligations raised a number of major difficulties in interpretation, which were identified by 
the ad hoc tribunal as follows: (1) the correct interpretation of the expression “best efforts” in 
the context of Article 10(1)-(3); (2) whether the obligations in Article 10(1)-(3) are 
obligations of conduct only, or also of result; (3) whether Article 10(1)-(3) defines “just and 
reasonable” for the purpose of Article 10(1); (4) whether the tribunal should begin by 
considering whether the user charges were “just and reasonable” or by considering whether 
the UK government had used its “best efforts”. 
 
The arbitral tribunal stated that “the 'best efforts' obligation incumbent on [the UK 
Government] under Art. 10(1) of Bermuda 2 cannot be regarded as a promise or guarantee on 
[the UK Government]'s part that user charges will in fact be 'just and reasonable'. Had that 
been the intention, the words 'use its best efforts to' would simply have been superfluous.” 
According to the tribunal, Article 10(1) of Bermuda 2 placed the parties under a continuous 
duty to do their best to ensure that the goals of that provision are attained, but that was not an 
absolute duty, since a party may be able to point to good reasons that explain why, if the 
charges imposed on the designated airlines of the other party were not just and reasonable, 
that was not due to any lack of required effort on its part. The tribunal held that the UK 
government's obligation to use its best efforts in relation to user charges imposed a positive 
duty to take all steps that were legally open to it. In the view of the tribunal, “a Party is 
entitled to recognise the normal margin of appreciation enjoyed by charging authorities in 
relation to the complex economic situation that is relevant to the establishment of charges.” 
However, the tribunal’s reasoning reflected to some extent the consideration of “joint 
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maximization volume” when it stated that “the Party is obliged to use as much effort as it 
would if it had an unconditional interest of its own in ensuring that relevant user charges did 
not exceed what was just and reasonable (e.g. because the Party itself was going to have to 
meet the cost of the charges): if a Party uses less effort than it would then have used, it cannot 
claim to have used its best efforts.” Even so, the tribunal put a limit to that consideration on 
the basis of the objective approach of “diligence insurance”, and stated that “the 'best efforts' 
obligation does not require the taking of steps which a reasonable government in the position 
of the Party would reasonably have believed to be unnecessary in order to ensure that the user 
charges imposed on the designated airlines of the other Party did not exceed just and 
reasonable charges.”1903  
 
In relation to the question of whether the obligations in Article 10(1)-(3) were obligations of 
"conduct" or "result", the tribunal rejected any interpretation that would treat both paragraphs 
(2) and (3) of Article 10 as creating obligations of result. According to the tribunal, such an 
interpretation would relegate “best efforts” to minimal significance, since any non-conformity 
with those paragraphs would itself constitute a breach of Bermuda 2, irrespective of the 
efforts made by the party in question to ensure conformity, and the only circumstances in 
which a party’s best efforts could be relevant would be where the other party alleged that, 
even though the requirements of paragraphs (2) and (3) were satisfied, the first party had not 
used its best efforts to ensure that charges were equitably apportioned among the categories of 
users.
1904
 The tribunal concluded that “paragraph (2), as well as being relevant to the 
characterization of charges as just and reasonable for the purposes of paragraph (1), also 
imposes an independent mandatory obligation and is in this respect an obligations of result.” 
According to the tribunal, Article 10(2) was not subject to the qualification of “best efforts” 
and imposed an obligation of result with respect to non-discrimination against the airlines of 
the other contracting party, according to which, user charges could not be just and reasonable 
unless they were set in accordance with the condition laid out in Article 10(2).
1905
 Thus, the 
tribunal’s reasoning in this regard was similar to that of the Rhodia decision of the English 
court, which held that where the contract actually specified that certain steps had to be taken 
as part of the exercise of reasonable endeavours, those steps would have to be taken, even if 
that could be said to involve the sacrificing of a party's commercial interests.
1906
  
 
By contrast, the tribunal stated that “paragraph (3) of Art. 10 is solely concerned to lay down 
criteria for the characterization of charges as just and reasonable for the purposes of the “best 
efforts” obligation contained in paragraph (1) and is therefore relevant only to the content of 
the obligation of conduct imposed by that paragraph.”1907 Given that each party’s interest is in 
the user charges imposed on its own designated airlines when they are using airport facilities 
in the territory of the other party, the tribunal discarded an interpretation of paragraph (3) as 
creating obligations independent of paragraph (1) since, because of the unlimited wording of 
paragraph (3), those obligations would be required to be performed for the benefit of not only 
the other party’s designated airlines, but also the first party’s own airlines and third countries’ 
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airlines.
1908
 Thus, despite its apparently imperative drafting, Article 10 (3) was not interpreted 
by the tribunal to that effect, since otherwise the evidently intended obligation to use no more 
than best efforts would have been effectively transmuted into an absolute obligation of result. 
Considering the function of Article 10 (3) as purely definitional, the tribunal held that Article 
10 (3), together with the “equitable apportionment” condition contained in Article 10 (1) and 
the mandatory condition contained in Article 10 (2), provided a complete definition of 
“justness and reasonableness” of charges. Thus, the tribunal rejected the UK government's 
submissions of other tests. The UK Government contended that the user charges at Heathrow 
compared favorably (or not unfavorably) with user charges at other airports elsewhere in the 
world. The tribunal held that such a finding would not relieve the tribunal of the need to 
consider whether the charges at Heathrow were just and reasonable under Article 10 (1)-(3), 
which contained its own definition of what constituted justness and reasonableness of user 
charges for the purposes of the parties’ best efforts obligation.1909 The tribunal also noted that 
the UK Government suggested no alternative, other than international comparability, to the 
principles referred to in Article 10 (1)-(3), for the purpose of characterizing charges as just 
and reasonable, and the US Government contended that there was no alternative for that 
purpose.
1910
  
 
As to the question of whether the correct starting point should be the “best efforts” of the UK 
Government or whether the results were “just and reasonable”, the tribunal stated that “In 
assessing whether ‘best efforts’ that a Party claims that it has made were sufficient, it will be 
necessary to consider whether a reasonable government, that was correctly interpreting the 
Treaty, would have believed that effort, beyond such (if any) as was deployed by the Party, 
was required. That question can be answered only in the light of all the relevant surrounding 
circumstances, including the actual user charges payable by the designated airlines of the 
other Party and those proposed by the Party’s competent authority.”1911 However, the tribunal 
underlined that what matters is not whether the result that the party had to use its best efforts 
to achieve was in fact achieved, but whether the party used its best efforts to achieve that 
result. According to the tribunal, Bermuda 2 was concerned with the position ex ante (as it 
was to be expected when the relevant charges were imposed), and not ex post (as it turned out 
to be in the event). Thus, in answering the question of performance or non-performance of 
best efforts obligations, the arbitral tribunal decided to start with the direction and sufficiency 
of the British Government’s efforts, rather than the just and reasonable quality of the actual 
charges, but, in the course of appraising the direction and sufficiency of those efforts, the 
tribunal was to examine the actual charges imposed in the past and the results of their 
imposition and the charges to be imposed in the future and their likely results as they were to 
be expected in the light of past experience.
1912
  
 
In a contract, in which a party does not tend to promise a perfect result, but promises to 
perform a degree of effort vaguely described in articulating a contractual obligation, both 
parties defer to the enforcement stage the uncertainty arising from the incorporation of such a 
vague standard in the formulation of the undertaking. In such cases, the control of uncertainty 
is delegated to the decision maker applying lex mercatoria in order for him to determine the 
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conditions of liability and burden of proof through an accurate reflection of the reasonable 
expectations of the parties. If the degree of the required efforts from the promisor is 
determined on the basis of the “joint maximization volume” as if the promisor and the 
promisee were united in a single firm, such references to “best efforts” in the contract become 
meaningless, to the extent that it places the uncertainty and burden of proof on the promisor of 
best efforts, who is required to prove that there was nothing significant it could have done to 
satisfy its obligation, as in Falstaff case. In such a case, the contracting parties’ choice of 
governance mechanism in the context of transactions governed through legal uncertainty is 
disregarded, since the vertical integration and contracts in the market can be considered as 
alternative modes for organizing the same transactions. Although the facts of the Falstaff case, 
which concerned the sale of a business, where part of the remuneration of the seller depended 
on future sales by the buyer of the products bearing the brand of target business, apparently 
required a more nuanced approach to the obligation of the buyer, the court disregarded the 
essence of a “best effort” obligation, which grants a form of autonomy of judgment to the 
promisor, by implying that even equal treatment of both brands would not have precluded 
liability, since the volume-based royalty attached only to the Ballantine label, and that 
Falstaff's duty of best efforts required to something more than equal treatment of both labels 
but something less than economic suicide.
1913
  
 
It is true that, in some contracts, the interests of the two parties in a best efforts obligation 
may conflict since, the promisor may wish to maximize its profit for its self-interest, while the 
promisee expects that the promisor should maximize the sum of its and the profits of 
promisee. However, when a party enters into a contract rather than opting for vertical 
integration, it has to choose its contracting partner on the basis of the latter’s competence in 
achieving a certain result. If the promisee settles for a best effort obligation under a particular 
bargain, it should be aware of the risk of monitoring problems, since it will not be able to 
discern the joint profits when it cannot monitor the costs of the promisor. These 
considerations should be relevant to the abstract reasoning of the decision maker controlling 
the uncertainty, as a form of risk allocation agreed by the parties, when they choose to 
become contractual partners on the basis of “best efforts” obligations rather than becoming 
partners in a firm through integration for organizing the same transaction.  
 
This is reflected by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the case of 
Zilg v. Prentice-Hall. The court stated that the contract in question established a relationship 
between the publisher and author, which implies an obligation, derived both from the 
common expectations of parties and from their relationship, upon the publisher to make 
certain efforts in publishing a book that it had accepted notwithstanding the contractual clause 
about the publisher's discretion.
1914
 The court took into account the competence of the 
publisher and contrasted the contract with the situation of an integrated firm by stating that 
“Zilg, like most authors, sought to take advantage of a division of labor in which firms 
specialize in publishing works written by authors who are not employees of the firm”, and 
“while publishers and authors have generally similar goals, differences in perspective and 
resulting perceptions are inevitable”.1915 The court added that although up-front payment to 
the author is a means of reconciling these differing viewpoints, the publishers will strongly 
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prefer to have flexibility in reacting to actual marketing conditions according to their own 
experience in view of the uncertainty regarding the publication of most books.
1916
  
 
Thus, in determining the level of required performance, the decision maker applying lex 
mercatoria should consider that, under a “best efforts” obligation, the promisor obtains from 
the bargain some autonomy in making judgment within the scope of its obligation. The 
promisee should prove that the promisor have failed in the exercise of this autonomy through 
incompetence or abuse, and the decision maker should examine the evidence relating to such 
a failure by taking into account the nature and purpose of the contract, as well as objective 
and subjective factors surrounding the contract through a contextual approach, rather than by 
considering the promisor as an employee of the promisee, and under the direct orders of the 
promisee to maximize its profits. 
 
In ICC Case No. 5946, the Falstaff doctrine came up in the determination of the required level 
of performance under a “best efforts” obligation in an exclusive agency agreement concluded 
between a French company and US company in 1983. The US defendant, as sole and 
exclusive agent for the distribution and sale of two varieties of controlled wines bottled and 
supplied by the French claimant, undertook to use its best efforts to promote the sale of these 
wines within the contract territory. In 1985, the claimant terminated the agreement, arguing 
that the defendant failed to comply with the best efforts clause in the agreement since it had 
sold only an insignificant number of bottles bearing claimant’s own trade name. The claimant 
alleged that the defendant had concentrated its forces on selling wine bearing the defendant’s 
own “Brand X” label. During the arbitral proceedings, it was questioned whether “Brand X” 
wine was a subject matter of the agreement. The parties agreed that the agreement was to be 
construed in accordance with the laws of New York.
1917
  
 
The sole arbitrator referred to the decision in the Falstaff case. The arbitrator noted that the 
substantial difference between the sales of Brand X and non-Brand X wine by the defendant 
would lead, as in the Falstaff case, to the conclusion that the defendant had failed to use its 
best efforts with respect to non-Brand X wine, if the agreement between the parties only 
covered non-Brand X wine. However, the arbitrator found that agreement encompassed Brand 
X wine as well as non-Brand X wine, and refused to examine the case under the Falstaff 
doctrine.
 1918
  The arbitrator also referred to Section 2-306 (2) of the New York Uniform 
Commercial Code, which provides a term implied in law whereby the exclusive dealing of 
certain goods between the seller and the buyer imposes an implied obligation by the seller to 
use its best efforts to supply the goods and by the buyer to use its best efforts to promote their 
sale. However, the arbitrator held that the claim that the defendant violated this implied 
obligation by ordering insignificant quantity of non-“Brand X” wine was unfounded since the 
evidence showed that the agreement also encompassed “Brand X” wine.1919  
 
After having held that the Brand X wine fell within the agreement and the alleged preference 
for the Brand X wine could not constitute a breach of the agreement, the arbitrator proceeded 
to determine whether the defendant failed to use its best efforts to promote wines subject to 
the agreement. Rather than looking at comparable levels of performance in other contracts in 
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the relevant sector or similar objective factors, the arbitrator focused on the history of the 
defendant’s performance under the contract, given that both parties relied on that evidence in 
their pleadings. The parties only disagreed as to how the performance between 1983 and 1985 
should be accounted for, but both parties tried to use the very weak first half of 1984 in their 
favor: the claimant argued that the base period was the 1983 calendar year, according to 
which the decrease from 1983 to 1984 amounted to 130 percent, while the defendant stated 
that the base period should be the first full 12 months period, encompassing the second half of 
1983 and the first half of 1984, which resulted in an increase of 7 percent in the quantities of 
wine ordered by the defendant. The arbitrator stated that the accurate approach would be to 
compare similar periods, which would mean that only the second half of 1983 and the second 
half of 1984 were to be compared, which resulted in a decrease of 34 percent.
1920
 However, 
the arbitrator noted that the performance has to be seen in context, and held that, in light of 
the difficulties attributable to the claimant, the drop of performance of 34 percent from the 
second half of 1983 to the second half of 1984 did not amount to a failure of the defendant to 
use its best efforts to promote the wines subject to the agreement. The arbitrator stated that the 
burden of proof that the defendant failed to use its best efforts was “clearly” on the claimant. 
According to the arbitrator, while the claimant made a prima facie case for the second half of 
1983 and 1984 that there was a non-significant drop of performance, the defendant also made 
a prima facie case that this drop in performance might have been caused by the difficulties 
attributable to the claimant, such as the claimant’s inability to reproduce same labels, to 
guarantee continuity of shipment and stick to the same corporate names. The arbitrator 
dismissed the allegation of defendant’s failure to use its best efforts on the ground that the 
claimant failed to overcome that prima facie case by showing that either one of those 
deficiencies alleged had no bearing on defendant’s ability to promote claimant’s wines in the 
contract territory.
1921
 
 
b. Supplementation with Best Efforts Obligations 
 
In supplementing a contract with individualized terms, the decision maker applying lex 
mercatoria should exercise its abstract reasoning in order to take into account the wide-spread 
use of the distinction between undertakings of “best efforts” or its variants and undertakings 
to achieve a certain result in international contracting practice and the recognition of such 
variations under the national legal systems. Such reasoning invites the decision maker to 
adopt a more refined approach in the supplementation of the contract with individualized 
terms, which takes into account the intensity of residual contractual obligations, in order to 
accurately give effect to the reasonable expectations of the parties. The residual contractual 
obligations may require a party to exert some efforts without bearing the risk of failure of its 
efforts, when the implied obligation requires a relatively complicated conduct, which involves 
a high degree of risk of failure in achieving a certain result, or a high degree of influence of 
the other party over its performance, such as the duty to use best efforts to agree or to obtain 
approvals from third parties or public authorities. 
 
The arbitral tribunal in ICC Case No 8331 supplemented a memorandum of understanding 
(MOU), declaring the parties’ intention to conclude certain agreements, with the implied 
undertaking to use best efforts to agree. Under the MOU, the parties committed themselves to 
conclude a contract for the sale of trucks and of spare parts and indicated in general terms 
their intention to come to an agreement for the setting up of an assembly plant for the 
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production of the same type of trucks in the buyer's country. While the sales contract was 
actually concluded, the defendant refused to enter into negotiations for the setting up of the 
envisaged assembly plant arguing that the claimant lacked the necessary business organization 
for such a project.
1922
 The parties agreed that the arbitral tribunal shall apply UNIDROIT 
Principles. The claimant argued that the MOU was not a binding contract, but a letter of intent 
in which the parties agreed to consider carrying out some projects. According to the claimant, 
the parties were bound to negotiate in order to try to come to a final agreement on the 
different projects of the MOU, but the MOU did not bind the parties to execute those projects. 
The defendant contended that the MOU was its basic agreement with the claimant regarding a 
vast project for the assembly and the manufacturing of trucks, and the claimant failed to 
execute its part of the deal by not forming the joint venture agreed on in the MOU. According 
to the defendant, the UNIDROIT principles confirmed that the MOU was a binding 
agreement between the parties, since what had been left for negotiation were secondary little 
matters to be clarified by the parties in further discussions.
1923
  
 
The tribunal considered that the real issue was to establish the legal effect of the general 
description of the parties’ intention, when such intention had not been translated into specific 
contractual obligations. The tribunal considered that when the parties agree upon general 
issues to be implemented by them at a later stage they cannot be released from their implied 
obligations to use their best efforts to ensure that such general issues become specific terms of 
contracts to be executed by the parties. The tribunal referring to Article 5.1.4(2) held that “the 
general description of the parties' intentions to reach agreements on certain issues contained in 
the MOU obligates the parties to exert their best efforts in order to have such intentions 
become defined terms of Contracts legally binding for each of them.”1924  The tribunal stated 
that “a party to an agreement that has freely chosen its counterpart for the business envisaged 
by both of them may not after the conclusion of said agreement invoke as a justification of the 
non-fulfillment of its obligation to exert its best efforts to have the business materialized that 
it has made a wrong choice in selecting the other party which, according to it, may not 
constitute a real counterpart.” Thus, the tribunal held that “the Claimant breached its 
obligation to make its best efforts with the view to proceeding with the establishment of the 
assembly of Claimant vehicles in Iran in cooperation with the Respondent.” 1925 
 
In ICC Case No 10346, the arbitral tribunal considered the intensity of obligations in the 
supplementation of the contract with the duty of cooperation. The dispute concerned a 
contract for the sale of electricity by the claimant, a Colombian company, to defendant, 
another Colombian company. The agreement was never performed, because the contract was 
not registered in the public registry. The arbitral tribunal, applying Colombian law, found that 
the defendant had not performed the duty to collaborate that it was obliged to exercise jointly 
with the other party in order to adjust the provisions of the contract to the requirements of the 
public authority thereby obtaining the registration of the contract. In this regard, the tribunal 
took into account a contractual clause, which provided that that the registration was a joint 
task of the parties, Article 871 of the Colombian Commercial Code, and Article 5.1.3 of the 
UNIDROIT Principles.
1926
 The tribunal considered that the undertaking to collaborate in 
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relation to the registration of the contract in the public authority can be classified as an 
“obligation to try” (“obligación de medio”), which is an undertaking on the part of the debtor 
to use all diligence to obtain a result which it cannot guarantee, in contrast to “obligations to 
produce results” (“obligaciones de resultado”). The standard of required behavior for the 
obligations to try was described by the tribunal as the duty of the debtor to conduct itself in 
such a way as to use all reasonable means within its knowledge, experience, material 
resources, and diligence to obtain the result expected by the creditor but without guaranteeing 
that it will be achieved. In the tribunal’s view, the failure to comply with such a duty meant 
debtor’s fault, as an error of conduct which lead to the negative evaluation of the behavior of 
the professional. The tribunal stated that “Claimant has been successful in demonstrating that 
[the defendant] did not exercise due diligence in relation to the obligation to try to procure the 
registration of the contract in the [public registry], which is equivalent to having proved fault 
on the part of [the defendant]. This is one of the connotations of this kind of obligation, in 
contrast to the general rule on contractual liability where there is a presumption of fault on the 
part of the debtor in the event of failure to provide the service specified.”1927 
 
3. Concluding Remarks 
 
The contractual liability under lex mercatoria is neither fault-based nor strict since, as the law 
of principled adjudication of contractual disputes, it does not provide such a distinction ex 
ante. Although, in the exclusive application of lex mercatoria to the substance of the dispute, 
the exercise of abstract reasoning on the basis of the international instruments enables the 
decision maker to derive such rules that are in favor of a regime of strict liability, those rules 
cannot be considered as established rules that are capable of overriding the regime of fault-
based liability under the national rules applicable to the substance of the dispute pursuant to 
the established rules of conflict, due to the divergent and nuanced approaches of the national 
legal systems to the issue of contractual liability. Even so, the abstract “best efforts” 
considerations provide a flexible tool for the decision maker interpreting or supplementing the 
contract to determine the conditions of liability and burden of proof through an accurate 
reflection of the reasonable expectations of the parties in a particular case. Thus, the 
conditions of liability and burden of proof may be determined primarily by the intensity of 
contractual obligations on the basis of the reasonable expectations of the parties to a particular 
contract. 
 
If the parties’ reasonable expectations require the decision maker to characterize an 
articulated or residual obligation, as one of “best efforts”, the promisee will have the burden 
of proving that the promisor has not satisfied the requirements of its obligation, so that the 
liability of the promisor may appear as fault-based. In determining the degree of required 
efforts, the decision maker applying lex mercatoria should consider that, under a “best efforts” 
obligation, the promisor obtains some autonomy of judgment within the scope of its 
obligation. The promisee should prove that the promisor have failed in the exercise of this 
autonomy through incompetence or abuse, and the decision maker should examine the 
evidence relating to such a failure by taking into account the nature and purpose of the 
contract, as well as objective and subjective factors surrounding the contract through a 
contextual approach. Thus, the decision maker will focus on the degree of efforts as would be 
made by a reasonable person of the same kind in the same circumstances, while emphasizing 
the subjective competence of the promisor, contractual context and the pleadings of parties in 
giving practical substance to the required degree of efforts. When the best effort standard is 
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accompanied by specific instances of conduct in the contract, the decision maker should not 
only utilize them in determining the contents of best efforts obligations, but also consider 
whether they can be characterized as independent undertakings to achieve a result in 
accordance with the risk allocation agreed by the parties.  
 
If the decision maker interpreting or supplementing the contract concludes that the obligation 
breached is an undertaking to achieve a certain result, then the promisee will only have to 
prove that the result have not taken place, and the promisor will bear the risks relating to its 
failure to perform the obligation, as though he has strict liability since he may not plead that 
he had done his best, subject to whether the default rules chosen by the parties or applicable 
pursuant to the established rules of conflict provide a rebuttable presumption of fault. 
However, in all cases, either party may provide such evidence that might affect the 
characterization of the obligation by the decision maker interpreting or supplementing the 
contract, and change the burden of proof and conditions of liability. Moreover, regardless of 
the intensity of its obligation, the promisor may be released from liability if it proves that the 
non-performance was due to the promisee’s interference or unforeseen contingencies, subject 
to the conditions to be derived from the articulated or established rules in the particular case. 
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iii. Force Majeure 
 
Regardless of whether its undertaking is characterized as one of best efforts or achieving a 
certain result, the promisor may be excused from liability for its non-performance if he proves 
that the performance of his obligations as agreed under the contract was rendered impossible 
by an event, which he could not have taken into account at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract, and he could not have avoided or overcome its consequences after the conclusion of 
the contract.
1928
 This excuse is based on the doctrine of force majeure, which originates in 
Roman law concept of “Vis Major”. The concept of “Vis Major” was referred to as acts of 
God and limited to events of natural causes. The doctrine of force majeure has progressively 
been expanded by the courts of different national legal systems. However, the doctrine has not 
been accepted in the same way by the national legal systems. In abstract terms, force majeure 
refers to those situations outside the control of parties and which prevent them from 
performing the obligations as agreed under the contract.
1929
 It has been defined as the law’s 
recognition of those situations “that without default of either party a contractual obligation has 
become incapable of being performed because the circumstances in which the performance is 
called for would render it impossible.”1930 In this sense, the force majeure doctrine serves to 
mitigate the goal of strict contract enforcement with notions of justice and fairness.
1931
 
 
1. Sources of Abstractions 
a. National Laws 
 
The force majeure excuse is expressly admitted by French law, under which it has been 
construed strictly, since either the obligor is freed when there is a total impossibility, or he has 
to perform the contract however onerous its performance has become.
1932
 Article 1147 of the 
French Civil Code, which regulates the conditions of contractual liability, provides that the 
debtor shall be ordered to pay damages by reason of the non-performance of a contractual 
obligation, whenever it does not prove that the non-performance comes from an external 
cause which cannot be imputed to him, although there is no bad faith on its part. Article 1148 
provides an exemption from paying damages for an obligor who failed to perform as a result 
of force majeure or of a fortuitous event. Although the texts use different words to designate 
the concept, “external cause which cannot be imputed to the debtor” under Article 1147, and 
force majeure and fortuitous event under Article 1148, the French doctrine generally 
considers that these terms mean the same thing. According to the case law, these words can 
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only be invoked if the obligor is free from fault, whereby absence of fault and exemption for 
non-performance due to force majeure are treated as equivalent.
1933
  
 
The case law derived three conditions for an event to constitute force majeure from the 
wording “external cause which cannot be imputed to the debtor”: the event must be exterior, 
unforeseeable, and irresistible. First, the event must occur outside the sphere for which the 
obligor is responsible. However, the French courts did not apply this condition in some cases, 
and recently, Cour de Cassation defined force majeure without mentioning this condition.
1934
 
Secondly, the event must be unforeseeable as of the time of the execution of the contract. In 
this determination, all of the circumstances surrounding the event, including its time and 
place, must be considered. It is generally admitted that the courts must, as in the case of 
appreciation of fault, base themselves on the standard of good family man, as adapted to the 
defendants’ activities and to their level of specialization.1935 Finally, the event must be 
irresistible. According to the case law, if there is the impossibility of resisting the event, even 
if it could be foreseen, it constitutes in itself a case of force majeure.
1936
 As in the requirement 
of unforeseeability, the test of irresistibility is primarily an objective one, which permits some 
subjectivity.
1937
  
 
Under French law, the effect of force majeure is detailed by the case law. Where force 
majeure is established, the obligor does not have to perform its obligations and it is not liable 
for damages. When the impossibility of performance is merely temporary, and time is not of 
the essence of the contract, the contract is merely suspended. In the case of permanent 
impossibility to perform under reciprocal contracts, the contract as a whole dissolves and the 
parties are released from it due to the interdependence of obligations, subject to the possibility 
of partially maintaining the contract. In general, the courts accept that release of the obligor 
from its obligation to perform automatically entails cancellation of the contract, wholly or in 
part, by operation of law.
 1938
 An application for judicial termination of the contract is not 
necessary in the case of impossibility of performance, because when one party’s obligation 
becomes impossible through force majeure, this removes the cause of the other party’s 
obligations and the contract disappears retroactively for lack of cause, with consequential 
restitution and counter-restitution of money or property transferred under it. It is also accepted 
that where the specific restitution is not possible, the courts may order the party under the 
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obligation of restitution to pay the value of the performance in question at the time of its 
transfer.
1939
 However, it is observed that the courts have occasionally preferred to rely on 
Article 1184 of the French Civil Code. Article 1184 provides for judicial termination of the 
contract on non-performance, and allows the courts to verify that the conditions of force 
majeure are fulfilled before the contract is retroactively terminated.
 1940
 It also grants the court 
the discretion to reduce or vary the creditor's obligation in order to take account of the 
reduced performance of the debtor, where the contract has been performed in part before the 
force majeure supervened, or where the force majeure does not wholly or permanently 
prevent performance.
1941
  
 
Some legal systems construct the ideas underlying the force majeure doctrine around the 
concept of impossibility of performance. Under the traditional doctrine of impossibility of 
performance, the obligor is released from its contractual duty to perform if the impossibility 
occurred after formation of the contract and cannot be attributed to any kind of fault of the 
obligor. Many civil law systems recognize this excuse to the contractual liability, although the 
way the excuse is given effect varies considerably. 
1942
  
 
German law, in general, approaches to this question by reference to the categories of 
impossibility. Where impossibility is only temporary, the contract is normally suspended. 
There is also a distinction between impossibility attributable or not attributable to the 
obligor.
1943
 The doctrine of impossibility of performance was regulated in Section 275 of the 
German Civil Code of 1900. Under this provision, the obligor was released from its duty to 
perform to the extent that the performance becomes impossible after the conclusion of the 
contract as a result of a circumstance for which he is not responsible. After the reform of the 
rules of obligations of the German Civil Code that came into force in 2002, the new system is 
based on a general concept of breach of duty under Section 280, which is considered 
comparable to the general concept of non-performance under the CISG, the UNIDROIT 
Principles and the PECL.
1944
 Accordingly, the questions of whether the breach was caused by 
an impediment or not become relevant only with regard to specific remedies under German 
law, and it does not matter, in principle, at the stage of determining non-performance whether 
the obligor was at fault or otherwise responsible for not overcoming the relevant impediment.  
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After the reform, Section 275 of the German Civil Code largely sets aside the requirement 
that the impossibility must not be imputable to the obligor.
1945
 Section 275 (1) only deals with 
the question whether or not the obligor can be forced to perform, and if performance is 
impossible, it should not be ordered to perform, regardless of the reason of impossibility. 
Thus, it provides that performance cannot be obtained in so far as it is impossible for the 
obligor, in the sense of subjective impossibility, or for everybody, in the sense of objective 
impossibility. Section 275 (2) recognizes the cases of “practical impossibility”, in which the 
obligor may refuse to perform if performance will cause the obligor an effort which, contrary 
to the requirement of good faith and fair dealing, is disproportionate to the interest of the 
obligee in getting the performance. In the latter cases, the question of whether the breach of 
duty is attributable to the obligor becomes relevant to some extent, since Section 275 (2) 
provides that, when it is determined what efforts may reasonably be required of the obligor, it 
must also be taken into account whether he is responsible for the obstacle to performance. 
Finally, pursuant to Section 275 (3), the obligor may refuse a performance of a personal 
character provided that, when the obstacle to the performance of the obligor is weighed 
against the interest of the obligee in performance, performance cannot be reasonably required 
of the obligor.  
 
Section 275 does not require the event causing impossibility to be unforeseeable.
1946
 
However, as Section 276 allows for stricter liability in cases of a guarantee or an assumption 
of risk by the obligor, which can be derived from the content of the contract, it is argued that 
this flexibility enables the interpretation of impossibility under German law to reflect the 
conditions of force majeure excuse: the obligor must not have assumed the relevant risk, the 
non-performance must be due to an impediment beyond its control, the obligor could not 
reasonably foresee the impediment at the time of contracting, and he could not reasonably 
avoid or overcome it or its consequences.
1947
 Thus, in this view, the decisive criterion should 
be whether the obligor has assumed a particular risk, instead of the distinctions among various 
categories of impossibility. 
 
The legal consequence of Section 275 of the German Civil Code is the exclusion of a claim 
for specific performance, regardless of the reason of impossibility. In cases of impossibility, 
the obligee may terminate the agreement for non-performance under Section 323, even if the 
non-performance was not the obligor’s fault. Section 326 (5) provides that although Section 
323 may apply to the cases of impossibility, it is not necessary to fix a period of time to 
terminate the contract. Moreover, pursuant to Section 326 (1) and (2), the obligee will be 
released from the obligation to make a counter-performance, whether or not the impossibility 
was caused by the obligor, unless the obligee itself is responsible for the impossibility. Thus, 
the obligee does not have to exercise his right to terminate the contract for non-performance 
under Section 323, since he is automatically released from his obligation under Section 
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326.
1948
 The ipso iure exclusion of the obligee’s duty to perform in cases of impossibility is 
considered as the functional equivalent to a right of termination.
1949
 According to Section 326 
(4), in cases where the obligee has already performed an obligation, from which he was 
released under Section 326, it may claim restitution of the benefits transferred, pursuant to 
Section 346.  
 
The obligor’s fault will be relevant to its liability for damages under Section 280: if the 
obligor caused the impossibility, he will be liable in damages. Likewise, according to Section 
283, where the obligor is excused from rendering specific performance due to impossibility, 
the obligee may demand damages in lieu of performance, if the requirements of Section 280 
(1) are satisfied. The second sentence of Section 280 (1) excludes liability when the obligor is 
not responsible for non-performance. Under Section 285 (1), whenever the obligor is excused 
from performing on the ground that performance is impossible, the obligee may demand 
surrender of what has been received by the obligor as substitute or an assignment of the 
substitute claim. Section 285 (2) provides that if the obligee demands damages in lieu of 
performance as well as surrender of substitute, the damages are reduced by the value of the 
reimbursement or the claim to reimbursement he has obtained. Moreover, pursuant to Section 
326 (3), if the obligor claims what the obligee has received as a substitute, the obligee is 
obligated to perform its counter-performance, but the latter is diminished insofar as the value 
of the substitute is lower than the value of the performance due.  
 
Common law traditionally treats contracts in absolute terms of risk allocation between the 
parties. Thus, originally in common law, the supervening events provided no excuse for non-
performance and the concept of force majeure was not a traditional common law doctrine. 
1950
 
However, the courts have gradually admitted doctrines of impossibility, impracticability and 
frustration, which take into account such events that occur after the contract was concluded 
and make performance of contract impossible, illegal, or something radically different from 
that which was in the contemplation of the parties at the time of contract conclusion, but these 
doctrines presently operate within very narrow confines.
1951
  
 
Under English law, the doctrine of frustration was established in 1863 in the case of Taylor v. 
Caldwell, where the court employed the concept of an implied term in fact as the basis of a 
doctrine of impossibility of performance.
1952
 This theory was later criticized due to the 
difficulty or impossibility in determining the parties’ implied intentions at the time of 
contracting, on the basis of the officious bystander test, since had that bystander pointed out 
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to the parties the supervening event that would take place in the future, the parties could have 
sought to insert reservations or qualifications in regulating the effects of such an event.
1953
 
Lord Radcliff, in the case of Davis Contractors Ltd v. Fareham UDC, highlighted the “logical 
difficulty in seeing how the parties could even impliedly have provided for something which 
ex hypothesi they neither expected nor foresaw” and emphasized the legal effect of 
frustration, which “does not depend on their intention or their opinions, or even knowledge, as 
to the event.” Thus, he stated that “frustration occurs whenever the law recognizes that 
without default of either party a contractual obligation has become incapable of being 
performed because the circumstances in which performance is called for would render it a 
thing radically different from that which was undertaken by the contract.”1954 Since it is 
established that the courts will not assist a party who is trying to escape from a bad bargain, 
the doctrine of frustration cannot be invoked simply because the performance has become 
more onerous, but only where the supervening event radically or fundamentally changes the 
nature of performance.
1955
 The contracting parties are expected to foresee many possibilities 
and guard against them in defining their obligations under the contract. Thus, in determining 
whether a radical change in the obligation exists, the courts will ask what the original contract 
required of the parties and then consider whether the frustrating event has rendered 
performance ‘radically different’ from that which was originally envisaged.1956 
 
There are a number of limitations upon the scope of the doctrine of frustration under English 
law. First, if the contract contains an express clause for the occurrence of the alleged 
frustrating event, the contract will not be considered as subject to the doctrine of 
frustration.
1957
 Thus, the force majeure clauses may exclude the operation of doctrine of 
frustration, because the contract, on its proper interpretation, will be held to have covered and 
made its own provision for the frustrating event.
1958
 The courts have generally interpreted 
these clauses narrowly.
1959
 Nevertheless, it is suggested that the courts are more willing to 
enforce a force majeure clause than to invoke the doctrine of frustration since a force majeure 
clause, agreed by the parties, forms an essential part of their bargain, and the court’s role in 
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relation to such a clause is confined to interpreting and giving effect to it without making a 
new contract for the parties or imposing an outcome irrespective of their wishes.
1960
 Secondly, 
the doctrine of frustration does not apply to a foreseeable event, which is within the 
contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting. The test of foreseeability is based on 
objective considerations, “any person of ordinary intelligence would regard as likely to 
occur.”1961 However, the approach, which required unforeseeability as a condition for the 
doctrine of frustration, was challenged by Lord Denning in The Eugenia, who considered that 
even if the event was foreseeable and the parties did not make a provision for it in the 
contract, the doctrine of frustration may apply provided that the basic criterion of something 
radically different from that which was the parties’ contemplation is satisfied.1962 Thirdly, a 
party cannot invoke the doctrine of frustration where the alleged frustrating event is caused by 
his own conduct, namely the cases of “self-induced frustration”. Thus, a party will only be 
entitled to rely on the doctrine of frustration if the frustrating event took place “without blame 
or fault” on its part.1963 If a party wishes to argue that a frustrating event is self-induced by the 
other party it must prove it on the balance of probabilities.
1964
 
 
The legal consequence of frustration under English law is that the relevant contract is brought 
to an end automatically at the time of the frustrating event. There is a clear distinction 
between breach of contract and frustration, and thus, there is no notion of temporary 
frustration, which excuses performance for the time being.
1965
 There were problems in 
relation to the remedial consequences of frustration since the decision in the case of Chandler 
v Webster in 1904, where it was held that the loss lay where it fell.
1966
 This approach, under 
which the parties are excused from their future obligations but not from the obligations that 
existed prior to the time of the frustrating event, was deemed unsatisfactory due to the 
problems of unjust enrichment. The House of Lord’s decision in the case of Fibrosa Spolka 
Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd changed the rule by allowing the money 
paid prior to the frustrating event to be recoverable upon a total failure of considerations, 
which arises when the party seeking for recovery has got no part of what he has bargained for.
 
1967
 However, the ‘total failure’ requirement in the decision of Fibrosa represented a 
significant limitation on the availability of restitution since if the other party has provided any 
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Moreover, the availability of restitution was limited in that the expenditure that may have 
been incurred by the other party in relation to the contract is not taken into account.
1968
 The 
Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 was enacted as a response.
1969
 The Act provides 
a more flexible form of restitutionary relief and the judicial discretion to make adjustments 
within the general framework of recovery for unjust enrichment.
1970
 The Act provides, in the 
section 1 (2), that moneys paid prior to the frustrating event are recoverable and not confined 
to total failure of consideration, and that the party to whom the payment was made may be 
entitled to set off against such payment expenses which he incurred in the performance of the 
contract prior to the frustrating event. Pursuant to the section 1 (3) of the Act with regard to 
the recovery of valuable benefits other than a payment of money, where one party has 
conferred to the other a valuable benefit prior to the frustrating event, he shall be entitled to 
recover a just sum which shall not exceed the value of the benefit which he has conferred 
upon the other party.  
 
In the United States, the term “frustration” is limited to situations where it is possible to 
perform the contract, but performance would be senseless, i.e. frustration of purpose.
1971
 
Instead, the term “impracticability” is the counterpart of the civil law concepts of 
impossibility or force majeure.  The doctrine of impracticability was first expressed in the 
case of Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, where the Supreme Court of California stated that 
“a thing is impossible in legal contemplation when it is not practicable.”1972 In the case, the 
defendants had contracted to remove a certain quantity of gravel from the plaintiff's land for a 
construction project, but took only half the agreed amount because the remainder of the gravel 
was under water. Performance of the contract was held “legally impossible” because the 
parties had not contemplated the removal of gravel from below the water level and it would 
have been 10-12 times as expensive for the defendants to remove the remaining gravel.  
 
Section 261 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides that “Where, after a contract is 
made, a party's performance is made impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an 
event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, 
his duty to render that performance is discharged, unless the language or the circumstances 
indicate the contrary.” This provision is based on Section 2-615 of Uniform Commercial 
Code, which provides the doctrine of impracticability for the sale of goods as an excuse for 
the sellers’ performance. Section 261 of the Restatement is broadly applicable to all types of 
impracticability and it “deliberately refrains from any effort at an exhaustive expression of 
contingencies”.1973 There are three categories of cases where this general principle has 
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traditionally been applied: supervening death or incapacity of a person necessary for 
performance (Section 262), supervening destruction of a specific thing necessary for 
performance (Section 263), and supervening prohibition or prevention by law (Section 264).  
 
The doctrine of impracticability is essentially based on an enquiry of which party assumed the 
relevant risk. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts, following the rationale of Section 2-615 
of the Uniform Commercial Code, states that the central inquiry is whether the non-
occurrence of the circumstance was a “basic assumption on which the contract was made”, 
and “determining whether the non-occurrence of a particular event was or was not a basic 
assumption involves a judgment as to which party assumed the risk of its occurrence.”1974 
Thus, if a party undertakes to achieve a result irrespective of supervening events that may 
render its achievement impossible, his non-performance is a breach even if it is caused by 
such an event.
1975
 Even absent an express agreement, a court may decide, after considering all 
the circumstances, that a party impliedly assumed an obligation to perform in spite of 
impracticability that would otherwise justify his non-performance.
1976
 Whether a party has 
assumed the risk of loss arising from the event can also be determined on the basis of the 
foreseeability of the supervening event since the fact that the event was unforeseeable is 
deemed significant as suggesting that its non-occurrence was a basic assumption. However, 
the Restatement explains that the fact that the event was foreseeable, or even foreseen, does 
not necessarily compel a conclusion that its non-occurrence was not a basic assumption, since 
the parties may not have thought it sufficiently important a risk to have made it a subject of 
their bargaining.
1977
  
 
The courts ruled, in a series of cases involved contracts to ship goods, that the closing of the 
Suez Canal in 1956 was foreseeable to parties who relied on the canal route and the risk was 
undertaken by the obligor.
1978
 In the case of Glidden Co. v. Hellenic Lines Ltd., the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found, on the basis of the evidence, that in 
prior contracts with other similar transactions, Hellenic had sought and obtained a clause 
specifically excusing its performance in the event that the Suez Canal was closed. The court 
stated that “In its negotiations with Glidden, Hellenic urged that the charters include the same 
or a like provision, but Glidden, after consideration of the matter, rejected any such clause. 
Hellenic thereupon agreed to the charters without any frustration provision ... protecting the 
shipper against the eventuality ... In all likelihood the shipper did not suppose at the time of 
negotiations that the contract language excused his performance if the Suez Canal were 
closed, for there would then have been little reason to press for the inclusion of a specific 
clause.”1979 Similarly, in Eastern Air Lines, Inc v. Gulf Oil Corp, the United States District 
Court for Southern District of Florida rejected Gulf's impracticability defense, by observing 
that: “The record is replete with evidence as to the volatility of the Middle East situation, the 
arbitrary power of host governments to control the foreign oil market, and repeated 
interruptions and interference with the normal commercial trade in crude oil... oil has been 
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used as a political weapon with increasing success by the oil-producing nations for many 
years, and Gulf was well aware of and assumed the risk that the OPEC nations would do 
exactly what they have done.”1980 
 
The term “impracticability” is an all embracing term to describe the required extent of the 
impediment to performance. According to the Restatement Second Contracts, the term 
“impracticability”, which was also employed by Section 2-615(a) of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, has deliberately been preferred to the term “impossibility” because the doctrine is not 
limited to situations of absolute impossibility. It is explained that the performance may be 
impracticable because of the extreme and unreasonable difficulty, expense, injury, or loss, but 
a mere change in the degree of difficulty or expense due to such causes as increased wages, 
prices of raw materials, or costs of construction, unless well beyond the normal range, does 
not amount to impracticability, since it is this sort of risk that a fixed-price contract is 
intended to cover. Moreover, a party is expected to use reasonable efforts to surmount 
obstacles to performance, and a performance is impracticable only if it is so in spite of such 
efforts.
1981
  
 
In Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit explained the doctrine of impracticability enunciated by section 
2-615 of the Uniform Commercial Code, as follows: “The doctrine ultimately represents the 
ever-shifting line, drawn by courts hopefully responsive to commercial practices and mores, 
at which the community's interest in having contracts enforced according to their terms is 
outweighed by the commercial senselessness of requiring performance. When the issue is 
raised, the court is asked to construct a condition of performance based on the changed 
circumstances, a process which involves at least three reasonably definable steps. First, a 
contingency -- something unexpected -- must have occurred. Second, the risk of the 
unexpected occurrence must not have been allocated either by agreement or by custom. 
Finally, occurrence of the contingency must have rendered performance commercially 
impracticable.”1982 Thus, the courts in the US have shown reluctance to uphold the defense of 
impracticability based on the ground of increased costs.  
 
In Maple Farms Inc. v. City School District of Elmira, the Supreme Court of New York 
rejected the defense of impracticability in the performance of a fixed-price contract under a 
milk supply contract as a result of 23% increase in price of raw milk. The court found that the 
contingency causing the increase of the price of raw milk was not totally unexpected since 
“any business man should have been aware of the general inflation in this country during the 
previous years and of the chance of crop failures.” The court explained that “the very purpose 
of the contract was to guard against fluctuation of price of half pints of milk as a basis for the 
school budget. Surely had the price of raw milk fallen substantially, the defendant could not 
be excused from performance. We can reasonably assume that the plaintiff had to be aware of 
escalating inflation. It is chargeable with knowledge of the substantial increase of the price of 
raw milk from the previous year’s low. It had knowledge that for many years the Department 
of Agriculture had established the price of raw milk and that that price varied. It nevertheless 
entered into this agreement with that knowledge. It did not provide in the contract any 
exculpatory clause to excuse it from performance in the event of a substantial rise in the price 
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of raw milk. On these facts the risk of a substantial or abnormal increase in the price of raw 
milk can be allocated to the plaintiff.” The court, nevertheless, stated that there could 
“conceivably” be a point “at which an increase in price of raw goods above the norm would 
be so disproportionate to the risk assumed as to amount to 'impracticability' in the commercial 
sense.”1983  
 
The legal consequence of the impracticability is that the obligor is discharged from 
performance. According to Section 269 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, temporary 
impracticability suspends the obligor's duty to perform, while the impracticability exists, but 
does not discharge his duty or prevent it from arising, unless his performance after the 
cessation of the impracticability would be materially more burdensome than had there been no 
impracticability. Section 272 (1) states that, in cases of impracticability, either party may have 
a claim for relief including restitution. Section 377 provides that “A party whose duty of 
performance … is discharged as a result of impracticability of performance … is entitled to 
restitution for any benefit that he has conferred on the other party by way of part performance 
or reliance.” Section 371 provides that if a sum of money is awarded as the measure of 
recovery, it may as justice requires be measured by either the market value of the performance 
or the “extent to which the other party’s property has been increased in value or his other 
interests advanced.” Section 377 qualifies this measure of recovery where a benefit is found to 
have conferred to a party by means of performance before the occurrence of the event, which 
later resulted in its destruction, and provides that “in that case recovery may be limited to the 
measure of increase in wealth prior to the event, if this is less than reasonable value.”1984  
 
Moreover, Section 272 (2) provides that “[i]n any case governed by the rules stated in this 
Chapter [dealing with impracticability of performance and frustration of purpose], if those 
rules together with the rules stated in Chapter 16 [Remedies] will not avoid injustice, the court 
may grant relief on such terms as justice requires including protection of the parties’ reliance 
interests.” Thus, the rule stated in Subsection (2) makes it clear that the court can “sever” the 
agreement and require that some unexecuted part of it be performed on both sides, rather than 
to relieve both parties of all of their duties, by supplying a term which is reasonable in the 
circumstances in order to avoid injustice.
1985
 Moreover, Section 272 (2) allows the court to 
grant, instead of or in addition to restitution, the reliance interest when a contract is 
discharged for impracticability, in contrast to the traditional common law approach that, when 
there is no enforceable contract and no party is in breach, the only permitted action is that of 
restitution.
1986
  
 
b. International Instruments 
 
The CISG addresses the issue of force majeure under Article 79, which provides that “A Party 
is not liable for a failure to perform any of his obligations if he proves that the failure was due 
to an impediment beyond his control and that he could not reasonably be expected to have 
taken the impediment into account at the time of the conclusion of the contract or to have 
avoided or overcome it or its consequences.” This provision is considered as a compromise 
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between the common law frustration or impracticality doctrine and the civil law force majeure 
doctrine. It was argued that, as these doctrines are quite distinct, and there are fundamental 
differences in values and assumptions, “the outcome of a dispute governed by this CISG 
provision may ultimately turn on whether a court chooses to emphasize the common law or 
civil law view”.1987 The lack of reference to accepted doctrines and concepts of national laws, 
such as force majeure, impossibility, frustration and impracticability, renders the 
interpretation of Article 79 difficult, but this difficulty is a result of the general aims of the 
CISG to provide the autonomous and uniform application and to prevent the decision makers 
from resorting to their national laws to obtain guidance.
1988
 However, it is pointed out that the 
requirements of supervening impediments under Article 79 echo in fact those of French 
doctrine of force majeure, which are characterized as exteriority, unforeseeability, and 
irresistibility.
1989
  
 
Article 79 of the CISG explicitly refers to “any obligation”, so that the buyer and the seller are 
subject to the same conditions.
1990
 For an exemption to be granted, the non-performance of 
the contract must be due to an impediment, which was beyond the control of the party 
invoking the exemption. As the concept of fault has been set aside by the CISG, the fault of 
the defaulting party does not require consideration, but the exemption will not be granted if 
the defaulting party fails to behave as required under the contract, including the implicit 
obligation of good faith.
1991
 The impediment must also be reasonably unforeseeable at the 
time of the conclusion of the contract. If the event were foreseeable, the defaulting party 
should, in the absence of any contrary provision in the contract, be considered as having 
assumed the risk of its realization. In the determination of the foreseeability of the 
impediment, the CISG refers to the objective considerations, i.e. the reasonable person.
1992
 
The use of “or” instead of “and” between the requirements of unforeseeability and 
unavoidability in the text of Article 79 appears as reflecting the approach of the French case 
law that an unavoidable event, even if foreseeable, may constitute force majeure. However, it 
is usually argued that an unforeseeable impediment exempts the non-performing party only if 
he can prove that he has been reasonably unable “to have avoided or overcome [the 
impediment] or its consequences”.1993 The basis of reference in the unavoidability is the same 
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as for unforeseeability, which is the reasonable person. Finally, the impediment must cause 
the non performance. The causality is to be denied, if the obligor is already in a situation of 
non-performance due to delay before the impediment arises, since that event would not have 
had any impact had performance been timely. 
1994
 Some argued that the impediment must be 
the exclusive cause of the non-performance.
1995
 Alternatively, it is suggested that the 
impediment should also be accepted when a cause overtakes another cause and whether the 
impediment lastly has caused the breach of contract should be decisive.
1996
 
 
If the performance of the contract is only delayed by such an impediment, Article 79(3) 
provides that the exemption is temporary and has effect only for the period during which the 
event exists, thereby exempting the buyer from liability for damages for late performance. 
The provision, however, does not address the adverse consequences of the temporary event 
after its end for the parties.
1997
  In the Vienna Conference, a proposal was made to add to 
paragraph (3) a provision that the non-performing party should be permanently exempted if at 
the end of the period of temporary exemption circumstances had “so radically changed that it 
would be manifestly unreasonable to hold him liable.”1998 The proposal was rejected as a 
result of a reluctance to extend the provision to the cases of frustration or hardship.
1999
 
Nevertheless, it is argued that paragraph 3 can be interpreted to the effect that although the 
exemption has effect for the period during which the impediment exists, it may have 
permanent effect if after the impediment has ceased to exist the circumstances have so 
radically changed that it would be manifestly unreasonable to hold the non-performing party 
liable.
2000
 
 
According to Article 79(4), the defaulting party must give notice to the other party of the 
impediment so as to enable the latter to take all the steps necessary to overcome the 
consequences of the failure. This rule can be considered as an instance of the application of 
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the principle of good faith in general and the duty of cooperation in particular. The notice 
must reach the party to whom it is addressed within a reasonable time after the party in default 
“knew or ought to have known of the impediment”. If the notice has not been received within 
a reasonable time, the defaulting party is liable for damages, which result from the failure to 
give notice, but not the damages, which would follow from the non-performance of the 
contract.
2001
 
 
The legal consequence of the supervening impediment under Article 79 is that, the defaulting 
party is not liable for the failure to perform in the sense that the non-performance is 
acknowledged, but the party is exempted due to the impediment. However, paragraph 5 
provides that “Nothing in this article prevents either party from exercising any right other than 
to claim damages under this Convention.” The language of the article seems to suggest that 
other than damages, all the other party's remedies are unaffected.
 2002
 Such other remedies 
include, the right to reduce price (Article 50), the right to compel performance (Articles 46 
and 62), the right to avoid the contract (Articles 49 and 64) and the right to collect interest as 
separate from damages (Article 78). Among these remedies, it is generally argued that the 
right to compel performance is the most problematic under the CISG.
2003
 Apparently, the 
CISG would allow an action for specific performance in a case where the goods are destroyed 
or in the case where the transfer of funds is prohibited.
2004
 It should be noted that at the 
Vienna Conference, the proposal to extinguish the obligor's obligation to perform, if the 
grounds for exemption existed, was rejected due to the fear that a release from the obligation 
to perform could also extinguish collateral rights and secondary claims such as interest.
2005
 
The general view expressed in the Vienna Conference was that judgment for a physically 
impossible performance would neither be sought nor obtained as a result of the legal doctrine 
“impossibilium nulla est obligatio”.2006 Thus, insofar as the impediment made performance 
actually impossible, there could be no specific enforcement, but it is argued that if 
performance was physically possible, but impracticable within the meaning of paragraph 1, 
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the seller would not be liable in damages for not performing, yet can be compelled to 
perform.
2007
  
 
However, it is pointed out that there is a danger that the national courts may set fines or 
penalties based on their rules of procedure for failure of the obligor to follow an order for 
specific performance (e.g. money penalties, such as astreinte), and, those fines or penalties 
could be the equivalent of granting damages and could even surpass them in amount.
2008
 
Thus, it is argued that a national court should dismiss a complaint asking for specific 
performance in such a case, on the basis of Article 28, which declares that the courts are not 
bound to order specific performance if they would not do so according to their national 
laws.
2009
 Alternatively, it is suggested that Article 79 (5) should be construed in light of the 
UNIDROIT Principles, without recourse to domestic law.
 2010
  Article 7.2.2 of the UNIDROIT 
Principles adopts the principle of specific performance subject to qualifications. It prevents 
the order of specific performance when the performance is impossible in law or in fact, 
unreasonably burdensome or expensive, or when the party entitled to performance may 
reasonably obtain performance from another source.  
 
The exemption under Article 79 does not preclude the right to avoid the contract in 
accordance with Article 25, which requires a fundamental non-performance, since the 
character of a conduct being a non-performance is not affected by the existence of 
impediments.
2011
 As Article 26 requires that a declaration of avoidance of the contract is 
effective only if made by notice to the other party, ipso facto avoidance is excluded.
2012
 
However, the right to avoid the contract remains limited to the party against which the non-
performance is committed, and a proposal to introduce such a right also for the other party did 
not meet with a favorable response.
2013
 If that party avoids the contract, the normal 
consequences of avoidance become applicable subject to the exclusion of damages as an 
available remedy to the obligee. Article 81 (1) releases both parties from their obligations 
under the contract. According to Article 81 (2), a party who has performed the contract either 
wholly or in part may claim restitution from the other party of whatever the first party has 
supplied or paid under the contract. Moreover, pursuant to Article 84, the seller, who is bound 
to refund the price, must also pay interest on it, and the buyer must account to the seller for all 
benefits which he has derived from the goods if he must make restitution of the goods, or if it 
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is impossible for him to make restitution of the goods or to make restitution of the goods 
substantially in the condition in which he received them.  
 
The approach of the CISG to the force majeure issues has been influential on the regulation of 
those issues in the international restatements of contract principles. Both the UNIDROIT 
Principles and the PECL deal with the issues of force majeure in their respective chapters on 
non-performance, and follow the approach of the CISG, which adopts a unitary concept of 
non-performance. Thus, even if the failure to perform is excused by force majeure, it is still 
treated as “non-performance”. However, in such cases, the available remedies are restricted: 
the aggrieved party may not claim specific performance or damages, but he may terminate the 
contract, withhold performance, reduce the price or claim interest on money due.
2014
  
 
Article 7.1.7 (1) of the UNIDROIT Principles was taken almost literally from Article 79 (1) of 
the CISG.
2015
 It excludes a party’s liability for non-performance if he proves that the non-
performance was due to an impediment beyond his control and that he could not reasonably 
be expected to have taken the impediment into account at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract or to have avoided or overcome it or its consequences. In the Official Comments, it is 
stated that Article 7.1.7 “covers the ground covered in common law systems by the doctrines 
of frustration and impossibility of performance and in civil law systems by doctrines such as 
force majeure, Unmöglichkeit, etc. but it is identical with none of these doctrines.” It is also 
explained that the reason for the choice of the title “force majeure” is that the term is widely 
known in international trade practice, as confirmed by the inclusion of “force majeure” 
clauses.
2016
 Article 7.1.7 of the UNIDROIT Principles is a default rule applicable insofar as 
the parties have not themselves allocated risks in their contract. The parties may either 
broaden or to narrow the excuses provided by the default rule. The freedom of limiting the 
obligor’s liability through allocation of risks, such as exemption clauses or, more specifically, 
force majeure clauses, is limited by the prohibition of clauses whose application would lead to 
a grossly unfair result, as provided in Article 7.1.6 on the exemption clauses.
2017
  
 
Similar to the Article 79 (1) of the CISG, Article 7.1.7 (1) of the UNIDROIT Principles 
reflects the requirements of French doctrine of force majeure, where the event must be 
exterior, unforeseeable and irresistible to relieve liability. Article 7.1.7(1) firstly requires that 
the obligor must prove that its non-performance was caused by an impediment beyond its 
control. Thus, the event which causes non-performance must be external to the obligor’s 
‘sphere of risk’.2018 Secondly, the impediment must be unforeseeable in the sense that the 
obligor could not reasonably be expected to have taken the impediment into account at the 
time of the conclusion of the contract. Thirdly, the impediment must be irresistible in the 
sense that the obligor could not reasonably have expected to have avoided or overcome the 
event, or rather its consequences, which eventually caused performance to fail, as if he was 
under a duty of best efforts. In determining the limits of reasonable conduct to avoid or 
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overcome the impediment, the threshold should be set at least as high as that of hardship, 
which requires a fundamental alteration of the equilibrium of the contract, pursuant to Article 
6.2.2 of the UNIDROIT Principles.  
 
Article 7.1.7 (2) of the UNIDROIT Principles provides that when the impediment is only 
temporary, the excuse shall have effect for such period as is reasonable having regard to the 
effect of the impediment on the performance of the contract. Thus, the obligor’s exemption 
may continue for some time after the original impediment has ceased because the focus is on 
the effect of the impediment on the progress of the contract and the period of time during 
which the performance is effectively delayed. This allows taking into account the effect of 
consequential impediments caused by the original event, as opposed to the corresponding 
provision of the CISG, which the Working Group considered inappropriate for the contracts 
other than sale.
2019
 According to Article 7.1.7 (3) of the UNIDROIT Principles, the party who 
fails to perform must give notice to the other party of the impediment and its effect on its 
ability to perform. The notice of impediment must be received by the obligee “within a 
reasonable time after the party who fails to perform knew or ought to have known of the 
impediment”. Delay in giving effective notice does not deprive the obligor of the right to 
invoke force majeure, but leads to his liability for damages caused to the obligee by the delay. 
 
In the cases of force majeure under the UNIDROIT Principles, there is a non-performance, 
but the remedies that are available to the aggrieved party are subject to limitations.
2020
 The 
excused non-performance does not give rise to the right to damages under Article 7.4.1 and 
the claim for specific performance is precluded due to the qualifications of Article 7.2.2. 
According to Article 7.1.7 (4), either party may exercise a right to terminate the contract or to 
withhold performance or request interest on money due. The Official Comment explains that 
the article does not restrict the rights of the party, who has not received performance, to 
terminate the contract if the non-performance is fundamental under the conditions of Article 
7.3.1.
2021
 In case of a temporary impediment of performance, the parties may only terminate 
the contract if the resulting delay in performance amounts to a fundamental non-performance. 
The right to terminate is to be exercised by giving notice to the other party according to 
Article 7.3.2. Thus, under the UNIDROIT Principles, the impediment does not automatically 
terminate a contract.
2022
  
 
In cases of force majeure if a party exercises its right to terminate the contract under the 
conditions of Article 7.3.1, the normal consequences of termination under Articles 7.3.5-7.3.7 
will be applicable to both parties. According to Article 7.3.5, termination of the contract 
releases both parties from their obligation to effect and to receive future performance. Article 
7.3.6 (1) provides that, on termination of a contract to be performed at one time, either party 
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may claim restitution of whatever it has supplied under the contract, provided that such party 
concurrently makes restitution of whatever it has received under the contract. The Official 
Comments are not clear in relation to the application of this provision to force majeure cases. 
In force majeure cases, given that the obligee will not receive the performance of the obligor 
due to the supervening event, its right to claim restitution should depend solely on its 
restitution of anything it has received from the obligor under the contract other than the 
performance of the extinguished obligation and, in the likely case where the obligee has not 
received anything under the contract, it should nevertheless be able to claim restitution of 
whatever it has supplied under the contract. Pursuant to Article 7.3.7 (1), on termination of a 
contract to be performed over a period of time, restitution can only be claimed for the period 
after termination has taken effect, provided the contract is divisible. In both cases, if 
restitution in kind is not possible or appropriate, an allowance has to be made in money 
whenever reasonable if, and to the extent that, the performance has conferred a benefit on its 
recipient.
2023
 Moreover, Article 7.3.6 (4), which is applicable to both contracts to be 
performed at one time and contracts to be performed over a period of time, allows the parties 
to claim compensation for expenses reasonably required to preserve or maintain the 
performance received. During the drafting process, some members of the Working Group 
considered the Article 7.3.6 (4) as being relevant to the force majeure cases where there is no 
right to damages for non-performance.
2024
 Finally, the UNIDROIT Principles do not take a 
position concerning benefits that have been derived from the performance, or interest that has 
been earned. The issue of interest can be resolved by means of Article 7.4.9 which provides 
that if a party does not pay a sum of money when it falls due, the aggrieved party is entitled to 
interest. With regard to the other types of benefits, the Official Comments merely state that in 
commercial practice it will often be difficult to establish the value of the benefits received by 
the parties as a result of the performance, and often both parties will have received such 
benefits.
2025
 However, in cases of force majeure, the obligor will not be able to perform its 
obligations and confer benefits on the obligee, and it is unclear whether the benefits may be 
claimed by the obligee, who has performed its obligation and demands restitution of its 
performance under the UNIDROIT Principles. 
 
The PECL regulate the issue in Article 8:108, but do not use the expression “force majeure”. 
The provision is titled “excuse due to an impediment”. The conditions under which the 
provision operates are very similar to the CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles. Article 8:108 
(1) provides that a party's non-performance is excused if he proves that it is due to an 
impediment beyond his control and that he could not reasonably have been expected to take 
the impediment into account at the time of the conclusion of the contract, or to have avoided 
or overcome the impediment or its consequences. The Official Comment defines the scope of 
application by stating that “unlike the equivalent article of CISG […] Article 8:108 has to 
apply only in cases where an impediment prevents performance”, and states that the 
conditions of the impediment are those “traditionally required for force majeure.”2026 Similar 
to the French doctrine of force majeure, these conditions are stated as the three features of a 
particular event, i.e. exteriority, unforeseeability, unavoidability. First, the event must be 
something outside the obligor’s sphere of control and it must have come about without the 
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fault of either party. Secondly, the event could not have been taken into account at the time 
the contract was made, since, otherwise, one may say either that the party affected took the 
risk or that it was at fault in not having foreseen it. In this condition, the test is “reasonable” 
foreseeability, focusing on whether a normal person, placed in the same situation, could have 
foreseen it without either undue optimism or undue pessimism. 
2027
 Finally, the impediment 
must be insurmountable or irresistible, and reasonableness also qualifies this condition. The 
Official Comments explain that “both conditions - that the party could not have avoided it and 
could not have overcome it - must be fulfilled before an excuse can operate” and “the party to 
be excused must prove that it could not have done either.” 2028 
 
In Article 8:108 (2) of the PECL, it is provided that where the impediment is only temporary, 
the excuse has effect for the period during which the impediment exists. It is also stated in the 
same paragraph that, if the delay amounts to a fundamental non-performance, the obligee may 
treat it as such. In the Official Comments, it is acknowledged that the consequences of the 
impediment may last longer than the event itself, so the term “temporary impediment” means 
not only the event which causes the obstacle but also its consequences.
2029
 Article 8:108 (3) of 
the PECL requires the non-performing party to give notice of the impediment and of its effect 
on its ability to perform, which should be received by the other party within a reasonable time 
after the non-performing party knew or ought to have known of these circumstances. In case 
of failure to give notice, the other party is entitled to damages for any loss resulting from the 
non-receipt of such notice. In the Official Comments, it is stated that, depending on the 
circumstances of the case, the “reasonable time” condition may even require immediate 
notification.
2030
  
 
As to the legal consequences of the force majeure, the Article 8:108 does not contain an 
explicit provision. In the Official Comments, it is stated that an impediment to performance 
relieves the party which has not performed from liability, and the decision maker should adopt 
a pragmatic approach to the availability of various remedies. It is stated that any form of 
specific performance is by definition impossible, and any form of damages, including 
liquidated damages and penalties, does not apply unless the parties have agreed otherwise. 
With regard to termination, the PECL retain the same general system that applies in the case 
of non-performance of contract. Pursuant to Article 9:305, both parties are released from their 
obligation to effect and to receive future performance. The restitution of money and property 
supplied under the contract is governed by Articles 9:307 and 9:308, both of which require the 
lack of counter-performance for a claim of restitution.
2031
 Article 9:308 does not cover the 
issue of benefits derived from performance in the context of restitution of property. Article 
9:309 provides that, on termination of the contract a party who has rendered a performance 
which cannot be returned and for which it has not received payment or other counter-
performance may recover a reasonable amount for the value of the performance to the other 
party. In the Official Comments, it is explained that although the obligor is not liable in 
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damages because its non-performance was excused under Article 8:108, the obligee may 
recover the benefit, which has been received by the obligor as a result of the obligee’s 
performance, and for which the obligee has not received payment or other counter-
performance, but the party which has received the benefit should not be required to pay the 
cost to the other of having provided it, if the net benefit to it is less, since it is only enriched 
by the latter amount.
2032
  
 
Article 9:303 (4) provides an exception to the rule that notice of termination must be given, as 
it is considered to be pointless to give the aggrieved party the right to keep in force a contract 
which has become totally and permanently impossible to perform. Thus, the PECL adopted 
the approach in those legal systems under which force majeure brings automatic termination 
of the contract.
2033
 It is further stated that, in the case of a partial impediment, i.e. when a 
divisible part of the main obligation or a secondary obligation becomes impossible, the 
creditor has a choice between terminating the contract and demanding performance of 
unaffected part of the contract. In the latter case, the creditor’s obligation will be reduced 
proportionately under Article 9:401 (Reduction of Price).
2034
 
 
c. Contracting Practices 
 
In the international contracting practice, there is a variety of approaches in relation to both the 
concept of force majeure and its legal consequences, since they are generally regulated by 
default rules under the national legal systems. In 1985, the ICC drew up a document 
containing “drafting suggestions” with various alternatives in relation to force majeure and 
hardship clauses, in order to facilitate the discussions of contract drafters. The document also 
contained a model “Force majeure (exemption) clause”.2035 These suggestions and the model 
clause were updated in 2003.
2036
 The ICC Model Force Majeure Clause of 1985 or 2003 can 
be incorporated by parties who may find it easier to do so than to negotiate clauses on their 
own. The ICC Model International Franchising Contract (2000) and the ICC Model 
International Sales Contract (1997) contain a Force Majeure clause, largely inspired by the 
ICC Force Majeure Clause of 1985, while the Force Majeure clause of the ICC Model 
Contract for the Turnkey Supply of an Industrial Plant is based on the ICC Force Majeure 
Clause of 2003.
2037
 The ICC Model Mergers and Acquisitions Contract (2004) provides a 
reference to ICC Force Majeure Clause of 2003.
2038
 Surprisingly, the ICC Model Commercial 
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Agency Contract (2002) does not contain a force majeure clause or a reference to the ICC 
Force Majeure Clauses, despite the long term of the contractual relationship.
2039
 The general 
approach of the CISG and the international restatement of contract principles to the issues of 
force majeure seems to have influenced the ICC Force Majeure Clauses of 1985 and 2003. 
However, there is not sufficient evidence as to the extent of use of these ICC Force Majeure 
Clauses of 1985 or 2003 in commercial transactions and, instead, a wide variety of force 
majeure clauses can be observed in the international contracting practices.  
 
The force majeure clauses in international contracting practices usually include the definition 
of the events constituting force majeure. The contractual definitions of force majeure 
sometimes highlight the traditional criteria, which can be found in French doctrine, the CISG 
and international restatements of contract principles, namely, exteriority, unforeseeability and 
unavoidability.
2040
 A similar approach was adopted by the ICC Force Majeure Clause 1985, 
and its first paragraph provided that “A party is not liable for a failure to perform any of his 
obligations in so far as he proves; - that the failure was due to an impediment beyond his 
control; and - that he could not reasonably be expected to have taken the impediment and its 
effects upon his ability to perform into account at the time of the conclusion of the contract; 
and - that he could not reasonably have avoided or overcome it or at least its effects.”2041  
 
The earlier editions of the FIDIC Conditions of Contract for Construction (the Red Book) 
contained no force majeure clause, and the contractor had, under the old Red Book, some of 
the relief typically provided by a force majeure clause due to a combination of Clause 44, 
dealing with extensions of time and Clause 65, dealing with Special Risks, including war.
2042
 
A force majeure clause, Clause 19, was introduced into all of the new editions of FIDIC 
Conditions for major works in 1999.
2043
 Clause 19 defines “Force Majeure” as “an 
exceptional event or circumstance: (a) which is beyond a Party’s control, (b) which such Party 
could not reasonably have provided against before entering into the Contract, (c) which, 
having arisen, such Party could not reasonably have avoided or overcome, and (d) which is 
not substantially attributable to the other Party.” 
 
In international contracting practices, there are also force majeure clauses, which omit one or 
another of the criteria of force majeure in the definition and provide more flexibility in its 
application. For example, unforeseeability or unavoidability is not expressly required in some 
clauses, or those requirements are relaxed by reference to “reasonableness” or “due diligence” 
in the efforts of the obligor to foresee or avoid an impediment. The expression “beyond the 
control of the parties” is commonly used to assess force majeure, but it is also relaxed in some 
clauses by reference to “reasonableness”, such as “an impediment beyond [obligor’s] 
reasonable control” in ICC Force Majeure Clause of 2003.2044 Similarly, although there is 
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usually a reference to the effect of force majeure events on the performance of the contract, it 
is not always required that performance be absolutely impossible, such as the performance 
becoming “impossible or exorbitant from an industrial or commercial standpoint”. 2045 There 
are also clauses, which do not contain a definition or any criterion for the determination of a 
force majeure event, but just providing a list of examples, which can give an indication to the 
decision maker interpreting the contract.
2046
 In practice, the force majeure clauses commonly 
include a list of supervening events. The most frequently cited examples are: natural disasters 
or acts of God; armed conflicts; strikes, lockouts or other industrial disputes either inside or 
outside the enterprise of the obligor; breakdown of machinery and similar accidents; transport 
or procurement difficulties; intervention of public authorities (fait du prince) or change of 
legislation.
2047
 In most of the cases, the list of examples are not exhaustive and introduced by 
an expression, such as “in particular” or “for example”, or followed by an expression, such as 
“or other similar circumstances”.  
  
The ICC Force Majeure Clause of 1985 also reflects the practice of listing specific events and 
provides that the list is not exhaustive.
2048
 Instead of declaring that the list of events is not 
exhaustive, the ICC Force Majeure Clause of 2003 attempts to clarify the relationship 
between the definition of force majeure and the list of specific events, by providing that the 
specific events listed shall be presumed to have established the conditions described in the 
definition in the absence of proof to the contrary and unless otherwise agreed in the contract 
between the parties expressly or impliedly, except for the condition of unavoidability.  In the 
comments, it is explained that the list of force majeure events establishes evidential 
advantages for a party invoking the clause, but even when invoking a listed event, that party 
still needs to prove that it could not reasonably have avoided or overcome the effects of the 
listed event.
2049
 The list provided by Clause 19 of the FIDIC Conditions mainly consists of 
events of war and related risks, and natural disasters. The list is not exhaustive and, it is 
provided that a specific event from the list can only be invoked if it satisfies the conditions 
stipulated in the definition of force majeure.   
 
Usually, there are attempts at contractual characterization of a contingency that diverges from 
the criteria traditionally employed by the national legal systems, by including in the lists such 
events that otherwise would not be categorized as force majeure, as a form of risk 
allocation.
2050
 The parties sometimes list events which will not constitute force majeure, even 
if they do meet the conditions for force majeure under the definition of force majeure clause 
or under the applicable national law. The ICC Force Majeure Clause of 1985 also provides a 
list of events, which do not constitute force majeure, namely “lack of authorizations, of 
licenses, of entry or residence permits, or of approvals necessary for the performance of the 
contract and to be issued by a public authority of any kind whatsoever in the country of the 
party seeking relief.”  
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The force majeure clauses in international contracts usually require the party invoking the 
clause to notify the other contracting party of force majeure event and, if it is temporary, of its 
cessation. Many force majeure clauses provide the requirement that notice be given “as soon 
as possible” or immediately, and some even specify time limits in the form of a certain 
number of days. The ICC Force Majeure Clause of 1985 requires the party seeking relief to 
give notice to the other party of such impediment and its effects on his ability to perform, as 
soon as practicable after the impediment and its effects upon his ability to perform became 
known to him, and to notify the other party when the ground of relief ceases. The ICC Force 
Majeure Clause of 2003 requires the party invoking the clause to give notice without delay 
from the time at which the impediment causes the failure to perform. Clause 19 of the FIDIC 
Conditions provides that the party, who is or will be prevented from performing its substantial 
obligations under the contract by force majeure, shall give notice to the other party of the 
event or circumstances constituting the force majeure and shall specify the obligations, the 
performance of which is or will be prevented. Clause 19 specifies the time limit for the notice 
as within 14 days after the party became aware, or should have become aware, of the relevant 
event or circumstance constituting force majeure.  
 
The consequences of the failure to give notice are also usually stated in the force majeure 
clauses. In the ICC Force Majeure Clause of 1985, the failure to notify mainly affects the 
extent of relief provided due to the force majeure event since, if notice is not timely given, the 
ground of relief takes effect, not from the time of the impediment, but from the time of notice 
and, in addition to that, the failing party becomes liable in damages for loss which otherwise 
could have been avoided.
2051
 Similarly, in the ICC Force Majeure Clause of 2003, if notice is 
not given without delay, the relief from the duty to perform starts from the time at which 
notice reaches the other party, and not from the time at which the impediment causes the 
failure to perform. Clause 19 of the FIDIC Conditions requires notification as a condition for 
the right to claim force majeure, and the party failing to give notice has no right to claim force 
majeure within the meaning of Clause 19.
2052
  
 
The legal consequences of force majeure events are often regulated in the contractual clauses. 
In force majeure clauses, the occurrence of force majeure events will, at least temporarily, 
exempt the liability of the obligor from non-performance of certain obligations arising from 
the contract. While some clauses do not even mention explicitly this consequence as it is 
considered self-evident, other clauses emphasize this aspect.
2053
 The ICC Force Majeure 
Clause of 1985 states explicitly that “A party is not liable for a failure to perform in so far as 
he proves” that the conditions of force majeure exemption have been established. In the 
comments, it is stated that the failing party is relieved not only from damages but also from 
penalties and other contractual sanctions, but the party is not relieved from paying interest on 
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a sum due.
2054
 The ICC Force Majeure Clause of 2003 provides that “A party successfully 
invoking this Clause is, …, relieved from its duty to perform its obligations under the 
contract” and “from any liability in damages or any other contractual remedy for breach of 
contract”.  
 
Sub-Clause 19.2 of the FIDIC Conditions provides that “the Party shall, having given notice, 
be excused performance of its obligations for so long as such Force Majeure prevents it from 
performing them.” Sub-Clause 19.2 provides that “Notwithstanding any other provision of 
this Clause, Force Majeure shall not apply to obligations of either Party to make payments to 
the other Party under the Contract.” Usually, the force majeure clauses in the international 
contracting practice do not specify this aspect due to the rule genera non pereunt, according to 
which the payment of a sum of money is never rendered impossible by the occurrence of 
force majeure.
2055
 In the comments to ICC Force Majeure Clause of 1985, it is stated that the 
clause covers non-performance of all kinds of obligations, including even monetary ones, but, 
in the case of payment, the duty to overcome the impediment is a very absolute one, and the 
conditions for relief will be satisfied only in exceptional circumstances.
2056
 
 
In the practice of international contracts, the initial effect of force majeure is usually the 
suspension of the performance of the contract. Particularly in the context of long-term 
contractual relationship, the parties take into account and emphasize the possibility of 
temporary nature of the event in the force majeure clauses. Most of the force majeure clauses 
extend the time limits for performance equal to the time during which performance is 
suspended. However, there are also clauses, which suspend performance, but do not prolong 
the duration of the contract, thereby cancelling a certain part of performance in some 
cases.
2057
  
 
The major consequence of the suspending effect of force majeure is that the parties are 
prevented from terminating the contract during the period of suspension. The ICC Force 
Majeure Clause of 1985 makes this aspect clear by providing that force majeure “postpones 
the time for performance, for such period as may be reasonable, thereby excluding the other 
party's right, if any, to terminate or rescind the contract.” In determining the reasonable 
period, the ICC Clause 1985 requires the decision maker to take into account the failing 
party’s ability to resume performance, and the other party’s interest in receiving performance 
despite the delay. Similarly, the ICC Force Majeure Clause of 2003 emphasizes the temporary 
nature of force majeure in suspending performance and precluding termination. Sub-Clause 
19.4 of the FIDIC Conditions also provides for the extension of time limits resulting from the 
suspension of the obligations of the contract. It provides that if the contractor is prevented 
from performing its substantial obligations and suffers delay by reason of force majeure, the 
contractor shall be entitled to an extension of time for any such delay. Moreover, Sub-Clause 
19.4 mentions the costs resulting from the suspension for the contractor, including the costs of 
rectifying or replacing the works and/or goods damaged or destructed by force majeure, as a 
matter of risk allocation between the parties. It provides that if the contractor incurs costs by 
reason of force majeure, the contractor shall be entitled to payment of any cost in the case of 
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war and related risks, which are assumed by the employer, and listed in sub-paragraphs (i) to 
(iv) of Sub-Clause 19.1 as force majeure events, to the extent they are not indemnified 
through the insurance policy, while the contractor assumes the risk of natural catastrophes, 
such as earthquake, hurricane, typhoon or volcanic activity, which are listed as force majeure 
events under Sub-Clause 19.1 (v), insofar as the costs incurred by the contractor by reason of 
such force majeure events will not be recoverable from the employer. 
  
The emphasis on the suspending effect of force majeure usually leads the drafters of force 
majeure clauses to oblige the party invoking the clause to overcome the impediment or both 
parties to cooperate in overcoming the impediment, in a way to re-establish the conditions 
enabling performance of the contract to be resumed. This obligation of cooperation is often 
formulated in a form of duty of “best efforts” or its variants and the failure to perform this 
duty results in payment of damages. This duty is not explicitly provided in the ICC Force 
Majeure Clause of 1985, but, in its comments, it is stated that “A party in breach should try to 
minimise damages caused by a failure to perform, both in his own interests and in those of the 
other party. If he does not do so he may be liable to pay compensation for loss or damage 
which otherwise could have been avoided, even though in principle the exemption clause 
operates.” The ICC Force Majeure Clause of 2003 explicitly provides that “A party invoking 
this Clause is under an obligation to take all reasonable means to limit the effect of the 
impediment or event invoked upon performance of its contractual duties.” Sub-Clause 19.3 of 
the FIDIC Conditions places this duty on both parties, and provides that “Each Party shall at 
all times use all reasonable endeavours to minimise any delay in the performance of the 
Contract as a result of Force Majeure.” 
 
As the suspension of the obligations resulting from force majeure cannot be prolonged 
indefinitely, most of the force majeure clauses in international contracting practice provide 
that, after a certain time limit, if the force majeure event has not ended, the contract may be 
terminated. In some clauses, it is provided that the parties will renegotiate if the suspension 
due to force majeure goes on beyond a fixed time limit. If renegotiations fail, force majeure 
clauses varyingly provides for termination or intervention of the arbitrators.
2058
 However, in 
general practice, the most common consequence of a prolonged force majeure event is that the 
obligee may terminate the contract.
2059
  
 
Some contracts confer a right to terminate on each of the parties, and those clauses usually 
provides for a requirement of notice termination. The ICC Force Majeure Clauses of 1985 and 
2003 adopt this approach. ICC Force Majeure Clause of 1985 provides that if the grounds of 
relief subsist for more than such period as the parties provide, or in the absence of such 
provision for longer than a reasonable period, either party shall be entitled to terminate the 
contract with notice. ICC Force Majeure Clause of 2003 grants the right to terminate to either 
party by notification within a reasonable period to the other party, provided that the duration 
of the impediment has the effect of substantially depriving either or both of the contracting 
parties of what they were reasonably entitled to expect under the contract. Sub-Clause 19.6 of 
the FIDIC Conditions specifies a period of time after which the contract may be terminated. If 
the execution of substantially all the works in progress is prevented for a continuous period of 
84 days, or for multiple periods which total more than 140 days, then either party may give to 
the other party a notice of termination of the contract, upon which the termination shall take 
effect 7 days after the notice is given. However, Sub-Clause 19.7 of the FIDIC Conditions 
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does not require any initial period of suspension or any notice of termination, if any event or 
circumstance outside the control of the parties arises, which makes it impossible or unlawful 
for either or both parties to fulfill its or their contractual obligations or which, under the law 
governing the contract, entitles the parties to be released from further performance of the 
contract. In those cases, upon notice by either party to the other party of such event or 
circumstance, the parties are released from further performance of the contract, implying that 
the contract comes to an end automatically, and the contractor is paid the same amount as he 
would be paid if the contract were terminated under Sub-Clause 19.6.  
 
When the contract is terminated due to force majeure, there is the problem of winding up the 
contractual relationship. Many force majeure clauses contain no specific provisions in this 
regard.
2060
 The ICC Force Majeure Clauses of 1985 prefers to cover the problem of winding 
up by general terms of restitution. It provides that “Each party may retain what he has 
received from the performance of the contract carried out prior to the termination. Each party 
must account to the other for any unjust enrichment resulting from such performance. The 
payment of the final balance shall be made without delay.” The ICC Force Majeure Clause of 
2003 and Sub-Clause 19.6 of the FIDIC Conditions tend to limit or exclude restitution and 
provide, instead, for monetary adjustments. The ICC Force Majeure Clause of 2003 states that 
when the contract is terminated and either party has, by reason of anything done by another 
party in the performance of the contract, derived a benefit before the termination of the 
contract, the party deriving such a benefit shall be under a duty to pay to the other party a sum 
of money equivalent to the value of such benefit. Sub-Clause 19.6 of the FIDIC Conditions 
provides that upon termination, the engineer shall determine the value of the work done and 
issue a payment certificate and the contractor will be paid accordingly. The payment 
certificate shall include the amounts payable for any work carried out for which a price is 
stated in the contract and certain costs incurred by the contractor, such as the cost of plant and 
materials ordered for the works and delivered to the contractor, which shall become the 
property of (and be at the risk of) the employer when paid for by the employer, other costs or 
liabilities which in the circumstances were reasonably and necessarily incurred by the 
contractor in the expectation of completing the works, the cost of removal of temporary works 
and contractor’s equipment from the site and the return of these items to the contractor’s 
works in his country, and the cost of repatriation of the contractor’s staff and labor employed 
wholly in connection with the works at the date of termination. 
 
2. Arbitral Decision Making 
 
It is argued that the theory of lex mercatoria was initially formulated around the concept of 
force majeure, because the national legal systems in dealing with force majeure issues were 
traditionally confronted with discrete and short term contracts, such as sales contracts, where 
the performance of both parties occurred immediately or over a relatively short period, and 
the international merchants have developed private solutions, better articulated than those 
offered by national legal systems.
2061
 However, the national legal system also evolves to meet 
the changes in the relevant society in which it aims to establish an order. It can be observed 
that there is an increasing tendency in the national legal systems with regard the issues of 
force majeure to emphasize an approach that focuses on risk allocations between the parties 
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and the use of standards that enable the decision makers to exercise their power of discretion 
in order to adapt the law to the circumstances of the particular case.  
 
Essentially, in view of the highly divergent understanding of the concepts of force majeure, 
impossibility, frustration, impracticability or supervening impediments across the different 
categories of the sources of abstraction, the national law that is found to be governing the 
substance of the dispute by the application of lex mercatoria at the conflict of laws stage 
should become the major determinant of reasonable expectations, in the absence of trade 
usages in the narrow sense. Moreover, the rules on force majeure under the national law 
chosen by the parties should be considered by the decision maker applying lex mercatoria as 
articulated rules and as part of the bargain. In such cases, the decision maker should consider 
the rules of the chosen national law as a form of specific risk allocation between the parties, 
unless those rules are formulated in the form of vague standards, thereby leading to 
uncertainty and enabling the power of discretion, i.e. the capacity for abstractions, of the 
decision maker.  
 
Once enabled to deal with such uncertainty under the terms of the contract and the applicable 
national law, the decision maker applying lex mercatoria will not be obliged to use its 
capacity for abstractions within the framework of the relevant national legal system by 
following its self-referential legal structures. The general contracting practices should rather 
have a significant influence on the exercise of its capacity for abstractions by the decision 
maker applying lex mercatoria as indications of the reasonable expectations of the parties. 
Thus, the chosen national law or the applicable national law pursuant to the established rules 
of conflict can be interpreted and applied by the decision makers in a way that corresponds 
with the general characteristics of international contracting practices. 
 
It is observed that international contracts which make no particular stipulation and leave these 
matters entirely to the applicable law are very rare.
2062
  While not all force majeure clauses are 
drafted the same way, the basic premise that appears with significant frequency in 
international contracting practices is that the parties understand the force majeure excuse as an 
issue of risk allocation in the regulation of its requirements and effects. This premise can be 
found not only in the standard contracts and clauses prepared by international organizations, 
but also in a spontaneous way in individual contracts.
2063
 As the reasonable expectations of 
the parties to international contracts require that an interpretation in line with the general 
practice is to be preferred to an interpretation strictly in line with the applicable national law, 
the decision maker applying lex mercatoria should approach the issues of force majeure 
excuse as a matter of risk allocation between the parties.  
 
a. Requirements of Force Majeure Excuse 
 
The burden of proving the requirements of the force majeure excuse is naturally placed on the 
party relying on it. This burden of proof can become lighter in the events that are so obvious 
or notorious that proof is not required.
2064
 In accordance with the contractual risk allocation 
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between the parties, the burden of proof can also be alleviated by the force majeure clauses 
that contain a list of events, which are agreed by the parties to constitute a force majeure 
excuse without fulfilling the conditions of its definition. In contrast, the force majeure clause 
may also require the party who invokes it to provide certain evidentiary means, and such 
evidentiary means can be interpreted as a contractual requirement for the force majeure 
excuse in a particular case. In ICC Case No 3880, the sale contract between the parties 
required that the force majeure be proven by a certificate of the competent Romanian 
authorities. The defendant seller contended that to the extent that the contract obliged it to 
supply goods made at a certain factory in Romania, which was the source proposed by its 
supplier, the default of its supplier constituted an insurmountable obstacle and an extraneous 
cause relieving it of any liability towards the claimant buyer. The arbitral tribunal stated that 
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, “delay on the part of one's supplier is a foreseeable 
contingency”, and the defendant did not prove that “it could not . . . have foreseen or 
mitigated the consequences of a delay in delivery by [its supplier]”.2065 The tribunal 
considered that “This interpretation of the will of the parties is confirmed by the 'force 
majeure' clause” to the extent that “this clause requires that the force majeure be proven by a 
certificate of the competent Romanian authorities”. Thus, the evidentiary means specified by 
the parties in the force majeure clause were interpreted by the arbitral tribunal in support of 
the conclusion that the parties did not intended the default of the supplier of the defendant to 
constitute an event of force majeure for the defendant, unless such default might be 
characterized in this way for the Romanian enterprise itself, which could be certified by the 
Romanian authorities.
2066
 
 
Under an abstract reasoning, which considers force majeure as an issue of risk allocation, the 
decision maker applying lex mercatoria should seek for the fulfillment of two basic 
requirements, unless otherwise specifically provided by the parties in the terms of the contract 
or in the applicable default rules. The first basic requirement of force majeure is that the event 
must prevent the obligor from performing any of its obligations, and the obligor is required to 
prove the casual link between the event and non-performance. The merely impractical or 
onerous nature of performance due to the changed circumstances will not amount to a force 
majeure excuse. For instance, as the international contracts are particularly susceptible to 
price or currency fluctuations, those events should be considered as inherent elements of 
international commerce and, even a drastic price change will not generally constitute a force 
majeure event.
 
Particularly, a fixed price can be viewed as a reciprocal allocation of risk of 
price fluctuations.
2067
 
 
In ICC Case No 11265, the dispute arose from a contract for the supply of petroleum products 
needed by the claimant to perform a procurement contract with the government of an African 
state. The claimant alleged that it was unable to fulfill its obligations towards the government 
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due to the defendant's failure to supply the required quantities of petroleum within the time 
limit. The defendant relied on the force majeure clause contained in the contract and argued 
that its failure to perform was due to problems relating to rail transport and the availability of 
trucks. The tribunal was of the opinion that the transport problems encountered by the 
defendant did not constitute a case of force majeure.
2068
 According to the tribunal, the 
defendant assumed a considerable risk under the contract by engaging to have a certain 
number of cars available, while it could and should have taken into account the likelihood of 
being faced with serious transport problems in the event that these cars would arrive late. The 
tribunal noted that, the parties contemplated rail transportation at the conclusion of the 
contract, but, in its view, once the defendant could not reasonably be unaware that this means 
of transportation was unsatisfactory due to the alleged problems, the defendant should have 
taken the steps to alleviate the difficulties posed by the rail transportation. However, the 
defendant delayed in taking those steps and the tribunal did not consider that delay was 
justified by the defendant’s conviction that the situation in the railroads could improve. The 
tribunal found that the defendant’s reasons for not organizing transportation by trucks sooner 
were clearly related to the higher cost of the road transportation. Thus, the road transportation 
was not arranged until assurance had been obtained from the claimant that the latter would 
cover the additional cost represented by such transport. According to the tribunal, it was 
beyond doubt that the defendant weighed up the amount it could be required to pay as a 
penalty under the contract against the additional cost of transportation by trucks, and preferred 
to take the risk of having to pay a penalty.
2069
 
  
Whether the situations of subjective content constitute force majeure events will depend on 
the character of the obligation undertaken by the party invoking the force majeure excuse. 
Unless the contract strictly requires the obligor to perform its obligations personally or 
through its own organization and the supervening event renders such performance impossible, 
the obligor may not be excused from its non-performance. In ICC Case No 3952, concerning 
a contract of delivery of crude oil, one party claimed force majeure, due to the fact that his 
own supplier had not delivered the necessary quantity of oil. The arbitrators, after having 
declared that delivery of such a fungible product as crude oil was never impossible, decided 
that if non-performance of a delivery obligation by a third supplier was to be qualified as 
force majeure, it must have been expressly stipulated in the contract: it had been negligence 
on the part of the defendant not to assure other supplies. Moreover, the tribunal rejected the 
argument that the shifting from one supplier to another would have caused high costs, since 
the actual price difference of over one third of the market price was not enough to be 
recognized as an excuse and to relieve the seller from delivery.
 2070
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In ICC Case No 9978, a dispute arose as a result of non-delivery of the goods under the 
contract of sale between the claimant, purchaser, and the defendant, seller. The defendant 
argued that it was not the owner of the goods at the time of conclusion of the contract and 
invoked force majeure excuse. The arbitral tribunal held that CISG was applicable. The 
tribunal stated that “non-delivery by a supplier does not fall under the concept of exemption 
from liability laid down in Art. 79 CISG or the force majeure clause contained in the contract. 
The contract clearly indicates that the goods sold were not a specific lot, but generic goods . . . 
In this case, the risk of non-delivery by its supplier ("procurement risk") is clearly on the 
seller… This is in line with the constant practice of ICC arbitrators who grant force majeure 
defences only in extreme cases such as war, strikes, riots, embargoes or other incidences listed 
in the force majeure clause of the contract. In cases of impediments to performance related to 
the typical commercial risks involved in the transaction, however, they uphold the principle of 
"pacta sunt servanda", thus preserving the sanctity of the contract as the magna charta of 
international contract law”.2071  
 
Whether such other events as economic impossibility or impracticability excuse the non-
performance of the contractual obligations should be determined on the basis of the position 
of the established rules in the particular case. Where the decision maker have found a national 
law as governing the substance of the dispute by means of the application of lex mercatoria at 
the conflict of laws stage, the relevant rules of this national law should be taken as indicating 
the established rules in the particular case, and should govern the necessary extent of 
obstacles excusing the obligor from performing its obligations. The issue of idiosyncrasy in 
the applicable national rules will not arise in this respect due to the divergence of approaches, 
which can be found in national legal systems and even in international contracting practices, 
in relation to what is understood by the concept of impossibility. Such a divergence precludes 
discovering such rules that are established in the order of international commerce. In cases 
where the decision maker has decided to apply lex mercatoria exclusively to the substance of 
the dispute, the decision maker should favor the conclusion that the force majeure excuse 
requires the performance of the obligations to become legally, factually or physically 
impossible in an objective sense, in view of the position of the international instruments, 
which assist his abstract reasoning, to the issues of force majeure.
2072
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The second basic requirement of force majeure excuse is that the effect of the alleged event 
on the contractual obligations must be outside of the control of the obligor. Thus, a party 
cannot rely on a force majeure excuse if it first created the impossibility and then sought to 
invoke it as a defense. This concept is particularly relevant in the context of disputes arising 
from state contracts, where the investors often dispute the proposition that governmental 
intervention is entitled to recognition as a supervening event uncontrollable by the parties.
2073
 
This requirement also implies that the event must be both unforeseeable and unavoidable. If 
the event was foreseeable at the time of the conclusion of the contract, the obligor could 
control its effect on its contractual obligation through the reallocation of the relevant risk, 
such as by negotiating for an explicit contractual clause providing that the materialization of 
the relevant risk will excuse the non-performance. In ICC Case No 2216, the Norwegian 
buyer of crude oil refused to perform the contract, arguing, among others, that it did not get 
the necessary authorizations to obtain foreign exchange from Norwegian authorities. The 
arbitral tribunal stated that an event of force majeure requires the characteristics of 
unforeseeability and irresistibility. The tribunal noted that the agreement did not include any 
reservations in relation to the Norwegian exchange control regulations and the relevant 
legislation had been in force before the contracts had been concluded. Thus, the buyer was 
therefore fully aware of the fact that authorizations might not have been given for a specific 
transaction, and assumed the relevant risk. The tribunal further found that the buyer failed to 
inform the seller the exchange control requirements, and this failure resulted from its 
negligence. In this regard, the tribunal pointed out that the agreement expressly excluded the 
force majeure excuse, where the event involved fault or negligence of the parties. Thus, the 
tribunal held the buyer responsible for breach of contract.
2074
  
 
In the ICSID Case of Autopista Concesionada de Venezuela, C.A. v. Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela, the tribunal, considering past experiences in Venezuela, implied that the 
government has foreseen and, thus, assumed the risk of the interference of civil protests with 
the performance of the concession agreement. The concession agreement was concluded 
between Aucoven, and Venezuela, under which Aucoven was to design, construct, operate, 
exploit, conserve, and maintain a highway system in Venezuela. The concession agreement 
granted Aucoven the exclusive right to collect tolls from highway users. The toll income 
would repay Aucoven’s investment, and finance the operation and maintenance of the 
highway system. To accomplish these goals, Venezuela agreed to increase the highway tolls 
according to a scheme. However, some toll increases agreed by the parties were not 
implemented by Venezuela because of major public protests against the planned increases. 
Venezuela argued that its inability to increase toll rates was excused by force majeure. The 
arbitral tribunal held that the dispute must be resolved by application of the Venezuelan law, 
pursuant to the second sentence of Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention, while international 
law would prevail over conflicting national rules.
2075
  
 
The tribunal noted that the contractual force majeure defined in Clause 41(2) of the 
concession agreement addressed the situation in which Aucoven is prevented from performing 
due to a force majeure event that affects itself, but it did not deal with a situation where 
Venezulea’s performance becomes impossible as a result of force majeure. Thus, the tribunal 
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decided to assess the consequences of force majeure according to the applicable law. The 
parties agreed that force majeure was a valid excuse for the non-performance of a contractual 
obligation in both Venezuelan and international law, and the following conditions must be 
fulfilled for a force majeure excuse: impossibility, i.e., “the force majeure event made 
performance impossible to achieve”; unforeseeability, i.e., “the force majeure event was not 
foreseeable”; and non-attributability, i.e., “the force majeure event was not attributable to the 
defeating party”.2076 The tribunal held that it was up to Venezuela, which relies upon the force 
majeure excuse, to prove that the conditions of force majeure were met. 
 
As to the condition of unforeseeability, considering the impact of the Caracazo, which was a 
political phenomenon that occurred in 1989 following an increase in the price of gasoline and, 
consequently, the price of transportation, on Venezuelan society in general, the tribunal stated 
that “one cannot reasonably argue that Venezuelan officials negotiating the Agreement could 
ignore that the increase in transportation price resulting from the contractual mechanism of 
toll rate increase could at least potentially lead to violent popular protest similar to the one of 
1989.”2077 The tribunal found additional support for this view in Venezuela’s submission that 
“[s]oon after the parties signed the Contract and before any attempt to implement any toll 
increases, it became apparent that strong public resistance to toll increases could imperil the 
Concession’s future”, and noted that Venezuela did not establish, or even explain, the reasons 
why the strong public resistance was apparent shortly after the signature of the agreement and 
before any actual attempt to increase the tolls, while it was unforeseeable shortly before 
during the negotiation of the contract. Thus, the tribunal was not convinced that the possibility 
of strong popular resistance to toll increase became apparent only after the conclusion of the 
concession agreement.
2078
 The tribunal held that “For lack of unforeseeability, Venezuela’s 
non-performance cannot be excused on the ground of force majeure. Hence, whether the 
conditions of impossibility and attributability are met is not decisive.”2079 
 
The consideration that the consequences of an event are avoidable implies that the obligor has 
some control over the effect of the event on the contractual obligations. Depending on 
whether the costs of the required efforts can be considered as being covered by the bargain 
underlying the contract on the basis of the articulated or established rules in a particular case, 
the obligor may be expected either to avoid or remove the effect of the event during the 
course of contract. In ICC Case No 1782, a German company, which had to deliver trucks to 
an Arab country and to maintain them, refused to perform its obligation of maintenance, after 
delivery, on the ground of force majeure because its employees of Jewish origin did not 
obtain the necessary visas. The tribunal ruled that the event did not make performance 
impossible as the German company could have taken appropriate measures to ensure the 
effective maintenance of the vehicles, as it had found a way to clear the vehicles by means of 
a third company in order to perform its obligation to deliver them. According to the tribunal, 
the German company could, similarly, find a way to honor its obligation to provide 
maintenance by hiring other personnel to maintain the trucks or assigning this part of the 
contractual obligation to a subcontractor.
2080
 Thus, the subsequent conduct of the German 
company as to the delivery of trucks indicated that it assumed the costs of avoiding the effect 
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of the alleged event of force majeure, such as ensuring the effective maintenance of the 
vehicles by means of a sub-contract.  
 
The determination of the existence of the unforeseeability and unavoidability depends on the 
contract and the presumption about the parties’ competences, which will be determined on the 
basis of the test of reasonable persons of the same kind as the parties placed under the same 
circumstances, through the contextual approach of the decision maker. It is argued that the 
repeated use of certain analytical criteria in arbitral awards dealing with force majeure 
recognize a standard of behavior for international merchants, which is conducive to 
establishing authoritative customary rules of lex mercatoria.
2081
 In essence, the arbitral awards 
suggest the significance of the reasonableness in determining whether the conditions of 
unforeseeability and unavoidability were satisfied in a particular case. The arbitral tribunals, 
by exercising an abstract reasoning, generally require the obligor to exercise the foresight 
expected from a reasonable person of the same kind in the same circumstances, and to assume 
the costs of such efforts as would be made by a reasonable person of the same kind in the 
same circumstances, to avoid the effect of alleged event of force majeure on the performance 
of its obligations. 
 
In the related ICC Cases No 2139 and No 2142, a government nationalized a foreign 
corporation’s source of raw materials, and subsequently contracted to sell a quantity of the 
same material to other foreign corporations. The company suffering the nationalization 
threatened seizure of all such materials sold by the government in the event that those 
materials were sold on the international market. Some of the prospective buyers argued that 
the threats constituted force majeure excusing their non-compliance with the purchase 
agreements, and they refused to carry out their obligation to take delivery of the materials 
sold. Invoking the arbitration clause contained in the sale contracts, the state enterprise 
concerned sought compensation for the injury caused. The arbitrators were led to make 
several awards, in all of which the plea of force majeure invoked by the defaulting buyers was 
rejected. In both cases of 2139 and 2142, the force majeure argument was rejected on the 
ground that the conditions of unforeseeability and unavoidability were not satisfied.  
 
The tribunal in ICC Case No 2139 defined a case of force majeure as an event “with aspects 
of unforeseeability (that is to say, when it happened, there was no particular reason to suppose 
that the event would occur) and irresistibility (that is to say, it was absolutely impossible for 
the defendant to perform the contract)”. The tribunal found that “the contract was concluded 
on … [date] and that at that time the crisis … which followed the nationalization … had 
already begun and therefore could not comprise the aspect of unforeseeability required by the 
law”. Noting that “[the state enterprise] has proven … that at that same period, other buyers 
were regularly lifting the oil cargoes which they had purchased”, the tribunal decided that 
“X… cannot claim that there was a case of force majeure making it impossible for X to 
perform the contract” and held the defendant responsible for the non-performance of its 
contractual obligations.
2082
 In ICC Case No 2142, the tribunal found that the event did not 
have “the characteristics of enforceability and unsurmountability necessary to constitute force 
majeure” because at the date of the signature of the contract, the crisis following upon the 
nationalizations was of public notoriety and was the object of numerous articles in the press, 
and even of governmental declarations, and there was evidence that at the same period other 
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purchasers regularly collected and transported the quantities of the product of which they had 
become purchasers. Thus, the tribunal held that “the elements which constitute force majeure 
are thus in no way reunited and that it is therefore appropriate to reject as inapplicable the 
argument drawn from force majeure”.2083 
 
The test of reasonable persons of the same kind as the parties placed under the same 
circumstances was central to the reasoning of the tribunal in ICC Case No 4462. The case 
concerned an Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement (“EPSA”) between National Oil 
Corporation (“NOC”) in Libya and Sun Oil, under which Sun Oil was to undertake, finance 
and carry out an oil exploration program and to receive a share of the petroleum production. 
The EPSA was concluded for a term of 20 years and it was to be governed by and interpreted 
in accordance with Libyan law. Article 22.1 of the EPSA provided that “Any failure or delay 
on the part of a Party in the performance of its obligations or duties hereunder shall be 
excused to the extent attributable to force majeure. Force majeure shall include, without 
limitation: Acts of God, insurrection, riots, war, and any unforeseen circumstances and acts 
beyond the control of such Party.” Under Article 22.2, if operations were delayed, curtailed or 
prevented by force majeure, and the time for carrying out obligations under the EPSA was 
thereby affected, the term of the EPSA would be extended, but either party could terminate 
the EPSA upon written notice to the other if the fulfillment of the obligations of either party 
was affected by force majeure for the periods specified in the agreement. On the basis of these 
provisions, Sun Oil suspended performance, arguing that its personnel, all of whom were US 
citizens, could not enter Libya after the US Government instituted an order declaring that US 
passports were no longer valid for travel to Libya, and Sun Oil’s application for a license to 
export oil technology was denied as a result of the US export regulations, which was enacted 
after the conclusion of the EPSA.
2084
  
 
The arbitral tribunal considered that the expression “force majeure” covers a legal notion, 
which is reflected in Article 360 of the Libyan Civil Code and, the effect of force majeure is 
to release the obligor from his obligation under the agreement and force majeure is 
established when an event meeting the three following conditions occurs: (i) being beyond the 
control of the parties, (ii) being unforeseeable at the time the agreement is entered into and 
(iii) rendering the performance of the obligation absolutely impossible. The tribunal noted that 
Article 360 is not “a public order provision” and the contracting parties are entirely free either 
to exclude force majeure or, on the contrary, to make its conditions more flexible. The 
tribunal stated that “This is the mere application of the principle according to which the 
contract constitutes the law between the parties, which principle is contained in Art. 147 of 
the Libyan Civil Code.”2085  
 
While both parties referred to the force majeure clause set forth in the EPSA, they disagreed 
on the meaning and the consequences entailed by such clause. According to Sun Oil, Article 
22 would be self-sufficient and would set up a specific force majeure regime, much more 
flexible and liberal than the one provided for under Article 360 of the Libyan Civil Code. Sun 
Oil argued that Article 22 expressly defined force majeure events as any “unforeseen” 
circumstances beyond the control of the party invoking force majeure and there was “no way 
to glean a requirement of unforeseeability”. Sun Oil also stated that Article 22 nowhere 
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mentioned the word “impossible”, and concluded that “Article 22 clearly is not limited to 
circumstances in which performance is absolutely, objectively and unqualifiedly 
“impossible”.”2086 Finally, according to Sun Oil, there was a clear distinction between 
extinguishment of the obligations of the parties under Article 360 of the Libyan Civil Code 
and “extension” of the time for “carrying out obligations” of the parties under Article 22 of 
the EPSA, which indicated that the effect of a force majeure event under Article 22 was 
defined “less strictly” than under Article 360. NOC argued that when using the expression 
“force majeure”, the parties were deemed to give it its usual meaning, unless the agreement 
expressly provided for the contrary. According to NOC, where the parties referred to the 
concept of force majeure in Article 22 and did not expressly exclude any of the conditions of 
force majeure required under Libyan common law, it would not be sufficient for such event to 
have been unforeseen and beyond the control of the parties, but the event should also meet the 
other criteria of force majeure under Libyan law. According to NOC, under Libyan law, the 
impossibility to perform must be absolute, in the sense that “there were no alternative means 
available” which would make it possible to achieve contractual objectives, the party invoking 
the force majeure would also have to prove that the event was irresistible, and the 
unforeseeability requirement would have to be examined objectively and strictly by reference 
to what a very vigilant person would have foreseen.
2087
  
 
According to the tribunal, the fact that the parties felt it necessary to include in the EPSA a 
force majeure clause demonstrated that they were not satisfied with the mere application of 
the rules of the Libyan Civil Code, but their common intention was not obvious when reading 
Article 22 of the EPSA for the lack of a definition of “force majeure”. The tribunal considered 
the reference to “any unforeseen circumstances and acts beyond the control of the party” as 
being extensive and proving “without any doubt the intent of the parties to extend the scope of 
force majeure beyond the cases traditionally deemed to constitute an irresistible occurrence 
(war, natural disasters etc.).” The tribunal stated that “In this respect, it reflects a certain trend, 
which is displayed to a greater or lesser extent in long term international contracts, to define 
force majeure less strictly that under most domestic contracts. It still remains to define how 
far did the parties intend to go in making this approach more flexible.”2088  
 
The tribunal did not exclude the possibility that, in selecting the adjective “unforeseen” 
instead of “unforeseeable”, Sun Oil and NOC expressed their intention to exclude the 
requirement of unforeseeability or at least, not to give to such a requirement a strict meaning. 
However, with regard to the condition of “impossibility of performance” required under 
general Libyan law, the tribunal considered that the interpretation that any circumstance 
beyond the control of the parties would excuse the nonperformance of the obligation or the 
delay in performing subject to the sole condition that such circumstance was not foreseen was 
difficult to be admitted, because it would result in allowing the enforceability of contractual 
obligations to be challenged upon the occurrence of the slightest difficulty and neither party 
made such an argument. The tribunal stated that “It is true that more and more international 
long term agreements contain provisions according to which is considered as an event of force 
majeure any event beyond the control of the parties which renders the performance of the 
agreement very difficult and/or more expensive than anticipated or any event which cannot be 
overcome by the use of reasonable means at reasonable costs. Such provisions when agreed 
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upon, leave no doubt as to the intent of the parties. They clearly reflect that the parties 
intended to avoid that the impossibility to perform be considered as the sine qua non 
requirement for force majeure. However, in order to be accepted, such exceptions to the 
common law of force majeure must be expressly provided for; they should not be presumed or 
implied.”2089  
 
The tribunal concluded that “it would be unjustified, in the absence of any specific provision 
to such effect in Art. 22, to construe such article as revealing an intent of the parties to waive 
an essential rule of Libyan common law according to which force majeure is only established 
when the event invoked by the defaulting party created an impossibility to perform whether 
on a temporary or a permanent basis.” According to the tribunal, this was clearly what Sun 
Oil seemed to have understood because in its telex to NOC, it stated that “the applicable US 
passport and export regulations have made it impossible for it to perform under the 
contract”.2090 Thus, the tribunal held that Article 22 expressed the intent of the parties not to 
strictly apply the usual criteria of force majeure, in particular with respect to the 
unforeseeability requirement, but that it did not exclude the fundamental requirement that the 
event must have rendered definitively or temporarily impossible the performance of the 
contractual obligations.   
 
The tribunal then examined Libyan case law on force majeure and especially “the leading 
case on such matter”, the Libyan Supreme Court decision in the Latsis case, dated 20 June 
1971. It concluded that: “The oral and written testimonies of the experts on Libyan law 
submitted on this subject as well as a careful examination of the Latsis case leave no doubt as 
to the fact that, under Libyan Civil Law, the impossibility must not be determined 
subjectively, i.e., by reference to the capabilities and personal means available to the 
defaulting obligor but rather objectively. It is because of such meaning that the impossibility 
is said to be 'absolute' . . . . However, one should only compare what can be compared. The 
question is not to take as a reference an ideal and purely abstract type of obligor. The 
comparison can only be established with an obligor being liable for obligations of the same 
nature and of the same importance as those of the defaulting obligor, and who would be faced 
with the same difficulties. This also results from the Latsis case and from the experts' 
testimonies. Under this approach, one is led to believe that, under the meaning of Art. 22, 
non-performance by a party or delay in performing contractual obligations is excused when an 
unforeseen circumstance beyond the control of the parties occur, which circumstance 
constitutes an obstacle such that an obligor, normally diligent, having the same obligations 
and placed in the same situation, could not have overcome it.”2091 
 
The tribunal held that, in view of the meaning of Article 22, Sun Oil, which has the burden of 
proof, must show evidence that each of the two regulations successively enacted by the U.S. 
Government did constitute (i) a circumstance ‘beyond the control’ of the parties, (ii) an 
‘unforeseen circumstance’ and (iii) an impossibility to continue exploration. According to the 
tribunal, the first requirement was certainly met since the regulations were acts of government 
and thus clearly beyond the control of the parties. As to the second requirement, the tribunal 
considered that both regulations constitute unforeseen circumstances at the time the 
agreement was signed given that, while the relations between the United States and Libya had 
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already been through difficult times before that date, political tensions between the two 
countries had so far left untouched the commercial relations in the area of petroleum business. 
According to the tribunal, third requirement was the crucial point, and the particular question 
was whether there was any solution for Sun Oil, any possible avenue other than the mere 
discontinuance of exploration. For that purpose, the tribunal considered that the nature and 
scope of obligations of Sun Oil should be accurately defined in order to assess the impact 
which the two regulations in question had on those obligations.
2092
  
 
As to the passport order, the tribunal was willing to admit that, upon signing the EPSA, it was 
assumed by both parties that Sun Oil would carry out the exploration with its own 
management and personnel and the majority of Sun Oil’s personnel were American citizens, 
but the tribunal also noted that, it was at all times possible for Sun Oil to hire non-US 
personnel, and it was not proven that the possibility to use non-US personnel was outside the 
intention of the parties.
2093
 Sun Oil argued that it is the universal practice in the oil industry 
for a company to rely on its own management and personnel in a major exploration operation. 
However, there was no evidence tending to show that a major oil company doing business on 
an international scale was expected to perform its exploration obligations only by way of 
utilizing technical and scientific personnel carrying passports of the company’s home country, 
and there was a lot of testimony tending to show the contrary.
2094
  
 
As to the export regulation, on the basis of the evidence submitted, the tribunal accepted the 
following facts: Sun Oil’s application for export license was sincere; due to the denial of such 
application, Sun Oil was prohibited from making available to its exploration team on site the 
result of the technical operations carried out in the US; and Sun Oil was also prohibited from 
disclosing to NOC in Libya or in any other place, information on its analysis processes. 
According to the tribunal, these facts were relevant only to the extent it was established that 
both parties had agreed that the only technical means which were to be used were those of the 
US center of Sun Oil.
2095
 According to Sun Oil, it could not resort to techniques other than its 
own as it is a rule in the oil industry that the operator uses its own personnel and its own 
technical resources for its exploration operations. The tribunal stated that “as a matter of 
practice in the oil industry, major companies which undertake at their risks and expenses to 
explore for oil would insist on using their own techniques in order to obtain the expected 
results and would generally not entrust contractors with Exploration Operations without 
retaining supervisory and management control. Therefore, there is no reason to question the 
fact that it was Sun Oil’s intent to use its own processes to complete the delicate task of 
analysing and coordinating all technical data (seismic and other), allowing to locate the oil 
fields and evaluate the size thereof.” However, the tribunal still questioned the possibility to 
infer that this use by Sun Oil of its own technological resources was an “essential condition of 
the contract” and to conclude that the only mode of performing the EPSA commonly 
contemplated by the two parties was through the use of Sun Oil’s own in-house 
technology.
2096
 Thus, although Libyan law required the condition of objective impossibility 
for the force majeure excuse, the tribunal seemed to be prepared to accept a subjective 
impossibility as excusing the non-performance if the common intentions of the parties 
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indicated that it was an essential condition of the contract and of the underlying bargain that 
the relevant obligation was to be performed through Sun Oil’s own organization, in which 
case its non-performance could have been excused, because the obligation would have been 
fundamentally changed due to the US regulations.   
 
However, according to the tribunal, the language of the EPSA indicated that it was the 
common intention of the parties to confer on Sun Oil, as operator, the broadest possible 
flexibility and discretion in selecting appropriate technologies, contractors, consultants, 
scientists and technical personnel. The tribunal held that the essential condition of the 
agreement was that Sun Oil, who was responsible for the exploration, had to complete the 
exploration program diligently and in a manner consistent with modern petroleum industry 
practices. In support of this finding, the tribunal noted that the costs of the efforts expected 
from Sun Oil to continue the performance of its obligations despite the US export regulations 
were covered by the EPSA, which conferred on Sun Oil a virtually unlimited power to 
engage, and charge to the operating account, as costs and expenses: “The service of 
consultants, contract services, utilities and other services procured from outside sources”.2097 
According to the tribunal, Sun Oil’s processes were not unique, and it could find on the oil 
market the support necessary to complete the exploration program with technological 
resources, which, while being consistent with modern practices, would not have been subject 
to the US Export Regulation. The tribunal observed that the other American companies, 
which had been engaged, at that time, in similar exploration operations, under similar EPSAs, 
did not discontinue the exploration on the basis of force majeure, but on the contrary, found 
ways to continue the exploration despite the US Export Regulation, which was binding on 
them as it was binding on Sun Oil. Thus, the tribunal applied the test of whether a reasonable 
person placed in the same circumstances as the party seeking to be excused would have been 
able, despite the supervening event, to perform the contract. The tribunal noted that normally, 
the judge must refer to a theoretical reasonable person but, according to the tribunal, in this 
case, there was an unusual situation in which parties placed in the same circumstances existed 
in reality and had been able to overcome the supervening obstacle to performance. Thus, the 
tribunal concluded that the US Export Regulations did not constitute for Sun Oil an event of 
force majeure excusing the discontinuance of exploration for such time as such regulations 
would remain in force, whether viewed separately or in connection with the passport order.
2098
 
The tribunal held that the passport order and/or export regulations in question did not 
constitute events of “force majeure” within the meaning of Article 22.1 of the EPSA and did 
not excuse Sun Oil's cessation of performance under the EPSA.
2099
 
 
In the joined ICC Cases No 3099 and 3100, the arbitral tribunal emphasized the relationship 
between the issue of foreseeability and the risk allocation between the parties. The dispute 
arose from two contracts for the purchase of refined oil products and crude oil between an 
Algerian state enterprise, as the seller, and an African state enterprise, as the buyer. The 
contracts provided that Algerian law was applicable. The buyer could not meet its payment 
obligations under the contracts, and invoked the force majeure clause contained the contracts. 
The buyer declared that it had in its bank the necessary sums for payment, but could not 
obtain, in spite of several representations to the Central Bank of its country, the authorization 
for payment. The buyer therefore stated that, without any fault on its part, it found it 
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impossible to realize the payments. The arbitral tribunal stated that “Lacking a general 
definition of the concept of force majeure in the contractual … and legal texts, the arbitral 
tribunal must turn to jurisprudence and doctrine. In French law, force majeure is an 
unforeseeable and unavoidable event which comes generally from outside the person who 
invokes it. The concept is therefore defined by its three characteristics: externality, 
unavoidability and unforeseeability”.2100  
 
The tribunal found that the foreign exchange regulations at the buyer’s country and, in 
particular, the requirement of a previous authorization by the Central Bank of the buyer’s 
country for the payment in foreign currency of the amounts due were already in force at the 
moment that the two sales contracts were concluded. Moreover, the tribunal stated that “[the 
buyer] knew — or at least should have known — that its country found itself in a difficult 
monetary situation and that the Central Bank would perhaps not be in a position, when 
invoices became due, to provide the necessary foreign exchange. This is a risk which the 
[buyer] could not ignore, taking into account the exceptional importance and the frequency of 
the payments to be made in US dollars. Therefore it was up to [the buyer], and not its bank, to 
obtain the necessary guarantees from the Central Bank (of its country); either at the moment 
the contracts were concluded, or at the latest before taking delivery of the refinery products or 
the crude oil.” The tribunal considered that according to the rules of good faith, the buyer 
could not bind itself in respect to the seller to pay for the products without having the 
certainty of being able to effectuate these payments in foreign currency on the dates they 
became due. The tribunal found that only after having taken delivery of the larger part of the 
products, the buyer approached the Central Bank in its country, the sole authority empowered 
to make the necessary foreign currency available to the buyer.
2101
  
 
The tribunal concluded that “For [the buyer] it is not a case of force majeure that the Central 
Bank did not provide it with the necessary foreign currency for the payment of the invoices. 
Moreover, [the buyer] itself is not without fault. It did not, as was warranted by the 
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circumstances, take the precaution of obtaining from the Central Bank the assurance that it 
would receive this currency. In this way the [buyer] made a relatively grave mistake which 
should be attributed to it, and not to its bank. Indeed, in view of the exceptional importance of 
the amounts to be paid, it is [the buyer] who should have made arrangements that the 
payments in US $ could be effectuated within the contractual time limit.”2102 Thus, the 
tribunal rejected the force majeure excuse because the element of unforeseeability was 
lacking. The relevant exchange control legislation was already in force before the contracts 
had been concluded, and it was regarded as the duty of the buyer to undertake the reasonable 
steps to get the foreign exchange transfer permissions. 
 
The arbitral tribunal in ICC Case No. 12112 also considered, as an element of the condition of 
foreseeability and risk allocation, the obligor’s duty to take reasonable steps to be certain of 
its capacity for performance before binding itself in respect to the obligee to perform certain 
obligations. The dispute arose from a joint venture agreement concluded between the foreign 
investors and the Ministry of Agriculture of State Y for the cultivation of agricultural 
products, the breeding of livestock and the processing and sale of the resulting products. The 
joint venture company (“Company X”) experienced serious difficulties from the start: among 
other disturbances, the land was occupied by farmers, who in some cases claimed ownership, 
and the workshops were occupied by protesting wives of workers. The investors commenced 
ICC arbitration, seeking the dissolution of Company X and damages.
2103
 The sole arbitrator 
first held that the law of State Y applied to the substance of the dispute. The arbitrator 
considered the contractual obligations of the parties and concluded that the state partner did 
not perform under those obligations because it failed to make available the land, the 
equipment and facilities that were its contribution in kind to the joint venture.
2104
  
 
The agreement contained some clauses dealing with the regime of liability and the force 
majeure excuse. The agreement provided for strict liability regime, according to which non-
compliance with any obligation would create liability. The arbitrator noted that State Y 
provides a regime where fault is the ground of contractual liability, but is presumed in case of 
any default in performance. The arbitrator considered that the clauses dealing with the force 
majeure excuse slightly differ in their system from the ordinary statutory regime of State Y 
law but, under State Y law, impossibility is of no excuse when the performance of the 
obligation has turned out to be impossible for the fault of the debtor. Thus, the arbitrator 
decided to examine the question of coordination between those two regimes. He considered 
that State Y liability regime is a minimum standard and the agreements providing for a 
liability regime stricter for the nonperforming debtor are valid. The arbitrator found that the 
two regimes lead anyway to identical results. Article 31 of the agreement provided that the 
parties would be exempted from the effects of non-compliance with their obligations, “if such 
non-compliance was the consequence of circumstances of force majeure arising after the 
conclusion of the contract as a result of extraordinary events which a Party could neither 
foresee nor avert by reasonable means.” Article 31 defined the expression “circumstances of 
force majeure” as “events which beyond the Party’s control and for whose occurrence it is not 
responsible, for example earthquake, flood, fire.” Article 33 of the agreement provided that 
“The Party which is unable owing to circumstances of force majeure to comply with its 
                                                 
2102
 Ibid. 
2103
 ICC Award in Case No. 12112, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration (2009), at 78 
2104
 Ibid., at 79 
 585 
 
obligations under this Contract, to make up for such non-compliance as quickly as 
possible.”2105 
 
The arbitrator stated that the burden of proof of non-performance was caused by force 
majeure lies on the side of the state partner. The arbitrator observed that the third parties, such 
as workers, their wives, peasants, who cannot be considered as the state partner’s auxiliaries, 
whose behavior could be imputed to the state partner, played a role in the disturbance and 
default of performance, but the state partner did not provide any convincing evidence that 
explain why the behavior of these third parties was impossible to prevent by reasonable 
means, or irresistible. The arbitrator required the evidence explaining that all reasonable 
means to avert the third parties’ behavior had been used by the state party, and describing the 
reasons why reasonable means were not sufficient and why sufficient means would have been 
unreasonable. In the absence of such evidence, the arbitrator did not admit that non-
performance was caused by “circumstances of force majeure” according to the agreement. 
The arbitrator also considered that the unstable political, social and economic situation of 
State Y at the relevant period and the resulting difficulties for performing agreed obligations 
did not allow him to change the notion of contractual obligation and the concept of force 
majeure, and to consider that the state partner was liberated simply because of the social 
unrest in that country, since otherwise any obligation in State Y at that time would have to be 
considered as subject to force majeure, which would prevent law to be an instrument of 
stability or contributing to stability. The arbitrator stated that “Nobody forced the State Y 
partner to agree on the obligations provided for in the Contract after negotiations. Once it had 
agreed to be bound on such obligations, it could not be liberated from them simply because of 
the general situation in State Y.”2106  
 
The arbitrator noted that even if one admitted that the relevant circumstances were impossible 
to avert by reasonable means, it was not clearly proven by the state partner that these 
circumstances were unforeseeable for the state partner. The arbitrator stated, with regard to 
the unforeseeability requirement of force majeure, that “Before entering an obligation, 
everyone must, before, be certain that he has the ability to perform it. If he has or must have a 
slightest doubt about his ability to perform at the given time, he must make all necessary 
verifications before promising performance.”2107 The arbitrator added that “In such a contract 
between a state partner and a foreign partner, the foreign partner legitimately relies on the 
national public partner as to questions of social climate and forces in the concerned region, 
that the foreign partner cannot estimate properly (this arises clearly out of the principle of 
good faith, which is central in State Y contract law…; imperio rationis, one can refer as well, 
per analogiam and a fortiori, to UNIDROIT principles of international commercial contracts, 
1994, Art. 6.14 [6.1.14 (Application for public permission) of the UNDROIT Principles 2010] 
et seq., with reference to the role of a national contracting party even not public.) If such a 
national public partner promises by a contract that defined obligations will be performed, its 
foreign contracting partner can only have the expectation that it will be done so. That is to say 
that the national public partner has a strict legal duty to check that performance will be 
possible at the promised time, taking also into consideration the social climate that the foreign 
partner cannot estimate properly; if it has not made the necessary verification, it must bear all 
consequences towards its foreign contractual partner.”2108  
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In the case, there was no clear evidence that the social climate had completely changed in an 
unpredictable way, between the time of negotiations and the time for performance. According 
to the tribunal, it would have been the duty of the State Y partner to ensure that the regional 
social forces would not disturb performance of its contribution, by checking and, if necessary, 
negotiating seriously with them before concluding the contract and entering the obligations. 
Thus, the arbitrator held that the conditions of the force majeure clause were not fulfilled 
since it was not proven that the state partner could neither foresee nor avert by reasonable 
means the circumstances that did not depend on it.
2109
 The arbitrator also stated that even if 
one had admitted that circumstances amounted to force majeure, it would not be possible to 
exclude the liability since it was not proven that the state partner did every effort to make up 
for non-compliance as required by Article 33 of the agreement. Finally, as the liability of the 
state partner was uncontestable under the liability regime provided for in the agreement, the 
arbitrator did not find it necessary to examine whether liability would also exist according to 
the State Y law.
 2110
 
 
When the contract requires the obligor to notify the other party of the force majeure event, 
such a duty can be considered as a requirement for the force majeure excuse and the failure to 
perform it as agreed may preclude the obligor from successfully invoking the force majeure 
excuse, depending on the formulation of the force majeure clause or the extent of delay. In 
ICC Case No 2478, the arbitral tribunal considered the substantive delay in notifying the other 
party of the force majeure event prevented the non-performing party from invoking the force 
majeure excuse. The tribunal dealt with a claim for damages made by a French company 
against a Rumanian company, which had not delivered to it a certain quantity of fuel. The 
tribunal found that the cancellation of the export license by the Rumanian authorities 
constituted a case of force majeure, both on the level of the general principles of law and on 
the level of the force majeure clause of the contract. However, the force majeure clause 
required the party invoking it to inform the other party without delay, in writing, of the 
occurrence of the event of force majeure and of the consequences which it intended to draw 
from it. As the Rumanian authorities’ decision was only made known to the other party, 
through the intermediary of the ICC Court of Arbitration, the arbitrators held that the 
respondent lost the possibility of taking advantage of force majeure.
2111
  
 
In ICC Case No 4237, the failure to notify the other party of the force majeure event was 
instrumental in the tribunal’s rejection of the force majeure excuse. The case concerned a 
sales contract concluded on August 15, 1979 between a Syrian buyer and a Ghanaian supplier. 
The contract stipulated payment by confirmed and irrevocable letter of credit. The contract 
contained a force majeure clause, which provided that “(a) In the event of confronting force 
majeure of any nature, the Suppliers shall undertake to advise buyers thereof and immediately 
after it discontinues. (b) Fluctuation of currency and rise in prices shall not be considered as 
force majeure events.”2112 On November 26, 1979, two letters of credit in favor of the supplier 
were confirmed. However, the supplier was not able to ship the goods according to the 
shipment schedule. The buyer reminded the supplier several times of the shipment schedule 
and the contractual delay penalties, yet extended the shipment period and the validity of the 
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letters of credit until May 31, 1980. On May 7, 1980, the supplier proposed a price increase of 
40% to recover their losses caused by “the increase of oil price”. During a meeting between 
both parties on July 28-30, 1980, it became apparent that this price increase was unacceptable 
to the buyer and the supplier wished to abolish the contract and relied on force majeure.  
 
The arbitrator rejected the supplier’s argument that they were prevented from performing 
under the contract by force majeure. The arbitrator noted that there was no specific mention of 
force majeure in any telex from the supplier to the buyer until the date until which the letters 
of credit were extended, and the first time when force majeure had been invoked by the 
supplier was during the discussions at the end of July 1980.
2113
 The arbitrator stated that “[the 
supplier] have in any case failed to inform [the buyer] in a proper and timely manner about 
the alleged events of force majeure. Rather, what becomes clear from the record, [the supplier 
was] in principle able to deliver but wished to have higher prices.”2114 The arbitrator 
concluded that “[the supplier] assert that the alleged events in Ghana were internationally 
known, and should certainly have been known to [the buyer] which are well-informed State 
organization. Leaving aside that such knowledge cannot substitute the requirement of a notice 
of an event of force majeure under Clause 15 (a) of the Contract, if every governmental 
reshuffle and accompanying public excitement constitutes force majeure, world trade would 
in modern times be bogged down to uncertainty.”2115  
 
b. Effects of Force Majeure Excuse 
 
The decision maker applying lex mercatoria should consider the approach of general 
contracting practices, which emphasizes the suspension of the performance, rather than 
outright termination or dissolution of the contract in the events of force majeure. As the 
parties often have a substantial common interest in the survival of the contract, they stipulate 
that the obligations affected by force majeure will initially only be suspended. This 
consideration should motivate the reasoning of the decision makers to extend the contract 
duration, when the effects of a force majeure event last for a reasonable period of time and 
then cease, unless the contractual clauses or the default rules chosen by the parties explicitly 
denies suspension in such cases. This is also considered as a general principle of law by some 
commentators.
2116
  
 
In ICC Case No 1703, the dispute arose from a turn-key contract for the supply of a factory 
between the claimant, an enterprise controlled by its state, and the defendant, a private 
company specialized in the supply and the starting up of industrial equipment. Hostilities 
broke out in the region, which brought about perturbations in the works and in the relations 
between the governments of the two parties. The defendant had to stop the work because, at 
the beginning of the hostilities against its state, the members of the personnel of the 
defendant, who were of the same nationality as the defendant, were required to leave the 
country. After the end of hostilities, defendant refused to continue and finish the work on the 
grounds that its government had withdrawn the necessary export financing facilities, that it 
was not possible to obtain the necessary visas for its personnel and that its security could not 
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be maintained. The arbitral tribunal stated that “The conditions in the country arising in 
connection with the hostilities inter alia the display of anti (the defendant’s country) reactions, 
presented a situation where, in view of the reasonable apprehension of threats to their own 
safety and that of their families, the employees could not be required to remain in the 
country.”2117 Thus, the tribunal considered that the defendant was excused from performance 
under the claimant’s law and the contract for the duration of the hostilities and at least for a 
certain period of time thereafter.  
 
According to the tribunal, after that period, the political situation in the country did not 
present dangers of such kind as to prevent the continued performance of the contract. The 
claimant argued that if the defendant, according to the contract, had given the claimant further 
notice, explaining the precise problems encountered through the defendant’s government’s 
prohibition and the difficulties to get visas, the claimant, considering the national importance 
of the project, could have made it possible for the defendant to have the contract performed. 
The tribunal noted that there was no evidence indicating that the defendant made any serious 
efforts to get visas, while some evidence indicated that, had such efforts been made, visas 
would have been obtained. According to the tribunal, “even apart from the question relating to 
visas other alternatives in order to overcome the difficulties in performing the contract, such 
as e.g. the assembling of a start-up team consisting of non-country of the defendant citizens, 
ought to have been explored by the defendant.” With regard to the financing facilities, the 
tribunal accepted that further financing through the defendant’s government agency became 
impossible, but noted that an arrangement of other means of financing than through the 
agency would have been a possibility open to the parties and would not have adversely 
affected the defendant. The tribunal stated that “The defendant, however, has not shown that, 
in accordance with the provisions of … the Contract, it has informed the claimant of the 
defendant’s willingness to continue performance of the Contract once the claimant had made 
available new means of financing the remaining – proportionally minor – payments under the 
Contract.” Thus, the tribunal considered that the defendant failed to pursue a course which 
could have preserved the essence of the contract.
 2118
 The tribunal rejected the plea of force 
majeure, since the effects of the force majeure event on the defendant’s performance of its 
obligations became reasonably avoidable after a certain period of time. 
 
Where the parties have not clearly agreed so, the decision, which declares that the 
performance of the contract is suspended for the duration of the force majeure event, is a form 
of supplementation of the contract with an implied term, which requires the parties to 
continue performance upon the cessation of a force majeure condition. Thus, such a decision 
may give rise to residual questions as to the duration of the contract and costs of performance. 
In this respect, the decision maker should seek guidance in the interpretation of the contract 
and the underlying bargain and refrain from a decision of suspension if such an interpretation 
requires the dissolution of the contract. This is particularly the case where a force majeure 
event extends over a substantial amount of time and become permanent in view of its 
consequences with regard to the performance of certain obligations as agreed under the 
contract. Moreover, the suspension of the contract due to the force majeure event may not be 
appropriate in cases where the parties cannot reasonably foresee for how long the effects of 
the force majeure event would last or whether those effects would ever cease, given that the 
parties may conclude with third persons similar contracts that have not been affected by the 
relevant event. 
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In the Alsing award, Greece was alleged to have breached a long-term contract with Alsing 
for the supply of matches for twenty years. Alsing argued that the contract should be extended 
for six years, corresponding to those of the World War II and thereafter (1940-46), when 
deliveries were not possible. The Umpire noted that, under the contract, Greece was not 
bound to receive a definite quantity of matches, and Greece’s obligation to obtain 
merchandise depended on its need for it, which may diminish or disappear as a result of 
circumstances. Although Greece did not cease to require matches during the years 1940-46, it 
was impossible for it to be supplied by Alsing. The Umpire stated that “The State's obligation 
to fulfil the contract was abolished for the period under consideration by reason of the 
impossibility of taking delivery ('impossibilium nulla est obligatio '), and [Greece] 
legitimately met its match requirements by going to other suppliers. No more than if the 
requirements as such had entirely or partly disappeared, can the plaintiff constrain the State to 
buy later the quantities of matches which it has already procured elsewhere.” The Umpire 
explained that “even in a sales contract providing for successive deliveries of a certain 
quantity of goods, the impossibility of making one or more deliveries frees the obligor from 
these obligations, without his being bound later to deliver or to take delivery of the quantities 
in question. Each delivery in a contract of this kind constitutes the fulfilling of a separate 
obligation which may be annulled for reasons peculiar to it. ... No doubt, in order to justify the 
impossibility of fulfilling one of the successive obligations, the existence of a temporary 
obstacle of which the removal seems possible is not sufficient; the fulfilment is in that case 
only delayed. But fulfilment is considered impossible when it is not possible to foresee the 
duration of the existence of this obstacle. . . . Such was certainly the case with the obstacles 
which the naval war, the occupation of Greece and the postwar difficulties placed in the way 
of fulfilling the supply contract. This being the case, Alsing's claims referring to acceptance 
and payment for periodic deliveries during the years 1940-46 were annulled; they did not 
again assume validity from the fact that the obligations as such subsequently became possible 
of fulfilment ....”2119 
 
The Umpire found support for this reasoning in the contractual clause, which provided that 
“cases of "force majeure" release the company from all responsibility.” According to the 
Umpire, “Nothing in the text of the contract can lead one to suppose that in addition to being 
released from its obligations, Alsing should receive as ‘compensation’ the right to effect later 
the deliveries made impossible by the events of the war and its aftermath.” The Umpire 
considered the supply contract as a contract of successive or continuous execution, but subject 
to an expiry period. In his view, the obligations which establish a lasting relationship between 
the parties cease on expiry of the agreed period, without account having to be taken of the fact 
that during certain periods fulfillment of the obligations was impossible for one or other of the 
parties. The Umpire stated that “the duration of the contract must be thought of as a 'tempus 
continuum' and not as a 'tempus utile,' in which the contract would be extended by the total 
amount of the periods during which the carrying out of the contracts encounters obstacles. 
The 'tempus utile' clause is exceptional and should follow clearly from the contract; it is 
inconceivable in a contract of long duration.” According to the Umpire “These principles are 
those of common law springing from Roman law . . . Greek jurisprudence is based on these 
grounds…”2120 
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The force majeure issues were commonly relevant to the disputes resolved by the Iran United 
States Claims Tribunal as a result of the circumstances surrounding Iranian Revolution, which 
ensured that the doctrine of force majeure would play a significant role in the Tribunal’s 
decisions. In a number of awards, the Tribunal stated that “[b]y December 1978, strikes, riots 
and other civil strife in the course of the Islamic Revolution had created classic force majeure 
conditions at least in Iran's major cities. By 'force majeure' we mean social and economic 
forces beyond the power of the state to control through the exercise of due diligence.”2121 The 
Tribunal recognized force majeure as a general principle of law and, determined the legal 
consequences of force majeure without focusing on a particular national law.
2122
  
 
In the case of Anaconda-Iran, Inc. v. Iran, the Tribunal was asked to determine whether either 
party or both of them justifiably could invoke force majeure as an excuse for non-
performance of contractual obligations and to determine the cause of termination of the 
agreement.
2123
 The dispute concerned a “Technical Assistance Agreement” (“TAA”), 
according to which, the claimant Anaconda was to provide the defendant National Iranian 
Copper Industries Company with certain technical assistance in connection with the 
development, construction and operation of an opencast copper mine and related plant and 
smelter in Iran. In consideration, the claimant was entitled to reimbursement of expenses 
incurred and payment of a certain fee. Both parties performed under the TAA at least up until 
1978. By 5 January 1979, social and political unrest in Iran had increased to such a degree 
that the claimant felt compelled to exercise its right, pursuant to Section 2.06 of the TAA, to 
invoke force majeure as an excuse for non-performance of its obligations, and proceeded to 
withdraw its personnel from Iran. Section 2.06 provided that: “[The claimant] shall have no 
responsibility to the extent and for the period that its obligations under this Agreement are 
affected by a force majeure incident, including without limitation, floods, tempest, 
earthquakes, sabotage, uprising, civil war, acts of government, epidemics and incidents 
beyond the control of [the claimant]. If prior to the Date of Operation any force majeure 
incident prevents the continuation of the Project and such incident continues in effect for a 
period of six months, then [the defendant] alone may upon notice to [the claimant] terminate 
this Agreement.”2124 The defendant contended that the withdrawal of the claimant’s personnel 
from Iran constituted a breach of the TAA as the defendant rejected the invocation of force 
majeure, and the conditions in Iran, at the time, did not constitute force majeure. On May 31, 
1979, the claimant terminated the TAA for the reason that the defendant failed to pay in 
accordance with the agreement amounts.
2125
 The claimant claimed entitlement to the 
equivalent of 18 months Technical Service Fee, as provided for in the TAA (“Termination 
Damage”), in addition to the amounts due and its “Termination Costs”, as provided by the 
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TAA. The defendant disputed the claimant’s alleged entitlement to payment for Termination 
Costs and Termination Damage as well as the claimed interest thereon, on the ground that the 
claimant had ceased to perform its obligations as of 5 January 1979 and that it did not resume 
performance prior to the termination of the Agreement.
2126
  
 
The Tribunal stated in general terms that “force majeure is an excuse for non-performance of 
a contractual obligation which depends on the facts and circumstances. When there is a 
situation of force majeure, the performance of contractual obligations will, partially or totally, 
be suspended. Force majeure also can have the effect of terminating a contract if force 
majeure renders performance of the contract impossible in a definitive way or for a prolonged 
period of time. As force majeure arises out of and depends on factual circumstances, it will 
affect a contract as soon as the circumstances emerge which create the obstacle to 
performance. The actual effect force majeure will have on the contract depends, however, on 
the extent to which these circumstances, practically and objectively, render performance 
impossible. Consequently, the existence of force majeure does not depend on, or arise out of, 
an agreement between the parties as to the existence of such circumstances. Nor is the 
application of force majeure dependent on any special formal requirements, unless the 
contract in question so provides. Under a variety of names most, if not all, legal systems 
recognize force majeure as an excuse for contractual non-performance. Force majeure 
therefore can be considered a general principle of law. It follows that the right to invoke force 
majeure does not depend on, or arise out of, an express contractual provision. The parties to a 
contract may, however, agree that force majeure will have certain specific consequences for 
their contractual performance or with respect to termination of the contract. They also can 
decide that their contractual obligations, or some of them, will not be affected by force 
majeure. It is clear, however, that a limitation on the right to invoke force majeure as an 
excuse for non-performance cannot be presumed, but requires instead an express contractual 
provision to that effect.”2127  
 
In accordance with its established practice, the Tribunal found that the claimant was excused 
from performance under the TAA from the time of departure of the claimant’s personnel in 
January 1979 up until 15 February 1979 due to force majeure. The Tribunal noted that after 
15 February 1979 the conditions in Iran had gradually evolved towards more normal 
conditions, but under the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal found that at least up until 31 
May 1979 the conditions in Iran were such as to justify continued non-performance by the 
claimant to the extent that contractual performance required the presence in Iran of United 
States personnel.
2128
 In that context, the Tribunal examined whether, contractually or 
otherwise, the defendant remained liable to the claimant when the claimant's non-performance 
was excused due to force majeure. The Tribunal noted that the TAA explicitly only provided 
for the effects that a force majeure situation will have on the claimant’s obligations and was 
silent as to the effect of such a situation on the defendant’s obligations. However, given that 
Section 2.06 authorized the defendant “alone” to terminate the TAA after six months of 
continuing force majeure conditions, the tribunal considered that this right, conferred solely 
on the defendant, was only explained if the defendant’s obligation to make contractual 
payments was not conditioned on the claimant’s actual performance in case of force majeure. 
The Tribunal noted that although such an obligation, prima facie, may appear unfavorable to 
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the defendant, the defendant remained entitled to require the claimant's unconditional 
continued performance immediately upon the expiry of the period of force majeure and that 
was not unreasonable to assume that such entitlement constituted valuable consideration for 
the defendant in view of the scope and magnitude of the project in question. According to the 
Tribunal, it was in the interest of the defendant that the claimant remained obligated to incur 
the costs related to retention of their personnel in view of an assumed resumption of 
performance of the TAA. In conclusion, the Tribunal rejected the defendant's contention that 
the claimant's non-performance justified the defendant's non-payment of the Technical 
Service Fee, employee salaries and fringe benefits for the period from 1 February 1979 until 
the date of termination of the TAA.
2129
  
 
The Tribunal noted that the claimant notified the defendant on 22 March 1979 of its intention 
to terminate the TAA, at which time, as the Tribunal found, the claimant was excused from 
performance due to force majeure. Under the TAA, the claimant had the express right to 
terminate the TAA for failure by the defendant to pay "any amount" due, which was deemed 
to be a material breach by the TAA, and this right was neither explicitly, nor, in the view of 
the Tribunal, impliedly conditioned an actual performance by the claimant. The tribunal also 
noted that the defendant did not invoke force majeure as an excuse for its own non-
performance, but maintained the position that force majeure conditions were not prevailing in 
Iran at the relevant time. Thus, the Tribunal was not asked to decide if the circumstances 
existing at the relevant time were such as to justify a suspension of defendant’s payment 
obligations pursuant to the TAA. The Tribunal, therefore, did not reach the issue whether such 
a determination could affect its findings. The Tribunal concluded that the claimant was 
entitled to terminate the TAA on 31 May 1979 due to the defendant’s breach of the TAA, and 
awarded substantial part of its claimed amount for the defendant’s breach of the TAA.2130 
 
Thus, according to the Tribunal, when there is a situation of force majeure, the performance 
of contractual obligations will, in the first instance, be suspended partially or totally. The 
question of which contractual obligations are suspended by the reason of force majeure is 
determined by the Tribunal on the basis of the interpretation of the contract and in accordance 
with the risk allocation as agreed by the parties. A force majeure event, which is permanent or 
extends over a substantial amount of time, leads to the termination of a contract by reason of 
frustration or impossibility of performance, even if the parties did not invoke force majeure, 
or the contract does not provide for such termination.
2131
  
 
In Mobil Oil Iran, Inc. v. Iran, the Tribunal considered that the relevant agreement was 
suspended but not frustrated or terminated by the events of force majeure. The dispute 
concerned a long-term Sale and Purchase Agreement (SPA) between Iran and a group of 
major oil companies collectively known as the "Consortium". In December 1978-January 
1979, as a consequence of the revolutionary events that were taking place in Iran, the 
production of oil was reduced substantially and eventually interrupted. On 10 March 1979 the 
defendant sent the Consortium a letter stating that the SPA "proved to be inoperative, soon 
after the Effective Date due to the fact that the latter companies failed to comply with certain 
essential provisions of the Agreement" and listing a series of principles upon which the future 
relationship should be based. On 23 March 1979 the Consortium, while reserving all their 
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rights, proposed a meeting for the purpose of reaching an agreement on the termination of the 
SPA. Negotiations were initiated but failed to produce any agreement before November 1979, 
when the rupture of all relations between Iran and the United States caused these negotiations 
to end.
2132
 Article 27 of the SPA envisioned force majeure as an excuse for failure by a party 
to comply with the terms of the agreement, but only as causing a suspension of certain 
provisions of the agreement. The Tribunal stated that “This is in line with the most common 
practice in contract law. Usually, force majeure conditions will have the effect of terminating 
a contract only if they make performance definitively impossible or impossible for a long 
period of time. It also is admitted generally that force majeure, as a cause of full or partial 
suspension or termination of a contract, is a general principle of law which applies even when 
the contract is silent.” Thus, although Article 27 did not so provide, the Tribunal held that it 
was no obstacle to a finding that the agreement was terminated by force majeure if the 
circumstances warrant such a finding. In the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal did not 
find that on 10 March 1979 the situation was such that the agreement could be considered as 
frustrated or terminated for cause of force majeure because a new revolutionary Islamic 
Government had already been established, and, thus, the conditions could be expected to 
progressively return to normal.
2133
  
 
In another case, Sylvania Technical Systems, Inc. v. Iran, which concerned a contract to train 
Iranian Air Force personnel to operate and maintain an electronic intelligence gathering 
system, Sylvania alleged that the Iranian Government breached and repudiated the contract in 
January and February 1979.
2134
 The Tribunal emphasized that force majeure defenses “must 
always be analyzed in the context of the circumstances causing force majeure, taking into 
                                                 
2132
 Mobil Oil Iran, Inc. v. Iran, 16 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R., at 10 
2133
 Ibid., at 38-39 paras. 116-117; However, the Tribunal noted that it would be erroneous to pretend that the 
conditions in Iran already had returned to normal by 10 March 1979. According to the Tribunal, the dramatic 
political changes brought about in Iran by the success of the Islamic Revolution and the decision of the Islamic 
Government to follow a policy radically different from that of the previous Government in the oil industry could 
not be without consequences to the contractual relationship between Iran and the Consortium, even if the 
changes of such a character and magnitude could not have had any effect on the validity of the agreement 
without materializing in specific measures.  The Tribunal stated that “A close scrutiny of the exchange of letters 
of 10 and 23 March 1979, as well as of the conduct of the Parties prior to and after this exchange, demonstrates 
that the Parties agreed at this time not to revive the Agreement, then suspended by force majeure. This 
agreement, however, was not unconditional. Both parties recognized that a reconciliation of interest was to take 
place between them, and that this reconciliation, as well as the other issues arising from the termination of the 
Agreement, was to be the object of subsequent negotiations, as spelled out in the 23 March letter. Such 
negotiations eventually took place and, undoubtedly, would have resulted in compensation for the loss sustained 
by the Consortium alluded to in the same letter. Any other outcome of the negotiation, in the absence of other 
counterparts acceptable to the Companies, would have amounted to an unjust enrichment of Iran and [National 
Iranian Oil Company] and an unjust loss for the Companies.”  The Tribunal held that the fact that the 
negotiations did not succeed before November 1979 and were interrupted by the events which took place during 
that month did not relieve the defendants from their obligation to compensate the loss sustained by the 
Consortium. Ibid., at 39-42 paras. 119-127; Thus, although the tribunal rejected the assertions that the SPA was 
terminated by way of frustration, it found that, after the occurrence of force majeure events, the parties agreed to 
terminate the agreement with the understanding that the legal and financial consequences of such a termination, 
including the compensation to be paid by the parties, would be determined through negotiations. In order to 
ascertain the compensation to be paid by one party to the other, the Tribunal decided to determine what the 
parties could legitimately have expected from negotiations conducted in good faith on the basis of the exchange 
of letters during March 1979, which established an agreement between the parties, by interpreting the SPA, not 
only pursuant to its initial terms, but also as to the manner in which it was performed and de facto or de jure 
amended during its life, up to the time it was suspended by force majeure. Ibid, at para. 161 
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 Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, Sylvania Technical Systems, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 8 IRAN-U.S. 
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account the particular part affected by those circumstances and the specific obligations that 
party is prevented from performing.”2135 The Tribunal pointed out that, “[f]orce majeure being 
an exception to the obligation to perform, a party that invokes it has the burden of proving 
that conditions of force majeure existed with regard to its various contractual obligations.”2136 
The Tribunal held that force majeure conditions existing in Iran from late December 1978 
until 15 February 1979, suspended both parties' performance under the contract, but rejected 
for lack of proof the defendant’s contention that force majeure conditions extended beyond 15 
February 1979 so as to prevent the defendant from performing its obligations. The Tribunal 
noted that the Iranian government had terminated the contract as a result of a “deliberate 
policy decision not to continue with American contractors in a project that related to secret 
military intelligence operations” and that such a decision had been taken in view of an historic 
development, and did not convey that performance by the defendant was prevented by the 
events beyond its control.
2137
 Thus, the Tribunal applied the provisions of the contract, which 
reserved to the Iranian government the right to make such policy decision and to decide to 
terminate the contract, while imposing on the government certain financial obligations. 
 
In other cases, the Iran United States Claims Tribunal held that the relevant agreements were 
terminated due to the events of force majeure and went on to determine the consequences of 
termination in relation to the questions of restitution. In many cases the contracts contained no 
provisions regulating the consequences of force majeure, and the Tribunal was left with wide 
latitude in determining the way in which the winding up between the parties was to be carried 
out.
2138
 In Queens Office Tower Associates v. Iran National Airlines Corp, the Tribunal set 
the precedent, with regard to the rights and the liabilities of the parties in cases of the 
premature termination of the contract due to force majeure, that “The governing rule is that 
the loss must "lie where it falls". The apportionment of the loss is subject generally to the 
Tribunal's equitable a discretion, using the contract as a framework and reference point.”2139  
 
In Gould Marketing, Inc. v. Iranian Ministry of National Defense, the dispute arose from a 
supply contract under which the claimant was to provide certain equipment and services to the 
Ministry and to provide a field service representative ("FSR") in order both to train Iranian 
nationals in the maintenance of the equipments and to carry out as many on-the-spot repairs as 
it could. The services were to be rendered over a ten year period between 1976 and 1986, but 
were in fact rendered for only three years. The claimant withdrew its FSR in December 1978 
due to the existence of unsafe conditions, and the defendant stopped its performance of the 
obligations as to the payment schedule in June 1979. The tribunal considered that, the 
claimant’s inability to supply services due to the social upheaval in Iran justified non-
performance by both parties: the claimant was excused from maintaining its FSR in Iran, and 
the defendant's failure to pay the June 1979 milestone was similarly excused. Since a 
suspension of both parties’ performance obligations could not continue indefinitely without 
having some effect on the viability of the contract, the Tribunal held that “the continued 
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existence of force majeure conditions had by mid-1979 ripened into a termination of the ... 
contract. Performance had become essentially impossible.”2140  
 
Given that the contract was governed by the law of California according to the choice of law 
clause, the Tribunal stated that “Under American law, as under English law since 1943, the 
general principle applied to equitably allocate such consequences of frustration of contract is 
that amounts due under the contract are to be proportioned to the extent the contract was 
performed. If no payment has been made, the Party which has performed is entitled to receive 
payment to the extent of that performance. If payment has been made, the Party which 
received such payment is entitled to retain that amount of money proportionate to its 
performance and must return any money in excess of that amount. In applying this general 
principle, the Tribunal should avoid unduly burdening either party with the hardships arising 
from the termination. Regardless of how difficult it might be for the Tribunal, as for any 
Court, to equitably allocate these burdens and how imperfect might be the justice reached, 
such difficulty and such imperfection should not be a reason for denying any relief.”2141 It 
concluded that “the measure of the value of that performance can be found by dividing the 
relevant contract price by ten and then multiplying the resulting figure by three”. 2142 As a 
result of the Tribunal’s calculations, the claimant was ordered to repay the respondent the 
excess monies it had received pursuant to the schedule of payments provided for by the 
contract. 
 
Where the contract was terminated as a result of force majeure event, the Iran US Claims 
Tribunal declined to award any costs or fees incurred after the date of termination or any lost 
profits as those would amount to awarding damages. In International Schools Services, Inc. v. 
National Iranian Copper Industries Co., which concerned a contract for the operation of an 
American elementary school for the dependent children of the expatriate workers of National 
Iranian Copper Industries Co., the claimant closed the school and ceased its performance 
under the contract in January 1979 due to the political unrest in Iran. It claimed for the 
amount of unpaid invoices for goods sold and services rendered as well as lost profits in the 
amount it would have earned had it not been forced to leave Iran prior to the expiration date 
of the contract. The Tribunal found that the force majeure situation amounted to a frustration 
of the contract in early 1979. Because there was little proof as to the specific date when the 
contract came to an end, and for the purposes of convenience, the tribunal determined that 
such date was 1 January 1979. Thus, the Tribunal held that as of 1 January 1979, the parties 
were excused from further performance under the contract and discharged from their duty to 
perform contractual obligations not yet due. The Tribunal noted that the contract itself and 
Article 229 of the Iranian Civil Code incorporated this principle, and concluded that “In 
apportioning the loss in this case the Tribunal finds that, applying the principles set out above, 
the Claimant should be reimbursed for the costs and fees that it incurred prior to 1 January 
1979, but should not be reimbursed for any costs or fees incurred after that date, nor should it 
be compensated for any ‘lost profits’.”2143 
                                                 
2140
 Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, Gould Marketing, Inc. v. Ministry of National Defence, (Interlocutory Award), 3 
IRAN-U.S. C.T.R.., at 154 
2141
 Gould Marketing, Inc. v. Ministry of National Defence, (Final Award), 6 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R., at 274; This 
passage was cited by William J. Levitt v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 520-210-3, 29 August 1991, 27 
IRAN-U.S. C.T.R., at 168 
2142
 Gould Marketing, Inc. v. Ministry of National Defence, (Final Award), 6 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R., at 279 
2143
 Iran US Claims Tribunal Award in Case No. 111 (194-111-1), October 10, 1985, International Schools 
Services, Inc. v. National Iranian Copper Industries Company, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, (1987), at 
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In Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force, which concerned a 
project for the establishment of maintenance capability for the Iranian Air Force's electronic 
equipment, the Tribunal held that the agreement was terminated due to the events of force 
majeure and rejected the claims for specific performance. The Tribunal noted that the first 
legal consequence of such a termination is that, as of the date of termination, the parties are 
excused from further performance and discharged from their duty to perform contractual 
obligations not yet due.
2144
 The Tribunal stated that the governing rule for the determination 
of the rights and liabilities of the parties in light of the termination of the contracts is that “the 
loss must lie where it falls” and the Tribunal practice in these situations has been to allocate 
equitably any loss between the parties in proportion to the extent the contract was performed 
by the date of termination. The Tribunal, referring to, among others, the cases of Gould and 
International Schools Services, stated that “it will determine the extent to which 
Westinghouse performed its obligations under each … contract at issue until such 
performance was made impossible, and whether, based on such performance, Westinghouse is 
entitled to receive further payments or, on the contrary must return to the Air Force part of the 
payments it received. In accordance with Tribunal practice in frustration cases, Westinghouse 
should not be reimbursed for any costs or fees incurred after the date the contracts came to an 
end, nor should it be compensated for lost profits… Moreover, by finding that the … 
contracts terminated by the end of December 1979, the Tribunal has necessarily rejected all of 
the Air Force's counterclaims for specific performance.”2145 
 
Thus, in the Tribunal's practice, the governing rule in force majeure cases was that the parties’ 
losses must lie where they fall, excluding the claims for specific performance and damages, 
subject to the Tribunal’s discretion to allocate equitably any such losses in proportion to the 
extent the contract was performed by the date of termination.
2146
 In the case Unidyne Corp. v. 
Islamic Republic of Iran concerning a contract under which Unidyne was to design and 
maintain a “Maintenance and Material Management” (or 3M) program to facilitate timely 
repairs and maintenance of the Iranian Navy’s fleet, the parties differed fundamentally on the 
causes of the non-completion of the contract. While the defendant contended that the claimant 
unlawfully failed to finish its work, the claimant alleged that the defendant’s actions 
prevented it from doing so.
2147
 As to the unfinished work, the claimant maintained that this 
was due to force majeure circumstances prevailing in Iran at the time. The claimant stated that 
because the Iranian revolution was the cause of its inability to continue performance, it was 
relieved of any liability by the force majeure clause of the contract. Moreover, the claimant 
considered that it should be paid compensation for the losses that it incurred as a result of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
333; Similarly, in Linen, Fortinberry and Associates v. Iran, considering that the purpose of a contract pursuant 
to which an American public relations firm was to promote the public image in the United States of the Pahlavi 
dynasty's Iran was frustrated by the success of the Islamic Revolution, the Tribunal held that the contract should 
be considered to have terminated on or about 31 January 1979, which was the mid way between the departure of 
the Shah from Iran and the installation of the Islamic Republic. Thus, the tribunal decided that the American firm 
was entitled to payment until that date. Iran US Claims Tribunal Award in Case No. 10513 (372-10513-2),  June 
28, 1988, Linen, Fortinberry and Associates v. Iran, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration (1989), at 459 
2144
 Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force, 33 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R., at 80 para. 62 
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Revolution because the event “was of [the defendant’s] own making.” The respondent denied 
the existence of force majeure conditions as alleged by the claimant.  
 
The tribunal found that the events occurred in November 1979, namely the seizure of the 
United States Embassy in Tehran, and ensuing deterioration of the relations between the 
United States and Iran, profoundly disturbed the performance of the contract, and the contract 
ultimately ground to a halt. Thus, in the tribunal’s view, the situation in Iran after the seizure 
of the Embassy amounted to force majeure for the claimant preventing it completing the work 
and ultimately leading to termination of the contract.
2148
 As to the effect of such termination, 
the Tribunal noted that the force majeure clause in the contract did not explicitly allocate 
between the parties the effects of a termination of the agreement for that reason.
2149
 The 
Tribunal found that the claimant should not be held liable for the non-completion of the 
contract and dismissed the counterclaims of the defendant for non-completion of the work. In 
light of the Tribunal’s prior finding that the social and economic forces operating in Iran 
during the height of the Islamic Revolution were beyond the power of the state to control 
through the exercise of due diligence, the Tribunal did not find the defendant liable for the 
extra costs and expenses incurred by the claimant, which were caused by the upheaval 
flowing from the said forces. The tribunal also refused to award the claimant’s claim for lost 
profits as the contract was terminated due to force majeure.
 2150
 The claimant maintained that 
it was not paid for all the work it had performed, but the defendant replied that as the contract 
was never completed, it was left with nothing more than reams of incomplete and useless 
papers. The Tribunal stated that “While it is indeed debatable whether the Respondent was 
able to implement and utilize fully the 3M system without further expertise of the Claimant 
and therefore whether the Respondent was able to benefit in every respect from the work 
accomplished, the Tribunal’s approach has been to hold a party liable to pay for work that was 
carried out prior to the occurrence of a force majeure event, although the contract was never 
fully performed.”2151 Thus, the Tribunal determined that the claimant was entitled to the 
balance in question plus interest in accordance with its precedents, according to which the 
governing rule as to the rights and liabilities of the parties in these circumstances is that “the 
loss must lie where it falls”, and “the apportionment of the loss is subject generally to the 
Tribunal’s equitable discretion, using the contract as a framework and reference point.”2152  
 
The approach of the Iran United States Claims Tribunal to the determination of the 
consequences of force majeure represents the abstract reasoning of a decision maker, who 
applies lex mercatoria as the law of principled adjudication of contractual disputes. It is 
argued that where the loss cannot be honestly attributed to the conduct of either party, the 
arbitrators on occasion, whatever the legal position, require the parties to share the loss and, 
thus, treat the frustration of the contract as a common hazard to be faced and the ensuing loss 
a common loss to be borne by both parties jointly rather than alone.
2153
 Thus, the flexibility to 
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apportion loss in consequence of force majeure excuse in the context of international 
arbitration may be perceived as an instance of the impression of “splitting the difference” by 
the arbitral tribunals between the parties. Indeed, the ad hoc arbitral tribunal in Chevron 
Corporation & Texaco Petroleum Corporation v. Ecuador stated in general terms that, “the 
doctrine of force majeure, like the doctrine of hardship and other related concepts, is designed 
to ‘distribute between the parties in a just and equitable manner the losses and gains resulting 
from’ an unforeseeable event.” On the basis of this premise,  the tribunal did not accept an 
interpretation that would mean that any negative effect of a force majeure situation would 
exclusively have to be borne by one party and in no way by the other party, in the absence of 
a support provided by the contract between the parties or the applicable national law for such 
an unusual interpretation.
2154
 Although the necessity of this flexibility is commonly explained 
on the basis of the concerns for justice and equity, the resulting discretion should not be 
motivated by an exercise of splitting the difference just to satisfy both parties, but it should 
relate to the decision makers’ concern for reflecting accurately the reasonable expectations of 
the parties in such a residual allocation.  
 
It should be underlined that, in these cases due to the basic requirements of the force majeure 
excuse, there are no indications of the explicit or tacit risk allocation agreed between the 
parties as to the distribution of losses and gains resulting from the force majeure event. Thus, 
the decision maker is required to take into account the underlying bargain and to discover the 
established rules in a particular case, which should be employed in the allocational ex post 
decision, since the knowledge of such rules is considered as part of the contracting parties’ 
cost of enabling the correspondence of the expectations in the order of international 
commerce. In force majeure cases, the decision maker will, in most cases, discover, either 
through abstractions from the general contracting practices and the flexible approach of 
national legal systems or through the established rules of conflict, such established rules that 
allow the restitutionary remedies and, at the same time, enable the decision maker to make 
monetary adjustments rather than restitution in kind, when the latter is not possible or 
appropriate. Thus, the allocational decision as a consequence of force majeure excuse is 
almost necessarily an instance of the decision maker’s exercise of equity infra legem and 
arises from the established rules in the particular case. 
 
3. Concluding Remarks 
 
The decision maker applying lex mercatoria should approach the issues of force majeure as a 
matter of risk allocation between the parties. The party invoking the excuse should prove that 
two basic requirements of the force majeure excuse have been fulfilled in the particular case, 
unless otherwise specifically provided by the parties in the terms of the contract or by the 
applicable default rules. These requirements essentially determine whether or not there is a 
gap in the risk allocation under a particular bargain. If the obligor is prevented from 
performing by an event whose occurrence, according to the intentions or expectations of the 
parties, is at neither party’s risk, then there is a gap in the risk allocation, and an exception 
will be made for its liability for non-performance. The first basic requirement of force 
majeure is that the event must prevent the obligor from performing any of its obligations in 
accordance with the underlying bargain. This requirement will usually depend on the 
existence of a legal, factual or physical impossibility in an objective sense. However, the 
subjective impossibility may also satisfy this basic requirement where the contract strictly 
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requires the obligor to perform its obligations personally or through its own organization and 
the supervening event renders such performance impossible. Economic impossibility or 
impracticability may also excuse the non-performance of the contractual obligations on the 
basis of the articulated rules or the applicable national law, which is considered as indicating 
the reasonable expectations of the parties, pursuant to the established rules of conflict. 
 
The second basic requirement of the force majeure excuse is that the effect of the alleged 
event of force majeure on the contractual obligations must be outside of the control of the 
obligor. This requirement implies that the event must be both unforeseeable and unavoidable 
for the obligor. The determination of the existence of the unforeseeability and unavoidability 
depends on the contract and the presumptions about the parties’ competences, which will be 
determined on the basis of the test of reasonable persons of the same kind as the parties placed 
under the same circumstances, through the contextual approach of the decision maker. The 
decision maker applying lex mercatoria will presume that the obligor has or should have 
exercised the foresight expected from a reasonable person of the same kind in the same 
circumstances, and assumed the costs of such efforts as would be made by a reasonable 
person of the same kind in the same circumstances, to avoid the effect of the alleged event of 
force majeure on the performance of its obligations.  
 
Thus, where the alleged event of force majeure was foreseeable at the time of contracting and 
the risk of the event’s occurrence was not reallocated to the obligee under the contract, the 
obligor will be considered as having assumed the relevant risk of the event, which prevents 
the performance of its obligation, and he will become liable for non-performance. Even if the 
alleged event of force majeure was unforeseeable at the time of contracting, the obligor may 
not rely on the force majeure excuse where the effects of the relevant event on the contractual 
obligations is avoidable by means of reasonable efforts of the obligor, and the costs of such 
efforts are within the sphere of risk of the obligor, or assumed by the obligee under the 
contract. Due to the presumptions as to the obligor’s competence in the order of international 
commerce, where the costs of such efforts merely renders the performance of the contractual 
obligation impractical or more onerous, the unforeseen event will not amount to a force 
majeure excuse. Even so, there is a link between the economic or subjective impossibility and 
the requirement of the unavoidability of the alleged event of force majeure in cases. This link 
arises from the approach of the decision maker applying lex mercatoria to the issues of force 
majeure as a matter of risk allocation and contractual interpretation. Thus, where the costs of 
the efforts that are required to avoid the effect of an unforeseen event on the contractual 
obligation are neither assumed by the obligee under the contact nor within the sphere of risk 
of the obligor, e.g. when the contract specifically requires the obligor to perform its 
obligations through its own organization, or the amount of such costs exceeds what would 
have been paid by a reasonable person of the same kind in the same circumstances to avoid 
the effects of the relevant event, the obligor may rely on the force majeure excuse, even if the 
relevant event does not render the performance of the obligation legally, factually or 
physically impossible in an objective sense under the traditional understanding of some 
national legal systems.  
 
The force majeure excuse, when successfully invoked by the obligor, implies a gap in the risk 
allocation and requires the decision maker to allocate the relevant rights and obligations 
residually on the basis of an abstract reasoning that takes into account the contractual clauses 
and the default rules, which are applicable as a result of the parties’ choice or pursuant to the 
established rules of conflict. The force majeure excuse initially suspends the performance of 
the contractual obligation, unless the contractual clauses or the default rules chosen by the 
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parties explicitly deny such a suspension. When available, the effects of suspension on the 
contract due to the temporary force majeure event, such as the extension of the period of 
performance, will be determined by the decision maker interpreting the contract through a 
contextual approach. If a force majeure event is permanent or extends over a substantial 
amount of time, so that it becomes permanent in view of its consequences with regard to the 
performance of obligations as agreed under the contract, then the contract will be terminated. 
In the absence of contrary indications in contractual clauses and the default rules chosen by 
the parties or applicable pursuant to the established rules of conflict, the termination of the 
contract due to a force majeure event can be considered as lex specialis in relation to the 
general right to terminate the contract for unexcused non-performance, because the obligee 
will not be entitled to damages for non-performance, and the termination may occur 
automatically. In such cases, the force majeure releases both parties from their obligations to 
perform and receive future performance as of the date of termination, which will be 
determined by the decision maker.  
 
In principle, the termination of the contract in cases of force majeure precludes the obligee 
from claiming damages or specific performance and implies that “the loss lay where it fell”. 
This result is subject to the decision maker’s discretion to allocate any such losses in 
proportion to the extent the contract was performed by the date of termination, in accordance 
with the underlying bargain, as long as the contract or the applicable default rules do not 
explicitly deny a restitutionary flexibility in cases of force majeure. Accordingly, the payment 
obligations may be reduced proportionally, if the contract was to be performed in parts or the 
performance is divisible. In the cases of indivisible performance, a monetary allowance can be 
made to the obligor for the benefits derived by a party from anything done by the other party 
in the performance of the contract.  Although the claims for lost profit in force majeure cases 
will not be awarded, the decision maker may take into account the right to claim interest for 
the delay in payment obligations, which arises as of the date of termination since this right is 
not to be characterized as a right to claim damages, but as a benefit. 
 
Since the issue of force majeure is primarily a matter of risk allocation under lex mercatoria, 
its requirements and consequences are subject to modification by the parties’ agreement and 
its interpretation. Particularly, there is a remarkable similarity between the concepts of force 
majeure and hardship since both of them are related to the change of circumstances after the 
conclusion of contract. Whereas force majeure normally renders the performance of an 
obligation impossible, the incidence of hardship merely makes it substantially more difficult 
for one of the parties and upsets the balance of contract. This difference, which seems clear in 
theory, is rather blurred in international contracting practices, since some force majeure 
clauses relax the requirements justifying a force majeure excuse. It is argued that this form of 
drafting may reduce or even abolish the distinction that normally exists between force 
majeure and hardship excuses from contractual liability.
2155
 However, the distinction still 
persists in practice.
2156
 The concept of force majeure requires the temporary or permanent 
impossibility to perform obligations, even if the content of impossibility depends on the 
particular circumstances of the case, whereas the concept of hardship covers situations, which 
will totally modify the economical balance of the contract in the future, and raises the 
question of a new agreement through renegotiation and adaptation. Thus, unlike hardship, the 
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relevant event is not necessarily the object of a new agreement in force majeure cases, even 
though, in practice, the parties may formulate a force majeure clause leading to renegotiation 
or arbitral intervention. 
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iv. Hardship 
 
The principle pacta sunt servanda provides that parties must adhere to the terms of the 
contract. In principle, modification or termination of the contract should be allowed by the 
mutual subsequent agreement of the parties to that effect. Such an agreement can be explicit 
or tacit depending on the circumstances of the case. There is also a Roman law principle, 
which implies that changed circumstances may affect the binding force of a contract. This 
principle is known under the maxim “rebus sic stantibus”: the contract remains binding 
“provided that things remain as they are”.2157 Under Roman law tradition, if performance is 
still possible but a fundamental change in the circumstances surrounding the contract rendered 
performance much more onerous and the contractual liability appeared as an unfair hardship 
for the debtor, the debtor could invoke the principle of “clausula rebus sic stantibus” and 
assert that the contract contains an implied term (“clausula”) that certain important 
circumstances must remain unchanged (“sic stantes”).2158 The principle of rebus sic stantibus 
mainly provides a total or partial relief to a party in case of changed circumstances. It assumes 
into each contract an implied term that the continuation of each party's obligations is 
dependent upon the continued existence of certain important facts or circumstances.
2159
  
 
The maxim of rebus sic stantibus is not universally admitted by the national legal systems. 
Likewise, there is no generally accepted term for describing the maxim in those national legal 
systems, where various default mechanisms have been introduced in order to deal with the 
relevant situations. Although such mechanisms vary from one national legal system to 
another, the underlying concept is generally described by the term “hardship” in the 
international contracting practices and international restatements of contract principles. The 
concept of hardship requires the decision maker to consider the effects on the specific 
contractual rights and obligations of the occurrence of a supervening event, which could not 
have been foreseen by the parties at the time of contracting, and because of which the 
performance of a contract has become much more onerous and substantially difficult.  
 
1. Sources of Abstractions 
 
a. National Laws 
 
The concept of clausula rebus sic stantibus was not included in the French codification of 
private law. An undue burden on a party caused by an unforeseen event was not a reason to 
derogate from the principle of pacta sunt servanda. In the Canal de Crappone case from 1876, 
the Cour de Cassation stated that the rule that the contract is the law between the parties under 
Article 1134 of the French Civil Code is general, absolute and governs contracts whose 
performance extends to successive periods, just as it governs contracts of all other types. The 
Court held that “under no circumstances is it for the courts, however, fair their decision may 
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appear to them to be, to take into account the time and circumstances in order to substitute 
new terms for those which have been freely accepted by the contracting parties.”2160 This case 
is still considered the landmark case in the field of civil and commercial contracts. The 
subsequent case law reaffirmed the absolute nature of the contract as a “law” between the 
parties, even if the projections of the one of the parties turn out to be wrong. In another case, 
the Cour de Cassation considered a party as having undertaken the risk of the future rise in 
prices and emphasized the impossibility for the judge to substitute a presumed agreement for 
the agreement expressed by the parties.
2161
 Thus, the courts gave priority to Article 1134 (1), 
which consecrates the binding force of the contract, over Article 1134 (3), which contains the 
principle of good faith and Article 1135, which provides that the contract binds the parties not 
only according to its wording, but also to all the consequences, which equity, custom or 
statute give to the obligation according to its nature.
2162
  
 
Under French law, a mechanism similar to the concept of hardship was recognized only in 
relation to the administrative contracts by the Conseil d'Etat in the case of Gaz de 
Bordeaux.
2163
 The case concerned the concession given by City of Bordeaux to a company for 
the provision of gas within the city for thirty years. The price to be paid for the gas was fixed 
by the contract. As a result of the First World War, the cost of coal increased fourfold in 
twenty months and the company claimed an increase in the price of gas. The Conseil held that 
the increase in the price of coal exceeded all reasonable expectations and the economy of the 
contract was entirely upset, so a solution must be found “which takes account both of the 
general interest, which demands the continuation of the company's service . . . and the special 
circumstances which do not allow the contract to be applied normally”. Thus, the case was 
remitted for assessment of an appropriate indemnity.
2164
 This mechanism is called “revision 
pour imprévision” and applies to an administrative contract whose “structure is absolutely 
overturned owing to exceptional circumstances” provided that the event is definitive. In such 
a case, the public authorities are liable to pay indemnity such as to share equitably the 
exceptional burden. The foundation of the doctrine is the need to protect the public interest. 
There are two main reasons to justify the operation of imprévision in the administrative 
contracts: (i) the principle of the continuity of the public service, which would be interrupted 
in the absence of an adjustment, and (ii) the right of the person contracting with the public 
authorities to expect financial equilibrium within the contract.
2165
 However, these reasons and 
the need to protect the public interest are not considered as justifying the operation of 
imprévision in the contracts between private parties.2166 Even so, it is argued that, in rare 
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cases involving a change in circumstances due to force majeure, the French courts awarded a 
contract modification under the label of compensation for damages.
2167
  
 
The strict position of French private law has been made more bearable by the parties to 
private contracts through the use of adaptation clauses and commercial arbitration.
2168
 
However, in the French legal doctrine of arbitration, there have been problems with the 
capacity of arbitrators to adapt contracts to changed circumstances, even if the parties agreed 
so. This is because an arbitral award is considered as a judicial act and, thus, it is argued that 
the role of an arbitrator, as a private judge, may not include performance of an “exclusively 
creative act”.2169 Nevertheless, in practice, when the contract contains an arbitration clause 
and arbitrators are asked to give effect to a hardship clause, it is generally considered that 
there to be a dispute and the arbitrators therefore interpret or apply the disputed clause.
2170
 
 
The German Civil Code of 1900 did not include the doctrine of clausula rebus sic stantibus. 
However, in 1920, after the collapse of the Mark and in the wake of the ensuing 
hyperinflation, the German courts invoked the unwritten clausula rebus sic stantibus in order 
to adapt the price agreed in a contract in light of the extraordinary war-related price increases. 
This practice paved the way for the development of a case law pronouncing “the doctrine of 
the disappearance of the basis of transaction” on the basis of the principle of good faith under 
Section 242 of the German Civil Code.
2171
 The leading cases on the doctrine mainly 
concerned the situations that occurred in the context of major political upheavals, such as 
wars, inflation and regime changes. The doctrine has also been applied to cases concerning far 
less dramatic change of circumstances that do not have repercussions for society at large.
2172
 
In the course of modernizing the German law of obligation in 2002, the case law was codified 
with a clear primacy of judicial adaptation of contract over termination in Section 313 of the 
Civil Code.  
 
Section 313 (1) of German Civil Code provides that if circumstances upon which a contract 
was based have materially changed after conclusion of the contract and if the parties would 
not have concluded the contract or would have done so upon different terms if they had 
foreseen that change, adaptation of the contract may be claimed in so far as, having regard to 
all the circumstances of the specific case, in particular the contractual or statutory allocation 
of risk, it cannot reasonably be expected that a party should continue to be bound by the 
contract in its unaltered form. Section 313 (2) extends the principles of the first paragraph to 
the cases where the material assumptions of both parties that form the basis of the contract 
subsequently turn out incorrect. Section 313 (3) provides the secondary solution in cases 
where an adaptation is not possible or not reasonable by allowing the disadvantaged party to 
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terminate the contract retroactively. With regard to the case of a contract for the performance 
of a recurring obligation, the termination operates with prospective effect.
2173
 Since Section 
313 does not mention any attempt of the parties to renegotiate the contract, it is generally 
understood that the parties are not under any obligation to negotiate in order to invoke Section 
313.
2174
 However, Section 313 emphasizes the exceptional character of the doctrine with 
regard to the principle of pacta sunt servanda, by providing stringent requirements: the 
changed circumstances or initial assumptions must have been material, the parties would not 
have concluded the contract if they had foreseen the supervening event, and binding one of 
the parties to the contract would be unreasonable.
2175
 
 
Under the common law, the hardship situations may become relevant to the extent that the 
doctrines of frustration and impracticability are more flexible notions than the force majeure 
or impossibility in civil law systems. In the House of Lords decision of British Movietonews 
Ltd. v. London District Cinemas, Viscount Simon stated that “The parties to an executory 
contract are often faced, in the course of carrying it out, with a turn of events which they did 
not at all anticipate - a wholly abnormal rise or fall in prices, a sudden depreciation of 
currency, an unexpected obstacle to execution, or the like. Yet this does not in itself affect the 
bargain they have made. If, on the other hand, a consideration of the terms of the contract, in 
the light of the circumstances existing when it was made, shows that they never agreed to be 
bound in a fundamentally different situation which has now unexpectedly emerged, the 
contract ceases to bind at that point - not because the court in its discretion thinks it just and 
reasonable to qualify the terms of the contract, but because on its true construction it does not 
apply in that situation.”2176 Thus, in English Law, the question of frustration of contract has 
been treated by the courts as a question of interpretation.
2177
 Viscount Simon added that 
“What distinguishes "frustration" cases is that the interpretation involves the consequence 
that, in view of what has happened, further performance is automatically ended… But there 
are, of course, many other examples where the court has to put an interpretation on the 
agreement made, not with the result that the contract is brought to an end by frustration, but 
with the result that the contract goes on and continues to bind the parties according to its true 
construction.”2178 In the House of Lords decision of Davis Contractors Ltd v. Fareham UDC, 
Lord Radcliffe, noting that the data for decision in frustration cases are, on the one hand, the 
terms and construction of the contract, read in the light of the then existing circumstances and, 
on the other hand, the events which have occurred, stated that “In the nature of things there is 
often no room for any elaborate inquiry. The court must act upon a general impression of 
what its rule requires. It is for that reason that special importance is necessarily attached to the 
occurrence of any unexpected event that, as it were, changes the face of things. But, even so, 
it is not hardship or inconvenience or material loss itself which calls the principle of 
frustration into play. There must be as well such a change in the significance of the obligation 
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that the thing undertaken would, if performed, be a different thing from that contracted 
for.”2179 
 
The English courts have exceptionally granted relief from contractual liability even where 
performance as to the letter of the contract was still possible but the purpose of the contract 
had been frustrated, as in the famous coronation case.
2180
 The doctrine of frustration of 
purpose applies where the common purpose for which the contract was entered into cannot be 
carried out because of some supervening event. However, examples of this doctrine are 
extremely rare since the courts do not wish to provide an escape route for a party for whom 
the contract has simply become a bad bargain.
2181
 The contractual purpose will be frustrated 
only when “the contract becomes impossible of performance by reason of the non-existence 
of the state of things assumed by both contracting parties as the foundation of the 
contract.”2182 
 
It is generally accepted that the English courts have no power to adapt a contract to 
unforeseeable and fundamental change of circumstances in the event of contractual 
performance becoming more onerous, even if the parties so desire. The reason is the principle 
that the function of the courts is not to make a contract for the parties but to interpret the 
contract made by them. The adaptation of the contract price to the changed circumstances was 
an issue in the case of Staffordshire Area Health Authority v. South Staffordshire Waterworks 
Co. The dispute concerned a contract for supply of water concluded in 1929 between a water 
company and a hospital. The water company agreed to provide the hospital "at all times 
hereafter" with its requirements of water at fixed prices. By 1975, the price became derisory 
as the other ratepayers were paying a rate that was 20 times greater than the agreed prices 
promised to the hospital.
2183
 The company gave 6 months notice of termination of the 
contract, and asked the court to declare that the contract was terminated by its notice and that 
from the date of termination of the contract, the company is entitled to charge the plaintiffs for 
the supply of water at the normal rate.
2184
 The Court of Appeal held that the company was 
entitled to a declaration that the agreement had been terminated by reasonable notice. The 
majority of the court did not grant a declaration that from the date of termination the water 
company was entitled to charge the authority at the normal rate.
2185
  
 
Denning LJ, in his minority view, stated that “It seems to me that we have reached the point 
which Viscount Simon contemplated in British Movietonews Ltd. v. London and District 
Cinemas Ltd... So here the situation has changed so radically since the contract was made 50 
years ago that the term of the contract “at all times hereafter” ceases to bind: and it is open to 
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the court to hold that the contract is determined by reasonable notice…, in the past 50 years, 
the whole situation has changed so radically that one can say with confidence: “The parties 
never intended that the supply should be continued in these days at that price.” Rather than 
force such unequal terms on the parties, the court should hold that the agreement could be and 
was properly determined in 1975 by the reasonable notice of six months. This does not mean, 
of course, that on the expiry of the notice the water company can cut off the supply to the 
hospital. It will be bound to continue it. All that will happen is that the parties will have to 
negotiate fresh terms of payment.… it seems to me plain that the contract of 1929 should be 
up-dated so as to have regard to the effect of inflation.”2186 Denning LJ then commended a 
solution to the parties “in the hope that it will settle their difficulties without troubling the 
courts further”.2187  
 
Although Goff LJ and Cumming-Bruce LJ agreed with the result that the contract was 
terminable on reasonable notice, their reasoning differed from that of Denning LJ. The 
majority allowed the contract to be ended by the water company, on the basis of a 
construction of the parties’ intentions that the contract was a contract for an indefinite period 
which could be brought to an end after a reasonable period of notice, but they did not found 
the decision on the existence of an implied term that the agreement should not continue to 
bind the parties upon the emergence of circumstance, which the parties did not then foresee. 
Cumming-Bruce LJ explained that “I am not attracted against the history of fact in this case 
either by the argument founded upon frustration or upon implied term akin to frustration, and 
I can find no authority which leads me to the view that the changing value of money has the 
effect in relation to domestic as compared to international contracts of giving rise to the 
operation of an implied term that the contract should only persist while money maintained the 
value or more or less the value that it had at the date of the formation of the agreement.”2188 
Given that the case was treated as the termination of a contract for indefinite duration by 
reasonable notice, the issue of adaptation of the contract to the changed circumstances was not 
relevant to the reasoning of the majority. Thus, Goff LJ stated that “It may well be that the 
point of principle as to determinability having been decided, the parties will now be able to 
reach a compromise… It is to be hoped that they will be able to do that so as in effect to apply 
the principle of the 1929 agreement to the changed circumstances of today, but that is a matter 
for them”.2189 It is observed that the approach of Denning LJ in this case is not generally 
accepted by the English courts.
2190
 
 
English law has also traditionally rejected the power of the arbitral tribunal to adapt the 
contract to changed circumstances.
2191
 The existence of a dispute is one of the cornerstones of 
the definition of arbitration in English law.
2192
 An arbitrator is supposed to solve legal 
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disputes, i.e. disputes over existing rights and duties, while the adaptation of the contract is 
considered as an activity of rearranging the contractual relationship on behalf of the parties. In 
this sense, adaptation is not deemed as arbitration, and the adaptation of the contract cannot, 
on this interpretation, constitute an arbitral award which could be enforced or challenged.
2193
 
This interpretation has been based on the perception that an arbitrator could only have the 
same powers as the judge, who determines the existing rights and duties of the parties and 
cannot make the contract for them by supplementing new terms at his discretion.
2194
 However, 
there still remained the question of whether a disagreement between the parties as to the 
future terms of their agreement can be considered as a “dispute” in the sense of a requirement 
for arbitration. In Sykes v. Fine Fare, the parties concluded a contract for the supply of 
poultry. The contract provided a fixed price for the weekly quantity of poultry during the first 
year of the contract, but thereafter “such other figures as might be agreed”. The contract was 
to last not less than five years. It was agreed that any difference between the parties should be 
referred to arbitration.
 2195
 The parties could not agree, and the Court of Appeal treated the 
failure to agree as a “difference” within the arbitration clause and thus capable of 
determination by arbitration. Denning LJ stated that “when an agreement has been acted upon 
and the parties, as here have been put to great expense in implementing it, we ought to imply 
all reasonable terms so as to avoid any uncertainties. In this case there is less difficulty than 
others because there is an arbitration clause, which liberally construed is sufficient to resolve 
any uncertainties which the parties have left.”2196 Thus, in his view, the contract was 
interpreted to contain an implied term that a reasonable quantity of poultry should be 
delivered, and that the task of the arbitrator was the determination of what constitutes a 
“reasonable quantity”. On the other hand, Danckwert LJ based his argument on the wording 
of the arbitration clause and stated that “it seems to me that the word ‘difference’ is 
particularly apt to describe that situation [where the parties have not agreed]”.2197 While under 
the old law such a wide understanding of dispute was not self-evident, it clearly underlies the 
English Arbitration Act of 1996, which, in Section 82, provides that ““dispute” includes any 
difference.”2198 
 
In US law, the requirement of impossibility was loosened to allow excuse in circumstances 
where the cost of performance increased so dramatically as to render performance 
commercially impracticable. The doctrine of commercial impracticability was first expressed 
in the case of Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, where the Supreme Court of California 
stated that “A thing is impossible in legal contemplation when it is not practicable, and a thing 
is impracticable when it can only be done at excessive and unreasonable cost.”2199 However, a 
mere change in the degree of difficulty or expense due to such causes as increased wages, 
prices of raw materials, or costs of construction, unless well beyond the normal range, does 
not amount to impracticability since it is this sort of risk that a fixed-price contract is intended 
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to cover.
2200
 It is argued that the doctrine imposes a risk sharing rule, around which the parties 
must contract explicitly and deliberately. Thus, to the extent that the commercial 
impracticability discharges the obligor’s obligation to perform, in cases where the 
performance is deemed to be impracticable when the cost rises above a certain amount, the 
doctrine provides that the risk that the cost will increase to any level up to that amount is 
borne by the obligor, while the risk of the cost rising above that amount is allocated to the 
obligee.
2201
  
 
US law also recognizes the doctrine of frustration of purpose. Although it is not explicitly 
recognized in the UCC, Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides in Section 265 that 
“Where, after a contract is made, a party's principal purpose is substantially frustrated without 
his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption 
on which the contract was made, his remaining duties to render performance are discharged, 
unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.” The main difference between 
the doctrine of frustration of purpose and impracticability is that the former does not require 
an impediment to performance of either party for its application. There are three requirements 
for the discharge of that party's duty under Section 265. First, the purpose that is frustrated 
must have been a principal purpose of that party in making the contract, in the sense that the 
object must be so completely the basis of the contract that, as both parties understand, without 
it the transaction would make little sense. Second, it is not enough that the transaction has 
become less profitable for the affected party or even that he will sustain a loss. The frustration 
must be so severe that it is not fairly to be regarded as within the risks that he assumed under 
the contract. Third, the non-occurrence of the frustrating event must have been a basic 
assumption on which the contract was made.
2202
  
 
In US law, some commentators object to the all-or-nothing allocation of the losses caused by 
cost increases beyond a certain amount and suggest that all losses above that amount should 
be shared between the parties, particularly in the long-term contractual relationships, by 
adjusting the agreement in the face of economic hardship.
2203
 Some of those commentators 
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also seem to be in favor of implication of the duty of renegotiation on the basis of the 
principle of good faith in the cases of commercial impracticability.
2204
 In cases of 
impracticability of performance and frustration of purpose, Section 272 of Restatement 
Second Contracts essentially allows the courts to grant relief on such terms as justice requires 
including protection of the parties' reliance interests. Particularly, with regard to sales 
contracts, Official Comment 6 to Section 2-615 of UCC states that “In situations in which 
neither sense nor justice is served by either answer when the issue is posed in flat terms of 
‘excuse’ or ‘no excuse’, adjustment under the various provisions of this Article is necessary, 
especially the sections on good faith, on insecurity and assurance and on the reading of all 
provisions in the light of their purposes, and the general policy of this Act to use equitable 
principles in furtherance of commercial standards and good faith.” However, the general 
language of these texts is criticized for providing little concrete guidance to courts to adjust 
the contract, and for prompting the courts to search for an absolute excuse on grounds of 
impossibility or commercial impracticability.
2205
 
 
In general, the US courts are extremely reluctant to substitute their judgment for that of the 
contracting parties or to disturb bargained for allocations of risk, and, in cases of 
impracticability and frustration of purpose, the courts almost always focus on the “relief” or 
“excuse” as opposed to adjustment.2206 An exceptional and controversial case where the court 
adjusted the contract in a hardship situation was the case Aluminum Company of America v 
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Essex Group Inc.
2207
 The decision is also illustrative of the approach of the US courts to the 
requirements and interrelationship of the doctrines of frustration of purpose and commercial 
impracticability as well as the doctrine of mutual mistake of fact. The Aluminum Company of 
America (“ALCOA”) and Essex had entered into a long-term contract under which ALCOA 
was to convert alumina provided by Essex and return molten aluminum to Essex for further 
processing. The price of each pound of aluminum was subject to an escalation formula under 
which non-labor costs were to be escalated in accordance with changes in the Wholesale Price 
Index for Industrial Commodities (“WPI-IC”). The adjusted price was subject to a “ceiling”, 
but without a “floor”. The contract was to run from 1967 until 1983, with Essex’s option to 
extend it until the end of 1988. In 1973, OPEC actions to increase oil prices and unanticipated 
pollution control costs increased ALCOA's electricity costs, which comprised its “principal 
non-labor cost factor” under the contract, greatly and unforeseeably beyond the WPI-IC 
indexed increase in the contract price.
2208
 ALCOA argued that the shared objectives of the 
parties with respect to the use of the WPI-IC were completely and totally frustrated, and that 
both ALCOA and Essex made a mutual mistake of fact in agreeing to use the WPI-IC to 
escalate non-labor costs. ALCOA sought reformation or equitable adjustment of the 
agreement so that, the pricing formula with respect to the non-labor portion of the production 
charge will be changed to eliminate the WPI-IC and substitute the actual costs incurred by 
ALCOA for the non-labor items.
2209
  
 
The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania considered that 
unforeseeable rise in ALCOA's non-labor production costs, which resulted in mistake in 
prediction of range of variation between indexed price and product costs, constituted a mutual 
mistake of fact and a risk which contract did not allocate and, therefore, ALCOA was entitled 
to relief under Indiana law. The Court noted that “The parties took pains to avoid the full risk 
of future economic changes when they embarked on a twenty-one year contract involving 
services worth hundreds of millions of dollars. To this end they employed a customary 
business risk limiting device-price indexing-with more than customary sophistication and 
care.”2210 Essex pointed out that at the time of the trial ALCOA had shown a net profit of $9 
million on the contract. However, the Court found that during the last three years ALCOA 
suffered increasingly large out of pocket losses. The Court considered that if the contract were 
to expire at the time of the trial that net profit of $9 million would raise doubts concerning the 
materiality of the parties' mistake, but Essex had the power to keep it in force until 1988, and 
ALCOA proved that over the entire life of the contract it will lose, out of pocket, in excess of 
$60 million, and the whole of this loss will be matched by an equal windfall profit to Essex. 
The Court held that this proof clearly established that the mistake had the required material 
effect on the agreed exchange.
2211
 Then the question was whether ALCOA, by omitting a 
floor provision, accepted the risk of any and every deviation of the selected index from its 
costs, no matter how great or how highly improbable. The Court noted that “The contract was 
drafted by sophisticated, responsible businessmen who were intensely conscious of the risks 
inherent in long term contracts and who plainly sought to limit the risks of their undertaking. 
The parties' laudable attention to risk limitation appears in many ways”. The Court stated that 
“In the context of the formation of the contract, it is untenable to argue that ALCOA 
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implicitly or expressly assumed a limitless, if highly improbable, risk. On this record, the 
absence of an express floor limitation can only be understood to imply that the parties deemed 
the risk too remote and their meaning too clear to trifle with additional negotiation and 
drafting.”2212 According to the Court, “Both parties knew that the use of an objective price 
index injected a limited range of uncertainty into their projected return on the contract… [and] 
consciously undertook a closely calculated risk rather than a limitless one.”2213 
 
The Court held that, under the doctrines of impracticability and frustration of purpose, 
ALCOA was entitled to reformation of long-term contract where, following execution of the 
contract, ALCOA's non-labor production costs rose greatly beyond the foreseeable limits of 
risk under non-labor component of objective pricing formula which was tied to WPI-IC and 
where, without judicial relief or economic changes that were not presently foreseeable, 
ALCOA stood to lose in excess of $60 million out of pocket during remaining term of 
contract. The Court noted that the doctrines of impracticability, of frustration of purpose, and 
of mistake discharge an obligor from his duty to perform a contract where a failure of a basic 
assumption of the parties produces a grave failure of the equivalence of value of the exchange 
to the parties.
2214
 Thus, the Court considered that there is a substantial area of similarity 
between the three doctrines, and no further discussion is required to establish that the non-
occurrence of an extreme deviation of the WPI-IC and ALCOA's non-labor production costs 
was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, and ALCOA neither assumed nor 
bore the risk of the deviation beyond the foreseeable limits of risk. The Court, nevertheless, 
emphasized that “The focus of the doctrines of impracticability and of frustration is distinctly 
on hardship.”2215 Finally, the Court considered that the doctrines of impracticability and of 
frustration focus on different kinds of disappointment of a contracting party: impracticability 
focuses on occurrences which greatly increase the costs, difficulty, or risk of the party's 
performance, while the doctrine of frustration focuses on a party's severe disappointment 
which is caused by circumstances which frustrate his principal purpose for entering the 
contract.
2216
 
 
The Court held that ALCOA satisfied the requirements of both doctrines. The impracticability 
of its performance was clear on the grounds that the increase in its cost of performance was 
severe enough to warrant relief, that the circumstances surrounding the contract showed a 
deliberate avoidance of abnormal risks, and that the risk of a wide variation between the WPI-
IC and ALCOA's costs was unforeseeable in a commercial sense and was not allocated to 
ALCOA in the contract.
2217
 As to ALCOA's claim of frustration, the Court noted that the 
results of the decisions on inflationary depreciation of money in US and other jurisdictions, 
such as Germany, where courts and legislatures have repeatedly acted to relieve parties from 
great and unexpected losses, would be readily explained in terms of frustration of purpose, 
and the frustration which those decisions involved was a frustration of the purpose to earn 
money or to avoid losses. Given that the requirements of risk allocation and gravity of injury 
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were fulfilled in the case, the Court held ALCOA was entitled to relief on its claim of 
frustration of purpose.
2218
 
 
Subsequently, the Court discussed the question of framing a remedy for ALCOA. According 
to the Court, the US courts have traditionally applied three remedial rules in cases of mistake, 
frustration and impracticability. First, some courts have declared that no contract ever arose 
because there was no true agreement between the parties, or because the parties were ignorant 
of existing facts which frustrated the purpose of one party or made performance 
impracticable. Secondly, the courts have held that a contract is voidable on one of the three 
theories. Thirdly, in both cases, where one or both parties have performed under the supposed 
contract, the courts have awarded appropriate restitution in the light of the benefits the parties 
have conferred on each other in order to prevent unjust enrichment. The courts in such cases 
have often called this remedy “reformation” in the loose sense of “modification.”2219 The 
Court stated that “To decree rescission in this case would be to grant ALCOA a windfall gain 
in the current aluminum market. It would at the same time deprive Essex of the assured long 
term aluminum supply which it obtained under the contract and of the gains it legitimately 
may enforce within the scope of the risk ALCOA bears under the contract. A remedy which 
merely shifts the windfall gains and losses is neither required nor permitted by Indiana 
law.”2220  
 
The Court held that “A remedy modifying the price term of the contract in light of the 
circumstances which upset the price formula will better preserve the purposes and 
expectations of the parties than any other remedy. Such a remedy is essential to avoid 
injustice in this case.”2221 During the trial the parties agreed that a modification of the price 
term to require Essex to pay ALCOA the ceiling price specified in the contract would be an 
appropriate remedy if the Court held for ALCOA. However, the Court noted that a price fixed 
at contract ceiling could redound to ALCOA's great profit and to Essex's great loss in changed 
circumstances. Thus, the Court held that for the duration of the contract the price for each 
pound of aluminum converted by ALCOA shall be the lesser of the Price A or Price B. Price 
A shall be the contract ceiling price computed periodically as specified in the contract. Price 
B shall be the greater of the price specified in the contract, computed according to the terms 
of the initial contract, or the price which yields ALCOA a profit of one cent per pound of 
aluminum converted.
2222
  
  
b. International Instruments 
 
The CISG is not explicit as to whether a disturbance which does not render performance 
temporarily or permanently impossible, but makes it considerably more difficult, can be 
considered as an impediment in the context of Article 79.
2223
 Scholarly opinions are divided 
on whether the situation of hardship is governed by Article 79. It is argued that the CISG 
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contains a gap in this respect which should be filled in accordance with Article 7.
2224
 
However, it is also noted that, in such a gap filling, the principle of good faith must not be 
used to bypass explicit provisions of Article 79, which ensure both contractual justice and the 
security of transactions. In this view, if Article 79 were to be regarded as the legal basis of the 
hardship doctrine in international sales, harmony would be jeopardized and the aim of the 
CISG, as stated in Article 7(1), would not be attained.
2225
 Others argued in favor of allowing 
changes in the circumstances in the form of economic difficulties to be considered as 
impediments within the meaning of Article 79 when they constitute a barrier to performance 
that is comparable to other types of exempting causes.
2226
  
 
The latter approach was also adopted by the CISG Advisory Council, in its Opinion No. 7. 
The Advisory Council noted that the legislative as well as the drafting history of Article 79 is 
not conclusive enough to warrant a conclusion that the hardship problem was meant to be 
excluded or included within its scope, but, as of 2007, there were no reported decisions 
whereby a court exempted a party from liability on the ground of hardship.
2227
 In the opinion 
of the Advisory Council, as the language of Article 79 does not expressly equate the term 
“impediment” with an event that makes performance absolutely impossible, a party may 
invoke hardship as an exemption from liability under Article 79 in a situation of genuinely 
unexpected and radically changed circumstances, i.e. in truly exceptional cases of “economic 
impossibility”. The Advisory Council stated that “It is certainly not possible or even 
convenient to attempt a definition of hardship, beyond accepting that the impediment may 
entail a situation of "economic impossibility" which, while short of an absolute bar to 
perform, imposes what in some legal systems is conceptualized as a "limit of sacrifice" 
beyond which the obligor cannot be reasonably expected to perform.”2228  
 
Moreover, the Advisory Council maintained that in a situation of hardship under Article 79, 
the court or arbitral tribunal may provide further relief consistent with the CISG and the 
general principles on which it is based. According to the Council, it is possible to infer from 
the obligation to interpret the Convention in good faith a duty imposed upon the parties to 
renegotiate the terms of the contract with a view to restore a balance of the performances.
2229
 
In 2009, the Belgian Supreme Court held, in a case governed by the CISG, that a party 
invoking a change of circumstances fundamentally disrupting the contractual equilibrium is 
entitled to request renegotiation of the contract. In the case, the parties had concluded an 
agreement for the sale of steel tubes. After the conclusion of the contract and before delivery, 
the price of steel unexpectedly increased by 70%, but the agreement contained no price 
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adjustment clause. The seller tried to renegotiate a higher contract price, but the buyer refused 
and insisted on delivery of the goods at the price agreed upon. The Belgian Supreme Court 
pointed out that while the CISG contained an express provision for force majeure as an 
exempting event in Article 79(1), this did not mean that it implicitly excluded the relevance of 
hardship and possibility of re-negotiation of the price. The Supreme Court pointed out that in 
order for gaps to be filled in a uniform manner, regard must be had to the general principles 
governing the law of international commerce, and concluded that according to such principles 
as incorporated inter alia in the UNIDROIT Principles, a party invoking a change in 
circumstances fundamentally disrupting the contractual equilibrium, had the right to request 
re-negotiation of the contract. Accordingly, the Supreme Court confirmed the decision of the 
Court of Appeal granting the seller the right to request the re-negotiation of the price.
2230
  
 
The Advisory Council stated that in case negotiations fail, there are no guidelines under the 
Convention for a court or arbitrator to "adjust," or "revise" the terms of the contract so as to 
restore the balance of the performances but, even if a decision maker were not ready to stretch 
the principle of good faith for that purpose, Article 79(5) may be relied upon by a court or 
arbitral tribunal to determine what is owed to each other, thus “adapting” the terms of the 
contract to the changed circumstances.
2231
 However, in general, the commentators, including 
those who maintain that the general definition of “impediment” is broad enough to cover 
extreme cases of hardship, are of the opinion that, under the Convention, hardship can only be 
invoked as an exemption from liability for non-performance, but cannot lead to a possible 
adaptation of the contract, unless expressly provided for by the parties.
2232
 
 
Both the UNIDROIT Principles and the PECL provide specific rules for hardship situations. It 
is argued that the inclusion of rules on hardship in the UNIDROIT Principles was motivated 
by the reason that hardship clauses have become very common in international contracts, and 
it was a response to the request frequently made by practitioners at the time the Principles 
were being prepared.
2233
 Under Article 6.2.1 of the UNIDROIT Principles, a party is bound to 
fulfill its obligations, even if its performance has become more onerous. The Official 
Comment to this provision refers to the principle of sanctity of contracts, and requires that 
“performance must be rendered as long as it is possible and regardless of the burden it may 
impose on the performing party”.2234 Thus, a party cannot get out of a contract merely because 
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it has turned out to be unprofitable.
 2235
 Article 6.2.1 is considered as an important reminder 
that the general duty is to perform and that relief is very much the exceptional case.
2236
  
 
Under Article 6.2.2, a hardship event is defined as one which “fundamentally alters the 
equilibrium of the contract either because the cost of a party’s performance has increased or 
because the value of the performance a party receives has diminished.” The Official Comment 
to the 1994 edition of the Principles sought to give some guidance on ascertaining the 
meaning of “fundamental”. While recognizing the importance of the circumstances in each 
particular case, the Official Comment stated that “If, however, the performances are capable 
of precise measurement in monetary terms, an alteration amounting to 50% or more of the 
cost or the value of the performance is likely to amount to a “fundamental” alteration.” 
However, this sentence was dropped from the 2004 and 2010 versions of the Principles 
because the figure of 50 per cent had been criticized on the grounds that it was too low and 
arbitrary.
2237
 In the absence of guidance in the Official Comment, it is left to the courts and 
tribunals to determine what is “fundamental”.2238 Article 6.2.2 provides that the conditions 
allowing a disadvantaged party to claim the hardship include: (a) the events occur or become 
known to the disadvantaged party after the conclusion of the contract; (b) the events could not 
reasonably have been taken into account by the disadvantaged party at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract; (c) the events are beyond the control of the disadvantaged party; 
and (d) the risk of the events was not assumed by the disadvantaged party. 
 
Article 6.2.3 of the UNIDROIT Principles provides rules on the effects of hardship according 
to which the disadvantaged party is “entitled to request renegotiations” of the contract. Upon 
failure to reach agreement within a reasonable time, either party may resort to the court or 
arbitral tribunal. The decision maker may, if reasonable, terminate the contract at a date and 
on terms to be fixed, or adapt the contract with a view to restoring its equilibrium. The 
Official Comments state that “the court will seek to make a fair distribution of the losses 
between the parties. This may or may not, depending on the nature of the hardship, involve a 
price adaptation. However, if it does, the adaptation will not necessarily reflect in full the loss 
entailed by the change in circumstances, since the court will, for instance, have to consider the 
extent to which one of the parties has taken a risk and the extent to which the party entitled to 
receive a performance may still benefit from that performance.”2239 Article 6.2.3 (4) states 
that the court may terminate or adapt the contract only when this is reasonable. The Official 
Comments explain that “the circumstances may even be such that neither termination nor 
adaptation is appropriate and in consequence the only reasonable solution will be for the court 
either to direct the parties to resume negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on the 
adaptation or the contract, or to confirm the terms of the contract as they stand”.2240  
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Article 6:111 of the PECL contains a mechanism that deals with the issue of hardship. The 
reason for inclusion of such a mechanism in the PECL is explained to be that the majority of 
countries in the European Community have introduced into their law some mechanism 
intended to correct any injustice, which results from an imbalance in the contract caused by 
supervening events which the parties could not reasonably have foreseen when they made the 
contract, and in practice contracting parties adopt the same idea, supplementing the general 
rules of law with a variety of clauses, such as "hardship" clauses.
2241
 Article 6:111 of the 
PECL first provides the reminder that party is bound to fulfill its obligations even if 
performance has become more onerous. Unlike the UNIDROIT Principles, which refers to 
fundamental alteration of the equilibrium of the contract in the determination of a hardship 
event, Article 6:111 requires that contract must become “excessively” burdensome because of 
a change of circumstances. The Official Comments explain that “The mere fact that a contract 
has become more onerous than expected is not enough: to adopt the phrase used by the Italian 
Civil Code, art. 1467, the contract must have become "excessively" burdensome”.2242 Article 
6:111 provides a list of conditions with regard to the change of circumstances for the 
applicability of hardship mechanisms: the change of circumstances must have occurred after 
the time of conclusion of the contract, the possibility of a change of circumstances was not 
one which could reasonably have been taken into account at the time of conclusion of the 
contract, and the risk of the change of circumstances is not one which, according to the 
contract, the party affected should be required to bear.  
 
When the conditions of Article 6:111 are satisfied, the parties are bound to enter into 
negotiations with a view to adapting the contract or ending it. It is also provided in Article 
6:111 that, the court may award damages for the loss suffered through a party refusing to 
negotiate or breaking off negotiations contrary to good faith and fair dealing. Essentially, the 
court will intervene only in the last resort, and its first aim should be to preserve the 
contract.
2243
 If the parties fail to reach agreement within a reasonable period, the court may 
end the contract at a date and on terms to be determined by the court or adapt the contract in 
order to distribute between the parties in a just and equitable manner the losses and gains 
resulting from the change of circumstances. The modification of the clauses of the contract 
must be aimed at re-establishing the balance within the contract by ensuring that the extra cost 
imposed by the unforeseen circumstances are borne equitably by the parties. In the Official 
Comments, it is stated that “Unlike the risks which result from total impossibility, the risks of 
unforeseen events are to be shared.” It is also noted that the court may intervene in a variety 
of ways and, the proposed solutions in the text are merely options. The court may reject the 
application, extend the period for performance, increase or reduce the price or the contract 
quantity, or order a compensatory payment. The Official Comments, however, make it clear 
that although the court can modify clauses of the contract, it cannot rewrite the entire contract. 
If the adaptation of the contract amounts to imposing a new contract on the parties, the only 
option open to the court would be to declare the contract ended. The Official Comments state 
that when the court declares the contract ended, it will have to fix the date, as from which the 
contract is ended, taking into account how much of it has been performed, and this date will 
determine the extent of restitution which will become due. Under the PECL, the court may 
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also order the payment of an addition to the price or of compensation for a limited period and 
the termination of the contract at the end of the period.
2244
 
 
Both set of rules under the UNIDROIT Principles and the PECL aim to keep the contract 
alive, despite an imbalance in the parties’ rights and duties, but the terms of contract will then 
have to be modified. Moreover, both sets of rules are not mandatory and the parties are free to 
agree that a particular change in circumstances shall not affect the terms of the contract and to 
adopt different remedial consequences for hardship situations.
2245
 However, the UNIDROIT 
Principles and the PECL have been criticized for going too far beyond reasonable commercial 
standards with the unjustified imposition of the third party intervener’s will in the absence of 
a hardship clause. It is argued that, apart from the fact that hardship in general and adaptation 
in particular endanger commercial relations by creating an undesirable level of instability, 
adaptation is hardly likely to be accepted by the parties, since the intervention of the third 
party, lacking background knowledge of the specific transaction in question, would always be 
an arbitrary exercise that might jeopardize the whole relationship.
2246
  
 
c. Contracting Practices 
 
The term “hardship” is frequently used in international contracting practices even in contracts 
drafted in languages other than English.
2247
 International contract drafters have formulated a 
great variety of clauses dealing with the situations of hardship. As to the requirements of 
hardship, the contracting parties resort to “contractual equilibrium”, criteria of fairness, good 
faith and equity, or specific terminology imposing thresholds, or adopt a mixed approach. As 
to the effects of changed circumstances on the contract, the parties provide the possibility to 
renegotiate, terminate or adjust the contract by means of various mechanisms.  
 
In 1985, the ICC drew up “drafting suggestions” with various alternatives in relation to 
hardship clauses, which may serve as a basis for discussions of contract drafting.
2248
 These 
suggestions did not include a standard clause that can be incorporated in a contract by 
reference. The document defined hardship as the occurrence of events not contemplated by 
the parties, which fundamentally alter the equilibrium of the contract, thereby placing an 
excessive burden on one of the parties in the performance of its contractual obligations. The 
document provided a procedure for renegotiation in which the aggrieved party shall make a 
request for revision within a reasonable time from the moment it becomes aware of the event 
and of its effect on the economy of the contract, and then the parties shall consult each other 
with a view to revising the contract on an equitable basis, in order to ensure that neither party 
suffers excessive prejudice. It is also stated that the request for revision does not of itself 
suspend performance of the contract. If the parties fail to agree on revision of the contract 
within a time-limit of 90 days of the request, the document provided four alternatives: (1) the 
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contract remains in force in accordance with its original terms; (2) either party may refer the 
case to the ICC Standing Committee for the Regulation of Contractual Relations
2249
 for a non 
binding revision, and if the parties do not agree on revision, the contract remains in force in 
accordance with its original terms; (3) either party may bring the issue of revision before the 
arbitral forum, or the competent court; and (4) either party may refer the case to the ICC 
Standing Committee for the Regulation of Contractual Relations for a binding revision. 
 
These suggestions were updated by the ICC into a model hardship clause in 2003.
2250
 The 
ICC Hardship Clause of 2003 starts with the principle of sanctity of contracts, and provides 
that a party to a contract is bound to perform its contractual duties even if events have 
rendered performance more onerous than could reasonably have been anticipated at the time 
of the conclusion of the contract. Thus, the threshold for the application of hardship is higher 
than just an increase in the cost or a decrease in value of the performance. The ICC Hardship 
Clause requires the party invoking it to prove that “(a) the continued performance of its 
contractual duties has become excessively onerous due to an event beyond its reasonable 
control which it could not reasonably have been expected to have taken into account at the 
time of the conclusion of the contract; and that (b) it could not reasonably have avoided or 
overcome the event or its consequences”. 
 
Under the ICC Hardship Clause of 2003, the hardship results in a duty to negotiate for both 
parties within a reasonable time of the invocation of the Clause, in order to come up with 
“alternative contractual terms which reasonably allow for the consequences of the event.” As 
a drastic departure from the UNIDROIT Principles and the PECL, the ICC Hardship Clause 
provides for the termination of the contract at the will of the aggrieved party when the 
alternative contractual terms are not agreed by the other party to the contract.
2251
 Therefore, in 
line with the criticisms against the position of UNIDROIT Principles and the PECL as to 
hardship, the ICC Hardship Clause of 2003 does not provide for adaptation of the contract to 
the changed circumstances, but reflects the approach of Article 1467 of the Italian Civil 
Code.
2252
 Article 1467 provides that in continuing or periodic contracts, or where performance 
is deferred, if performance by one of the parties has become excessively onerous as a result of 
the occurrence of exceptional or unforeseeable events, the party liable for performance under 
                                                 
2249
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such conditions may apply for termination of the contract.
2253
 Article 1467 also provides that 
the party against which the termination is demanded can prevent termination by offering to 
modify equitably the conditions of the contract. Thus, the Italian approach restricts both the 
aggrieved party’s right to terminate the contract and the decision maker’s power to adapt the 
contract, since it requires the other party to offer alternative terms, only upon which the 
decision maker can render a judgment about whether those terms are equitable and reasonably 
allow for the consequences of a hardship event and, if affirmative, adapt the contract to the 
changed circumstances in accordance with those terms.
2254
  
 
As specified in the Notes to the ICC Hardship Clause, the aggrieved party’s right to terminate 
the contract only arises if the other party does not offer reasonable alternative terms to save 
the contract.
2255
 However, since the approach of Italian rule with regard to judicial adaptation 
of contract is not included in the Clause, if the aggrieved party fails unreasonably to accept an 
offer for alternative terms made by the other party, terminates the contract and no longer 
performs, the other party may only claim unjust termination. It is argued that this approach 
aims at providing an incentive for the parties to work out their own solution through 
renegotiation.
2256
 This solution is considered as a more appropriate response to the needs of 
the parties since the decision maker can only decide on termination of the contract if the 
conditions for hardship are met, and. cannot take the parties’ place by “redrafting” the 
contract on their behalf.
2257
 Interestingly, however, none of the ICC Model Mergers & 
Acquisitions Contract, Share Purchase Agreement, the ICC Model Contract for the Turnkey 
Supply of an Industrial Plant and the ICC Model Commercial Agency Contract contains a 
hardship clause or a reference to the ICC Hardship clause, although, except for commercial 
agency, they all contain clauses incorporating or largely inspired by the ICC Force Majeure 
clause. 
 
The FIDIC Conditions deal explicitly with many events of hardship and their consequences in 
order to offer a fair balance of risks between the contracting parties and to ensure that the 
risks incurred by the parties to a contract are clearly identifiable and understood.
2258
 Since the 
first edition of the FIDIC Conditions was published in 1957, the FIDIC Conditions have 
contained provisions entitling the contractor to claim additional costs and/or time from the 
employer when the contractor encounters specifically defined unforeseeable events.
2259
 The 
FIDIC Conditions refer to the notions of “Employer’s risks” and the allocation of the 
responsibility for damage to the works, rather than the language of hardship, in determining 
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when the risk deriving from those events should have been borne by one party or by the 
other.
2260
  
 
The basic allocation of risk between the Contractor and the Employer is for damage to the 
works before take over in Sub-Clauses 17.2 to 17.4 of the FIDIC Conditions, in which the 
principles are unchanged from the old versions. Until the Taking-Over Certificate is issued for 
the works, if any loss or damage happens to the works, materials and plant, other than due to 
“Employer’s risks”, the Contractor must rectify this loss or damage at its own cost. 
“Employer’s risks” are generally events or circumstances over which neither party will have 
any control, such as war, hostilities, unforeseeable operations of the forces of nature and alike, 
or events or circumstances caused by the Employer, directly or indirectly. If the loss or 
damage occurs due to an Employer’s risk, the Contractor must rectify this loss or damage to 
the extent required by the Employer or the Engineer requires rectification. Where the 
Employer or the Engineer requires rectification and the Contractor suffers delay and/or incurs 
cost in the performance of the contract, the Contractor may be entitled to an extension of time 
and to any such cost.
2261
  
 
Moreover, under Sub-Clause 4.12 of the FIDIC Conditions, if the Contractor encounters 
“physical conditions”, which means natural physical conditions and manmade and other 
physical obstructions and pollutants, including sub-surface and hydrological conditions but 
excluding climatic conditions, the Contractor shall continue executing the Works, using such 
proper and reasonable measures as are appropriate for the physical conditions. If and to the 
extent that the Contractor encounters physical conditions, which are unforeseeable, and 
suffers delay and/or incurs costs due to these conditions, the Contractor shall be entitled to an 
extension of time, and payment of any such cost. Under Sub-Clause 13.7, Contractor may 
claim extension of time and any cost attributable to a change in the Laws of the Country 
where the construction site is located. Under Sub-Clauses 8.4 and 8.5, the Contractor shall be 
entitled to an extension of time for the performance of the contract in the cases of 
exceptionally adverse climatic conditions, unforeseeable shortages in the availability of 
personnel or goods caused by epidemic or governmental actions, or, subject to certain 
conditions, the unforeseeable delay or disruption caused by relevant legally constituted public 
authorities. 
 
Under Sub-Clause 20.1, if the Contractor considers himself to be entitled to any extension of 
the time and/or any additional payment, under any clause of the FIDIC Conditions or 
otherwise in connection with the contract, the Contractor shall give notice to the Engineer 
within a certain period of time.
2262
 In case of the failure to give notice, the time shall not be 
extended, the Contractor shall not be entitled to additional payment, and the Employer shall 
be discharged from all liability in connection with the claim. The Engineer shall respond with 
approval or with disapproval and detailed comments to agree or determine the extension of 
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the time, and/or the additional payment. If the Engineer does not respond within the 
determined timeframe or the parties are dissatisfied with the Engineer's ruling, the parties may 
refer this issue to the dispute resolution mechanisms.  
 
Therefore, except for the entitlements to adaptation of the contract, such as the inclusion of 
additional costs into the contract price and extension of time, and force majeure events under 
Clause 19, which discharge the Contractor from performance of its obligations, the Contractor 
is under the burden of bearing the consequences of any hardship situation which the 
Contractor is supposed to have taken into consideration in determining the price. The 
Contractor is also under the duty to notify the hardship situations when covered by the 
Conditions in order to be entitled to adaptation, which means extension of time for 
completing the works and the increase in contract price due to the payment of additional 
costs. The FIDIC Conditions simply deal with the problem of hardship in terms of the 
contractual risk allocation between the Contractor and the Employer, according to the 
equitable criteria exercised by Engineers and, in some cases, by the arbitrators.
2263
 
 
2. Arbitral Decision Making 
 
In the doctrine, it is argued that the interrelated doctrines of pacta sunt servanda and rebus sic 
stantubis are often relevant to the arbitral decision making, and the clausula rebus sic stantubis 
is usually considered as a rule of lex mercatoria.
2264
 Under lex mercatoria, pursuant to the 
basic principle of sanctity of contracts, the parties are certainly bound by the obligations they 
have undertaken, but it is still questionable whether consideration must be given to an 
established rule in the order of international commerce, which commands a single solution for 
the unforeseen contingencies that change the initial circumstances under which contractual 
obligations have been accepted, without rendering their performance temporarily or 
permanently impossible. The conflicting approaches of the national legal systems, the wide 
powers granted to the decision makers under the international restatements of contract 
principles and the great variety of the relevant clauses in the international contracting 
practices preclude the decision maker applying lex mercatoria to discover such established 
rules in the order of international commerce, which could constitute a doctrine of hardship.  
 
The national legal systems provide three types of solutions for the situations of hardship: the 
contract is preserved, terminated or adjusted. First solution provides that, the contract must be 
performed, however onerous the performance may be, unless there is an impossibility of 
performance, namely force majeure. This is the French solution for private contracts, as 
opposed to administrative contracts. It is argued that this strict application of the pacta sunt 
servanda constitutes an incentive for the parties to introduce adequate clauses in their 
contract, such as indexation clauses, hardship clauses, or adaptation clauses.
2265
 The second 
solution provides that the changed circumstances entail the disappearance of contract even if 
the unforeseen event does not reach to the level of force majeure. This is the English law 
solution inasmuch as frustration is a more flexible notion than force majeure. It is argued that, 
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contrary to the belief that English law does not encourage the adjustment of bargains in the 
event of contractual performances becoming more onerous, English law underlines that it is 
for the parties to do the adjusting, and not for the courts.
2266
  
 
The third solution is that of German law and, arguably and to a truly limited extent, US Law. 
The court may either terminate the contract or adjust it in order to allocate the unforeseen loss 
equitably between the parties. In the ALCOA case, the United States District Court concluded 
with a general remark in order to further justify its extraordinary solution of adjustment: “If 
the law refused an appropriate remedy when a prudently drafted long term contract goes badly 
awry, the risks attending such contracts would increase. Prudent business people would avoid 
using this sensible business tool… Much of the story of modern business law and of modern 
management concerns deals with the problem of risk limitation… Corporate managers are 
fiduciaries… Attention to risk limitation is essential to the fiduciary duty of corporate 
managers. Courts must consider the fiduciary duty of management and the established 
practice of risk limitation in interpreting contracts and in the application of contract doctrines 
such as mistake, frustration and impracticability…. while the Court willingly concedes that 
the managements of ALCOA and Essex are better able to conduct their business than is the 
Court, in this dispute the Court has information from hindsight far superior to that which the 
parties had when they made their contract… and a rule that the Court may not act would have 
the perverse effect of discouraging the parties from resolving this dispute or future disputes on 
their own. Only a rule which permits judicial action of the kind the Court has taken in this 
case will provide a desirable practical incentive for businessmen to negotiate their own 
resolution to problems which arise in the life of long term contracts.”2267 
 
Thus, the abstractions from the national legal systems and international restatements may 
support the view that it is one of the concerns in the different approaches to the issue of 
hardship that the parties should resolve themselves through cooperation the problems arising 
from an unforeseeable contingency, which does not render the performance of the contract 
temporarily or permanently impossible, but disturbs the equilibrium of the contract by 
increasing the cost of performance or decreasing its value. This concern seems to be most 
clearly pronounced in Article 1467 of Italian Civil Code, which provides that, in the event that 
the performance becomes excessively onerous, the judge may terminate the contract but the 
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other party may offer an equitable indemnity in order to save the contract. Such a concern is 
also appropriate in the spontaneous order of international commerce, due to the importance of 
the utilization of the knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place, of which 
beneficial use can be made only if the decisions depending on it are left to the parties or are 
made with their active cooperation. Thus, the decision maker, applying lex mercatoria, should 
be willing to encourage and direct the parties to renegotiate for adjusting their contracts, in the 
change of circumstances, which does not render performance impossible, but brings about 
costs that are not covered by the parties’ express or implied risk allocations. The 
unconditional acceptance of the solution of adaptation may lead to a dangerous degree of 
discretionary power whereby the specific contractual rights and obligations of the parties 
come under the judicial review through the principle of good faith and fair dealing for the sole 
reason that the circumstances are materially modified, generating significant imbalance 
between the respective obligations. Such a review should not disregard the knowledge of 
particular circumstances of time and place, and the parties’ risk allocation contemplated under 
their bargain. 
 
a. Risk Allocation 
 
In abstract terms, the concept of hardship, which leads to some form of relief from the 
ascertainable meaning of the contact, should require that such performance must become 
excessively onerous due to an event, the risks of which have been neither contemplated nor 
allocated by the parties through the articulated rules. In ICC Case No 9479, the claimant and 
defendant, both Italian companies, were created upon the dissolution of a partnership 
specialized in the manufacture of textiles. The claimant inherited the right to use the 
registered trademark, whereas the defendant was entitled to use the company name only as a 
means of identifying itself as a corporate entity or as the producer of the fabrics manufactured 
by it, but not as a trademark. To this end, the two parties entered into an agreement giving the 
defendant clear and detailed instructions on the way in which the company name was to be 
reproduced on labels and finished items of clothing. The claimant argued that the defendant 
breached this agreement by reproducing the company name in such a way that customers 
were misled and that the trademark was depreciated. The defendant argued that the parties' 
agreement on the use of the trademark should be amended in light of the European trademark 
Directive EEC/89/104, claiming it had suffered hardship since the introduction of this 
directive.
 2268 
The arbitral tribunal determined that any question other than the validity of the 
agreement had to be decided according to the provisions of the agreement in the light of, and, 
in case of need, supplemented by the usages of international trade, having regard whenever 
necessary to “international public policy”.2269 
 
The defendant maintained that the EEC/89/104 Directive, which was issued after the 
execution of the agreement, explicitly allowed the owner of a name to use it in its commerce, 
as long as it does so in a manner consistent with honest and fair principles, even when said 
name constitutes the trademark of another businessman. The defendant argued that, since it 
entered into the agreement at a time when Italian law restricted drastically the use of a name 
as a trademark when such name was used as a trademark by someone else, the liberalization 
introduced by the European Directive put the defendant in a situation of hardship. The 
defendant relied on Articles 6.2.1-6.2.3 of the UNIDROIT Principles, and requested an 
equitable modification of the agreement so that, on the territory of the European Union, the 
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defendant might benefit from the liberal solutions resulting from the application of the 
Directive.
2270
 Since no national law had been made applicable to the agreement, and the 
provisions of the agreement did not contemplate the possibility of its modifications on 
equitable grounds, the arbitral tribunal considered the usages of international trade in order to 
supplement the provisions of the agreement. In this respect, the tribunal recognized the 
UNIDROIT Principles as an accurate representation, although incomplete, of the usages of 
international trade. On the basis of Articles 6.2.1-6.2.3 of the UNIDROIT Principles, the 
arbitral tribunal held that it would be entitled to make an equitable modification of the 
agreement, but it was not convinced that the defendant was faced with a situation, which may 
be characterized as "hardship".
2271
  
 
The tribunal noted that “the issuing of the EEC Directive did not alter in any way the 
equilibrium of the Agreement among the parties. The situation of [claimant] and its affiliates 
remain unaffected insofar as their entitlement to the . . . trademark is not concerned by the 
Directive. [Defendant] does not meet any new difficulty in complying with the restriction on 
the use of the . . . name.” The tribunal stated that “[Defendant]'s position, in a nutshell, is that 
it would have had no reason to enter into the Agreement should the EEC Directive have been 
introduced before April 1987. This has nothing to do with hardship, which is a notion which 
may play a role when the performance of a contract is at stake but has no function in the 
formation of contracts. Even if it is probable that [Defendant] would have entered into the 
Agreement, as drafted in 1987, after the adoption of the EEC Directive in 1989, a subsequent 
evolution of the legislative context of a contract does not constitute a hardship when it does 
not destroy the balance of the parties' respective obligations. Moreover, without denying that 
the parties had in mind the Italian … law when they executed the Agreement, it was not made 
to be enforced in Italy only nor in Europe. The Agreement is a global arrangement, due to be 
enforced in the whole world.”2272 Irrespective of the fact that the adoption of EEC Directive 
did not constitute a situation of hardship, the tribunal decided to dismiss the defendant's 
contention that the agreement be modified in so far as its effects in the territory of the 
European Union are concerned, on the ground that it was in direct contradiction with the 
intention of the parties to organize their relations as to the use of the trademark by harmonized 
solutions applicable in any jurisdiction, whatever be the content of the law in that 
jurisdiction.
2273
 Thus, the tribunal rejected the defense of hardship, since the parties regulated 
the risks arising from the applicability of the default rules of the national laws, which deal 
with the rights of the owner of a name to use it in its commerce as far as their territories are 
concerned, through an agreement, which defined, with a view of its worldwide application, 
the respective status of the owner of the trademark and of the owner of the name, irrespective 
of the legal precepts of any national law. 
 
In most cases, the element of foreseeability at the time of contracting will be relevant to the 
determination of whether the parties contemplated and allocated the risk of alleged event of 
hardship. In ICC Case No 7177, the tribunal dismissed the argument based on clausula rebus 
sic stantibus since the contract was concluded at a time of political instability, and changing 
circumstances were foreseeable. The case concerned contracts for the international sale of oil 
concluded between a Greek agent of an Antiguan Corporation having an office in 
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Switzerland, as seller, and a Greek purchaser. Under the first contract, which was signed in 
October 1990, the purchaser was to buy a given volume of oil for the period November 1990 
to March 1991. Two weeks after Iraq invaded Kuwait and United Nations armed forces 
started their land offensive, a second contract was signed to buy diesel, with deliveries 
scheduled for February-April 1991. Military operations ended on 28 February 1991, but the 
price of petroleum on the international markets fell. The parties met to renegotiate the price of 
the petroleum under the contract. They were unable to agree, and the seller terminated the 
contract on the grounds of fundamental changes in the market. The purchaser initiated 
arbitration proceedings.
2274
  
 
The tribunal determined that Greek law was the substantive law of the contract.
2275
 Article 
388 of the Greek Civil Code provided that “if the circumstances on which the parties, having 
regard to good faith and business usage, mainly based a synallagmatic contract, subsequently 
changed for extraordinary and unforeseeable reasons, and if, as a result of this change, 
performance of the obligation, taking into account the counter-obligation, became 
inordinately onerous for the obligor, the matter may request the court to adjust his obligation 
at its discretion to a suitable extent, or to rescind the whole of the contract or the part not 
carried out. If the rescission of the contract is decided upon, the obligations of both parties are 
extinguished and the parties have a mutual obligation to return whatever they have received, 
pursuant to the provisions relating to the unjust enrichment”.2276 The defendant argued that, 
Article 388 being applicable, the tribunal may either rescind the contract and release the 
parties from the non-performed part thereof, or adjust the performance to an appropriate level 
by reducing the price by an amount which reflects the value of the performance of the 
opposing party. The tribunal stated that “Nobody at the outset of the . . . war could know how 
long it would last. As usual in case of war, there was a difference of opinion as to its probable 
duration. A war may end at any time and no one can unilaterally base a contract on the 
assumption that it will last for a certain period; by doing so, a party simply miscalculates its 
risks and cannot ask for application of a rule which requires the unforeseeability of an event.” 
The tribunal considered that even if it is very seldom that the date when the war will end can 
be safely predicted, a war necessarily ends, and the fact that a war can end at any time is not 
unpredictable. Thus, according to the tribunal, nothing prevents the parties from agreeing that, 
should the war end before or after a given date, contractual provisions are to be amended. The 
tribunal stated that “If [Defendant] based its purchasing policy on the assumption that the war 
was to last long, [Defendant] was simply wrong and the purpose of Article 388 is certainly 
not to correct a commercial miscalculation.” Thus, the tribunal held that the conditions for 
applicability of Article 388 of the Greek Civil Code were not met.
2277
 
 
The decision maker applying lex mercatoria should carefully analyze the risk allocation 
between the parties that is indicated by the articulated rules, which consist of the terms of the 
contract and the default rules chosen by the parties. Even if the articulated rules do not contain 
a hardship rule or they contain such a rule, which lacks the necessary specificity to cover the 
event in question, the decision maker should consider whether other terms of the contract or 
default rules chosen by the parties provide any guidance about which party had assumed the 
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risk associated with the relevant hardship event. The absence of specific terms or the inclusion 
of a specific risk in the contract may itself be a risk allocation. The parties may have agreed to 
consider specific risks and no others, and the party who will suffer from the risk's 
materialization may have decided that the expected loss from the risk is not worth the costs 
that would have to be incurred to identify it and allocate it expressly elsewhere.
 2278
   
 
In the case of Questech Inc. v. Iran, the Iran US Claims Tribunal decided to apply clausula 
rebus sic stantubis, but the reasoning of the tribunal, as reflected in the award, suggests, to 
some extent, that the risk of the change of circumstances that lead to the application of the 
clausula was essentially allocated to the claimant according to the interpretation of the 
contract by the Tribunal. The claimant, Questech, contended that the respondent, the Ministry 
of Defense, failed to comply with the contractual requirements for termination of the contract. 
The contract was part of a project to modernize and expand Iran's electronic intelligence 
gathering system, and provided for Questech to evaluate the planning and implementation of a 
training program conducted by another company, and to certify student achievement in the 
program.
2279
 The Tribunal found that the respondent terminated its contract with Questech due 
to its deliberate policy decision not to continue with American contractors in a project that 
related to secret military intelligence operations in the presence of the transformations arising 
from the Islamic Revolution in Iran. The Tribunal noted that the contract contained no 
provision that dealt directly with the consequences of the respondent’s right to make such a 
policy decision and to terminate the contract unilaterally. Moreover, the contract did not allow 
the respondent to terminate it for its own convenience. A prior contract between the claimant 
and the Imperial Iranian Air Force contained a clause permitting termination whenever the Air 
Force determined it was in its best interests. According to the tribunal, the absence of such a 
clause in the contract in dispute confirmed that the parties did not intend the respondent to be 
able to terminate it for its convenience. However, the tribunal found an indication in the 
contract that the parties recognized that the respondent might cancel the contract even in the 
absence of either force majeure or default by the claimant. The contract provided that “In the 
event the Contract is cancelled due to Force Majeure or the Employer cancels the Contract for 
any reason except the Contractor's negligence, all Bank guarantees of good performance of 
work will be immediately released.” The Tribunal considered that this provision, while not 
offering a comprehensive set of legal consequences for any unilateral termination of the 
contract, showed that the parties envisaged that the respondent could cancel the contract for 
other reasons than the ones explicitly stated in the contract.
2280
  
 
The Tribunal stated that “the Contract … was rooted in military cooperation, and even 
belonged to a highly secret intelligence gathering system. As such it touched on especially 
sensitive aspects of the State partner's defence interests and policy. In this particular situation 
the political relationship between the States concerned was of greater importance than in 
ordinary commercial relations, and in this case even more than with regard to contracts for the 
sale of less sensitive military equipment or services. If, during the performance of a contract 
like the present one, these circumstances undergo fundamental changes which the parties had 
not foreseen, then a consequence may be that a contract party is not barred from opting for a 
termination of the contract in such a situation.”2281 The tribunal stated that the concept of 
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“changed circumstances, also referred to as clausula rebus sic stantibus, has in its basic form 
been incorporated into so many legal systems that it may be regarded as a general principle of 
law; it has also found a widely recognized expression in Article 62 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties of 1969.” However, considering wider and narrower formulations of 
the clausula in different legal systems and certain differences in its practical application, the 
tribunal stated that “it might be argued that … it would not be easy to establish a common 
core of such a general principle of law”. Nevertheless, the Tribunal found the basis for the 
application of the doctrine of hardship in the express wording of Article V of the Claims 
Settlement Declaration, which “mandated the Tribunal to “tak[e] into account relevant usages 
of the trade, contract provisions and changed circumstances” when deciding “all cases”, 
thereby mentioning “changed circumstances” on the same level as “contract provisions”.”2282  
 
The tribunal held that “The fundamental changes in the political conditions as a consequence 
of the Revolution in Iran, the different attitude of the new government and the new foreign 
policy especially towards the United States which had considerable support in large sections 
of the people, the drastically changed significance of highly sensitive military contracts as the 
present one, especially those to which United States companies were parties, are all factors 
that brought about such a change of circumstances as to give the Respondent a right to 
terminate the Contract.” Although, the Tribunal based its decision on the principle of changed 
circumstances, which in its view, “may be invoked in the absence of express provisions 
regulating the termination of a contract”, its following statement indicates that the claimant 
could have foreseen that a change in the regime in Iran may result in the cancellation of 
contract, but it did not act to allocate this risk elsewhere through the contract: “taking into 
account the nature of this Contract as well as the fact that its contract Party was a government 
entity which would be particularly affected by potential changes of the type described above, 
the Claimant could have been aware that such changes in this particular area were more 
foreseeable than in other fields of contractual relations. The Claimant could therefore not 
expect that the Contract would remain unaffected by changes in such a highly sensitive 
military domain.”2283  
 
As to the consequence of the respondent's termination of the contract, the Tribunal held that 
the respondent was obliged to compensate the claimant for the damages that the claimant has 
suffered from such a termination. This compensation included reimbursement for costs 
incurred, represented by invoice amounts rendered and not paid including profits to the time 
of termination, as well as for other direct costs, but did not comprise future profits, which the 
claimant might have made had the contract continued, because, in the tribunal’s view, that 
would imply that the respondent was under an obligation to continue the contract, which was 
not the case due to the change of circumstances.
 2284
  
 
In his Separate Opinion, Howard M. Holtzmann a member of the Tribunal, agreed with the 
amount of damages awarded in the case, but considered that "changed circumstances" 
resulting from a political policy decision of the Iranian Government cannot be a basis for 
determining that Government's contractual liability and, therefore, the doctrine of clausula 
rebus sic stantibus, cited in the award, was entirely inapplicable.
2285
 In his view, the measure 
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of compensation to be paid by the respondent for its actions in unilaterally terminating the 
contract should be determined by the terms of the contract itself and, under the provisions of 
the contract, the respondent would likewise be obligated to compensate the claimant for work 
performed and costs incurred under the contract, but not for profits lost because of the 
termination. According to Holtzmann, the award ignored the fact that the contract in its basic 
structure and by its wording provided the respondent with complete control over the amount 
of work to be done by the claimant, and this necessarily included a power to cancel the 
contract in its entirety.
2286
 Under the contract, when the Respondent exercised its right to 
"omit" services, the claimant would “only be paid for work actually performed under this 
Contract” and "[i]f the level of effort or other expenses actually required to perform the work 
are more or less than [the estimated maximum price of the Contract], the contract price will be 
adjusted accordingly." Moreover, the parties clearly envisioned that the contract might be 
terminated completely, for as noted in the Award, Article 7.4 provided for the release of all 
bank guarantees of good performance if "the Contract is cancelled due to Force Majeure or 
the Employer cancels the Contract for any reason except the Contractor's negligence."
2287
  
 
Thus, Holtzmann stated that the legal consequences of the termination of the contract were 
governed by the contract itself: the respondent was obligated to compensate the claimant at 
the contractual rates for work performed and for other costs incurred under the contract, but 
not required to compensate the claimant for future profits that the claimant might have earned 
had the contract continued, because upon termination of services payment was to be adjusted 
to reflect only "work actually performed," and because the claimant could have no reasonable 
expectation of continuing its performance and earning all of its hoped-for profit.
2288
 
Holtzmann concluded that “the Contract in this case provided the Respondent with a right to 
terminate the Contract and determines the compensation to be paid to the Claimant because 
the Respondent's exercise of that right. As a result, there is no need to invoke the doctrine of 
changed circumstances or to speculate about the political conditions in Iran in 1979 and the 
reasons for the termination, particularly since no evidence was presented upon which to base 
the speculation in the Award. Finally, the doctrine is in any event wrongly applied in the 
Award in this case.”2289 
 
Given that the outcome of the case would remain the same, the diverging approaches in the 
award and in the separate opinion could be combined through an interpretation to the effect 
that the claimant undertook an implied risk, which arose from the nature and other terms of 
the contract. The risk was that the respondent could terminate the contract on the basis of a 
political decision arising from a change of circumstances, and deprive the claimant of its 
claim for future profits lost because of such a termination. Thus, in essence, the tribunal can 
be considered as holding that the claimant, who could have contemplated the risk and 
allocated it elsewhere at the time of contracting, should incur the loss arising from the risk's 
materialization, in the absence of indications as to the specific reallocation of the relevant risk 
in the contract, on the basis of its other provisions. Such an interpretation is partly supported 
by both the award and the separate opinion. 
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It would be wrong to assume that that the risks of unforeseen contingencies are not allocated 
by contract because they are not specifically contemplated by the parties. Before considering 
the adjustment in the contract due to unforeseen contingencies that make the performance 
excessively onerous, the decision maker should consider the possibility of making 
adjustments in the determination of the risk assessments, as long as the decision maker is 
aware of the uncertainty caused by the presence of unforeseen contingencies.
2290
 For instance, 
even if some events, such as a change of regime in the context of a state contract, have not 
been specifically contemplated by the parties in a given case, the parties may have both 
contemplated and allocated the relevant risk, not specifically, in its narrow frame, but as part 
of a broader risk, such as the state party’s unilateral right to terminate the contract on the basis 
of its discretion. The decision maker may account for the incompleteness in the specification 
of the risks explicitly allocated by the parties in their narrow frame by adjusting the 
probability assessment of the more broadly framed risk on the basis of the test of reasonable 
persons of the same kind as the parties placed under the same circumstances. Although the 
broader risks are admittedly more uncertain because of the failure to specify all the relevant 
contingencies, these risks can nevertheless be priced, allocated and managed by the parties in 
their bargain in broader frames.
2291
 Thus, the question is not whether a risk is allocated in a 
contract, but at what level it is allocated.
2292
 
 
In ICC Case No 7365, the tribunal did not consider initially whether it should make 
adjustments in the determination of the risk assessments, but directly relied on a principle it 
derived from the UNIDROIT Principles and the Questech case, which, according to the 
tribunal, allowed it to adjust the contract due to unforeseen fundamental change of 
circumstances in the particular context of the contract.
2293
 The case concerned two contracts 
for the sale (“Sales Contract”) and for the installation (“Service Contract”) of sophisticated 
military equipment that comprised an Air Combat Maneuvering Range (“System”), which 
was entered into in 1977 between a United States corporation (Cubic) and the Iranian Air 
Force (Iran). Under the Sales Contract, Iran was provisionally to accept and take delivery of 
the System at Cubic's plant in San Diego, California and subsequently transport the System to 
Iran. Under the Service Contract, Cubic was to perform various site preparation tasks prior to 
formal acceptance in Iran and thereafter to perform installation, maintenance and training in 
connection with the equipment for a specified period of almost three years. The contracts 
were duly performed until the advent of the Islamic Revolution in early 1979 and Iran had 
paid 70% of the price due under the Sales Contract, i.e. the down payment of 50% and two 
payments of 10% each relating to Cubic's partial performance identified as "Milestone 1" and 
"Milestone 2".
2294
 The parties entered into a series of negotiations but were unable to reach an 
agreement as to how to proceed in the context of revolution. Iran argued that, because of 
Cubic's breach of the Service Contract by evacuating its specialists from Iran and also for 
reasons of force majeure and frustration, it could not pay and was prevented from making the 
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payments corresponding to "Milestone 3" under the Sales Contract.
2295
 Iran claimed the 
reimbursement of payments made to Cubic in addition to damages, while Cubic argued that 
Iran had breached its contractual obligations by not paying the remainder of the price, and 
presented a counterclaim for damages. The contracts contained a choice of law clause 
designating the law of Iran.
2296
 Even so, the arbitral tribunal stated that “both Parties 
eventually agreed to the complementary and supplementary application of general principles 
of international law and trade usages... As to the contents of such rules, the Tribunal shall be 
guided by the Principles of International Commercial Contracts, published in 1994 by the 
UNIDROIT Institute, Rome.”2297 
 
The tribunal noted that “The revolutionary events … occurred and even culminated precisely 
during the period when the performance of the Sales Contract entered into the milestone 3 
phase, which was defined as completion of subsystem tests at Cubic's plant and acceptance of 
same by Iran's representatives; following this step, the System should have been shipped - 
under an U.S. export licence - to Iran. Not surprisingly, the performance of milestone 3 was 
disturbed as a result of the chaotic situation during the revolutionary period… The System has 
not been shipped to Iran.”2298 It was disputed between the parties whether Cubic would have 
been able to ship the System to Iran in the period up to May 16, 1979, when the export licence 
was still valid in its original amount or whether the U.S. State Department would have 
cancelled the licence if it had been advised that the goods were to be shipped to Iran. While 
not answering this question, the tribunal noted that that “a certain risk of export licence 
cancellation existed at this time since even prior to the revolution of February 1979 some 
export licences were cancelled and even shipment of goods with export licences already in 
freight forwarding storage facilities were prevented. Cubic, as a company with particular 
know-how in the exportation of sensitive military equipment, must have been aware of such 
risk.” The tribunal also stated that “[Cubic] must have been aware that the original licence had 
expired on May 16, 1979, and that the political situation was extremely unfavourable for the 
export of sensitive military equipment to Iran. Cubic must also have been aware of the 
reimbursement obligation it had under the Sales Contract… This explains why [Cubic] - 
keeping in mind that it was its responsibility to obtain and maintain the export licence - must 
have been interested in conducting negotiations with [Iran] in order to find a mutual solution 
to the problem of the Contracts.”2299 
 
The tribunal then underlined the importance of the principle of sanctity of contracts in the 
order of international commerce. It stated that “Legal certainty and stability require that a 
party to a contract is responsible for its performance. This traditional rule of contract law is 
known as sanctity of contract or "pacta sunt servanda", and is generally respected in all legal 
systems of the world. In principle it states that the parties must adhere to the terms of their 
contract and therefore be excused from non-performance only to the extent such is provided 
for in the contract. As a consequence, parties to a long-term contract are expected to foresee 
to a reasonable extent the developments, including changes, which may occur.” Subsequently, 
the tribunal referred to the clausula rebus sic stantibus. It stated that “Under the laws of 
contract in all municipal legal systems exceptions to the basic notion of pacta sunt servanda 
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have been developed on the ground that in particular circumstances fairness and justice 
require the making of a legal excuse for nonperformance of contractual promises. While the 
excuse concepts in different legal systems vary to a great extent, they are all based on largely 
the same premise; namely, that some unforeseen development has occured [sic] affecting the 
contractual performance without the fault and beyond the control of the parties. For instance, 
Subsec. 4 of the UNIDROIT Principles Art. 6.2.3 setting out the legal consequences of 
hardship states that "If the court finds hardship it may, if reasonable (a) terminate the contract 
at a date and on terms to be fixed, or (b) adapt the contract with a view to restoring its 
equilibrium." Moreover, from the covenant of good faith and fair dealing which is implied in 
each contract follows that in a case in which the circumstances to a contract undergo said 
fundamental changes in an unforeseeable way, a party is precluded from invoking the binding 
effect of the contract. The idea that a change in circumstances may affect the binding force of 
a contract is known under the maxim clausula rebus sic stantibus: the contract remains 
binding provided that things remain unchanged. It is understood, however, that due to the 
fundamental principle of pacta sunt servanda not any change of circumstances can be 
sufficient. Due to its exceptional character, its application is only justified if the change in 
circumstances was fundamental and unforeseeable. In such restrictive and narrow form this 
concept has been incorporated into so many legal systems that it is widely regarded a general 
principle of law. As such, it would be applicable in the instant arbitration even if it did not 
form part of the Iranian law.”2300 
 
The tribunal referred to the practice of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, which refused to apply 
the doctrine of changed circumstances to contracts the termination of which was invoked by 
the Iranian party as a result of the political change caused by the Islamic Revolution, due to its 
general position that the revolutionary changes per se did not constitute an unforeseeable 
change of circumstances which could excuse Iran from non-performance of any commercial 
contract entered into with the United States prior to the beginning of the revolution.
2301
 
However, according to the tribunal, all of the awards rejecting the applicability of the doctrine 
of changed circumstances did not involve the national security of Iran but the oil industry. 
The tribunal referred to the Questech award, which in its view, expressly distinguished 
between the case of sales of highly sensitive military equipment from cases involving 
"ordinary commercial relations".
2302
  The tribunal stated that “In this situation which was 
characterised by the transfer of sensitive military equipment from one country to the other, the 
political relationship between the countries concerned was of utmost importance. Such 
relationship had worsened in spring 1979 to an extent that it had become highly improbable 
that Cubic would obtain, after the expiration of its original export licence, an unrestricted 
renewal.”2303 
 
Thus, the tribunal held that “(i) regardless of whether [Iran] was objectively still capable - 
despite the revolutionary turmoil in its home country - to make payment through a 
representative in the U.S.A. when Milestone 3 was completed and (ii) regardless of whether 
the Parties were actually aware of the quasi-cancellation of the needed export license, the 
fulfillment of the Contracts was undoubtedly on the verge of being frustrated due to the 
changed political relationship between the countries… Applying the principles referred to in 
                                                 
2300
 Ibid., at para. 8.10  
2301
 Ibid., at para. 8.14 
2302
 Ibid., at para. 8.15 
2303
 Ibid., at para. 8.17 
 634 
 
the Questech case … mutatis mutandis, the Arbitral Tribunal concludes that the fundamental 
change of circumstances entitled each of the Parties to unilaterally request, if not the 
termination of the contracts, then at least an adaptation of its terms, in particular the 
postponement of the contractual dates by a reasonable period of time.”2304  
 
The examination of the issue of hardship under lex mercatoria should not start from the pre-
established models of risk allocation, which would derive from the application of the default 
mechanisms of force majeure or hardship. In international contracting practices, the parties 
negotiating a contract should be expected to have begun with an assessment as complete as 
possible of all the specific and broader risks of their contract, before resorting to such 
mechanisms that can be found in the model clauses or default rules of force majeure, 
hardship, frustration or impracticability, which allow the decision maker to address the 
residual allocation of the relevant risks. Thus, even if the specific allocation of risks do not 
readily provide a solution for the particular dispute, the decision maker applying lex 
mercatoria, rather than seeking such a solution in those default mechanisms, should consider 
the possibility of dealing with the incompleteness in the specific allocation of the risks by 
adjusting the probability assessment of the more broadly framed risk on the basis of the test of 
reasonable persons of the same kind as the parties placed under the same circumstances. In 
ICC Case No 7365, since the tribunal proceeded from Article 6.2.3 of the UNIDROIT 
Principles, in its approach to the issue of hardship, the tribunal’s considerations of the nature 
of the contract and the effect of changed circumstances on the obligations in its particular 
context apparently served the tribunal’s examination of whether they justify a possible 
adaptation of the contract, in terms of the postponement of the contractual dates by a 
reasonable period of time. However, the tribunal might have given effect to the reasonable 
expectations of the parties in a more accurate manner, whereby the solution could have 
emerged in line with the basic principles of the order of international commerce, had those 
considerations be initially taken into account by the tribunal for the purpose of making 
adjustments in the determination of the risk assessments, as in the decision in the Qeustech 
case, rather than for justifying directly an adjustment in the contractual terms on the basis of a 
solution, which is suggested by the UNIDROIT Principles as a pre-established model that 
cannot be considered as the established one in the order of international commerce. 
 
Despite its conclusion with regard to the change of circumstances and the applicability of 
Article 6.2.3 of the UNIDROIT Principles, the tribunal in ICC Case No 7365 arrived at a 
solution similar to the one in the Questech award and implicitly made adjustments in the 
determination of the risk assessments. On the basis of the evidence of negotiations and the 
subsequent conduct of the parties, the tribunal found that the parties agreed in 1979 to 
discontinue the contracts until the results of Cubic's attempt to resell the System would be 
known.
2305
 While Iran concentrated its claims on the reimbursement of its advance payments, 
Cubic partly reused the System manufactured for Iran mainly in the context of a sale to the 
Canadian Government and was then no longer in a position or willing to perform the 
Contracts. The tribunal held that this situation amounted to a factual termination of the 
contracts at the request of Iran.
2306
 In fact, the contracts explicitly provided for the right of 
Iran to terminate for its convenience, by written notice, the contract in whole or in part "when 
it is in the best interest of the Government". The amounts to be paid by Iran to Cubic by 
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reason of termination under this clause "may include a reasonable allowance for profit on 
work done."
2307
  
 
However, it was doubtful whether this clause could be directly applied to the case. The 
tribunal stated that it is a widely accepted principle that contractual obligations of the parties 
may be implicit and in this respect referred to Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the UNIDROIT 
Principles in considering that “Implied obligations may stem from the nature and purpose of 
the contract, practices established between the parties and usages, good faith and fair dealing 
and reasonableness”.2308 According to the tribunal, pursuant to such criteria as good faith and 
fair dealing, parties to a contract may reasonably expect that similar situations should have the 
same or similar consequences to the extent that the applicable law or the contractual terms do 
not explicitly provide otherwise, and in the instant case, the factual circumstances were 
extremely close to, if not identical with, a termination of the Contracts by Iran for its 
convenience. In this regard, the tribunal again turned to the risk assessments of the parties and 
considered that it was mainly Iran which expressed the wish to terminate the contracts, 
whereas Cubic would obviously have preferred that the project be continued subject to the 
timely renewal of the export licence and the change of circumstances that induced the parties 
to discontinue the Contracts, i.e. the Islamic Revolution, occurred in Iran's, not in Cubic's area 
of risks.
2309
 The tribunal than stated that “Except for the absence of an explicit reference, by 
Iran, to the Termination for Convenience Clause or to a similar language close to the wording 
of that contractual provision, all requirements of a contract termination under the Termination 
for Convenience Clause are met. It would be excessively formalistic, and contrary to the 
principles of good faith, fair dealing and reasonableness if Iran's entitlement to a 
reimbursement of the advance payments and Cubic's entitlement to further payments would 
be governed, in the instant case, by different legal or contractual provisions than in the event 
Iran had formally invoked the contract clause entitling it to terminate the Contracts for its 
convenience. Accordingly, the Tribunal concludes that the Termination for Convenience 
Clause shall be applied, if not directly, then at least by analogy, to the assessment of the 
Parties respective claims.”2310  
 
The tribunal stated that “The obvious and most important effect of a contract termination, be 
it for the convenience of one party or for other reasons, is that either party may claim 
restitution of whatever it has supplied, provided that such party concurrently makes restitution 
of whatever it has received" (UNIDROIT Principles Art. 7.3.6). The same principle applies 
under Iranian law in the event of mutual termination of a contract…. The principle is 
explicitly referred to in the Termination for Convenience Clause which provides for a refund 
of payments by the contractor should the contractor's statement of expended funds show 
excess payments by Iran”.2311 Under the termination for convenience clause, the amount to be 
taken into account in favour of Cubic consisted of a compensation for Cubic's “expended 
funds” that related to Cubic's direct costs and “a reasonable allowance for profit on work 
done” as an allowance for Cubic's gross profit margin, which covered Cubic's general and 
administrative expenses, its research and development costs as well as its net profits, but not 
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lost profits on work not already done.
2312
 Moreover, the tribunal considered that since the 
hardware manufactured by Cubic remained at Cubic's disposal, its entitlement to be 
compensated was reduced by the value of resale or reuse of the System.
2313
 In the end, Iran 
was awarded with compensation since it had already made payments under the Sale Contract 
in excess of the amount of compensation to which Cubic was entitled under the Sales 
Contract, and no additional claims was awarded under the Service Contract.
2314
 
 
In other cases, the arbitral tribunals rejected the application of hardship rules in the 
UNIDROIT Principles as a pre-established model for verification of trade usages in the 
narrow sense, or general principles of law. In ICC Case No. 8873, which concerned a 
construction contract governed by Spanish law pursuant to the choice of law of the parties, the 
contractor argued that the dispute should be decided not only on the basis of the provisions of 
Spanish law, but taking into account the international trade usages and the general principles 
of law and, in particular, practices existing in the field of international civil engineering 
contracts. The contractor invoked the hardship rules under Articles 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 of the 
UNIDROIT Principles, due to a number of unforeseen difficulties which substantially 
increased the cost of the construction. The tribunal stated that, as the parties chose Spanish 
law as the governing law of the contract, the contractor was required to prove that the 
hardship provisions of the UNIDROIT Principles reflect a generally established international 
practice, where those involved in international trade consider themselves bound without the 
need for an express stipulation to that effect. The arbitral tribunal considered that, although 
there is a tendency to stipulate hardship clauses in certain sectors of international trade in a 
repetitive way and it is possible to consider the provisions of UNIDROIT Principles on 
hardship as commercially reasonable, the hardship clauses in business practice deal with a 
principle of exceptional matters and, thus, determine, in detail, the circumstances justifying 
the hardship and its consequences. In the tribunal’s view, since the contents of the hardship 
clauses in international practice vary greatly in different contractual settings, the hardship 
provisions of the UNIDROIT Principles cannot be considered as trade usages in the narrow 
sense, in the absence of explicit reference by the parties.
2315
  
 
In ICC Case No. 9029 which concerned a Shareholders Agreement for the financing of an 
aeronautical project between an Italian company and an Austrian company, the respondent 
claimed that the agreement was invalid or inapplicable, and based its claims on the 
UNIDROIT Principles, particularly, among others, the provisions on hardship, as “as an 
authoritative source of knowledge of international trade usages”.2316 The agreement contained 
a choice of law clause in favor of Italian law as the applicable law. The respondent argued 
that the agreement caused grave hardship to the detriment of the respondent due to the 
excessive disparity in the contract or in some of its clauses, with excessive advantage to one 
of the parties, and particularly maintained that that the services rendered by the claimant were 
no more than abstract “Supports”, in part not corresponding to the truth and in part, on the 
contrary, laying burdens exclusively on the respondent.
2317
 The arbitral tribunal considered 
                                                 
2312
 Ibid., at para. 13.2-13.4 
2313
 Ibid., at para. 13.8 
2314
 Ibid., at para. 18.1-18.2 
2315
 ICC Award in Case No. 8873, July 1997, ICC International Court of Arbitration Bulletin, 10-2 (1999), at 80 
2316
 ICC Award in Case No. 9029, March 1998, ICC International Court of Arbitration Bulletin, 10-2 (1999), at 
88 
2317
 Ibid., at 89 
 637 
 
that the reference to lex mercatoria and the specific appeals to the UNIDROIT Principles did 
not constitute sufficient justification for sustaining the respondent’s claim that the 
shareholders agreement should be declared invalid or void, for various reasons. First, the 
respondent failed to prove that the rules invoked are part of lex mercatoria and the existence 
of interpretative and applicative trends in international commercial circles supporting the 
interpretation that was put forward. The tribunal stated that “although the Unidroit Principles 
constitute a set of rules theoretically appropriate to prefigure the future lex mercatoria should 
international commercial practice adapt to the Principles, at present there is no necessary 
connection between the individual Principles and the rules of the lex mercatoria, so that 
recourse to the Principles is not purely and simply the same as recourse to an actually existing 
international commercial usage.”2318 Secondly, according the tribunal, “when the parties have 
chosen national law as the law applicable to their relationship, it being certainly not possible, 
in such a case, to substitute international commercial usages for the national law chosen by 
the parties with regard to institutions, actions, and effects, for which the latter makes special 
provision.”2319 Thus, the tribunal considered, as part of the articulated rules and the bargain, 
the relevant rules of Italian law, which specifically regulate the issues relevant to the dispute.  
 
In any event, the tribunal considered that even if lex mercatoria and the UNIDROIT 
Principles were applicable in this case, the respondent’s claim aimed at obtaining from the 
tribunal the finding that the shareholders agreement was invalid or void, could not be 
sustained with regard to the supposed hardship. The tribunal stated that “the extent of the 
contributions requested could reasonably have been foreseen by a professional operator in the 
aeronautical sector, by exercising the due diligence expected from a professional from the 
sector to which Respondent belonged.”2320 According to the tribunal, in the case, there would 
be no presuppositions of hardship that were listed under Article 6.2.2 (a)-(d) of the 
UNIDROIT Principles and, therefore, no grounds for a finding of invalidity or nullity. In this 
regard, the tribunal noted that “Respondent was aware - or, at any rate could have been aware, 
… that this was an old project, and that responsibility for the technical aspects, the 
certification, the marketing, and any finance necessary for the joint venture would fall upon it, 
and that it would assume the related risk; that no unforeseen circumstances had even emerged 
while the contract was being concluded such as to aggravate that risk, taking into account, 
after all, that Respondent declared its intention of extricating itself from its obligation only 
two months after the Shareholders Agreement had been finalized.”2321 
 
Under lex mercatoria, the traditional concept of hardship should be replaced by a notion of 
risk allocation, which does not follow solely the default mechanisms of the relevant doctrines, 
but considers the context and nature of the particular contract. This is essentially reflected by 
the UNIDROIT Principles, which provide in Article 6.2.2 sub-paragraph (d) that there can be 
no hardship if the risk of the events was assumed by the disadvantaged party.
2322
 The risks 
associated with the relevant hardship event may be allocated implicitly as inferred from other 
terms of the contract or on the basis of the test of reasonable persons of the same kind as the 
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parties placed under the same circumstances. In practice, rather than referring to pre-
established models, the parties negotiate a suitable risk allocation aimed at establishing which 
party should bear which risk.
2323
 In line with this practice, the decision maker should exercise 
his abstract reasoning in determining the foresight of the parties as to their awareness of the 
risks such transaction present and in making adjustments in their probability assessments.  
 
In an arbitral case before the Centro de Arbitraje de México in 2006, the arbitral tribunal 
rejected the defense of hardship due to the risk allocation between the parties by referring to 
Article 6.2.2 sub-paragraph (d) of the UNIDROIT Principles. In the case, the claimant asked 
for termination of the contract as well as damages for the harm suffered as a result of the 
respondent’s failure to provide the goods. The parties expressly referred to the UNIDROIT 
Principles as the law governing the substance of any potential disputes. The respondent 
objected that its failure to deliver the goods was due to the destruction of the crops by a series 
of extraordinarily heavy rainstorms and flooding caused by the meteorological phenomenon 
known as “El Niño”. According to the respondent these events amounted to a case of hardship 
and therefore any liability on its part was excluded. The tribunal examined the case in light of 
Article.6.2.2 of the UNIDROIT Principles. The tribunal considered that the occurrence of “El 
Niño” fundamentally altered the equilibrium of the contract because it affected the supply of 
products dramatically. According to the tribunal, the weather event was unpredictable at the 
time of contracting and beyond the control of the respondent. However, the tribunal found 
that the respondent assumed the risk. In the tribunal’s view, the reason for the parties to enter 
into a supply contract is twofold: the supplier wishes to ensure a buyer, and the buyer wishes 
to ensure the desired volume of available supply. According to the tribunal, in this 
understanding, the supply contract, in essence, regulates the risk whereby the supplier does 
not have to worry about the market situation, because that risk is now borne by the buyer, 
who is committed to purchase a given volume, and the buyer does not have to worry about the 
existence of the product, because the risk is borne by the supplier, who is committed to make 
available a certain volume of the product. Accordingly, the risk of the occurrence of an event 
that affects the production lies with the producer and a decline in demand for the product on 
the market is not a reason for the buyer not to perform its obligation to pay for the product 
supplied by the supplier. Thus, tribunal rejected the respondent’s argument that its liability for 
non-performance was excluded on the grounds of hardship, by holding that, especially in the 
context of a supply agreement concerning specific quantities of goods to be delivered, a 
vegetable grower assumes the risk of crop destruction by rainstorms and flooding.
2324
 
 
In ICC Case No. 8486, a Dutch manufacturer and Turkish buyer concluded a contract for the 
installation of a machine for the production of lump sugar for the Turkish market. The 
contract provided Dutch law as the applicable law. The agreed price was for the entire 
installation, and the buyer had to pay 5% of the price one year prior to delivery. Due to 
financial difficulties, the buyer only paid 3% of the contractual price as advance payment. 
Following unsuccessful negotiations, the manufacturer commenced ICC arbitration as 
provided for in the contract. The manufacturer claimed an amount in payment for the part of 
the manufacturing system which could not be sold to other buyers as it had been made 
expressly for the Turkish buyer as well as interest and legal fees. The buyer objected that it 
was discharged of its obligations under the contract because of the dramatic drop in the price 
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of the relevant product on the Turkish market, which amounted to hardship. The buyers also 
counterclaimed its advance payment.
2325
  
 
The sole arbitrator considered that the circumstances alleged by the defendant did not 
discharge the defendant from its obligation to pay on the ground of unforeseen circumstances 
in the sense of Article 6:258 of the Dutch Civil Code. The arbitrator started from the premise 
that Article 6:258 must be applied with the utmost restraint because, among others, it is a 
special rule with respect to the general possibility, under Article 6:248(2) together with 
Article 3:12 of the Dutch Civil Code, to consider certain contractual provisions inapplicable 
on grounds of reasonableness and fairness in certain circumstances.
2326
 The arbitrator noted 
that “In Dutch national legal practice, the general provision [of Art. 6:248 BW] is applied 
with the utmost restraint... According to Art. 3:12 BW, 'Dutch common opinion of law' is the 
determining factor in the first place; it is replaced by the common opinion in international 
contract law when the provision is applied in an international context. Both are influenced in a 
decisive manner by the principle of contractual good faith (pacta sunt servanda) expressed in 
Art. 1.3 of the UNIDROIT Principles for International Commercial Contracts… This 
common opinion of law must also be taken into account for the application of national law to 
international relationships… The necessity and admissibility of the interpretation of national 
law in the light of the UNIDROIT Principles is also asserted especially for Dutch law… The 
same restraint should be exercised, according to the Dutch legislator, when applying the 
special provision of Art. 6:258… This restraint is also in line with international contractual 
and arbitral practice. It is also to be taken into consideration in the context of Dutch national 
law.”2327  
 
According to the arbitrator, “the termination of a contract for unforeseen circumstances 
('hardship', 'clausula rebus sic stantibus') should be allowed only in truly exceptional cases”. 
The arbitrator considered the following in exercising his abstract reasoning: “In international 
commerce one must rather assume in principle that the parties take the risks of performing 
under and carrying out the contract upon themselves, unless a different allocation of risk is 
expressly provided for in the contract… Art. 6.2.1 of the UNIDROIT Principles expressly 
provides that the mere fact that the performance of the contract entails a higher economic 
burden for one of the parties does not suffice to assume that there is 'hardship'… Also the ICC 
Principles on 'Force Majeure and Hardship' provide that a party cannot argue that 
performance is impossible only because the contract happens to have become unprofitable …. 
Accordingly, a Dutch arbitral tribunal held that a dramatic fall in the price [of a product] as 
well as currency fluctuations alone are not unforeseen circumstances and thus do not justify 
the termination of a contract. In the opinion of the arbitral tribunal, these circumstances fall 
rather within the risk sphere of the party concerned”.2328  
 
Applying this reasoning to the case, the arbitrator found that “The rising of a private 
manufacturing sector and the connected fall in the price [of the product] described therein, as 
well as the general trade situation in Turkey, only concern the economic frame of the Turkish 
market and thus fall within the risk sphere of the defendant.”2329 This finding was supported 
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by the submissions of the defendant that “it was perfectly aware of the unstable commercial 
situation in Turkey and that it always had to consider that 'the situation ... can change 
suddenly'.” The arbitrator also considered that “With respect to these unstable circumstances 
on the Turkish market, which were known to the defendant, it does not seem maintainable that 
the defendant wants to shift the commercial risks related thereto onto the claimant. Further, 
the claimant helped the defendant when concluding the contract, in that by [accepting] the 
financing clause [contained therein] it accepted a significant pre-financing risk, apparently in 
consideration of the good commercial relations which had existed until then between the 
parties. Also, during the entire proceedings the claimant has indicated its willingness to 
cooperate in an economic solution of the problem which is acceptable for the defendant.” The 
arbitrator concluded that “In the light of the above situation, the circumstances raised by the 
defendant fall within the economic risk to be borne by the defendant, also according to the 
interpretation valid in international commercial relations. The arbitral tribunal may not, 
according to Art. 6:258(2) BW, consider them unforeseen circumstances in the sense of this 
provision”.2330 
 
Only the failures of the parties to contemplate and allocate the risks of change of 
circumstances, which represent a gap of risk allocation in the articulated rules that cannot be 
addressed, by means of a contextual interpretation and adjustments in the determination of the 
risk assessments, should trigger the considerations of hardship under lex mercatoria. In ICC 
Case No. 1512, the arbitrator stated that “'The principle "Rebus sic stantibus" is universally 
considered as being of strict and narrow interpretation, as a dangerous exception to the 
principle of sanctity of contracts. Whatever opinion or interpretation lawyers of different 
countries may have about the 'concept' of changed circumstances as an excuse for 
nonperformance, they will doubtless agree on the necessity to limit the application of the so-
called 'doctrine rebus sic stantibus' (sometimes referred to as 'frustration', 'force majeure', 
'Imprévision', and the like) to cases where compelling reasons justify it, having regard not 
only to the fundamental character of the changes, but also to the particular type of the contract 
involved, to the requirements of fairness and equity and to all circumstances of the case… As 
a general rule, one should be particularly reluctant to accept it when there is no gap or lacuna 
in the contract and when the intent of the parties has been clearly expressed... Caution is 
especially called for, moreover, in international transactions where it is generally much less 
likely that the parties have been unaware of the risk of a remote contingency or unable to 
formulate it precisely”.2331 
 
b. Renegotiation 
 
In the first instance, the hardship situations under lex mercatoria should lead the decision 
maker to consider the renegotiation of the agreement by the parties with a view to adapting 
the contract or terminating it thereby enabling them to arrive at the allocation had they 
contemplated and allocated the relevant risks at the time of contracting. As it is pointed out, 
finding alternative contractual terms which reasonably allow for the consequences of the 
hardship event is a complex endeavor best carried out by the parties themselves.
2332
 In ICC 
Case No 2291, the arbitrator, applying lex mercatoria, stated that any commercial transaction 
is founded on the balance of reciprocal performances and that to deny such principle would 
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transform a commercial transaction into a hazardous and speculative contract. According to 
the arbitrator, it is a rule of lex mercatoria that the performances are balanced in financial 
terms.
2333
 The arbitrator considered that as the contract must be interpreted in good faith, each 
party has the duty to behave in a manner that avoids causing prejudice to the other party, 
while the reasonable renegotiation being customary in international economic transactions. 
2334
  
 
In some cases, the parties explicitly provide in the contract a duty to renegotiate in the change 
of circumstances. In those cases, the decision maker should analyze the scope and 
consequences of its application. In ICC case No. 2478, the arbitral tribunal had to rule on a 
claim for damages made by a French company against a Rumanian company which had not 
delivered to it a certain quantity of fuel because of a change in the price of oil. The respondent 
maintained that its refusal to deliver the oil was justified and relied on Appendix 3 to the 
contract, which contained a clause that “In the event of devaluation or revaluation of the 
French franc or the dollar, the parties shall come together to examine the consequences of the 
new situation and agree on the measures to be taken in order to reestablish the contractual 
equilibrium as intended by and in the initial spirit of the contract for the as yet undelivered 
quantities as well as for the as yet unpaid quantities”. The respondent argued that this clause 
was to be interpreted as a clause of 'unforeseeability or monetary parity' and it placed the 
parties under an obligation to adjust the prices when the contract's initial conditions had 
undergone a change and, as the negotiations entered into by the parties following the 
devaluation of the dollar proved to be abortive, the contract had lost its reciprocal nature and 
no longer needed to be performed. The arbitral tribunal noted that “Appendix 3 to the contract 
actually constitutes only an obligation to negotiate in view of agreeing on measures to be 
taken in order to re-establish a contractual equilibrium in the event that the French franc or the 
U.S. dollar (the contract currencies) would be devalued or revaluated.” According to the 
tribunal, the movement of prices on the world oil market as such was not covered by that 
clause, which was not a price revision clause. Moreover, the tribunal stated that “Appendix 3 
does not automatically entitle the parties to the cancellation of the contract should the 
negotiations fail. The respondent could certainly have had recourse to arbitration had it 
considered that the other party's refusal to accept the new price offered by the respondent was 
unjustified. But as long as the arbitral award, which would be favorable to it, had not been 
made, nothing in Appendix 3 authorized the respondent to suspend unilaterally the deliveries 
provided in the contract.”2335 
 
In ICC Cases No 6515 and 6516, which were joined by the same arbitral tribunal, the parties 
entered into a number of agreements which were intended to associate the Italian claimant 
with the development of a major project to be undertaken in Greece by two Greek defendants. 
The defendants were to compensate the claimant for services rendered under the agreements. 
The understanding of the parties was that the compensation paid by the defendants to the 
claimant was not subject to Greek taxes since the claimant did not have a permanent 
establishment in Greece and the compensation was subject to Italian taxes by reason of the 
Tax Treaty between Italy and Greece. The Greek authorities decided that the claimant had 
acquired a permanent establishment in Greece and the compensation should be subject to the 
withholding tax. This decision resulted in double taxation as the claimant already bore Italian 
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corporate income taxes in Italy for those payments. The claimant argued that the burden of 
these withholdings should be borne by the defendants.
 
The contract provided that the parties 
should negotiate in good faith in case of the changed circumstances. The tribunal, in a 
majority decision, held that the defendants’ failure to negotiate had damaged the claimant and 
awarded claimant damages amounting to 65% of the Greek tax liability.
2336
 This decision is a 
clear case of splitting the difference as far as its section on the measure of damages is 
concerned. 
 
The case is also interesting due to the approach of the tribunal to the issue of change of 
circumstances. Although the imposition of the withholding tax did not result in any excessive 
hardship for the claimant within the meaning of Article 388 of the Greek Civil Code, which 
was chosen as applicable by the parties, the tribunal considered the requirements of Article 
388 as irrelevant in the particular circumstances of the case. The tribunal stated that “the 
parties did not anticipate, [at the time of contracting], that Greek tax law would be interpreted 
and applied so as to impose a 20% or 25% withholding on payments made by either first or 
second defendant to claimant. Accordingly, the parties based their business analysis on the 
assumption that no corporate income tax was exigible [in] Greece, and that no corporate 
income tax would be exigible in Greece. This assumption proved wrong.” The tribunal 
considered whether disruption of the economic balance of the contracts which resulted from 
the imposition of withholdings should be taken into account. The tribunal stated that “the 
parties did agree upon an initial allocation of the taxes as between themselves, because this 
initial allocation worked out an economic balance which was satisfactory to all of them. But 
they never said that this initial allocation should be maintained at all costs, including the cost 
of disruption of the economic balance of the contracts…. The initial allocation of taxes 
provided by the contracts was to remain unchanged rebus sic stantibus. But changes in 
economic circumstances certainly could warrant re-allocation of taxes between the parties. 
They certainly indicated that the parties make a bona fide effort in order to reach an 
agreement with that re-allocation of taxes. The arbitral tribunal does not harbor any doubt that 
the imposition of the withholdings on the compensation paid by the first and/or second 
defendant to claimant constituted such a change in economic circumstances…. the contracts 
were based upon an analysis of the economic profitability of the underlying transactions. That 
analysis led the parties to agree upon the initial allocation of taxes. Thus, this initial allocation 
of taxes was one of the elements which the parties took into account in order to work out their 
agreement. It may well be that the imposition of the withholdings did not result in any 
excessive hardship for claimant – a highly doubtful conclusion in light of the facts that (i) 
profit margins are usually low in such a competitive environment as engineering, and that (ii) 
those profit margins were flattened out by double taxation. But whether the imposition of the 
withholdings resulted or did not result in excessive hardship within the meaning of Art. 388 of 
the Greek Civil Code is totally irrelevant here, since the parties had agreed that, in any case, 
they would enter into a bona fide attempt at settling the financial consequences thereof.”2337  
 
The tribunal interpreted the amendment clauses in the agreements to the effect that when the 
change of circumstances has an impact on the balance of contractual obligations, the parties 
are obliged to enter into bona fide negotiations in order to determine, which waivers, 
alterations or modifications would be necessary in order to strike a new balance between the 
obligations of the parties. The tribunal stated that “This is not to say, however, that the parties 
had an obligation to reach agreement on the proposed waivers, alterations or modifications. 
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The parties were left to agree or not to agree upon such waivers, alterations or modifications. 
But what they could not possibly escape was the obligation to listen to proposals which were 
put by one party to the other party.” According to the tribunal, this obligation to renegotiate in 
good faith would be binding upon the parties even if this was not explicitly stipulated in the 
agreement. However, the tribunal made it clear that “In so holding, the arbitral tribunal does 
not rest upon some freshly discovered principle of international trade law. It rests upon the 
very wording of Arts. 288 [on the principle of good faith] and 388 [on the change of 
circumstances] in the Greek Civil Code, which have been cited by the parties in their written 
submission and oral presentations.”2338 The tribunal, thus, held that “the contract here under 
consideration made it an obligation for the parties to re-negotiate their Agreements in case of 
change in circumstances – an obligation which was totally consonant with Greek law, and 
namely Arts. 288 and 388 of the Greek Civil Code.”2339 
 
The tribunal found that the defendants were in violation of their contractual obligations, under 
three respects. First, the defendants, pending the completion of the works, failed to take a 
clear and unambiguous position as to whether they would agree or would not agree to re-
negotiate the contracts thereafter, and misled the claimant into believing that a re-allocation of 
taxes would take place once the performance would be completed. In the tribunal’s view, in 
light of the attitude of the defendants, the claimant chose to complete its share of the works, 
with no other warranty than what it believed was an implicit commitment by the defendants to 
enter into negotiations.
2340
 Secondly, the defendants, after completion of the works failed to 
enter into bona fine negotiations with the claimant for the purpose of determining whether the 
change in economic circumstances warranted a re-allocation of the tax burden as between the 
claimant and the defendants. According to the tribunal, since the proposals made by the 
claimant at this stage were never clearly approved or disapproved by the defendants, the 
claimant was again misled to believe that bona fide negotiations had taken place and that 
these bona fide negotiations had resulted into a firm agreement between the parties as to 
reallocation of taxes.
2341
 Thirdly, the defendants, once the Greek authorities had started to 
impose the withholdings on the amounts paid to the claimant, failed to enter into bona fide 
negotiations in order to amicably settle their difference with the claimant, thereby forcing the 
claimant into arbitration. The tribunal found that the parties incorporated the ingredient of 
negotiation into the provisions of the jurisdictional clause, but the defendants did not respond 
to efforts of the claimant to initiate an amicable settlement and, even made “their best efforts 
in order to block any direct negotiation” between the claimant and the defendants. 2342  
 
In the case, the claimant requested monetary damages since the agreements were fully carried 
out. The defendants suggested that the claimant suffered no injury because notwithstanding 
the imposition of the withholdings, the claimant was able to fully carry out its obligations. 
However, according to the tribunal, the claimant suffered injury because its compensation was 
decreased by a significant percentage.
2343
 The claimant argued that it should be awarded the 
total amount of the withholdings. However, the tribunal considered that the damages must be 
somewhat lesser than the withholdings since, at the time the claimant made its first request to 
                                                 
2338
 Ibid., at 97 
2339
 Ibid., at 98 
2340
 Ibid., at 101-102 
2341
 Ibid., at 102 
2342
 Ibid., at 99-100  
2343
 Ibid., at 103 
 644 
 
the defendants with respect to re-allocation of the tax burden in its letter to the defendants, the 
claimant limited its claim to “a reasonable readjustment of contract price to compensate 
claimant of the financial consequences suffered” by reason of the withheld money.2344 On the 
basis of that letter, the tribunal stated that it “could have found that an even division between 
claimant and defendants of the total of money withheld ought to be made in order to fulfill the 
request which claimant made at that time for a ‘reasonable adjustment’.” However, in order to 
assess damages due and owing to the claimant, the tribunal also took into account the 
subsequent behavior of the defendants, which misled the claimant into believing that a 
reasonable adjustment would take place and whereby the claimant continued to perform in 
good faith before any clear understanding had been reached as between the parties with 
respect to the reasonable adjustment. The tribunal also took into consideration “the fact that 
the defendants did try some efforts, if not their best efforts, in order to have the Greek 
authorities withdraw their decision on the withholdings.”2345 On the basis of these 
considerations, the tribunal held that “the total amount of the moneys withheld should be split 
35%-65%; and that 35% of the withholdings should be borne by claimant, whereas 65% of 
the withholdings should be borne by first and second defendants.”2346  
 
In ICC Cases No. 6515 and 6516, the tribunal considered that there was a gap in the risk 
allocation agreed by the parties, since the parties did not contemplate and allocate the risk of 
the imposition of the withholding tax in Greece. The parties provided a contractual obligation 
of renegotiation for dealing with the gaps in their initial risk allocation. Thus, even if the 
withholding tax did not result in any excessive hardship for the claimant, the arbitral tribunal 
pointed out that the terms of the contract, which obliged the parties to negotiate in cases of 
gaps in the agreed risk allocation, should prevail over the default mechanisms provided by the 
applicable national rules. However, although the tribunal earlier in the award stated that the 
parties were not under an obligation to reach agreement on the proposed adjustments, it 
eventually imposed what was proposed by the claimant during negotiations upon the 
defendants. Moreover, since this proposal contained a vague reference to the concept of 
reasonableness, the tribunal imposing this solution inevitably arrived at a decision of splitting 
the difference on equitable grounds, even if it tried to justify its solution with the behavior of 
the defendants during negotiations. In cases of failure to perform the duty of negotiation, the 
decision maker should award damages for the expenses incurred by the aggrieved party in the 
negotiations, i.e. negative or reliance interest, but should not impose the imaginative outcome 
of a failed process of negotiation, which amounts to awarding compensation for speculative 
damages. In such cases, in order to be able to adapt the contract or award expectation or 
positive interest to the aggrieved party, the decision maker should either be authorized by the 
terms of the contract or applicable default rules to impose a reasonable solution, or find a 
correspondence of expectations of the parties during the process of negotiations, which allows 
him to ascertain and enforce the object of negotiations in an objective manner.  
 
The tribunal’s exercise of adjustment and splitting the difference in this case seems 
inappropriate as it can be considered as an instance of equity contra legem. As stated in the 
Aminoil award, “there can be no doubt that a tribunal cannot substitute itself for the parties in 
order to make good a missing segment of their contractual relations- or to modify a contract – 
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unless that right is conferred upon it by law, or by the express consent of the parties.”2347 In 
ICC Cases No 6515 and 6516, the agreements did not provide for a reasonable readjustment 
by the tribunal in the change of circumstances, but merely required the parties to renegotiate 
in good faith. The parties did not regulate the consequences of a failure to reach an agreement, 
unlike some clauses in practice under which this issue is explicitly regulated, such as ICC 
Hardship Clause of 2003, which clearly provides for a right to terminate. In this regard, it is 
argued that in the event that the parties fail to agree under a renegotiation clause, which does 
not state the consequences of failure to agree, it must be presumed that they intended to 
authorize the competent court or arbitral tribunal to fill the gap and to adapt the contract so as 
to maintain its equilibrium.
 2348
 Under this view, the legal consequences of renegotiation and 
hardship clauses are considered identical.
 
However, this view neglects the established rule that 
the contractual duty to negotiate does not oblige the parties to agree. If the decision maker 
presumes that, as argued, the parties intended the decision maker to adapt the contract in case 
of failure to agree under a renegotiation clause, the decision maker would be compelled to 
impose on the parties an agreement which the parties were not obligated to enter into in the 
first place. Thus, the relevant clause should indicate the parties’ intentions as to the legal 
consequences of the occurrence of defined events. Thus, if a hardship clause merely obligates 
the parties to negotiate without regulating the failure of negotiations upon the occurrence of 
events that it defines by less stringent criteria than the requirements of the concept of hardship 
under the applicable default rules, it should be primarily treated as a negotiation clause, as the 
parties intended, and should not be interpreted in a way to relax the requirements of the 
hardship concept under the applicable default rules in order to enforce the legal consequences 
of the default hardship rules, unless there are other interpretative indications that reveal their 
common intention as to relaxing those requirements in that regard. 
 
Thus, the tribunal in ICC Cases No 6515 and 6516 should have turned to the default 
mechanism provided by the national rules applicable in the case in order to devise a solution 
in the presence of the change of circumstances. Article 388 of the Greek Civil Code provides 
that “If having regard to the requirements of good faith and business usage, the circumstances 
on which the parties had mainly based the conclusion of a bilateral agreement have 
subsequently changed on exceptional grounds that could not have been foreseen and if 
because of this change the performance due by the debtor has become excessively onerous, 
taking also into consideration the counter-performance, the court may, at the request or the 
debtor, and according to its own discretion reduce the debtor's performance to the appropriate 
extent or determine the dissolution of the contract in its entirety or with regard to the part 
which has not been performed.”2349 The imposition of a 20% or 25% withholding on 
payments made by the defendants to the claimant the claimant seems not satisfactory for the 
requirement that the obligation should become excessively onerous, which would entitle the 
tribunal to adjust or terminate the agreement. The tribunal focused on the profit margins in the 
relevant sector, and it was of the opinion that this requirement could be satisfied in the case, 
but it did not rely clearly on Article 388, and even considered it “irrelevant” in reaching its 
conclusion. 
 
                                                 
2347
 Ad-Hoc-Award, Kuwait v. The American Independent Oil Company (AMINOIL), International Legal 
Materials,  21 (1982), at 1015 
2348
 Brunner, Christoph, Force majeure and Hardship under General Contract Principles: Exemption for Non-
Performance in International Arbitration, Kluwer Law International, 2009, at 514 
2349
 Zimmermann, Reinhard, & Simon Whittaker (eds.), Good faith in European Contract Law, Cambridge 
University Press, 2000, at 559 
 646 
 
When there is no hardship clause in the individual contract, the arbitral tribunals in some 
cases held that there is a duty to renegotiate. Some authors have argued that the recognition 
and application of the duty to renegotiate represents neither the integration of universal 
principles nor a distillation of national legal rules, but the emergence of an innovative legal 
rule specifically designed for the needs and patterns of conduct in the community of 
international commercial merchants.
2350
 In ICC Case No 8365, the tribunal stated that it is one 
of the principles of lex mercatoria that if some unforeseeable difficulties emerge during the 
performance of a contract, the parties must in good faith renegotiate in order to overcome 
such difficulties.
2351
 However, it is also argued that “At the transnational level there is by no 
means agreement on the existence of such a duty to renegotiate, even in light of the changing 
understanding of a contract as a flexible framework for the “fair” and “reasonable” 
distribution of contractual rights and obligations.”2352 It can be observed that the arbitral 
tribunals in other cases implied a duty of renegotiation on the basis of the principle of good 
faith under the applicable national laws. 
 
 
ICC Case No. 9994 concerned a licence and sales agreement between a US company and a 
French company, under which the former was to make, use and sell products derived from 
raw material supplied by the latter. The French company initiated the arbitration, claiming 
that the respondent wrongfully terminated the agreement, on the ground that it no longer 
corresponded to the respondent's business strategy, and unlawfully disclosed confidential 
information. The "law of France" was the substantive law to be applied to the dispute. The 
arbitral tribunal dismissed both claims of the claimant and found that the real reason for the 
respondent's withdrawal from the agreement was the increase in the price of the raw material 
and the parties' inability to agree on a new price. The price increase was due, amongst other 
things, to the more stringent conditions imposed upon the claimant by a government agency 
for the collection of human placentae from which the raw material was extracted. The tribunal 
stated that “French law requires from each party to perform the agreement in good faith (see 
c. civ. 1134, al. 2). Good faith imposes upon the parties the duty to seek out an adaptation of 
their agreement to the new circumstances which may have occurred after its execution, in 
order to ensure that its performance does not cause, especially when the contract at stake is a 
long term agreement, the ruin of one of the parties … This principle is also prevailing in 
international commercial law (see Unidroit Principles, art. 6.2.2. and 6.2.3.).” The tribunal 
noted that “when negotiating the agreement, the parties were under the impression that the 
[government agency] would not impose a control placenta per placenta, although they did not 
exclude such an eventuality. Now, some time after the signature of the Agreement, the 
[government agency] required individual donors' screening and that severe demand was 
certainly one of the cause [sic] of the increase of the cost of the [raw material] well above the 
US$ . . . per gram agreed upon in the Agreement…, this was certainly a somehow unexpected 
event.” According to the tribunal, “the fact that the "Force Majeure Clause", …, did not 
expressly contemplate the risk of a potential regulatory change, does not "per se" exempt 
[Respondent] from renegotiating the contract price as, according to the French doctrine 
quoted thereabove, this duty is already imposed upon the contracting parties by the rule of 
good faith and that rule cannot be defeated by any divergent contractual provisions.” Thus, 
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the tribunal held that due to the new request of the government agency relating to the control 
of the placentae, the claimant was entitled to a renegotiation of the contract price, but that did 
not mean at all that the claimant was entitled to impose upon the respondent its own view on 
what should be the correct price.
2353
  
 
The decision maker applying lex mercatoria should not consider that a mere change of 
circumstances implies a duty to renegotiate the contract, which is silent in that respect, solely 
on the basis of such ideas that long-term contractual relationships require closer cooperation 
between the parties. In order for a duty of renegotiation between the parties to arise from the 
basic principle of good faith and fair dealing under lex mercatoria, there must be a gap in the 
risk allocation agreed by the parties with regard to the change of circumstances, which cannot 
be resolved by means of interpretation or adjustments in the determination of the risk 
assessments. It should be noted that due to such features of the doctrine of hardship under lex 
mercatoria, the adjustments in the determination of risk assessments will usually resolve the 
dispute by determining the consequences of the change of circumstances with regard to the 
contractual obligations of the parties and, thus, negate the need to proceed with the default 
mechanisms, as it can be observed in the Questech award. Given that the central issue with 
regard to hardship under lex mercatoria is the risk allocation, only if there are no explicit or 
implicit indications as to the risk allocation agreed between the parties and the parties fail to 
agree on a solution through renegotiation, these risks must be allocated by the decision maker 
in such a way that upholds the underlying bargain and the reasonable expectations of the 
parties to a particular contract.  
 
It is argued that under general contract principles and in the absence of a renegotiation clause, 
an infringement of the duty to renegotiate by the party which is confronted with a request for 
renegotiation should generally not result in liability for damages, and only when a party enters 
into negotiations and negotiates or breaks off negotiations in bad faith, it may become liable 
for the losses caused to the other party, which will be limited to the expenses incurred by the 
aggrieved party in the negotiations. In this view, since there is an intrinsic link between the 
renegotiation phase and the subsequent judicial proceedings, an infringement of the duty to 
renegotiate should exclusively entail the consequences in the context of the cost allocation of 
the subsequent court or arbitral proceedings.
2354
 However, the renegotiation is an important 
element of the concept of hardship under lex mercatoria, which is based on a notion of risk 
allocation, and it is the key differentiating factor between hardship and force majeure. The 
abstractions from the national legal systems reveal that it is a concern in the different 
approaches to the question of hardship to encourage the parties to resolve themselves through 
cooperation the problems arising from hardship situations.  
 
Essentially, the parties to international contracts usually enter into negotiations on their own 
motion in the presence of unforeseen contingencies that affect the equilibrium of the bargain. 
Thus, the decision maker should maintain and encourage such established practices in the 
order of international commerce. As lex mercatoria does not provide an ex ante or pre-
established model for the hardship situations in the form of a simple solution, such as the 
preservation, termination or adaptation of the original contract, which can be found in a 
particular legal system, it would not be possible to encourage the parties to renegotiate 
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without the ex post decision maker motivating them to consider it as a duty, the violation of 
which entails some financial consequences. Thus, if a party violates this duty in bad faith, 
whereby the process is unjustifiably delayed or intentionally obstructed or the proposals by 
the other party are obviously rejected for reasons other than normal business judgment, the 
other party should at least be entitled to claim compensation for its losses arising from delay 
and costs incurred in reliance on reaching a solution. In the end, the process of renegotiation 
and the parties’ subsequent conduct may provide direct indications for the decision maker 
devising a solution in accordance with the reasonable expectations of the parties. For instance, 
in ICC Case No. 7365, the evidence of negotiations and the parties’ subsequent conduct 
indicated that the parties agreed on the termination of the contracts and the tribunal did not 
have to adapt the contract terms on the basis of its discretion, even if it was apparently 
prepared to do so. However, since the parties under the duty to negotiate are not obligated to 
agree, the decision maker applying lex mercatoria should not impose the proposal of one party 
on the other party by adapting the contract or awarding positive interest as damages on the 
basis of that proposal, unless he is authorized by the terms of the contract or applicable default 
rules to impose a reasonable solution, or he finds a correspondence of expectations of the 
parties with regard to such a proposal from the evidence of negotiations. 
 
3. Concluding Remarks 
 
In cases of hardship, there is a gap of contractual risk allocation in relation to the change of 
circumstances, which render performance excessively onerous, thereby resulting in costs, 
which have been neither contemplated nor allocated by the parties through the articulated 
rules. In the first instance, the hardship situations under lex mercatoria should lead the 
decision maker to consider the renegotiation of the agreement by the parties with a view to 
adapting the contract or terminating it thereby enabling them to arrive at the allocation had 
they contemplated and allocated the relevant risks at the time of contracting. If the parties fail 
to agree on a solution through renegotiation, these risks must be allocated by the decision 
maker in such a way that upholds the underlying bargain and the reasonable expectations of 
the parties to a particular contract. In such cases, the decision maker should refer to the 
mechanisms provided by the default rules chosen by the parties or applicable pursuant to the 
established rules of conflict, while taking into account the evidence of renegotiations and 
other subsequent conduct if available. The issue of idiosyncrasy in the applicable national 
rules will not arise in this respect due to the divergence of approaches in the default 
mechanisms of the relevant doctrines of change of circumstances. The default mechanisms 
will eventually require the decision maker to adopt one of the three solutions: the termination, 
preservation or adaptation of the original contract.
2355
  
 
In cases where lex mercatoria governs the substance of the dispute to the exclusion of any 
national law, the solution of adaptation should be covered by either party’s petitions or 
evidence, so that the issue comes under the scope of the parties’ delegation to the decision 
maker of controlling legal uncertainty. Thus, in such cases, the decision maker should not 
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adapt the contract to the change of circumstances, if neither party requests for adaptation, 
since the ex officio adaptation of the contract by the decision maker requires an authorization 
from the articulated or established rules in the particular case, but there is no established rule 
in the order of international commerce that grants such an authority to the decision maker 
unconditionally. If a party requests the adaptation of the contract, the decision maker should 
require such party to reasonably substantiate the contents of its request, and the decision 
maker should satisfy the basic principles of equal treatment of parties and due process under 
lex mercatoria. If the decision maker is not given sufficient indications as to how the 
alternative terms should be determined, he may have to dismiss the claim for adaptation, and 
turn to determining the conditions of termination and its possible consequences.  
 
In adapting the contract to the changes circumstances, the decision maker should take into 
account the bargain underlying the original contract. Thus, the adaptation of contract in case 
of an increased cost of performance or decreased of value of counter-performance should be 
made in light of the widespread understanding across the sources of abstraction that a party is 
bound to fulfill its obligation even if performance has become more onerous. The decision 
maker should consider that the aggrieved party bears the risk that the cost of performance may 
increase or that the value of the performance it receives may diminish, and adjust the contract 
to the extent necessary for removing the “excessive onerousness” in the performance and 
rendering the cost or value of the performance within the scope of risk that has been 
undertaken by the aggrieved party.
2356
 In the cases of termination of the contract due to 
hardship, the decision maker should take into account the relevant considerations with regard 
to the general right to terminate the contract, and consider that the recoverable damages, as a 
supplementary remedy, may also include losses incurred by a party arising from delay and 
costs on reaching an agreement during the renegotiation of the original agreement if the other 
party rejected to negotiate, or negotiated or broke off negotiations in bad faith.  
 
However, the decision maker applying lex mercatoria should never engage in an exercise of 
adaptation of the contract due to hardship in the absence of sufficient indications in the 
evidence of negotiations or the parties’ pleadings as to the alternative terms, when lex 
mercatoria governs the substance of the dispute exclusively, or without having regard to the 
specific requirements of judicial adaptation, when the articulated or established rules in the 
particular case address the issue of hardship, since such an exercise of adaptation can be 
considered as an instance of equity contra legem and of splitting the difference, which may 
never serve the aim of accuracy in reflecting the reasonable expectations of the parties. 
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v. Right to terminate the contract 
 
The basic principle of pacta sunt servanda under lex mercatoria provides that the contract can 
only be terminated by the explicit or implicit agreement of the parties, in accordance with the 
articulated rules, which include the contract terms and the default rules chosen by the parties, 
or on the basis of the qualifying function of the basic principle of good faith and fair dealing. 
When there are residual issues arising from the articulated rules, due to the incorporation of a 
vague standard or failure to deal with a particular contingency regarding the termination of a 
particular contract, the decision maker applying lex mercatoria will have to interpret or 
supplement those rules in order to determine the conditions, procedures and consequences of 
the termination of the contract, on the basis of an accurate reflection of their reasonable 
expectations. The main issues with the right to terminate the contract under lex mercatoria are 
to determine and define the threshold of seriousness of circumstances, which allow a party to 
abandon the bond of pacta sunt servanda, the process for the exercise of the right to terminate, 
and the effect of termination on the contractual relationship. 
 
1. Sources of Abstractions 
 
a. National Laws 
 
The right to terminate the contract under national legal systems mainly exists, when there is 
an actual or imminent non-performance of the contract, which is not excused and attains a 
certain degree of seriousness. Some legal systems also allow for the possibility of termination 
of the contract for a just cause, namely extraordinary change of circumstances resulting from 
objective events, which substantially affect a party’s ability to continue to perform under an 
unchanged contract. In many legal systems, the court has some discretion in assessing 
whether the contract is to be terminated, due to the uncertain nature of vague standards 
employed in determining the required degree of seriousness of non-performance or other 
causes that justify the termination of the contract.
2357
  
 
The general principle of French law with regard to the termination of the contract is stated in 
Article 1184 of the Civil Code. Article 1184 (1) provides all bilateral contracts with an 
implied term, in the form of a resolutive condition, for the event a party fails to perform his 
undertaking. Article 1184 (2) provides that in a case, where one of the parties does not 
perform its obligations, the contract is not “resolved” automatically by the operation of law. 
The aggrieved party may claim either performance, or resolution (termination) and damages, 
but he must seek termination in legal proceedings before a court. Moreover, the aggrieved 
party must give the other party a “mise en demeure”, whereby the non-performing party is put 
in default through a notification of the delinquency, in order to claim termination.
2358
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Article 1184 merely prescribes how termination must be sought without specifying any legal 
criterion which would justify termination on the ground of non-performance.
2359
 When the 
aggrieved party applies to the court for an order resolving the contract, the court exercises its 
discretion in order to decide whether the claim for termination is justified. Where there is a 
total non-performance, the court will usually order termination, but it may also grant the non-
performing party a period of grace, under Article 1184 (3), to allow him to perform his 
obligation, if the court considers that the aggrieved party is seeking to take advantage of a 
temporary difficulty in order to escape from a bad bargain.
2360
 In the cases of defective or 
partial performance, the court will exercise its discretion by having regard to various factors, 
such as the defendant’s degree of fault and the gravity of non-performance.2361 In those cases, 
the court will assess whether the non-performance is sufficiently serious to justify 
termination, or whether the non-performing party’s conduct is in bad faith and justifies 
termination, even if the non-performance is not sufficiently serious. On the basis of these 
assessments, the court will decide whether the contract should be terminated in full or, 
instead, the debtor should be given a grace period. The court may also order an intermediate 
solution, for example, of partial resolution of the contract with a reduction in price.
2362
  
 
Article 1134 of the French Civil Code, which was based on the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda, has been traditionally seen as the basis of all remedies for breach of contract, 
whether they are provided for by legislation, case law or the agreement itself.
2363
 As the 
starting point is the fundamental principle of Article 1134 that agreements legally formed 
have the force of law for the parties, it is considered as the right of the creditor to require the 
debtor to render the actual performance of the obligation. This approach to the rule under 
Article 1134 in the meaning that the contract must be performed leads to the opposition to the 
termination of the contract under French law. Under such an approach, the contract must be 
upheld, even in cases of non-performance.
2364
 Thus, at any time before the court has ordered 
termination, the non-performing party can prevent termination by offering to perform. On the 
other hand, the aggrieved party is not barred from claiming performance merely because he 
has claimed termination. This reflects the approach of French law, which regards termination, 
as an extraordinary remedy, while performance or damages being generally preferred.
2365
  
 
Under French law, there are a number of exceptions to the rule that termination requires an 
order of the court. First, the parties may agree on an express provision for termination. As 
Article 1184 is not considered as a mandatory rule, the parties are generally free to provide 
that in certain events the contract will be terminated by the operation of law.
2366
 However, the 
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French courts tend to construe contractual termination clauses strictly against the parties 
seeking to take advantage of them. Moreover, even a clause, which is explicit to exclude the 
need for recourse to the court, does not relieve the aggrieved party from giving a mise en 
demeure, which has not been excluded by agreement explicitly or implicitly, so as to exercise 
its contractual right to terminate.
2367
 A properly drafted termination clause, on the other hand, 
may enable the parties to terminate the contract for some relatively minor default, but subject 
to the requirements of the principle of good faith.
2368
 In those cases, the court may only 
intervene if a dispute arises, but its power is limited to taking notice of termination, which has 
to be determined according to the terms of the contract.
2369
 
 
The second exception to the requirement of a court order for termination arises from the 
French case law, according to which the creditor may immediately terminate the contract 
when the conduct of the debtor has become so bad that the continuation of the contractual 
relationship has become impossible or unbearable. The early case law related to the dismissal 
of employees, but the rule has been extended to other cases where there is a special 
relationship of trust and confidence between the parties, where there is an urgent need to 
protect the creditor’s interest, and where the breach is so destructive of trust as to make 
continuance of the contractual relationship intolerable.
2370
 A mise en demeure is not required 
in those cases if it would serve no purpose.
2371
 This approach to termination aims at 
overcoming the laborious mechanism of termination, and it is justified only if immediately 
declared. In those cases, the aggrieved party may terminate the agreement without a sufficient 
notice period, but at its own risk and peril.
2372
 The matter is ultimately subject to judicial 
control, as it remains open to the debtor to go to court and ask it to refuse to recognize the 
creditor’s act of termination, and the exact conditions justifying this form of unilateral 
termination are not clear.
2373
 
 
As termination is in principle a judicial remedy under French law, available at the discretion 
of the court, one of the principal factors, which the court takes into account in exercising that 
discretion, is the degree of the fault. Particularly, a creditor may treat a contract as discharged 
without getting a prior judgment for termination in cases of declared refusal by the debtor to 
perform. 
2374
 This exception to the general requirement of applying to court for termination 
may also be relevant to the case of a declaration made before the date for performance. Thus, 
it resembles the approach under common law systems, where anticipatory breach may allow 
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the termination before the time at which performance was actually due. However, in such 
cases under French law, a creditor may treat the contract as though it is at an end, after the 
date for performance arrives, at the risk of a court subsequently holding that he was not 
entitled to terminate, but his action will not be treated as wrongful merely because he acted 
without first getting a judgment.
2375
  
 
Under French law, the general principle is that termination can operate not only prospectively, 
discharging the parties from their obligations of future performance, but also retrospectively, 
thereby placing the parties back into the situation in which they would have been had the 
contract never been concluded, and imposing on the parties the duty to return what they have 
already received on the basis of the contractual agreement.
2376
 Article 1183 of the French 
Civil Code provides for the retrospective dissolution of the contract as the main result of the 
termination.
2377 
French law recognizes that the retrospective effect of termination does not 
wipe out all contractual terms. Particularly, such contract terms as exemption clauses, penalty 
clauses and termination clauses survive, since they regulate the consequences of non-
performance,.
2378
 Moreover, the courts accept that sometimes a creditor’s request for the 
termination of contract takes effect only prospectively. In such situations, where this is 
recognized by the Civil Code, the creditor is said to effect the “résiliation” of the contract. 2379 
In cases of “résiliation”, there is no general dissolution of the contract with its related 
obligations of restitution and counter-restitution by the parties. The parties may keep the 
benefit of what each has done for the other under the contract until the time of non-
performance, while they are released from their obligations for the future. According to the 
French legal doctrine, résiliation, whether judicial or unilateral, can take place where 
performance of the contract is continuous or in installments on the grounds that restitution and 
counter-restitution presents too many difficulties in such cases. It is also argued that the 
proper justification of the prospective effect of résiliation is the protection of reliance rather 
than any ostensible difficulty in restitution or counter-restitution, given the possibility of 
restitution of an equivalent value (restitution en valeur).
2380
 
 
In French law, it is assumed that liability for contractual non-performance remains contractual 
even if the contract is ‘destroyed’ by termination.2381  Thus, even if terminated, the contract 
can still provide a proper basis for a claim for damages. Article 1184 of the French Civil Code 
explicitly provides that resolution may be combined with damages. The damages are assessed 
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on a normal basis, such as where damages are claimed in case of non-performance. Thus, the 
French approach does not start with the assumption that termination and damages are 
logically inconsistent, and it avoids needless complexities and the risk of serious injustice in 
denying the most appropriate remedies.
2382
 
 
German law does not require an order by a court for the termination of the contract. 
Termination is effected by a declaration made by the aggrieved party pursuant to Section 349 
of the German Civil Code. Under German law, the notice of termination does not have to be 
in any particular form, but it must require the debtor to perform its obligations and specify a 
reasonable time within which it is required to do so. If the specified time is too short, the 
notice does not become invalid. A reasonable time will begin to run where the creditor has 
deliberately set a time which is so short that it indicates lack of good faith.
2383
 However, there 
is no need to serve a notice on the non-performing party in order to put the latter into breach 
and to enable the right to terminate (Mahnung, mise en demeure).
2384
 
 
German law emphasizes the right to performance, and grants the debtor a right to a second 
chance to perform in many instances.
 2385
 In order to preserve the balance of interests in the 
termination of the contract, the German model is based on a general requirement that the 
aggrieved party first has to set an additional period of time to allow the non-performing party 
a second chance, except for the cases of an obviously fundamental or incurable breach.  Thus, 
the mere failure of the obligor to perform does not entitle the obligee to terminate the contract. 
As long as performance remains possible, the obligor must first give the obligee a notice 
requiring him to perform within a stated additional period of time (“Nachfrist”), pursuant to 
Section 323 of the German Civil Code.
2386
 Section 323 dispenses with the Nachfrist 
requirement if the obligor refuses to perform, if time was of the essence, or in other “special 
circumstances”, which, having due regard to the parties’ interests, justify immediate 
termination. The proposal of the first Law Reform Commission had favored another model, 
which grants the right to terminate the contract to the obligor in cases of fundamental breach, 
while providing the instrument of a request which makes time of the essence by setting a 
period of grace for cases where the seriousness of breach might be uncertain.
 2387
  This model 
has a limited effect on Section 324 of the German Civil Code after the reform in 2002, which 
allows termination in cases of breach of protective duties of care, but the term “fundamental 
breach” is replaced by the requirement that the obligor “can no longer reasonably be expected 
to abide by the contract” Moreover, in order to ensure that minor breaches may not be used as 
an excuse for terminating the contract through Nachfrist mechanism, Section 323 (5) of the 
German Civil Code provides that if the performance has been defective, termination depends 
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on the weight of the defect, and minor defects do not give rise to the right of termination. It is 
also provided that in cases where the debtor has performed in part, the creditor may terminate 
the complete contract only if only if he has no interest in partial performance.
2388
 
 
Originally, the drafters of the German Civil Code of 1900 regarded fault, a prerequisite for a 
damage claim, as indispensable for the aggrieved party’s right to terminate the contract.2389 
However, the notion of “fault” in the context of termination was a wider one than the 
corresponding notion in relation to liability for damages. The phrase used to describe the 
requirement of “fault” in the context of termination was “for which he is responsible”.2390 
After the reform in 2002, the requirements for the right to terminate still largely mirror the 
conditions for a claim for damages in lieu of performance. This assimilation reflects a desire, 
on the part of the drafters of the reform, to prevent any danger of the requirements for 
termination of contract effectively being subverted by the possibility of resorting to the 
remedy of damages in lieu of performance.
2391
 However, there is one major difference 
between the requirements for termination and for a claim for damages in lieu of performance, 
and, thus, between the old and the new law. The availability of the remedy of termination 
does no longer depend on whether or not the debtor has been at fault.
2392
 The right to 
terminate is not limited to non-excused impediments of performance. Pursuant to Section 323 
(6), the only further requirement for termination is that the creditor should not be solely or 
overwhelmingly responsible for the debtor’s breach, or the creditor, even if not responsible, 
should not be at default in accepting performance before the debtor’s breach.2393 
 
Under German law, where the debtor has seriously and definitively refused to perform, the 
creditor does not have to fix an additional period for performance in order to terminate the 
contract pursuant to Section 323(2)(1) of the German Civil Code. Section 323 (4) provides 
that this applies even if such refusal has occurred before the time for performance has arrived. 
However, it should be noted that generally in civil law systems the anticipatory non-
performance solely affects the requirements of termination, e.g. putting the non-performing 
party at default, fixing an additional period of performance or applying to the court for 
termination. Unlike common law systems, they do not entitle the aggrieved party to terminate 
the contract before performance has become due. 
2394
 
 
In the case of contracts to be performed over a period of time, the German Civil Code, after 
the reform, contains a special provision granting the aggrieved party a right to terminate the 
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contract for a good cause. Pursuant to Section 314 of the German Civil Code, either party may 
terminate a contract for the performance of a recurring obligation on notice with immediate 
effect if there is good cause for doing so. The existence of a good cause is determined on the 
basis of whether the terminating party cannot reasonably be expected to continue the 
contractual relationship until the agreed termination date or until the end of a notice period by 
having regard to all the circumstances of the specific case and balancing the interests of both 
parties. German law does not limit the right to terminate for a good cause to cases involving a 
breach of contract. In particular, in case of long-term contracts, which require a close 
cooperation of the parties on the basis of mutual trust, the breakdown of the parties’ relations 
may justify the termination of the contract for a good cause.
2395
 This type of termination is 
called “Kündigung” and merely operates prospectively. 2396 
 
For the cases other than that of Kündigung, Section 346 of the German Civil Code provides 
that at termination, both parties have the right to recover money paid, property supplied and 
other means of performance or counter-performance.
2397
 This is the resolution of the contract 
(“Rücktritt”), which operates retrospectively and implies the liquidation of the parties’ 
reciprocal rights and duties.
 2398
 Thus, in German law, after termination, both parties have a 
duty to return to each other what they have received under the contract. Whenever possible, 
restitution should be made in kind.
2399
 If restitution in kind is not possible, an allowance is to 
be made in money for the value received. After the reform, restitution is not to be rendered in 
terms of the law of unjustified enrichment. The German Civil Code, rather, makes available a 
specific restitution regime for this purpose through Section 346. This regime deals with the 
position of the party terminating the contract as well as with that of the other party. In the 
doctrine, the existence of this specific restitution regime has always been justified by pointing 
out that termination does not remove the entire contract and does not, therefore, create a 
situation where the performance can be said to have been made without legal ground. The 
specific restitution regime transforms the contractual relationship originally agreed upon into 
a contractual winding-up relationship.
2400
 As termination of the contract merely transforms 
the contractual relationship, it does not affect contractual provisions, such as dispute 
settlement clauses.
2401
 
 
Under German law, before the reform, termination of contract and the claim for damages 
were incompatible. There was a sharp distinction between two senses of termination: refusal 
to accept performance and Rücktritt. While refusal to accept performance was not regarded as 
termination and, thus, it could be combined with a claim for damages, Rücktritt deprived the 
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aggrieved party of his right to damages for non-performance. Where a contract was 
terminated in the sense that one party duly declared Rücktritt, the Civil Code made 
termination alternative to damages for non-performance, so that the two remedies could not 
be combined.
2402
 After the reform, termination no longer precludes a claim for damages based 
on the contract. This is now specifically stated in Section 325 of the German Civil Code. In 
principle, termination of the contract and all kinds of damages are compatible.
2403
 
 
The general principle in common law is that termination of a contract for non-performance 
can be achieved simply through a notice of termination given by the aggrieved to the non-
performing party. The notice does not have to be in any particular form. A process of 
termination by an order of the court is not normally required. However, it is possible for the 
aggrieved party to obtain a judgment to the effect that the contract is or has been terminated, 
when it may be desirable for clarifying the legal position. Moreover, a judgment must often be 
obtained to give effect to the consequences of termination, in the sense of restitution.
2404
 In 
common law, a breach will justify termination if it frustrates the aggrieved party’s purpose in 
entering the contract or if it “substantially” deprives him of what he bargained for.2405 In other 
words, the termination of a contract for non-performance can be justified if the non-
performance is of an “essential” term.2406 A prior formal notice in the nature of a Nachfrist is 
not normally required. If a stipulation as to time is an essential term, failure by one party to 
perform it within the stated time generally gives the other party the right to terminate the 
contract. Where time is not of the essence of the contract, the aggrieved party can in effect 
make it of the essence by giving notice to the other party calling upon him to perform within a 
specified reasonable period.
2407
 
 
In England, the question whether or not a promise is “essential” is discussed within the 
context of a classification of contractual terms, as “conditions”, “warranties” and “innominate 
terms”. A condition is an essential term of the contract which goes to the root or the heart of 
the contract.
 2408
 When it is breached, the aggrieved party may either terminate the contract 
and obtain damages for any loss suffered as a result of the breach, or affirm the contract and 
recover damages for the breach. A warranty on the other hand is a lesser or subsidiary term of 
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the contract. A breach of a warranty only enables the aggrieved party to claim damages, but 
he cannot terminate the contract and must, therefore, continue to perform his obligations 
under the contract.
2409
 In order to provide a greater degree of remedial flexibility, a third 
category has been recognized in English law. In Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd. v. 
Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd., Diplock LJ stated that there exist “many contractual 
undertakings of a more complex nature which cannot be categorized as being “conditions” or 
“warranties”.”2410 Diplock LJ’s reference to “complex undertakings” led to a third category of 
terms and the terminology in subsequent decisions reflected this by referring to “innominate 
terms” and “intermediate stipulations.”2411 A breach of an innominate term enables the 
aggrieved party to terminate the contract only where the breach has had serious consequences 
for him. In deciding whether or not the breach was of a sufficiently serious character, the 
courts will have regard to all the relevant circumstances of the case.
 2412
  
 
Under English law, there is a considerable difficulty of distinguishing among a condition, a 
warranty and an innominate term. A term will generally be regarded as a condition if it has 
previously been recognized as such by statute or precedent, or if it appears that it was the 
intention of the parties that a particular term is to be a condition. However, the court will not 
treat a term as a condition if the result of such a construction would be unreasonable.
2413
 It is 
observed, in practice, that the courts have been reluctant to find that a term is a condition 
unless there is clear evidence to justify such a conclusion.
2414
 In Bunge Corp v. Tradax Export 
S. A., Wilberforce L.J. said that “It remains true… that the courts should not be too ready to 
interpret contractual clauses as conditions.”2415 The classification of a term as a warranty is 
also rare as the emergence of the new category of innominate terms appears to have reduced 
the number of occasions when a term will be classified as a warranty. 
2416
 The contracting 
parties are free to classify terms as warranties or conditions. However, if they wish to confine 
a term to the status of warranty, they should “make it plain from the contract as a whole” that 
the term is only a warranty.
2417
  
 
The legal classification of contractual terms is based on the assumption that the effect of non-
performance of some obligations is more serious than the effect of non-performance of 
others.
2418
 As the bipartite classification of conditions and warranties inevitably introduces an 
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 660 
 
element of rigidity and tend to distract attention from the effects of non-performance in 
individual cases, an element of flexibility is introduced through the concept of “innominate 
term” which requires the court to engage in a balancing exercise. Thus, the court is required to 
evaluate the competing policy considerations of certainty and justice and to assess their 
weight on the facts and circumstances of the individual case.
2419
 The English courts engage in 
such a balancing exercise, and both policies of fairness and certainty have been supported by 
various judicial decisions.
2420
  
 
In the United States, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts dispenses with the distinction 
between conditions and warranties on the question of termination.
2421
 While the mere 
presence of a breach does not entitle the aggrieved party to terminate the contract, it is 
generally stated that a “material failure” to perform by a party may entitle the aggrieved party 
to terminate the contract.
2422
 The reference to “material failure” instead of “material breach” 
in US law is important in that the former is a broader concept, including any non-
performance, defective performance, or late performance. If the failure was not justified, for 
example by impracticability, the failure amounts to a breach of contract. A non-justified 
material failure is the Restatement terminology used to refer to a material breach.
2423
 In 
determining whether a failure of performance is material, the circumstances listed in Section 
241 can be considered. These include (1) the extent of the deprivation of a reasonably 
expected benefit to the aggrieved party; (2) the extent of the deprivation of adequate 
compensation for part of the benefit the aggrieved party will be deprived; (3) the extent of 
forfeiture suffered by the party failing to perform; (4) the likelihood the party failing to 
perform will cure his or her failure; and (5) the extent to which the party failing to perform 
does or does not comport with the requirement of good faith and fair dealing. If the failure to 
perform is immaterial, the aggrieved party may not terminate the contract, but he may claim 
damages for breach. 
 
The Restatement explains that material failure of performance, which includes defective 
performance as well as an absence of performance, operates as the nonoccurrence of a 
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condition.
2424
 According to Sections 237 and 238, performance or an offer of performance is a 
condition for the aggrieved party’s remaining duty under the contract. A material failure 
delays reciprocal performance temporarily and discharges reciprocal performance 
permanently if the material failure is not cured during the time in which performance can 
occur.
2425
 The Restatement distinguishes between “partial” breach and “total” breach. If the 
failure to perform is material, the aggrieved party may suspend his performance or terminate 
the contract on the basis of whether the harm from the failure is curable.
2426
 A material failure 
to perform that is curable justifies suspending performance, but does not allow the aggrieved 
party to terminate the contract. A total breach, which means a material failure that is incurable 
or not cured in time, justifies the aggrieved party terminating a contract and entitles him to a 
claim for damages for total breach.
2427
 Section 236 (1) defines a claim for damages for total 
breach as “one for damages based on all of the injured party’s remaining rights to 
performance.” Section 242 lists circumstances to be considered in determining the period of 
time after which remaining duties are discharged, if a material failure has not been cured, i.e. 
circumstances that determine whether the uncured material failure constitutes a “total” breach. 
The list includes, in addition to those stated in Section 241, the extent to which it reasonably 
appears to the aggrieved party that delay may prevent or hinder him in making reasonable 
substitute arrangements, and the extent to which the agreement provides for performance 
without delay. In those cases, the aggrieved party may also choose to continue with the 
contract and claim damages for partial breach. Pursuant to Section 236 (2), a claim for 
damages for partial breach is defined as “one for damages on only part of the injured party’s 
remaining rights to performance.” If the aggrieved party elects to or is required to await the 
balance of the other party's performance under the contract, his claim is one for damages for 
partial breach; for example, an aggrieved party, who claims damages in addition to specific 
performance, claims damages for partial breach.
2428
 
 
The Restatement directs the courts to consider the extent to which the aggrieved party has 
received the benefit that he expected from the contract in the determination of a material 
failure in performance.
2429
 Thus, there will be a material breach if a party has failed to 
perform substantially in terms of the contract. There is a tendency of the courts to refer to 
material breach and to substantial performance as opposite sides of the same coin.
2430
 The 
substantial performance rule contrasts with the perfect tender rule, which was developed with 
respect to contracts for the sale of goods during the nineteenth century under common law. 
Under the perfect tender rule, the buyer is free to reject the goods unless the tender conforms 
in every respect to the contract, including not only quantity and quality but also the details of 
shipment.  
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The perfect tender rule is adopted by the Article 2-601 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 
This constitutes an exception to the doctrine of substantial performance in a contract for the 
sale of goods in US law. Article 2-601 allows the buyer to reject a tender under a single 
delivery contract, if the goods or the tender of delivery fail in any respect to conform to the 
contract. Karl Llewellyn unsuccessfully proposed replacing the perfect render rule with a 
substantial performance rule to govern sales of goods between merchants under the UCC. 
Llewellyn observed, from the practice, that merchants regularly make and accept deliveries of 
goods that vary in minor ways from the contract terms and arrange adjustments between 
themselves accordingly. He argued that under a substantial performance rule, the courts 
would be authorized to make the same kinds of adjustments; whereas, under a perfect tender 
rule, buyers would be free to take advantage of a falling market by rejecting an imperfect 
tender whenever the price of the goods had fallen since the time of purchase. In Llewellyn's 
view, the perfect tender rule would lead mercantile injustice by allowing a buyer in a falling 
market to reject deliveries “which in all mercantile decency could be expected as of course to 
fill the buyer's expectations.”2431  
 
The perfect tender rule, however, is curtailed to a certain extent under the UCC. For example, 
Article 2-602 states that rejection of goods must be within a reasonable time after their 
delivery or tender, and rejection is ineffective unless the buyer seasonably notifies the seller. 
Moreover, Article 2-605 provides that the buyer’s failure to notify a particular defect, which 
is ascertainable by reasonable inspection, precludes him from relying on the defect as a valid 
reason to reject the goods, where the seller could have cured it if stated seasonably. 
Furthermore, pursuant to Article 2-608(1), once the buyer has “accepted” the goods, he can 
only terminate (“revoke his acceptance”) if the non-conformity of the goods “substantially” 
impairs their value. It is observed that, in practice, the courts readily hold that the buyer has 
accepted the goods so as to restrict the right of termination to cases of “substantial” 
impairment.
2432
 The requirement of substantial impairment of value is also used by the UCC 
in Article 2-610, regarding anticipatory repudiation and Article 2-612 regarding the breach of 
installment contracts. As this requirement is similar to the common law standard of material 
breach, it is observed that the courts have used Section 241 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts as a guideline to resolve if a breach is substantial.
2433
 
 
The common law doctrine of anticipatory breach enables the aggrieved party to claim 
damages at the date of the acceptance of the breach, or to terminate the contract immediately 
before performance has actually become due.
2434
 However, the right of the aggrieved party to 
terminate the contract on the ground of the anticipatory breach does not arise merely because 
the breach is anticipatory. Other requirements of termination may have to be satisfied. Where 
the aggrieved party decides to terminate the contract, he must give notice to the party in 
breach that he accepts the anticipatory breach in definite and unequivocal terms, or he must 
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otherwise provide overt evidence as to his acceptance of the breach by acting upon it prior to 
the time of performance that is due under the contract.
2435
 Article 2-610 of the UCC requires 
that the loss arising from a party’s repudiation of the contract with respect to a performance 
not yet due must substantially impair the value of the contract to the aggrieved party. 
Similarly, under the Restatement, in order for a statement or an act to be an anticipatory 
breach, which enables the other party to terminate, the threatened breach must be of sufficient 
gravity that, if the breach actually occurred, it would of itself give the obligee a claim for 
damages for total breach.
2436
 In English law, a refusal to perform except in a defective manner 
will amount to an anticipatory breach provided that the defect is sufficiently serious, and in 
deciding this question, the same criteria are used as in deciding whether failure to perform 
justifies the other party to terminate the contract.
2437
  
 
Under English law, a refusal to perform or deliberate breach of a minor obligation may also 
indicate an intention to refuse to perform substantial obligations in the future and will then 
justify termination for anticipatory breach, but it is submitted that termination will not be 
justified, if the refusal or breach that is confined to the minor obligation does not show a 
general intention to repudiate.
2438
 Thus, if the repudiation contained an element of 
equivocation or ambiguity, a question might arise as to whether termination was indeed 
justified.
2439
 For the latter kind of situations, Section 2-609 of the UCC provides that, when 
reasonable grounds for insecurity arise with respect to the performance of either party, the 
other may in writing demand adequate assurance of due performance and, until he receives 
such assurance, may suspend any performance for which he has not already received the 
agreed return. A party failing to timely comply with a reasonable demand for adequate 
assurances has committed an anticipatory breach on the basis of which the other party can 
immediately bring lawsuit.
2440
 The Restatement provides this mechanism where a party has 
reasonable grounds to believe that the obligor will commit a breach that would of itself give 
the obligee a claim for damages for total breach.
2441
 
 
Under common law, where a breach gives rise to a right in favor of the aggrieved party to 
terminate, that party has a choice whether to terminate or not.
2442
 The aggrieved party is not 
                                                 
2435
 McKendrick, Ewan, Contract law, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, at 398; Rowley, Keith A., A Brief History of 
Anticipatory Repudiation in American Contract Law, University of Cincinnati Law Review, 69 (Winter 2001), at 
569 
2436
 Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 250, Comment d. 
2437
 Beale, Hugh. G., Remedies for Breach of Contract, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1980, at 69. In Decrowall 
International S.A. v. Practitioners in Marketing Ltd. [1971] 1 WL.R. 361, the likelihood that payment would 
continue to be made slightly late was held not to amount to a repudiation because it did not go to the root of the 
contract, and there was no doubt that the payments would ultimately be made. 
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 Beale, Hugh. G., Remedies for Breach of Contract, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1980, at 70 
2439
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Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Vol. 7 Ch. 16, Tubingen: Mohr, 1976, at 139 
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 Rowley, Keith A., A Brief History of Anticipatory Repudiation in American Contract Law, University of 
Cincinnati Law Review, 69 (Winter 2001), at 619 
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 Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 251(1); This mechanism of adequate assurance is argued to be 
“the most innovative and commercially sensible development in contract law in [the twentieth] century.” 
Robertson Jr., R.J., The Right to Demand Adequate Assurance of Due Performance: Uniform Commercial Code 
Section 2-609 and Restatement (Second) of Contracts Section 251, Drake Law Review, 38 (1988-1989), at 353 
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obliged to exercise his right to terminate the contract. He can either terminate the contract and 
claim damages, or affirm the contract and claim damages. The aggrieved party is not required 
to exercise his right of election between termination and affirmation immediately, but he must 
take reasonable steps to mitigate his loss.
2443
 Where the aggrieved party wishes to accept the 
breach and terminate the contract, he must communicate his decision to the other party. The 
act constituting the acceptance of a breach does not require a particular form, but it must 
clearly and unequivocally convey to the non-performing party that the aggrieved party is 
treating the contract as at an end.
2444
 A mere failure to perform will not constitute an 
acceptance of the breach in all cases. Whether an act constitutes an acceptance depends on the 
particular contractual relationship and the particular circumstances of the case.
2445
 If the 
aggrieved party does not terminate the contract, he is said to have affirmed the contract, but 
this will be without prejudice to his right to damages. Affirmation of a contract is only 
effective if the aggrieved party has knowledge of the facts establishing his right to terminate, 
knowledge of his right to terminate, and the affirmation is communicated to the other 
party.
2446
 If the aggrieved party affirms the contract, the contract remains in force, and both 
parties remain bound to continue with the performance of their respective contractual 
obligations. Once the aggrieved party has exercised his right of election and chosen either to 
terminate or to affirm, that decision cannot be revoked. The exercise of this right of election is 
also called “waiver by election”.2447 
 
There are additional rules limiting the right to terminate, which aim at avoiding undue 
prejudice to the non-performing party, where he is led to believe that the remedy of 
termination will not be claimed.
 2448
 Thus, the right to terminate the contract may be lost by 
“waiver by estoppel”. The waiver by estoppel arises when the aggrieved party represents 
clearly and unequivocally to the non-performing party that he will not exercise his right to 
terminate or behaves in a way that leads the non-performing party to believe that he will not 
exercise his right to terminate. In the case of waiver by estoppel, the aggrieved party’s 
knowledge of the circumstances or of the right is not required as the other party is entitled to 
rely on the apparent election conveyed by the representation. The waiver by estoppel may also 
amount to a complete waiver, including not only the right to terminate the contract, but also 
the right to claim damages.
 2449
  
 
In principle, under English law, the consequence of termination of the contract “does not 
involve an undoing of what has already been performed under the contract”. 2450 There is a 
distinction between termination and rescission ab initio. The latter is the remedy available to 
the victims of such events as fraud, misrepresentation or undue influence, and has different 
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2450
 Atiyah, P. S., An Introduction to the Law of Contract, Clarendon Express (Oxford), 5
th
 ed., 1995, at 410 
 665 
 
consequences to termination for non-performance.
2451
 Both rescission ab initio and 
termination releases both parties from their obligations to perform in the future. If a contract 
is effectively rescinded ab initio it is as if it had never existed: no action can be brought on it, 
and if the party, who was entitled to rescind, wishes to claim damages, he must claim in tort 
or under statute.
2452
 In contrast, a contract which has been terminated does not cease to exist, 
and the court must take into consideration such contract terms that are intended to regulate the 
consequences of breach or termination. In cases of termination, while both parties are released 
from their “primary obligation” to perform, which are put to an end through termination, the 
party in breach, by legal implication, becomes subject to a “secondary obligation” to pay 
damages to the aggrieved party for the loss sustained by him in consequence of the breach. 
The damages are to be assessed by reference to those obligations which would have fallen due 
for performance at some time in the future.
2453
 The prospective nature of termination also 
means that, although the parties are discharged from the need to perform those obligations 
that would have fallen due after the date of termination, rights and obligations that have 
unconditionally accrued prior to termination remain enforceable. Whether or not a right has 
unconditionally accrued depends upon a range of factors, including the nature of the 
obligation, what performance has been rendered by each party, and whether the party seeking 
to enforce the obligation is in breach. In some cases, money and property may be 
conditionally transferred under a contract, so there is a contractual obligation to repay or 
return it upon termination.
2454
  
 
In English law, in order to determine the rights to the restitution of benefits conferred under a 
contract terminated, it is necessary to distinguish cases in which money has been paid, in 
which property has been transferred and in which services have been performed. If money has 
been paid before the date of termination, and assuming that it was not paid as a deposit or on 
terms that it would be forfeited if the contract was not performed, the aggrieved party may 
recover that amount only where there has been “a total failure of consideration”. The concept 
of “consideration” in the restitutionary context has a different meaning from the consideration 
required by English law for the formation of a valid contract. In Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v 
Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd., it is explained that in the context of restitution, it is 
not the promise which is referred to as the consideration, but the performance of the promise: 
the money was paid to secure performance and, if performance fails, the inducement which 
                                                 
2451
 Sir Owen Dixon explained the distinction in McDonald v Dennys Lascelles Limited as follows; “When one 
party to a simple contract, upon a breach by the other contracting party of a condition of the contract, elects to 
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when a contract, which is not void or voidable at law, or liable to be set aside in equity, is dissolved at the 
election of one party because the other has not observed an essential condition or has committed a breach going 
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for its breach.” (1933) 48 CLR 457, at 476–77 
2452
 Beale, Hugh. G., Remedies for Breach of Contract, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1980, at 104-105 
2453
 McKendrick, Ewan, Contract law, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, at 393 
2454
 In Dies v. British and International Mining and Finance Corporation [1939] 1 KB 724, at 743, Stable J 
observed that “to enable the seller to keep [the money] he must be able to point to some language in the contract 
from which the inference to be drawn is that the parties intended and agreed that he should”. Stable J determined 
that the payment was not a deposit. Therefore once the contract was discharged the seller had no contractual or 
other right to retain it. The seller had not earned the money in accordance with any contractual provision. 
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brought about the payment is not fulfilled.
2455
 Failure of consideration occurs where a party 
confers a benefit under a contract, which is initially valid but prematurely discharged for 
breach or by frustration, without receiving the counter-performance on which such conferral 
was premised. In such cases, the benefit conferred is recoverable under the law of restitution 
on the ground of failure of consideration.
2456
 Where the property is transferred or created 
pursuant to a contract, its title is generally not revested upon termination for breach, but it is 
possible to recover its value. In cases of services performed by the party in breach before the 
contract was terminated, the common law position has traditionally been that, unless the 
contract is severable into units each with its own price and it can be said that some units have 
been performed, the party in breach gets nothing. 
2457
 However, it has been held that the 
aggrieved party can become liable to pay for what he has received, if he makes a “fresh 
contract” with a third party on the same subject matter by “voluntarily accepting” the 
benefit.
2458
 On the other hand, the aggrieved party may recover a reasonable sum for his 
services rendered under the contract.
2459
 Finally, although the common law systems do not 
distinguish sharply between instantaneous and long term contracts in the context of 
termination, they reach results which are very similar to those reached in the civil law systems 
in cases involving contracts of the latter kind.
2460
 For example, in cases of contracts which are 
long-term or relational in their nature, including hire, joint ventures and commercial supply 
arrangements, failure of consideration will rarely be arguable, since the assumption tends to 
be that the right to keep the benefit of prior performances has been earned.
2461
 
 
In US law, where there is a breach of contract permitting the aggrieved party to terminate, that 
party may exercise the option of the remedy of restitution instead of claiming damages for 
total breach.
2462
 Thus, the aggrieved party has an additional remedial option after justifiably 
                                                 
2455
 Viscount Simon LC’s statement in [1943] AC 32 at 48 
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nd
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terminating the primary obligations, and instead of seeking the substituted value of the other 
party’s promised performance, the aggrieved party may seek to recover the value of any 
performance it rendered to the other party prior to the breach.
2463
 Section 373 (1) of the 
Restatement provides that on a breach by non-performance that gives rise to a claim for 
damages for total breach or on a repudiation, the aggrieved party is entitled to restitution for 
any benefit that he has conferred on the other party by way of part performance or reliance. 
However, under Section 373 (2), the aggrieved party has no right to restitution if he has 
performed all of his duties under the contract and no performance by the other party remains 
due other than payment of a definite sum of money for that performance. In such cases, the 
aggrieved party is barred from recovery of a greater sum as restitution by Section 373 (2) than 
the sum of money that has been fixed as the price. Since the aggrieved party is entitled to 
recover the price in full together with interest, he is considered as having a remedy that 
protects his expectation interest by giving him the very thing that he was promised. The same 
rule applies to a contract which is “divisible” in the sense that parts of the performances to be 
exchanged on each side are properly regarded as a pair of agreed equivalents.
2464
 Section 371 
provides flexibility in fitting the measure of recovery to the particular case by stating that “as 
justice requires” the measure of recovery is either the market value of the plaintiff's 
performance or the “extent to which the other party's property has been increased in value or 
his other interests advanced.”2465 Finally, Section 374 (1) provides that the party in breach is 
also entitled to restitution of “any benefit he has conferred by way of part performance or 
reliance in excess of the loss that he has caused by his own breach” whether or not his breach 
was willful. However, specific restitution, while accessible to the aggrieved party unless in 
the discretion of the court it would “unduly interfere with the certainty of title to land or 
otherwise cause injustice”, is not available to the party in breach under Section 372 (1) (b).  
 
b. International Instruments 
 
The concept of “fundamental breach” constitutes the basis of “avoidance”, i.e. termination, of 
the contract, under the CISG. As termination has severe economic consequences for the 
defaulting party who has prepared his performance in the context of international contracts, 
the CISG require that non-performance be fundamental in order for the aggrieved party to 
avoid the contract under Articles 49 (1) (a) and 64 (1) (a).
2466
 While a general breach entitles 
the aggrieved party to claim damages, the party is entitled to the remedy of contract avoidance 
if he can prove that the breach is fundamental. Under Article 25 of the CISG, a breach is 
fundamental when it results in such detriment to the aggrieved party as substantially to 
                                                                                                                                                        
him for costs of transportation of goods that he has incurred. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 
378, Comment d. 
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deprive him of what he is entitled to expect under the contract, unless the party in breach did 
not foresee and a reasonable person of the same kind in the same circumstances would not 
have foreseen such a result.
2467
  
 
Article 25 of the CISG provides a two-part test, which aims at balancing the interests of both 
parties.
2468
 First, the decision maker should scrutinize the breach according to the substantial 
detriment test. There will be a fundamental breach of contract, which justifies avoidance, if 
the aggrieved party has no further interest in the performance of the contract after the 
breach.
2469
 The determination of this interest depends on the terms of the individual contract, 
whether express or implied, and reasonable expectations of the parties under the 
circumstances of a particular case. Secondly, the decision maker should deal with the issue of 
foreseeability. Article 25 only applies when the party in breach had or ought to have foreseen 
the substantially detrimental result of the breach of contract. Thus, the decision maker should 
hypothesize a reasonable person engaged in the same line of trade, exercising the same 
function, and take into account the whole socio-economic background.
2470
 This test allows the 
party in breach to escape the determination of fundamental breach and its consequences by 
proving that he did not foresee the substantially detrimental result, and that a reasonable 
person could not have foreseen it.
2471
 Although Article 25 does not expressly state the time 
when the party in breach had to foresee or should have foreseen the detrimental consequences, 
 
it is generally argued that the relevant point in time at which the consequences of the breach 
must have been foreseeable is the time of the conclusion of the contract.
 2472
  
 
Under the Article 26 of the CISG, the avoidance must be declared by the aggrieved party in a 
notice to the party in breach. Thus, under Article 49, which allows a buyer to declare the, and 
under Article 64, which permits the seller to declare avoidance under certain specified 
circumstances, the avoidance of the contract is conditioned on a declaration of avoidance by 
the buyer or seller.
2473
 A buyer’s declaration of avoidance must inform the seller that the 
buyer will not accept or keep the goods, while a seller’s declaration of avoidance must inform 
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the buyer that the seller will not deliver the goods or, if the goods have been delivered, that 
the seller demands their return.
2474
   
 
Article 49 of the CISG contains the buyer's remedy of avoidance of the contract. Article 49(1) 
envisages two situations, which entitle the buyer to terminate the contract. First situation is 
that the failure by the seller to perform any of his obligations under the contract or the 
Convention amounts to a fundamental breach of contract. Second situation occurs when the 
seller’s failure to deliver the goods, although not amounting to a fundamental breach of 
contract, continues within the additional period of time fixed by the buyer in accordance with 
Article 47 (1), or the seller declares that he will not deliver within the period so fixed.
2475
 
Thus, the failure of the seller to deliver goods, when it is not a fundamental breach, leads to a 
Nachfrist mechanism. Only in the case of non-delivery, the CISG allows the buyer to 
transform a non-fundamental breach of contract into a fundamental breach by fixing an 
additional period of time for performance.
2476
 This protects the interests of the seller as it 
would be too harsh for him to lose the benefits of the whole contract on account of 
insignificant shortcomings.
2477
 Moreover, Article 45(3) states that no period of grace may be 
granted to the seller by a court or arbitral tribunal when the buyer resorts to a remedy for 
breach of contract. It is explained that, since the CISG does not provide a procedure of 
applying to a court for avoiding the contract, there is no room for such an additional period to 
be granted by a court.
2478
 
 
Article 49 (2) declares the buyer’s remedy of avoidance lost if the seller actually delivered the 
goods and the buyer hesitated too long before declaring the contract avoided.
2479
 The article 
aims at removing the risks of needless costs of the care and return of the goods, which could 
result from the undue delay of the buyer in declaring avoidance of the contract, and avoiding 
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the buyer’s speculation at the seller’s risk when the price of the goods is subject to market 
fluctuations.
2480
 Thus, Article 49 distinguishes between the obligation to deliver and 
obligations other than delivery. As soon as delivery has been made, if the buyer wants to 
reject it, he is obliged to declare the contract avoided within a reasonable time after he has 
become aware of the delivery. In cases of fundamental breach of any of the seller's obligations 
other than delivery, the buyer will lose his right to reject the goods and to declare the contract 
avoided unless he does so within a reasonable time under the particular circumstances. 
 
Article 64 of the CISG provides the seller’s remedy of avoidance of the contract. It 
distinguishes between the situation, where the buyer fails to perform any obligation under the 
contract or the Convention and his failure amounts to a fundamental breach of contract, and 
the situation, where the buyer fails to perform either his obligation to pay the price or his 
obligation to take over the goods, or he declares that he will not do so, within the additional 
period of time fixed by the seller in accordance with Article 63 (1).
2481
 Article 64 (2) provides 
that the seller’s remedy of avoidance is lost if the buyer has actually paid the price and the 
seller did not declare the contract avoided within a reasonable time under the particular 
circumstances. This implies that the seller retains the right to avoid the contract without 
regard to those time limits only as long as the price remains unpaid.
2482
 However, once the 
price has been paid, even if the buyer has committed a fundamental breach of the contract, the 
seller cannot wait and watch market developments before making his decision to avoid the 
contract.
2483
 Article 64(2) distinguishes between two different situations, namely late 
performance by the buyer of any of his obligations, and any breach other than late 
performance by the buyer. In case of late performance by the buyer, the seller should avoid 
the contract before he has become aware that performance has been rendered, in order not to 
lose the right to declare the contract avoided. In other cases of non-performance, the seller 
should declare the contract avoided within a reasonable time, after he knew or ought to have 
known of the breach, after any additional time period allowed for performance was expired, 
or after the buyer has declared that he will not perform his obligations. 
 
Article 72 of the CISG provides for a contract to be avoided for an anticipatory breach. 
Article 72 (1) provides that if prior to the date for performance of the contract it is clear that 
one of the parties will commit a fundamental breach of contract, the other party may declare 
the contract avoided. Article 72 (2) requires, if time allows, the party intending to declare the 
contract avoided to give reasonable notice to the other party in order to permit him to provide 
adequate assurance of his performance. The absence of an assurance of performance in 
response to such a notice would make it clear that a breach is going to occur. In cases where 
there is no time to notify, or where the delivery date is so near that assurances could not be 
procured in time, there is no need to notify the other party.
2484
 While Article 72 allows the 
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avoidance of the existing contract, so that another one can be expeditiously entered into, and 
uncertainty with respect to financial commitments can be removed, Article 71 allows a party 
to suspend the performance of his obligations in cases of anticipatory breach.
2485
 However, 
Article 72 contains a stricter requirement for its invocation by allowing a party to declare the 
contract avoided on the condition that, prior to the date for performance of the contract, it is 
clear that the other party will commit a fundamental breach of contract, than Article 71, 
which allows a party to suspend the performance of his obligations on the condition that, after 
the conclusion of the contract, it becomes apparent that the other party will not perform a 
substantial part of his obligations. 
 
The consequences of avoidance are provided in Articles 81-84 of the CISG. Article 81 sets 
forth the two consequences which result from the avoidance of the contract. First, under 
Article 81 (1), avoidance of the contract releases both parties from their obligations 
prospectively, subject to any damages which may be due. Moreover, the second sentence of 
Article 81(1) explicitly states that the avoidance does not affect any provisions of the contract 
for the settlement of disputes, such as arbitration and renegotiation clauses, or any other 
provision of the contract governing the rights and obligations of the parties consequent upon 
the avoidance of the contract, such as penalty or liquidated damages clauses and clauses 
restricting or excluding liability. Secondly, under Article 81 (2), a party who has performed 
the contract either wholly or in part may claim restitution from the other party of whatever the 
first party has supplied or paid under the contract, and if both parties are bound to make 
restitution, they must do so concurrently. Thus, Article 81(2) provides the retrospective effect 
of the avoidance of the contract. However, the parties’ actions of restitution are to be 
governed by the applicable law. Thus, where specific performance is limited under the 
applicable law, restitution in kind will be difficult to obtain. The party in breach will be liable 
for all the expenses consequent to the restitutions, because of the principle that damages are 
designed to compensate the aggrieved party for the entire loss he has suffered as a result of 
the breach, pursuant to Article 74.
2486
 
 
Article 82 provides a limitation on the right to declare the contract avoided when the buyer is 
unable to return the goods substantially in the conditions in which he received them. This 
limitation is criticized on the basis of the experience with German law, where it caused 
important problems and scholarly controversies before the reform.
2487
 However, it is argued 
that this limitation does not lead to serious injustice to an aggrieved buyer since even if the 
buyer may not avoid the contract, he may recover damages resulting from the seller’s breach 
of contract.
2488
 Article 83 explicitly provides that the loss of the right to declare the contract 
avoided does not deprive the buyer of the right to claim other remedies which are available 
under the contract and the Convention. Moreover, it is pointed out that the failure of 
restituting the goods is defined by the Convention in a flexible way thereby allowing the 
decision maker to exercise his discretion in determining whether the goods returned can be 
                                                 
2485
 Bennett, Trevor, Article 72, in C. Massimo Bianca & Michael Joachim Bonell (eds.), Commentary on the 
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2486
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International Sales Law: the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention, Milan, Giuffrè, 1987, at 604 
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Michael Joachim Bonell & Franco Bonelli (eds.), Contratti commerciali internazionali e Principi UNIDROIT, 
Giuffré, Milano 1997, at 268 
2488
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Law International, 3
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 ed., 1999, at 509 
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regarded as substantially in the same conditions in which the buyer received it.
2489
 There are 
also several exceptions to this rule. First, the buyer retains the right to declare the contract 
avoided if the impossibility to restitute the goods “is not due to his act or omission”. The 
second exception deals with the situation in which the goods have perished or deteriorated as 
a result of the examination provided for in Article 38. Thirdly, the buyer retains the right to 
declare the contract avoided, if the goods or part of the goods have been sold in the normal 
course of business or have been consumed or transformed by the buyer in the course of 
normal use before he discovered or ought to have discovered the lack of conformity.  
 
Article 84 requires the parties to return all benefits of possession. The first paragraph states 
that where the seller is under obligation to refund the price, he must pay interest from the date 
of payment. The second paragraph provides that the buyer must account to the seller for all 
the benefits which he has derived from the goods or part of them. The buyer has to return 
benefits which he has derived from the goods if the buyer must make restitution of the goods 
or part of them, or if it is impossible for him to make restitution of all or part of the goods 
substantially in the condition in which he received them, but he has nevertheless declared the 
contract avoided or required the seller to deliver substitute goods. Given the absence of any 
precision in the article concerning the mode of assessment of this benefit, the matter is 
governed by the applicable national law on restitution.
2490
 
 
As avoidance terminates the rights and duties of both parties to proceed further with 
performance, subject to a claim for damages for breach of contract, and gives rise to 
restitutionary duties for both parties, the remedy of contract avoidance is considered as a 
remedy of last resort.
2491
 In this regard, the relationship between the buyer’s right to terminate 
the contract for defective performance and the seller’s right to cure defective performance has 
a particular importance. Article 48, which regulates the seller’s right to cure, by reserving 
Article 49, appears to underline the priority of the buyer's remedy of avoidance over the 
seller's right to cure. However, the relationship between Article 48 and 49 remains largely 
unsettled, and requires the decision makers to strike a balance between the competing 
interests of the buyer and the seller.
2492
  
 
It is argued that the seller’s right to cure under Article 48, being more specific than the 
general right to avoid the contract, prevails over the buyer's right to avoid the contract. 
According to this view, in determining the existence of a fundamental breach, the decision 
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maker should take into account whether the seller will cure, where cure is feasible and where 
an offer of cure can be expected, given that the decision on the fundamental breach should be 
made in the light of all of the circumstances.
2493
 However, the buyer’s need for a prompt and 
clear answer to this question is emphasized in view of the fact that any uncertainty would be 
at the risk of the asking buyer until the answer arrives. Thus, it is argued that the buyer who 
has already suffered the seller’s fundamental breach of contract should not, in addition, be 
burdened with the entire range of uncertainties as to the same seller's ability and willingness 
to cure. It is suggested that the buyer should not be required to delay avoidance of the contract 
unless the question of whether the seller will cure is answered affirmatively based on the 
buyer’s actual knowledge, such as prior experience with the seller, an ad hoc commitment or 
the underlying general conditions of sale.
 2494
 Moreover, Article 48 (2) provides that if the 
seller requests the buyer to make known whether he will accept cure and the buyer does not 
comply with the request within a reasonable time, the seller may perform within the time 
indicated in his request, and the buyer may not, during that period of time, resort to avoidance 
or any remedy which is inconsistent with performance by the seller. The underlying idea is 
that the buyer deserves protection only when he is cooperative and gives the seller a fair 
chance.
2495
 Thus, it is observed that some national courts applying the CISG have been 
reluctant to consider a breach to be fundamental when the goods can be repaired and the seller 
offers and makes a speedy repair without any inconvenience to the buyer.
2496
  
 
The avoidance of contract for non-performance under the CISG has greatly influenced the 
approach of the UNIDROIT Principles to the issue of termination for non-performance. 
Articles 7.3.1, 7.3.3 and 7.3.4 of the UNIDROIT Principles entitle the aggrieved party to 
terminate the contract for actual or anticipatory non-performance.
2497
 Termination under those 
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provisions is explicitly stated as exceptions to the basic principle of pacta sunt servanda under 
Article 1.3.
2498
 The Official Comment to Article 7.3.1 states that it is necessary to take a 
restrictive approach to the right of termination as a result of the balancing of different 
considerations, namely the need to allow the aggrieved party to terminate the contract in 
certain cases, and the fact that this may cause serious detriment to the non-performing party 
that may incur expenses in preparing and tendering performance which cannot be 
recovered.
2499
 The Official Comment mentions the preservation of the contract and the 
minimization of economic waste as general policies of the Principles.
2500
 Thus, Chapter 7 
combines three mechanisms, which are relevant to the remedy of avoidance under the CISG: 
the concept of fundamental breach, the Nachfrist mechanism, and the right of the non-
performing party to cure.  
 
Article 7.3.1 (1) of the UNIDROIT Principles provides that a party may terminate the contract 
where the failure of the other party to perform an obligation under the contract amounts to a 
fundamental non-performance. Article 7.3.1 does not give a definition of “fundamental non-
performance”.2501  Article 7.3.1 (2) provides a non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered 
in the determination of whether a particular non-performance amounts to a fundamental non-
performance. First, under Article 7.3.1 (2) (a), regard is to be had to whether the non 
performance substantially deprives the aggrieved party of what it was entitled to expect under 
the contract unless the other party did not foresee and could not reasonably have foreseen 
such result. This is clearly modeled upon the definition of fundamental breach under Article 
25 of the CISG, which provides the two-part test. The only difference between Article 7.3.1 
(2) (a) of the UNIDROIT Principles and Article 25 of the CISG is that the breach must have 
resulted in a “detriment” to the aggrieved party according to the wording of the CISG. This 
difference does not have any practical consequences, since the crucial element of Article 25 of 
the CISG is the “substantial deprivation” test, according to which the emphasis is not on the 
extent of the damage caused, but rather on the legitimate interests of the aggrieved party. 
Moreover, if the aggrieved party is substantially deprived of what it was entitled to expect 
under the contract, this alone constitutes a “detriment”.2502 Second factor to be taken into 
account in the determination of fundamental non-performance is whether strict compliance 
                                                                                                                                                        
would lead to another departure from the general principle pacta sunt servanda, it was deemed necessary to 
provide safeguards against abuses of the remedy and to avoid overlapping with the provisions on hardship. Thus, 
the draft rules on termination for just cause attempted to specify the provision’s scope of application with regard 
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109, Rome, 26-29 May 2008, at 4-5; As to the effect of termination for just cause, it was stated that it entails the 
end of the contractual relationship for the future only without retrospective effect. It was also mentioned that the 
parties may still be under a duty to liquidate their relationship, for example by disclosing the relevant accounts 
and inventory. UNIDROIT 2009 - Study L - Doc. 109, Rome, 26-29 May 2008, at 8; The expectation of the 
competent organs of the UNIDORIT was that work on the new edition of the Principles should have been 
completed by 2010, while the draft chapter on termination of long term contracts for just cause only had a first 
reading by 2010. Thus, the Working Group decided that the draft has been put on hold to be taken up again in 
one way or another in the near future, possibly in an even broader context. UNIDROIT 2009 - Study L - Misc. 
29, at 17-18 
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with the obligation, which has not been performed, is of essence under the contract, pursuant 
to Article 7.3.1(b). The Official Comment states that this factor is not interested in the actual 
gravity of the non-performance but in the nature of the contractual obligation for which strict 
performance might be of essence.
2503
 The third factor, under Article 7.3.1(2)(c), requires the 
consideration of whether the non performance is intentional or reckless. The Official 
Comment explains that it may be contrary to good faith to terminate a contract if the non-
performance, even though committed intentionally, is insignificant.
2504
 Fourthly, pursuant to 
Article 7.3.1(2)(d), it should be considered whether the non performance gives the aggrieved 
party reason to believe that it cannot rely on the other party's future performance.
2505
  Linking 
this factor to the third one, the Official Comment states that sometimes an intentional breach 
may show that a party cannot be trusted.
2506
 Fifthly, under Article 7.3.1(e), regard should be 
had to whether the non performing party will suffer disproportionate loss as a result of the 
preparation or performance if the contract is terminated. This factor is a countervailing 
circumstance against the characterization of non-performance as fundamental and based upon 
the reliance of the non-performing party. The Official Comment states that non-performance 
is less likely to be treated as fundamental if it occurs late, after the preparation of 
performance, than if it occurs early before such preparation.
2507
  
 
Article 7.3.1(3) introduces the mechanism of Nachfrist for the cases of delay in performance, 
which does not amount to a fundamental non-performance in the sense of Article 7.3.1(1) and 
(2).
2508
 Article 7.3.1 (3) provides that “In the case of delay the aggrieved party may also 
terminate the contract if the other party fails to perform before the time allowed it under 
Article 7.1.5 has expired.” Article 7.1.5 (3) provides that, in a case of delay in performance 
which is not fundamental, the aggrieved party may give notice allowing an additional period 
of time of reasonable length and it may terminate the contract at the end of that period. If the 
additional period allowed is not of reasonable length it shall be extended to a reasonable 
length. It is also provided that the aggrieved party may in its notice provide that if the other 
party fails to perform within the period allowed by the notice, the contract shall automatically 
terminate. Under Article 7.1.5 (4), the possibility to obtain a right to terminate the contract by 
using the Nachfrist mechanism is excluded if the obligation which has not been performed is 
only a minor part of the entire contractual obligation. However, it should be noted that 
termination through Nachfrist mechanism is limited to cases of delay. In other cases of non-
performance, fixing an additional period of time for performance under Article 7.1.5, which 
applies to every kind of nonperformance, may only be relevant to the doctrine of fundamental 
non-performance under Article 7.3.1: for instance, as fixing an additional period of time for 
performance may help to clarify the questions of whether the non-performance is intentional 
or reckless, or whether the non performance gives the aggrieved party reason to believe that it 
cannot rely on the other party's future performance. 
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Article 7.1.4 contains the third mechanism used to restrict the availability of termination as a 
remedy. As opposed to the Nachfrist technique, this mechanism is not triggered by the 
aggrieved party, but by the non-performing party that wants to keep the contract alive. It 
provides that, if certain conditions are met, the non-performing party may cure by correcting 
the non-performance. Pursuant to Article 7.1.4 (1), the non-performing party may, at its own 
expense, cure any non-performance, provided that (a) without undue delay, it gives notice 
indicating the proposed manner and timing of the cure; (b) cure is appropriate in the 
circumstances; (c) the aggrieved party has no legitimate interest in refusing cure; and (d) cure 
is effected promptly. Thus, subject to those conditions, the non-performing party is able to 
extend the time for performance for a brief period beyond that stipulated in the contract, 
unless timely performance is required by the agreement or the circumstances.
2509
 
Consequently, this mechanism enables the non-performing party to prevent termination by 
performing properly within a reasonable period of time and under adequate circumstances. In 
Article 7.1.4 (3), it is explicitly stated that upon effective notice of cure, those rights of the 
aggrieved party that are inconsistent with the non­performing party's performance are 
suspended until the time for cure has expired. Further, Article 7.1.4 (2) provides that the right 
to cure is not precluded by notice of termination. The Official Comment states that “If the 
aggrieved party has rightfully terminated the contract … the effects of termination … are also 
suspended by an effective notice of cure. If the non-performance is cured, the notice of 
termination is inoperative.”2510 Thus, the non-performing party may cure its non-performance 
even after a notice of termination by the aggrieved party and revive a contract that has been 
formally terminated by offering cure and performing properly. The latter is a far reaching 
rule, which aims at restricting the termination of the contract and cannot be found under the 
CISG or the PECL.
 2511
   
 
The right of a party to terminate the contract is exercised by notice to the other party, pursuant 
to Article 7.3.2 (1). This provision makes it clear that, in principle, there is no ipso facto 
termination of the contract, even if all the requirements are met. Article 7.3.2 (2) regulates 
time limits for the exercise of the right to terminate. When performance has been offered late 
or otherwise does not conform to the contract, the aggrieved party will lose its right to 
terminate the contract unless it gives notice to the other party within a reasonable time after it 
has or ought to have become aware of the offer or of the non-conforming performance. The 
Official Comments discusses two situations where time limits for late performance under 
Article 7.3.2(2) are not directly applicable, but the good faith principle may require the 
aggrieved party to inform the non-performing party whether it intends to accept the late 
performance.
2512
 First situation occurs when the non-performing party asks the aggrieved 
party whether it will accept late performance. Second situation is the case where the aggrieved 
party learns from another source that the non-performing party intends to perform. In these 
situations, if the aggrieved party fails to inform the other party if it does not wish to accept the 
late performance, it may be held liable in damages.  However, where the non-performing 
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party asks the aggrieved party whether it intends to accept the late performance prior to the 
date of performance, the case will fall under Articles 7.3.3 and 7.3.4.
2513
 
 
Articles 7.3.3 and 7.3.4 of the UNIDROIT Principles govern the cases of anticipatory breach. 
Article 7.3.3 provides that where prior to the date for performance by one of the parties it is 
clear that there will be a fundamental non performance by that party, the other party may 
terminate the contract. According to the Official Comment, it must be clear that there will be 
non-performance, and even a well-founded suspicion is not sufficient to invoke this provision. 
Moreover, it is required that the non-performance be fundamental and a notice of termination 
be given.
2514
 When its conditions are satisfied, Article 7.3.3 allows the aggrieved party to 
terminate the contract before the time at which performance is due.
2515
 The provision under 
Articles 7.3.3 is essentially based on Article 72 of the CISG. However, in contrast to Article 
72 of the CISG, Article 7.3.3 of the UNIDROIT Principles does not require the aggrieved 
party to give notice of intention to terminate to the other party in order to allow him to 
provide adequate assurance of his performance. The lack of notification requirement is 
criticized on the ground that the notification requirement would reduce the possibility of an 
innocent party abusing its rights, promote communication and cooperation between the 
parties, and would maintain the balance between the two parties by offering the other party an 
opportunity to demonstrate its commitment and ability to perform the contract.
2516
  
 
Article 7.3.4 of the UNIDROIT Principles provides for the right to demand adequate 
assurance of due performance when a party reasonably believes that there will be a 
fundamental non-performance. Although Article 71 of the CISG and Article 7.3.4 of the 
UNIDROIT Principles contain different standards with regard to the required degree of 
probability of fundamental non-performance, there are similarities between the two provisions 
in the sense that both seem to establish a standard requiring a lower degree of probability than 
that of the standard of being “clear”.2517 Article 7.3.4 enables a party demanding adequate 
assurance to withhold his own performance in the meantime and to terminate the contract if 
adequate assurance of due performance is not given within a reasonable time. This provision 
forms a separate ground for termination, which is independent of Articles 7.3.1 and 7.3.3.
 
 
 
Article 7.3.5 of the UNIDROIT Principles provides for the prospective effect of the 
termination for non-performance. The provision states that termination releases both parties 
from their future performance obligations, and that termination will neither preclude claims 
for damages nor affect those provisions in the contract for the settlement of disputes or any 
other term of the contract which is to operate even after termination. The Official Comment 
refers to clauses relating to dispute settlement, and other terms, which by their very nature are 
intended to operate even after termination, such as confidentiality agreements.
2518
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The 2004 edition of the UNIDROIT Principles addressed the issue of restitution following the 
termination of the contract for non-performance in Article 7.3.6. It provided, in paragraph (1), 
that on termination of the contract either party may claim restitution of whatever it has 
supplied, provided that such party concurrently makes restitution of whatever it has received, 
and, in paragraph (2) that, if performance of the contract has extended over a period of time 
and the contract is divisible, restitution can only be claimed for the period after termination 
has taken effect. Article 7.3.6 (1) also provided that if restitution in kind is not possible or 
appropriate, allowance should be made in money whenever reasonable. However, the 
approach of Article 7.3.6 was considered unsatisfactory. It is criticized as being vague, since 
it did not expressly take account of the causes of the impossibility of restitution in kind and 
the obligor’s responsibility for destruction of or injury to the goods.2519 Moreover, it left 
unsettled a number of questions whether the recipient of performance is entitled to 
compensation for expenses incurred for the preservation or maintenance of the object of the 
performance, and whether the recipient must make restitution of any benefits it may have 
received from the performance.
2520
 It is also argued that the rules on restitution in case of 
termination should not adopt sales contracts as the paradigm model.
2521
  
 
As a result of the discussions of the Working Group assigned with the task of preparing a 
third edition of the UNIDROIT Principles, the new Articles 7.3.6 and 7.3.7 of the UNIDROIT 
Principles 2010 take those considerations into account. The new Articles make a clearer 
distinction between different types of contracts with regard to the issues of restitution after 
termination of the contract for non-performance. Article 7.3.6 deals only with “contracts to be 
performed at one time”, while “contracts to be performed over a period of time” are covered 
by Article 7.3.7. The Official Comments to Article 7.3.6 state that the most common example 
of a contract to be performed at one time is an ordinary contract of sale where the entire 
object of the sale has to be transferred at one particular moment. According to the Official 
Comments, a turnkey contract, in which the contractor is under an obligation to produce the 
entire work to be accepted by the customer at one particular time, is also considered as a 
contract to be performed at one time.
2522
 The distinction is based on the concept of 
characteristic performance under private international law, in order to distinguish better 
between contracts to be performed at one time and contracts to be performed over a period of 
time.
2523
 The Official Comments explain that under a commercial contract one party will 
usually have to pay money for the performance received, and that obligation is not the one 
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Study L - Doc. 100, Hamburg - April 2007 
2521
 Zimmerman, Reinhard, The Unwinding of Failed Contracts in the UNIDROIT Principles 2010, Uniform 
Law Review, (2011), at 568; UNIDROIT 2006 - Study L - Misc. 26, October 2006, at para. 48; UNIDROIT 
2007 - Study L - Misc.27, November 2007, at paras. 240, 322; UNIDROIT 2008 - Study L - Misc.28, October 
2008, at paras. 21, 27 
2522
 Official Comment 1 to Article 7.3.6 of the UNIDROIT Principles 
2523
 UNIDROIT 2009 - Study L - Misc. 29, October 2009, at para. 4 
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that is characteristic of the contract. Thus, a contract of sale where the purchase price has to 
be paid in instalments, will fall under Article 7.3.6 provided that the seller’s performance is to 
be made at one time.
2524
 On the other hand, a contract of sale where the goods have to be 
delivered in instalments will be considered as a contract to be performed over a period of 
time, and Article 7.3.7 will be applied.
2525
 
 
Article 7.3.6 (1) grants each party a right to claim the return of whatever the party has 
supplied under the contract provided that that party concurrently makes restitution of 
whatever it has received. Article 7.3.6 (2), which corresponds to the former rule, provides that 
if restitution in kind is not possible or appropriate, an allowance has to be made in money 
whenever reasonable. The Official Comments state that the allowance will normally amount 
to the value of the performance received. Article 7.3.6 (2) refrain from specifying the 
condition of appropriate allowance, in order to provide the decision maker with the sufficient 
flexibility with regard to the choice between objective and subjective value of the 
performance.
2526
 As to the standard of appropriateness of restitution in kind, the Official 
Comments refer to Article 7.2.2(b), which excludes the claim for specific performance, if it is 
unreasonably burdensome or expensive.
2527
 The Official Comments state that the purpose of 
specifying that allowance should be made in money “whenever reasonable” is to make it clear 
that allowance should only be made if, and to the extent that, the performance received has 
conferred a benefit on the party claiming restitution.
2528
  
 
Article 7.3.6 (3) provides that the recipient of the performance does not have to make an 
allowance in money if the impossibility to make restitution in kind is attributable to the other 
party. According to the Official Comments, this provision implies an allocation of risk.
 2529
 
                                                 
2524
 Official Comment 1 to Article 7.3.6 of the UNIDROIT Principles 
2525
 Zimmerman, Reinhard, The Unwinding of Failed Contracts in the UNIDROIT Principles 2010, Uniform 
Law Review, (2011), at 585 
2526
 During the discussions of the Working Group, the term “allowance” was criticized for being vague and the 
Rapporteur Zimmermann suggested the term “compensation for value”. UNIDROIT 2007 - Study L - Misc.27, 
November 2007, at para. 296; However, The majority of the Working Group was in favor of keeping 
“allowance” because it was widely used, e.g. in the United States, and it was sufficiently flexible so as to cover 
the concepts of both objective value and subjective value. UNIDROIT 2008 - Study L - Misc.28, October 2008, 
at para. 22 
2527
 Official Comment 3 to Article 7.3.6 of the UNIDROIT Principles 
2528
 Official Comment 2 to Article 7.3.6 of the UNIDROIT Principles; during the discussions of the Working 
group, the notion of “whenever reasonable” had been questioned as being too vague, but the majority wanted a 
sufficiently flexible rule to cover all kinds of contingencies that might come up and therefore the decision was 
taken to keep “whenever reasonable”. UNIDROIT 2008 - Study L - Misc.28, October 2008, at para. 22 
2529
 The Rapporteur Zimmermann focused on the question of what happens if one of the parties is unable to 
return the performance received by him because what he has received has deteriorated or has been destroyed. In 
his opinion, the problem was one of risk allocation. He proposed to draft a rule that places the risk of accidental 
deterioration and destruction on the recipient of the performance. He criticized the risk regime of Article 82 of 
the CISG and suggested that it should not be regarded as a model on which the UNIDROIT regime can be based. 
He gave the following reasons for his position: “According to Art. 82 CISG, the purchaser loses the right to 
terminate the contract if it is impossible for him to make restitution of the goods substantially in the condition in 
which he received them (Art. 82 (1)). That does not, however, apply if the impossibility of making restitution is 
not due to his act or omission (Art. 82 (2)(b)). These rather involved provisions place the risk of accidental 
destruction at least very largely, and contrary to first appearances, on the seller, for if the purchaser retains the 
right to terminate, provided the impossibility to return is not due to his act or omission, he may claim back his 
purchase price even though he is unable to return the object received. But when is the impossibility to return due 
to the purchaser’s “act or omission”? This is a very vague criterion rendering the risk rule’s scope of application 
quite uncertain. What appears to be the general rule (Art. 82 (1)) turns out to be the exception after all (Art. 82 
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Under this allocation, the recipient of performance is liable to make good the value of that 
performance if it is unable to make restitution in kind. The provision applies even if the 
recipient was responsible for the deterioration or destruction of what it had received. The 
Official Comments state that such allocation of the risk of deterioration or destruction is 
justified, in particular, because the risk should lie with the person in control of the 
performance. In this regard, Article 7.3.6 (3) solely makes it explicit that there is no liability 
to make good the value where the deterioration or destruction is attributable to the other party: 
either because it was due to the other party’s fault, or because it was due to a defect inherent 
in the performance. According to the Official Comments, the recipient’s liability to make 
good the value of the performance received is not excluded in cases where the deterioration or 
destruction would also have occurred had the performance not been rendered. The Official 
Comments explain that the question of the recipient’s liability to pay the value of the 
performance only arises in cases where the deterioration or destruction occurs before 
termination of the contract, but if what has been performed deteriorates or is destroyed after 
termination of the contract, the normal rules on non-performance apply, and gives the other 
party a right to claim damages according to Article 7.4.1, unless the non-performance is 
excused under Article 7.1.7.
2530
 Finally, Article 7.3.6 (4) allows the recipient of performance 
to claim compensation for expenses reasonably required to preserve or maintain the 
performance received. 
 
Article 7.3.6 does not take a position concerning the benefits that have been derived from the 
performance, or interest that has been earned. During the discussions of the Working Group, 
there was insufficient support for the proposed rule on the benefits.
2531
 There were various 
reasons put forward by the members of the Working Group, including such arguments that the 
cases envisaged by the rule were not considered by some members as important so as to 
justify having such a rule in the Principles
2532
; that it is already stated that if a party does not 
pay a sum of money when it falls due, the aggrieved party is entitled to interest under Article 
7.4.9
2533
, and that a rule on benefits would engender litigation and would unduly complicate 
matters.
2534
 It is pointed out that even the term “benefit” is open to doubt and 
misunderstanding, at least on an international level, leading to such questions as whether 
compensation must be made for benefits that recipient has failed to derive from the 
                                                                                                                                                        
(2)(a)). And the general policy of saddling the seller with the risk is very questionable.” He suggested that there 
should be a rule which requires compensation for value also has to be paid insofar as the object received has 
deteriorated or has been destroyed, but there should be an exception to this rule to cover cases where the object 
deteriorates, or is destroyed, as a result of the defect inherent in it. According to Zimmermann, even though the 
defectiveness of the object supplied, and hence of the deterioration or destruction resulting from that 
defectiveness, may not be due to the seller’s fault, it is still true to say that the risk of deterioration or destruction 
emanates from his sphere. In other words, a seller, who creates the risk which has to be distributed, cannot 
reasonably complain if he finds himself burdened with it. Thus, he proposed a rule that exclude the duty to pay 
compensation for value in all cases where the deterioration or destruction was attributable to the other party (i.e. 
the creditor). UNIDROIT 2007 - Study L - Doc. 100, Hamburg - April 2007 
2530
 Official Comment 4 to Article 7.3.6 of the UNIDROIT Principles 
2531
 UNIDROIT 2007 - Study L - Misc.27, October 2008, at para. 63-64 
2532
 Ibid., at para. 355 
2533
 Ibid., at para. 370 
2534
 UNIDROIT 2008 - Study L - Doc. 105, April 2008, Appendix A, at 3 
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performance, and whether the benefits received should remain with the recipient if he was in 
good faith.
2535
 
 
In particular, the Working Group’s decision seemed to have been influenced by the 
observations from the international business practice. Professor Christine Chappuis, having 
consulted the Groupe de travail contrats internationaux
2536
, stated that practitioners seemed 
rather skeptical, in the sense that in their experience the question as to whether in case of 
restitution also the benefits received must be taken into account seldom occurred and, in 
practice, parties are normally satisfied to get back what they have delivered under the contract 
and, in the rare case that one party intends to claim in addition compensation for the benefits 
the other party has received from that performance, such a claim would be part of the claim 
for damages. This observation was also confirmed by the Rapporteur of the relevant rules, 
Professor Reinhard Zimmermann, who had also made some enquiries in the business world. 
He stated that the answers he had received were basically the same as those reported by 
Chappuis, i.e. that in case of termination parties wanted to get back their performance but did 
not care about additional benefits. In his view the reason was that in commercial practice 
normally both parties receive some benefits and it would be inconvenient to try to evaluate 
them with a view to their return. Finally Emmanuel Jolivet, observer for the ICC International 
Court of Arbitration, reported that, at the ICC, a brief enquiry had been made concerning 
awards mentioning restitution of benefits and over the last 10 years only 4 awards were found 
in which restitution of benefits had been claimed by one of the parties.
2537
 Thus, the Official 
Comments to Article 7.3.6 state that “In commercial practice it will often be difficult to 
establish the value of the benefits received by the parties as a result of the performance. 
Furthermore, often both parties will have received such benefits.”2538 
 
Article 7.3.7 (1) contains a special rule, which excludes restitution for performances made in 
the past, with respect to contracts to be performed over a period of time. It provides that, on 
termination of a contract to be performed over a period of time, restitution can only be 
claimed for the period after termination has taken effect, provided the contract is divisible. 
The Official Comments underline that “contracts to be performed over a period of time are at 
least as commercially important as contracts to be performed at one time.” According to the 
Official Comments, contracts to be performed over a period of time include leases (e.g. 
equipment leases), contracts involving distributorship, out-sourcing, franchising, licensing 
and commercial agency, service contracts in general as well as contracts of sale where the 
goods have to be delivered in instalments. It is explained that performances under such 
contracts can have been made over a long period of time before the contract is terminated, and 
                                                 
2535
 Zimmerman, Reinhard, The Unwinding of Failed Contracts in the UNIDROIT Principles 2010, Uniform 
Law Review, (2011), at 579-582 
2536
 Groupe de travail contrats internationaux is a working group established in 1975 by Marcel Fontaine. The 
Group conducts a systematic analysis of the main types of clauses appearing in international contracts. The 
Group uses large samples taken from the practical experience of its members, which consist of corporate 
lawyers, members of the Bar and professors specializing in international trade transactions. The Group meets 
usually two or three times a year. All studies have been published, either in Droit et Pratique du Commerce 
International, or in the International Trade Journal. From 1975 to 1992, the Group was chaired by Marcel 
Fontaine, before Filip De Ly took the chair. The updated versions of the different studies published between 
1975 and 2001 were gathered and coordinated in a book:  Fontaine, Marcel & Filip De Ly, Drafting International 
Contracts: An Analysis of Contract Clauses, Brill Academic Publishers, 2009 
2537
 UNIDROIT 2008 - Study L - Misc.28, October 2008, at para. 52-56 
2538
 Official Comment 6 to Article 7.3.6 of the UNIDROIT Principles 
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it may thus be inconvenient to unravel these performances.
2539
 In those cases, restitution can 
only be claimed in respect of the period after termination, provided that the contract is 
divisible. Article 7.3.7 (2) provides that as far as restitution has to be made, the provisions of 
Article 7.3.6 apply. 
 
The 2010 edition of the UNIDROIT Principles clarifies some of the unresolved questions 
arising from the 2004 edition with regard to restitution after termination of the contracts, 
which could only be answered on the basis of its underlying general principles in accordance 
with Article 1.6 (2).
2540
  Above all, both the 2004 and 2010 editions of the UNIDROIT 
Principles allow restitution rather liberally, as they do not limit restitution to cases of a total 
failure of consideration or to cases where no counter-performance has been received, and nor 
do they exclude the right to terminate the contract for non-performance in cases of 
impossibility of restitution in kind. It is argued that, by so doing, the Principles take the 
middle ground between those legal systems which regard termination as retrospective and 
those legal systems which regard it as essentially prospective.
2541
 Moreover, the Principles 
grant the decision maker the maximum flexibility with regard to such matters as determining 
the value of performance when the restitution in kind is not possible or appropriate.  
 
The rules on termination of contract under the PECL are similar to those of UNIDROIT 
Principles. The approach of the UNIDROIT Principles that makes termination of contract 
possible in the event of a fundamental non-performance is also found in the PECL. Article 
9:301 (1) provides that a party may terminate the contract if the other party's non-performance 
is fundamental. Under Article 8:103, a non-performance of an obligation is fundamental to the 
contract when (a) strict compliance with the obligation is of the essence of the contract, or (b) 
the non-performance substantially deprives the aggrieved party of what it was entitled to 
expect under the contract, unless the other party did not foresee and could not reasonably have 
foreseen that result, or (c) the non-performance is intentional and gives the aggrieved party 
reason to believe that it cannot rely on the other party's future performance. Article 8:103 of 
the PECL is not drafted as a mere list of factors to be taken into account, but describes three 
cases in which a breach is fundamental. The provision does not include the disproportionate 
loss factor as a countervailing circumstance against the characterization of fundamental non-
performance, which is found in the UNIDROIT Principles.
2542
 The provision also merges the 
intention factor with the loss of reliance factor into one element thereby making it clear that a 
minor breach committed intentionally and recklessly does not constitute a fundamental non-
performance.
2543
 
                                                 
2539
 Official Comment 1 to Article 7.3.7 of the UNIDROIT Principles 
2540
 For instance, under the 1994 edition of the UNIDROIT Principles, it was suggested that Article 7.3.6 
providing for an appropriate allowance insofar as restitution in kind is not possible can be considered as a 
comprehensive rule for damages “in lieu of restitution” insofar as the damages concerned are meant to take the 
place of the restitutionary obligations. Thus, on the basis of the similarity of functions between the allowance in 
cases of restitution and the damages for non-performance, some unsolved questions could be answered by the 
analogous application of the rules of non-performance as contained in Chapter 7 of the Principles. Schlechtriem, 
Peter, Termination and Adjustment of Contracts  [Under the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts], European Journal of Law Reform, 1-3 (1999), at 319-320 
2541
 Vogenauer, Stefan & Jan Kleinheisterkamp (eds.), Commentary on the UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts (PICC), Oxford University Press, 2009, at 854 
2542
 Ibid., at 822-823 
2543
 Lando Ole, Termination for Breach of Contract in the CISG, the Principles of European contract law, the 
UNIDROIT Principles of international commercial contracts, in K. Boele-Woelki and F.W. Grosheide (eds), The 
Future of European Contract Law, Liber Amicorum E.H. Hondius, Kluwer International, 2007, at 200; Lando, 
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Article 8:106 of the PECL contains a Nachfrist mechanism, on the basis of two rules: (1) 
Even where the aggrieved party has an immediate right to terminate because of the other's 
non-performance, if the aggrieved party has indicated that it is still prepared to accept 
performance, it may not change its mind without warning since the other party may have 
relied on having the period set in the notice in which to perform; and (2) Where there has 
been a delay in performance but the delay is not fundamental, the aggrieved party may 
terminate the contract after having given the non-performing party reasonable notice.
2544
 
Thus, when there has been a non-performance by one party, the aggrieved party may always 
fix an additional period of time for performance. However, during the period fixed the 
aggrieved party may not seek specific performance or terminate the contract, while it may 
withhold its own performance and it may claim damages for the delay in performance or other 
losses caused by the non-performance. Pursuant to Article 8:106 (3), in a case of delay in 
performance which is not fundamental, the aggrieved party may in its notice provide that if 
the other party does not perform within the period fixed by the notice the contract shall 
terminate automatically. If the period stated is too short, the aggrieved party may terminate, or 
the contract shall terminate automatically, only after a reasonable period from the time of the 
notice. 
 
Article 8:104 of the PECL restricts the right to cure to those cases where the time for 
performance has not yet arrived, or where the delay would not be such as to constitute a 
fundamental non-performance. Thus, there is no right to cure if time is of the essence or has 
become of the essence following the expiry of a notice under Article 8:106.
2545
 However, this 
provision does not affect the general rule that, in all cases of non-fundamental non-
performance, the non-performing party maintains a general right to cure. Moreover, Article 
9:303 (3) (b) alleviates the strictness of the primacy of termination over cure, in the case of 
fundamental non-performance that may be cured without the delay. It provides that in cases in 
which the aggrieved party knows or has reason to know that the other party intends to tender 
within a reasonable time, it must notify the other party of its refusal to accept performance in 
order to maintain its right to terminate the contract. Thus, failure to notify the curing party 
accordingly will prevent the aggrieved party from termination the contract if the other party in 
fact tenders cure within a reasonable time.
2546
 
 
Article 9:303 (1) provides that a party’s right to terminate the contract is to be exercised by 
notice to the other party. According to the second paragraph, the aggrieved party loses its 
right to terminate the contract unless it gives notice within a reasonable time after it has or 
ought to have become aware of the non-performance. Article 9:303 (3) (a) provides that when 
a tender of performance is due but has not been made, the aggrieved party need not give 
notice of termination before a tender has been made. If a tender is later made it loses its right 
                                                                                                                                                        
Ole & Hugh Beale (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Parts I and II, Kluwer Law International, 2000, 
at 365-366 
2544
 Lando, Ole & Hugh Beale (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Parts I and II, Kluwer Law 
International, 2000, at 372 
2545
 Ibid., at 368 
2546
 Yovel, Jonathan, Cure after date for delivery: Comparison between provisions of the CISG (seller's right to 
remedy failure to perform: Article 48) and the counterpart provisions of the Principles of European Contract Law 
(Articles 8:104 and 9:303), in John Felemegas (ed.), An International Approach to the Interpretation of the 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1980) as Uniform Sales Law, 
Cambridge University Press, 2007, at 391 
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to terminate if it does not give such notice within a reasonable time after it has or ought to 
have become aware of the tender. Article 9:303(3) (c) provides an exception to the notice 
requirement in cases where one of the parties is permanently excused from non-performance 
under the force majeure rule. 
 
Article 9:304 of the PECL deals with anticipatory non-performance and allows a party to 
terminate the contract, where prior to the time for performance by the other party it is clear 
that there will be a fundamental non-performance by it. In the Official Comment, it is stated 
that the need to notify the other party within a reasonable time does not apply to cases of 
anticipatory non-performance.
2547
 In order for this Article to apply it must be clear that a party 
is not willing or able to perform at the due date. If its behavior merely results in doubt as to its 
willingness or ability to perform, Article 8:105 entitles a party, who reasonably believes that 
there will be a fundamental non-performance by the other party, to demand adequate 
assurance of due performance and to withhold performance of its own obligations so long as 
such reasonable belief continues. Article 8:105 appears to go further than Article 7.3.4 of the 
UNIDORIT Principles by explicitly providing that the aggrieved party may withhold its own 
performance “as long as such reasonable belief continues”. It is argued that this does not 
result in substantial differences between the two provisions as the usual way of overcoming 
such a belief is to provide adequate assurances of performance.
2548
 Where this assurance is not 
provided within a reasonable time, the party demanding it may terminate the contract if it still 
reasonably believes that there will be a fundamental non-performance by the other party, and 
gives notice of termination. 
 
Article 9:305 provides that the termination of contract releases both parties from their 
obligation to effect and to receive future performance, but, subject to Articles 9:306 to 9:308, 
does not affect the rights and liabilities that have accrued up to the time of termination. The 
drafters of the PECL considered it "inconvenient" to treat a contract that has been terminated 
as being cancelled in the sense of never having been made.
2549
 Thus, in principle, any 
contractual performance already received does not need to be returned, nor is it necessary to 
make restitution of its value. Article 9:305 states that termination is not retroactive and 
specifically mentions the contractual clauses surviving termination. Under Article 9:305 (2), 
termination does not affect any provision of the contract for the settlement of disputes or any 
other provision which is to operate even after termination. Moreover, termination does not 
preclude a claim for damages for non-performance.
2550
  
 
Even though termination is prospective in general, there are situations where the PECL 
accords retrospective effect to termination. Article 9:306 provides that the aggrieved party 
may reject a performance already received if its value to it has been fundamentally reduced as 
a result of the other party's non-performance. The PECL also allows for a restitutionary 
remedy after termination, where one party has conferred a benefit on the other party but has 
not received the promised counter-performance in exchange. The benefit may consist of 
                                                 
2547
 Lando, Ole & Hugh Beale (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Parts I and II, Kluwer Law 
International, 2000, at 414 
2548
 Vogenauer, Stefan & Jan Kleinheisterkamp (eds.), Commentary on the UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts (PICC), Oxford University Press, 2009, at 852 
2549
 Lando, Ole & Hugh Beale (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Parts I and II, Kluwer Law 
International, 2000, at 419 
2550
 Article 8:102 of the PECL provides that a party is not deprived of its right to damages by exercising its right 
to any other remedy.  
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money paid (Article 9:307), other property which can be returned (Article 9:308) or some 
benefit which cannot be returned, e.g. services or property which has been used up (Article 
9:309).
2551
 On termination of the contract, Article 9:307 provides that a party may recover 
money paid for a performance which it did not receive or which it properly rejected. A party, 
who returns money paid, will have to pay interest on the money for the period that it has in 
possession in accordance with Article 9:508.
2552
 Pursuant to Article 9:308, a party who has 
supplied property which can be returned and for which it has not received payment or other 
counter-performance may recover the property. Under Article 7:110 (4), when the contract 
has been terminated and the property must be returned by the recipient to the other party, if 
the other party fails to accept or retake the property, the recipient must take reasonable steps 
to protect and preserve the property and it is entitled to be reimbursed or to retain out of the 
proceeds of sale any expenses reasonably incurred. Article 9:309 provides that a party, who 
has rendered a performance which cannot be returned and for which it has not received 
payment or other counter-performance, may recover a reasonable amount for the value of the 
performance to the other party. As to the calculation of this amount, the Official Comments 
state that the party which has received the benefit should not be required to pay the cost to the 
other of having provided it, if the net benefit to it is less, since it is only enriched by the latter 
amount, and if the net benefit to the recipient is greater than the cost of providing it, the 
recipient should not be liable under this article for more than an appropriate part of the 
contract.
 2553
  
 
Thus, similar to UNIDROIT Principles, under the PECL, the aggrieved party is allowed to 
terminate even if he cannot restore the performance in kind substantially in the condition in 
which he received them, but he must account to the other party for the benefits he has derived 
from the performance.
2554
 However, the approach of the PECL, which is considered akin to 
the position under English law, was criticized for its unnecessarily complex differentiation 
between different types of performance, and for its focus on the lack of counter-performance, 
which reveals that these provisions were modeled on the English concept of total failure of 
consideration that has increasingly been criticized in its country of origin.
2555
 Moreover, the 
PECL do not cover such issue as benefits derived from performance in the context of 
restitution of the property, and how the deterioration or destruction of the performance 
rendered affects the unwinding of the contract.
2556
  
 
c. Contracting Practices 
 
In international contracting practices, termination clauses are much more tailor-made than 
typical boilerplate clauses, because termination clauses relate to the core of the contract. 
                                                 
2551
 Lando, Ole & Hugh Beale (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Parts I and II, Kluwer Law 
International, 2000, at 422 
2552
 Ibid., at 421 
2553
 Ibid., at 425-426 
2554
 Lando Ole, Termination for Breach of Contract in the CISG, the Principles of European contract law, the 
UNIDROIT Principles of international commercial contracts, in K. Boele-Woelki and F.W. Grosheide (eds), The 
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 Zimmermann, Reinhard, Restitutio in Integrum: The Unwinding of Failed Contracts under the Principles of 
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Termination clauses are an important subject of negotiations between parties. The bargaining 
power and negotiation strategies greatly affect the contents of the termination clauses. An 
imbalance to which a party agrees regarding one part of the termination clause is sometimes 
set off by modification to another part of the termination clause.
 2557
 Moreover, as the national 
legal systems, to a great extent, do not impose mandatory rules regarding termination of the 
contracts, the contracting parties themselves usually clarify or modify termination aspects of 
their contractual relationship in accordance with their specific contractual setting.
2558
 
Particularly, termination clauses give rise to a category of cases, in which the requirement of 
seriousness of non-performance under national laws need not be satisfied.
2559
 The 
international contract practice has developed the technique of express termination clauses in 
order to minimize the court intervention, which may slow down the process of termination 
and introduce uncertainty and unpredictability as to whether termination will ensue.
2560
 For 
these reasons, there is a great variety of termination clauses that can be found in international 
contracts. 
 
It is also possible to observe a tendency of international contracting practices towards a 
common abstract understanding of the issues relevant to termination clauses. These clauses 
usually do not limit the right to terminate the contract to cases involving a breach of contract. 
In particular, in case of long-term contracts, termination clauses provide that various 
circumstances, which affect the relationship between the parties, may justify the termination 
of the contract. Thus, the parties explicitly provide for the termination of the contract in 
certain circumstances, under which the parties no longer wish to continue their contractual 
relationships. In light of these considerations, it can be observed that there is a growing 
tendency in contracts with parties having similar bargaining power to approach the issue of 
termination not from the question of who is to blame for termination, but rather when and 
how termination is to be achieved, whereby the termination becomes an inherent stage in the 
contractual relationship and an issue of risk allocation between the parties. This approach is 
most visible in the deadlock and divorce clauses in international joint venture contracts.
2561
 It 
is also relevant to any other forms of transactions governed through legal uncertainty, which 
typically require longer term relationship and involve great interests on both sides. Moreover, 
where it is important to find ways out which are acceptable for both parties, the contracting 
parties are more inclined to draft the contract in terms of problem solution through the 
incorporation into the termination clauses such mechanisms as Nachfrist and cure by the non-
performing party.
2562
  
 
Termination clauses in international contracting practices cover a wide range of different 
situations, which lead to the termination of contracts. These include the effect of a condition 
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subsequent, an agreement by the contracting parties to terminate the contract, the breach of 
certain contractual obligations, the passing of a period for which the contract has been 
concluded in case of fixed term contracts, notice given by one party to the other party in case 
of contracts concluded for an indefinite period, and such circumstances as a party’s 
involvement in insolvency, bankruptcy or similar proceedings or even in bribery.
2563
 In line 
with the trend of contracting parties to draft termination clauses in terms of problem solution 
and risk allocation, termination clauses provide a mixture of various termination grounds and 
procedures as to the steps towards termination. 
 
This is particularly apparent in the FIDIC Conditions. The FIDIC Conditions for major works 
provide in Clause 15 the terms regarding “Termination by the Employer” and in Clause 16 
those dealing with “Suspension and Termination by Contractor”. These clauses set out the 
various grounds which will entitle the Employer to terminate the contract or entitle the 
Contractor to suspend or terminate the contract. First of all, Sub-Clause 15.1 provides that if 
the Contractor fails to carry out any obligation under the Contract, the Engineer may by notice 
require the Contractor to make good the failure and to remedy it within a specified reasonable 
time. In such a case, the Employer may terminate the contract when the Contractor fails to 
comply with the notice to correct. This provision introduces a Nachfrist mechanism, which 
assures that a mere breach does not suffice to trigger the application of the termination clause, 
and provides the Contractor with an opportunity to cure his defective performance.  
 
Sub-Clause 15.2 allows the Employer to terminate the contract for specified defaults by the 
Contractor. The Employer is entitled the terminate the contract if the Contractor fails to 
comply with Sub-Clause 4.2 (Performance Security) or with a notice under Sub-Clause 15.1, 
or fails, without reasonable excuse, to proceed with the Works in accordance with Clause 8 
(Commencement, Delays and Suspension) or to comply with a notice issued under Sub-
Clause 7.5 (Rejection) or Sub-Clause 7.6 (Remedial Work), within 28 days after receiving it, 
or subcontracts the whole of the Works or assigns the Contract without the required 
agreement. Sub-Clause 15.2 also contains a provision regarding anticipatory breach of the 
Contract, which allows the Employer to terminate the contract if the Contractor abandons the 
Works, or “otherwise plainly demonstrates the intention not to continue performance”. In all 
those cases, the Employer may, upon giving 14 days’ notice to the Contractor, terminate the 
Contract and expel the Contractor from the Site. Sub-Clause 15.2 explicitly reserves the 
Employer’s claim for damages in the case of his termination of the contract by providing that 
the Employer's election to terminate the Contract shall not prejudice any other rights of the 
Employer's under the Contract or otherwise. Sub-Clause 15.2 also enables the Employer to 
terminate the contract by notice immediately, when the Contractor becomes insolvent or 
bankrupt, or commits bribery. The ground of bribery for immediate termination responds to 
the current emphasis on the subject of bribery among international development banks.
2564
 
This ground can also be found in the general practice of drafting termination clauses under 
construction contracts.
2565
 In the Multilateral Development Bank Harmonized Edition of the 
FIDIC Conditions, Sub-Clause 15.6 explicitly provides that “If the Employer determines that 
the Contractor has engaged in corrupt, fraudulent, collusive or coercive practices, in 
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competing for or in executing the Contract, then the Employer may, after giving 14 days 
notice to the Contractor, terminate the Contractor’s employment under the Contract and expel 
him from the Site, and the provisions of Clause 15 shall apply as if such expulsion had been 
made under Sub-Clause 15.2.” 
 
Sub-Clause 15.5 of the 1999 Edition introduces the right of the Employer to terminate for 
convenience, which was absent from the previous editions.
 2566
 It provides that the Employer 
may terminate the Contract, at any time for the Employer’s convenience, by giving notice of 
such termination to the Contractor. The termination shall take effect 28 days after the later of 
the dates on which the Contractor receives this notice or the Employer returns the 
Performance Security. In order to ensure that this clause is not abused by the Employer, Sub-
Clause 15.5 provides that the Employer shall not terminate the Contract under this Sub-Clause 
in order to execute the Works himself or to arrange for the Works to be executed by another 
contractor or to avoid a termination of the Contract by the Contractor. In the case of a 
termination for convenience, the Contractor is only entitled to be paid for work done and is 
not entitled to his profit on the balance of the contract which he is being deprived of the right 
to complete. 
 
The FIDIC Conditions enable the Contractor either to suspend work or to terminate the 
contract under certain circumstances. Sub-Clause 16.1 allows the Contractor to suspend work 
if he is not being paid amounts to which he is entitled in due time. He may also suspend work, 
where the Engineer fails to certify a payment certificate when he should do so, and where the 
Employer fails to provide reasonable evidence that financial arrangements have been made 
and are being maintained to enable the Employer to pay the Contract Price in accordance with 
the contract payment schedule. Sub-Clause 16.2 entitles the Contractor to terminate the 
contract if the Contractor does not receive the reasonable evidence of the Employer’s 
financial arrangements within 42 days after giving notice to suspend work. The Contractor 
may also terminate the contract if the Engineer fails, within 56 days after receiving a payment 
application and supporting documents, to issue the relevant Payment Certificate. The FIDIC 
Conditions was criticized in the past for not acknowledging the situation where the Engineer 
himself fails to perform his duty and, this provision aims at granting the Contractor a remedy 
in this situation.
2567
 Sub-Clause 16.2 (d) provides a standard of fundamental non-performance 
for the Contractor’s ability to terminate the contract: the Contractor may terminate the 
contract if the Employer substantially fails to perform his obligations under the Contract in 
such manner as to materially and adversely affect the ability of the Contractor to perform the 
Contract. Similar to the Employer’s right to terminate, Sub-Clause 16.2 allows termination by 
the Contractor in cases of Employer’s insolvency or bankruptcy, and assignment of contract 
without prior agreement of the Contractor. In any of these events or circumstances, the 
Contractor may, upon giving 14 days’ notice to the Employer, terminate the Contract. 
However, the Contractor may by notice terminate the Contract immediately in the case of 
Employer’s bankruptcy and prolonged suspension of work by the Engineer. It is also provided 
that termination by the Contractor will not prejudice any other rights of the Contractor, under 
the Contract or otherwise. 
 
Sub-Clauses 15.2, 15.3, 15.4, 16.3 and 16.4 deals with the consequences of termination and 
provides for its prospective effect and restitutionary duties as well as detailed termination 
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procedures. Sub-Clause 15.2 provides that when the Employer terminates the contract, the 
Contractor must deliver to the Engineer any “required Goods, all Contractor's Documents, and 
other design documents made by or for him”. Reflecting the importance of cooperation during 
termination, Sub-Clause 15.2 provides that the Contractor shall use his best efforts to comply 
immediately with any reasonable instructions included in the notice of termination for the 
assignment of any subcontract, and for the protection of life or property or for the safety of 
the Works. It is provided that after termination, the Employer may complete the Works and 
use any Goods, Contractor’s Documents and other design documents made by or on behalf of 
the Contractor.  
 
Sub-Clause 15.3 deals with the valuation of the work done by the Contractor after a notice of 
termination by Employer has taken effect, and requires the Engineer to agree or determine the 
value of the Works, Goods and Contractor’s Documents, and any other sums due to the 
Contractor for work executed in accordance with the Contract. Sub-Clause 15.4 sets out the 
terms of payment after termination by the Employer. It provides that Employer may (i) 
proceed with claims for any payment to which he considers himself to be entitled, (ii) 
withhold further payments to the Contractor until the costs of execution, completion and 
remedying of any defects, damages for delay in completion and all other costs incurred by the 
Employer, have been established, and/or (iii) recover from the Contractor any losses and 
damages incurred by the Employer and any extra costs of completing the Works.  
 
Sub-Clause 16.3 provides that after a notice of termination under Sub-Clause 15.5 
(Employer’s termination for convenience), Sub-Clause 16.2 (Termination by contractor) or 
Sub-Clause 19.6 (Optional termination, payment and release in cases of force majeure) has 
taken effect, the Contractor shall promptly cease all further work, except for such work as 
may have been instructed by the Engineer for the protection of life or property or for the 
safety of the Works, hand over Contractor’s Documents, Plant, Materials and other work, for 
which the Contractor has received payment, and remove all other Goods from the Site, except 
as necessary for safety, and leave the Site. When the Contractor terminates the contract in 
accordance with Sub-Clause 16.2, the Employer shall promptly return the Performance 
Security to the Contractor, pay the Contractor in accordance with Sub-Clause 19.6, which 
provides that that upon termination, the Engineer shall determine the value of the work done 
and issue a Payment Certificate, including amounts payable for works and certain costs 
incurred by the Contractor, and pay to the Contractor the amount of any loss or damage 
sustained by the Contractor as a result of the termination. 
 
The general approach of the FIDIC Conditions to the issue of termination can also be found in 
the ICC model contract for the turnkey supply of an industrial plant. Article 30.1 allows the 
Purchaser to terminate the contract in cases where cumulated liquidated damages for delay 
exceeds the maximum amount determined by the parties or, where the Plant fails to attain 
minimum performance levels at the time of taking over. Article 30.2 allows the Supplier to 
terminate the contract if the Purchaser is in breach of any of its payment obligations and this 
breach continues longer than ninety days, or such other period as the parties may agree. 
Article 30 also provides a standard of fundamental non-performance requirement as well as an 
opportunity to cure for termination. Under Articles 30.1 (c) and 30.2 (a), either party may 
terminate the contract where the other party has failed to perform a substantial obligation 
under the contract after having been served “a notice of failure and make good” by the first 
party within a reasonable period. Moreover, Article 30 enables termination of the contract for 
insolvency as an instance of anticipatory breach. Either party may terminate the contract if the 
other party becomes bankrupt or insolvent and fails to provide, at the first party’s request, an 
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adequate security for the fulfillment of obligations. Finally, Article 30.1 (e) enables the 
Purchaser to terminate the contract if the Supplier is involved in bribery.  
 
The introductory note to the ICC Model Contract for the turnkey supply of an industrial plant 
draws attention to the harsh consequences of the retrospective effect of termination, namely 
unreasonably high losses for the supplier resulting from returning the contract price and 
dismantling of the plant, which is frequently tailor made and cannot be resold. On the other 
hand, it is acknowledged that there is a need to protect the purchaser against the risk of being 
forced to keep a plant that does not fulfill its reasonable expectations.
2568
 Thus, Article 30 
aims to achieve a balance between these conflicting considerations through a risk allocation. 
As to the effect of termination, Article 30.4 states that termination shall not affect obligations 
which have already been performed at the time when the termination notice is given nor the 
right to receive payment for obligations already performed.
2569
 This prospective effect does 
not apply in the case of termination by the Purchaser for the Plant’s failure to attain minimum 
performance levels at the time of taking over. In such a case, the Purchaser may require the 
Supplier at its own cost to dismantle and remove the equipment from the site and to pay back 
the contract price, as far as received, to the Purchaser.  
 
International finance agreements and share purchase agreements usually contain their own 
peculiar approach to the formulation of termination clauses. These clauses are usually specific 
to the representation and warranties part of the contract, where at least one of the parties states 
that certain events of default or other events enumerated in the termination clause do not exist 
at the time of the formation or performance of the contract.
2570
 Particularly, in the share 
purchase agreements, since the subject of the contract is the transfer of an enterprise, the 
sellers are required to cooperate for the achievement of the contractual purpose by conducting 
the business of the target enterprise in the ordinary course. Thus, those agreements usually 
contain measures against the behaviors of the sellers, which may decrease the value of the 
transaction to the buyer before the transfer actually occurs. Moreover, the share purchase 
agreements commonly include a form of risk allocation whereby the seller undertakes the risk 
of some objective events that affects the value of the target company, given that the target 
remains under the control of the seller during the period of time from the date of execution of 
the agreement until closing. Thus, the share purchase agreements regularly provide the buyers 
with an option to escape a deal when there is a material adverse change in the business 
operations, properties, prospects, assets or condition of the enterprise. These circumstances 
are determined more or less in detail in advance under the clauses, which are called “material 
adverse change” or “material adverse effect” clauses in practice. The share purchase 
agreements normally provide material adverse change protections for the buyer, but they are 
sometimes drafted to permit either party to terminate the transaction if a material adverse 
change has occurred with respect to the other party or if objective events that would constitute 
such a material adverse change have occurred. 
 
The conditions of material adverse change are usually clearly defined by the parties in the 
contract, which provides quantitative guidelines as to what constitutes a material adverse 
                                                 
2568
 ICC Model Contract for the Turnkey Supply of an Industrial Plant, ICC publication, 653, Paris, 2003, at 14 
2569
 Moreover, Article 34.5 explicitly provides that the confidentiality obligations shall survive any termination 
or expiration of the contract. 
2570
 Fontaine, Marcel & Filip De Ly, Drafting International Contracts: An Analysis of Contract Clauses, Brill 
Academic Publishers, 2009, at 573 
 691 
 
change.
2571
 However, adverse changes could conceivably be measured by means of a number 
of different quantitative indicia, and such clauses can significantly complicate the negotiation 
process.
2572
 Thus, sometimes the parties only agree on a vague standard in defining the 
material adverse change, and such clauses require interpretation by the courts or arbitral 
tribunals particularly with regard to matters over which a party has only partial control, such 
as market share, or no control, such as the availability or price of one or more commodities. In 
such cases, the decision maker should take into consideration the overall context of the 
negotiation and the long-term strategic aspects of the businesses involved in interpreting the 
scope of broad material adverse change clause in order to ascertain the risk allocation between 
the parties, and require the buyer, who invokes a material adverse change exception to its 
obligation to close, to prove that the circumstances indeed warrant the required materiality of 
effect under that risk allocation, in order to prevent a buyer from utilizing opportunistically 
the breadth and vagueness of the clause for escaping a deal.
2573
 
 
The ICC Model Mergers & Acquisitions Contract, Share Purchase Agreement, contains a 
material adverse change clause due to their increased frequency in practice.
2574
 However, the 
Model Contract does not provide any detail as to the definition of material adverse change, 
and merely advises the contracting parties wishing to utilize the model contract to give 
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particular regard not only to the specificities of the transaction and business but also to the 
evolution of practice and judge-made law in the relevant jurisdiction.
2575
 Article 5.3 of the 
Model Contract states that, in the event of a material adverse change, the buyer shall be 
excused from his obligations under the agreement without prejudice to available remedies 
when material adverse change being the result of an action or omission on the part of the 
seller. As Article 5.3 discharges the buyer from his obligation to pay, while reserving his 
claims for damages, its application results in automatic termination of the contract, in contrast 
to Article 6.1, which allows either party to terminate the contract with written notice with 
immediate effect when the conditions to closing have not satisfied by the closing date.    
 
International practice of drafting termination clauses in terms of problem solution and risk 
allocation may be observed in the ICC Model Commercial Agency Contract. Article 18 of the 
Model Contract provides for the regular termination of the contract by giving a written notice, 
which effectively terminates the contract after a certain period of time. Apart from the regular 
termination, Article 20 allows the parties to terminate the contract with immediate effect in 
certain circumstances and applies irrespective of the contract’s term being definite or 
indefinite. Article 20.1 provides that each party may terminate the contract with immediate 
effect by giving notice, in the event of a substantial breach by the other party, or in case of 
exceptional circumstances justifying termination. A substantial breach is defined by Article 
20.2 as any failure by a party to carry out all or part of his obligations under the contract 
resulting in such detriment to the other party as to substantially deprive him of what is entitled 
to expect under the contract. This definition is clearly modeled on Article 25 of the CISG.
2576
 
Article 20.3 enables the parties to list certain articles of the contract, violation of which 
justifies termination irrespective of the gravity of the breach. Moreover, Article 20.3 makes it 
clear that any violation of the contractual obligations may be considered as a substantial 
breach if such violation is repeated.  
 
Article 20.2 of the Model Contract defines the exceptional circumstances, referred to under 
Article 20.1, as being circumstances in which it would be unreasonable to require the 
terminating party to continue to be bound by the contract. Article 20.4 lists certain exceptional 
circumstances, such as bankruptcy and other financial difficulties and any circumstance which 
are likely to affect substantially one party’s ability to carry out his obligations. Moreover, the 
Model Contract provides Annex VII, which may be completed by the parties optionally. 
Annex VII allows the principal to terminate the contract immediately in the event of a change 
of control, ownership and/or management of the agent company. The omission to complete 
Annex VII or to mention a particular circumstance does not mean that this circumstance 
would never be considered an exceptional circumstance.
2577
  
 
Article 20.6 regulates the consequences of unjustified early termination. If a party’s 
termination of the contract is not justified, the termination will be effective, but the other party 
will be entitled to damages for the unjustified early termination. Such damages will be the 
loss suffered by the aggrieved party and the profit of which he has been deprived. In the 
absence of evidence of a greater or smaller loss, the damages will be equal to the average 
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commission for the period the contract would have been in force in case of a regular 
termination under Article 18.
2578
  
 
Under some national laws, when a commercial agency contract is terminated, the agent is 
entitled to some form of compensation from the principal for the goodwill that the agent has 
created or substantially increased. In view of differing approaches of national laws to the issue 
of “goodwill indemnity”, the ICC Model Commercial Agency Contract incorporates two 
alternative solutions. First alternative provides the standard protection applicable in many 
national legal systems, whereas the second alternative expressly excludes a right to indemnity 
for the agents from countries where no legal indemnity is recognized. However, the 
contracting parties are advised to take into account that, if the rules of the agent’s country 
governing the goodwill indemnity are to be considered as “international public policy”, they 
may have application to the contract, or even in cases where no such legislation exists, it may 
be considered by the decision maker fair to grant the indemnity, particularly if this conforms 
to the trading practices.
2579
  
 
The first alternative provides for the restitution of the benefits conferred by the agent to the 
principal. Accordingly, the agent is entitled to goodwill indemnification, if the agency 
contract is terminated in a legally valid way, under the conditions set out by Article 21.1. 
These conditions are: (a) the agent should have brought to the principal new customers or 
increased the volume of business with existing customers, and the principal continues to 
derive substantial benefits from those activities, and (b) the payment of indemnity should be 
equitable having regard to the surrounding circumstances. Pursuant to Article 21.2, the 
amount of indemnity will be calculated on the basis of reasonable commercial practice and 
not exceed a figure for one year calculated from the agent’s average annual remuneration over 
the preceding five years or, if the contract has lasted for less than five years, the average for 
the period in question. This provision follows the principle of an indemnity for a maximum 
period of one year, which is adopted by almost every national law awarding a goodwill 
indemnity.
2580 
According to Article 21.4, the agent shall have no right to indemnity in cases 
where the principal has terminated the contract for substantial breach by the agent or for 
exceptional circumstances, where the agent’s termination of the contract is not justified under 
Article 20, where the agent terminates the contract on grounds of age, infirmity or illness, and 
where the agent assigns his rights and duties under the contract to another person. Article 27.2 
provides that if there is an assignment by the agent, the goodwill indemnity of the new agent 
will be calculated by taking into account the activity of the old agent, but the price paid by the 
old agent to the new one cannot be a basis for calculating the indemnity. Article 21.5 provides 
that the goodwill indemnity is in lieu of any compensation for loss or damage arising from 
contract expiry or termination, but Article 20.6 contains an exception and makes it clear that 
damages for unjustified early termination will be in addition to the indemnity under Article 
21.  
 
Moreover, pursuant to Article 19.1, the agent is entitled to commissions for orders transmitted 
by the agent or received by the principal from the relevant customers before the termination or 
expiry of the contract and which result in the conclusion of a contract for sale not more than 
six months after expiration or termination. This provision establishes an irrefutable 
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presumption that these contracts of sale are attributable to the agent’s work during the agency 
contract.
2581
  For orders received after the expiration or termination of the agency contract, the 
agent is not, in principle, entitled to commission, unless it proves that the conclusion of the 
transaction is mainly attributable to its efforts during the agency contract, that the conclusion 
of the transaction took place within a reasonable period of time after the end of the agency 
contract, and that the agent informed the principal in writing, before the end of the contract, of 
the pending negotiations which may give rise to commission. Finally, after expiry or 
termination of the contract, Article 22 requires the agent to return to the principal all 
advertising material and other documents and samples, which have been supplied to him by 
the principal and are in the agent’s possession. 
 
2. Arbitral Decision Making 
 
The tension between justice in a particular case and legal certainty is clearly apparent in the 
case of termination of contracts. Thus, the national legal systems and international 
instruments adopt both some safeguards of general application, and vague standards, which 
enable the decision maker to account for the circumstances of a particular case. Particularly in 
the field of termination for non-performance, the default rules contained in those sources aim 
to strike a balance between the competing interests of the parties: the interests of the 
aggrieved party, who does not wish to continue with its performance, as it would have to 
extend a credit to the non-performing party with a danger that the aggrieved party would 
never repaid, and the interests of the non-performing party, who does not wish to lose its 
contractual rights when it performed its obligations to a great extent.
2582
  
 
In international contracting practice, the parties prefer much more tailor-made clauses. These 
clauses regulate the conditions that justify the termination of the contract. These conditions 
are not necessarily limited to the non-performance of contractual obligations. The non-
performance of contract is an instance of the circumstances that justify the termination of the 
contract. Such circumstances may also be provided by the parties in the form of the 
bankruptcy or insolvency of a party, where the breach of that party is anticipated, illegal acts 
of a party in its performance of the contract, where the other party does not wish to be 
involved in such practices, or the occurrence of some events that are outside of the control of 
the parties. In other words, the termination clauses declare the circumstances, whether it is 
non-performance or another event, under which the parties no longer wish to continue their 
contractual relationships. Moreover, the parties commonly specify the process of termination 
as well as its consequences. The widespread use of such termination clauses indicates that the 
contracting parties treat the issue of termination as a matter of risk allocation and a problem 
solving mechanism.  
 
Thus, for the decision maker applying lex mercatoria, the termination of contract, as an 
inherent part of the contractual relationship, is a matter of interpretation and supplementation 
of the contract. Accordingly, the surrounding circumstances, nature and purpose of the 
contract in a particular dispute as well as the articulated rules, which contain both the 
contractual clauses and the default rules chosen by the parties, indicate the risk allocation 
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between the parties, which determines the circumstances under which the parties wish to 
terminate the contractual relationship, the process that must be followed by the parties to 
terminate, and the consequences of such a termination.  
 
a. Circumstances Justifying Termination  
 
The decision maker applying lex mercatoria should consider the necessity of establishing a 
balance between the competing interests of the parties in the cases of termination. The basic 
principle of pacta sunt servanda requires the protection of the interests of the party, when he is 
entitled to terminate the contract upon the occurrence of certain circumstances. These 
circumstances are defined by the articulated rules, as non-performance of certain obligations, 
the changes in the parties’ financial capabilities or management, or the changes in the 
conditions of the relevant market. In exercising his abstract reasoning, the decision maker 
applying lex mercatoria should consider that the continued performance of the obligations of 
the parties under the contract depends on the absence of those circumstances. However, this 
consideration may be subject to qualification by the basic principle of good faith and fair 
dealing, which requires the decision maker to take into account the interests of the other party, 
in order to enable the correspondence between the expectations of the parties, and to reveal 
their reasonable expectations. Thus, the decision maker should determine whether the 
existence of the circumstances, which allegedly justify the termination of the contract, 
actually conforms to the risk allocation that has been agreed by the parties in the underlying 
bargain, which may need to be ascertained by the decision maker through a contextual 
approach in accordance with their reasonable expectations.  
 
ICC Case No. 8817 concerned an agreement for the exclusive distribution and sale of food 
products between a Spanish distributor, and a Danish principal. The contract allowed for 
termination without notice in the case of a substantial breach of contract, which was defined, 
inter alia, as the distributor’s “lack of ability” to pay and a “substantial modification in the 
ownership, organization or management of the distributor”. The principal terminated the 
contract on the basis of those grounds with immediate effect. The distributor commenced 
arbitral proceedings, claiming damages for unjustified termination of the contract. The 
contract did not contain a choice of law clause. The arbitrator considered that the CISG and its 
principles, as elaborated in the UNIDROIT Principles were perfectly suited to resolving the 
dispute, and the provisions of the contract, being the law of the parties, should apply.
2583
  
 
As to the distributor’s “lack of ability” to pay as a ground for termination, the arbitrator 
considered that the principal tried to change practices and usages of the parties, and “[t]he 
change affects the time limit for payment and the need for a continuous balance between the 
deliveries of goods and their payment”. Referring to Article 9 (1) of the CISG and Article 1.8 
of the UNIDROIT Principles on usages and practices, which the parties have established 
between themselves, the arbitrator stated that those modifications, wished by the principal, 
should have been negotiated with and accepted by the distributor. In the absence of such an 
agreement, the arbitrator held that the distributor’s continued application of the practices 
previously accepted at least tacitly by the parties did not constitute a ground for termination of 
the contract by the principal for the distributor’s lack of ability to pay the outstanding sums to 
the principal within the time limit set by the principal.
2584
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With regard to the substantial modification in the ownership, organization or management of 
the distributor, the arbitrator deduced from the nature of this ground, which allowed 
termination without notice, that it only sanctioned a substantial modification. According to the 
arbitrator, as is the case with all sanctions, its application could not be requested by those who 
were even partially responsible for the modification on which they relied in order to terminate 
the contract. The principal considered that the dismissal of the general manager of the 
distributor constituted a substantial modification in the management. The arbitrator examined 
the activities of the principal and the distributor’s general manager, and concluded that the 
principal helped the general manager in his secret activities at a competitor of the distributor, 
by delivering to him goods of the same nature as those delivered to the distributor, which 
eventually led to the general manager’s justified dismissal. The arbitrator held that the 
defendant had no relevant justification for terminating the contract on the basis of the 
dismissal of the claimant’s general manager that the defendant partly caused. 2585 Thus, the 
sole arbitrator decided that the principal had no ground for terminating the contract without 
notice and ordered the principal to pay damages.
 
 
 
In interpreting the termination clauses, the decision maker should determine, through a 
contextual approach and by considering the contract as a whole, the common intentions of the 
parties as to the regulation of the circumstances that justify the termination of the contract. In 
ICC Case No. 8362, the claimant distributor concluded an exclusive distributorship agreement 
with defendant manufacturer, for the distributorship in Europe of a product manufactured by 
the defendant. The agreement was governed by the law of New York. The agreement would 
continue for three years unless terminated pursuant to the termination clause, which provided 
for termination by mutual agreement. In the second year, the defendant decided to conclude 
an asset sale agreement and sold its non-core business to X. The distributorship agreement 
was not included among the assets transferred to X. However, following the sale, the claimant 
dealt with X and, in the initial months of the third year, received the defendant’s products 
from X on the conditions previously agreed by the defendant. Eventually, the claimant learned 
that it had no contract with X as the distributorship agreement was not assigned, that it would 
no longer have distribution rights in Europe and that it would have to buy the products 
through X’s European distributor at a higher price. The defendant responded to the claimant’s 
inquiry as to the status of the distributorship agreement by stating that it had not assigned the 
agreement but it was no longer manufacturing the product.
2586
  
 
The claimant argued that the defendant did not have the right to terminate the distributor 
agreement upon the sale to X and the defendant breached its obligations by transferring rights 
to the assignee that it had previously granted to claimant. The defendant argued that the 
supply clause of the distributor agreement allowed the manufacturer to cease entirely 
production of all products upon ninety days’ prior notice to the claimant, and that this right 
constituted an independent basis for cessation of the agreement in addition to the provisions 
of the termination clause.
2587
 The arbitrator held that the plain meaning of supply clause was 
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to allow for seasonal changes and not to allow for discontinuation of production as a ground 
for terminating the agreement, since the supply clause was neither included nor referenced in 
the termination clause. The arbitrator noted that a contrary interpretation would be 
inconsistent with a provision of termination clause, which entitled either party to terminate the 
contract upon thirty days prior notice to the other if the other party ceases to carry on 
business. The arbitrator further stated that even if the supply clause allowed the defendant to 
cease production entirely and terminate the agreement, it would be unreasonable and contrary 
to the principles of good faith and fair dealing to conclude that such conditions would include 
a sale of its product business.
2588
  
 
The defendant further argued that the agreement was terminated by mutual agreement, as 
provided by the termination clause in the agreement, since the claimant established its own 
course of dealing with X on an order-to-order basis, and this conduct amounted to consent to 
termination of the agreement. The arbitrator rejected this argument. The arbitrator noted that 
the claimant was not advised of the non-assignment to X and, thus, the claimant understood 
that the agreement remained in effect and pursued its business relationship with X on the basis 
that it retained its right under the distributorship agreement. Moreover, the arbitrator 
considered that the claimant’s ultimate position in the X distribution network was the subject 
of negotiations with X, and the claimant was entitled to expect that it might be able to retain 
essentially the same rights that it enjoyed under the distributor agreement, thereby avoiding 
the need for litigation.
2589
 The arbitrator held that no right of termination was allowed under 
supply clause and no termination occurred pursuant to termination clause, or by waiver and, 
thus, the defendant’s actions in assigning to X rights reserved to claimant under the 
distribution agreement constituted a breach thereof.
2590
 
 
Since it is considered as part of the reasonable expectation of each contracting party, on which 
its own obligation is based that the other party will perform its obligations, the non-
performance of the other party’s obligation is treated in all legal systems as the most 
important reason to terminate a contract.
2591
 Thus, it is generally argued in the doctrine that 
arbitrators treat a party’s right to terminate the contract for other party’s failure to perform or 
lack of proper performance as a general principle of law.
2592
 In the Lena Goldfields 
arbitration, the tribunal, applying general principles of law, decided that the conduct of the 
Government, which resulted in a total impossibility for Lena of either performing the 
Concession Agreement or enjoying its benefits, was a breach of the contract going to the root 
of it and, thus, Lena was entitled to be relieved from the burden of further obligations 
thereunder and to be compensated in money for the value of the benefits of which it had been 
wrongfully deprived.
2593
 In the Sapphire award, the arbitrator stated that “There is a general 
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rule of private law to be found in positive systems of law, which says that a failure by one 
party to a synallagmatic contract to perform its obligations in breach of contract releases the 
other party from its obligations and gives rise to a right to pecuniary compensation in the form 
of damages. Although the methods of applying this principle differ, particularly with regard to 
judicial techniques and the formalities required for the implementing of this right, this rule is 
a general rule, and constitutes a general principle of law recognized by civilized nations…. 
However different the judicial techniques employed may be, however divergent may be the 
theoretical explanations given by doctrine, one point is certain: this principle is explained by 
the interdependence of the obligations contained in the same contract. It would be illogical 
and contrary to the most elementary notions of equity if one party could obtain satisfaction 
while the other suffered a loss. Whether the notion of the reciprocal effect of obligations, of 
the equal value of obligations, or of the implied condition is relied on, it is impossible to 
escape the essential and elementary conclusion that one of the parties must not benefit from 
the performance of the contract by his partner while evading his own obligations. The 
disregarding of the contractual law by one of the parties releases the other from its 
undertakings.”2594 
 
Due to the concern for striking a balance between the interests of the parties in the cases of 
termination of contract, the national legal systems are based on a basic principle for the 
termination of contracts, namely that there must be an actual or imminent breach of a certain 
degree of seriousness.
2595
 The existence of a serious breach implies the absence of a 
substantial performance by the party in breach. In this context, substantial performance by a 
party prevents the other party from terminating the contract. For example, the breach of minor 
obligations alone does not give rise to the right of the aggrieved party to terminate the 
contract, or the party in breach is given a fair opportunity to remedy its defective performance 
if this is reasonable. The interests of the aggrieved party in substantial performance of the 
other party are also protected through the mechanisms of anticipatory breach or adequate 
assurances for performance. Although these mechanisms have not been uniformly adopted 
across the national legal systems, it can be said, in abstract terms, that most of the national 
legal systems as well as international instruments have opted for the default standard of 
substantial performance over that of perfect tender, which enhances the risk of strategic 
behavior and moral hazard on the part of the creditor, who may opportunistically take 
advantage of the possibility to reject any tender which is less than perfect and to refuse a 
substantially correct performance, whenever he seeks to free himself from his obligations 
promised in consideration of the debtor’s full performance.2596  
 
The decision maker applying lex mercatoria should apply this established rule in the order of 
international commerce that a party is entitled to treat itself as discharged from its obligations 
only if the other has committed a fundamental or material breach. In the application of this 
rule, the decision maker should refer to the terms of the contract in determining whether the 
non-performance of a particular obligation justifies the termination of the contract by the 
other party on the basis of the risk allocation agreed by the parties. The characterization of the 
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relevant obligation as an undertaking to achieve a specific result or to use one’s best efforts 
may be directly relevant to the determination of whether the termination is justified on the 
ground of fundamental non-performance. In the commercial agency contracts, the agent 
usually undertakes to use its best efforts to achieve a certain volume of the sales of the 
products of the supplier thereby assigning the risk of underachievement to the supplier, who 
may not terminate the agreement on that ground. In ICC Case No. 10422, which concerned an 
agreement for the exclusive distribution of a European manufacturer’s products in a Latin-
American distributor’s country, the manufacturer terminated the agreement alleging the 
distributor’s failure to meet the contractually agreed sales figures. The distributor argued that 
the termination was ineffective because the sales figures indicated in the agreement were not 
binding commitments. The tribunal, having decided to apply the general rules and principles 
of international contracts, noted that contrary to widespread contracting practice, the 
agreement did not expressly state that the failure to meet the agreed sales figures permits the 
supplier to terminate the contract. Considering that the agreement merely stated that the 
parties agreed on determined sales objectives and contained no obligation on the distributor’s 
part to guarantee that such a result would be achieved, the tribunal stated that the failure to 
meet the purchase objectives did not, in itself, amount to a breach of contract and, thus, 
cannot be considered a justifiable reason for termination in advance.
2597
 
 
Moreover, in cases where the parties explicitly provided remedies other than termination of 
the contract for the breach of a particular obligation, the decision maker should take into 
account the relevant contractual clauses, which indicate an allocation of risks between the 
parties, in determining whether the termination of the contract for the non-performance of 
such an obligation is justified. In a case in the Camera Arbitrale Nazionale ed Internazionale 
di Milano, the principal terminated an exclusive agency contract, alleging unsatisfactory sales 
results. The agent initiated arbitral proceedings invoking unlawful termination by the 
principal and claiming damages. The contract did not contain a choice of law clause but, at 
the outset of the arbitral proceedings, the parties agreed that the arbitrator would decide ex 
aequo et bono and apply the UNIDROIT Principles. Article 18 of the contract allowed either 
party to terminate the contract “before its expiry or renewal if the other party shall find that 
this agreement has been violated by the other party and the violation has not been cured.”2598 
Referring to Article 1.3 of the UNIDROIT Principles, which contains the principle of pacta 
sunt servanda, the arbitrator took into account another provision of the contract, where the 
parties explicitly intended that in case the sales target were not met, the parties were to decide 
by agreement whether to renegotiate the area and/or the commission fees. Moreover, the 
arbitrator interpreted Article 18 of the contract in the sense that non-performance under the 
contract should be communicated to the non-performing party, so that the latter could, if 
possible, remedy such non-performance, but no oral or written warning preceded the 
termination notice of the principal. The arbitrator also considered Article 7.3.1 of the 
UNIDROIT Principles on the question of fundamental non-performance as a requirement for 
termination, and concluded that “it seems impossible to deem fundamental for the termination 
a situation which was explicitly and expressly provided for by the parties to the contract as 
being renegotiable, by an agreement of the parties, as to the area or the commission fees.”2599 
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Thus, the arbitrator held that the unilateral termination of the agency contract was not 
justified.
2600
  
 
Under the transactions governed through legal uncertainty, the decisive factor in determining 
whether a non-performance is fundamental to justify the termination by the aggrieved party 
will usually be the extent of the detrimental effect of the breach on the aggrieved party’s 
reasonable expectations from the contractual relationship and from the breaching party’s 
future performance, which is also expressed in Article 7.3.1. (2) (d) of the UNIDROIT 
Principles, and in Article 8:103 (c) of the PECL. In Sapphire Award, the arbitrator found that 
the defendant, although having carried out one of its principal obligations, failed to 
collaborate closely with its partner under the contract, and showed its intention to refuse to 
collaborate loyally by its clearly unjustified grievances. The arbitrator considered this 
behavior of the defendant as a means to convince the plaintiff that the defendant intended to 
avoid the contract by continuous and systematic obstruction, but without wishing to be the 
first to denounce it. Thus, the arbitrator held that the defendant's behavior was likely to 
destroy any confidence their partner had, and in these circumstances, the defendant could not 
reasonably or in good faith require that the plaintiff should still be bound to proceed with the 
contract.
2601
  
 
In ICC Case No. 3267, the dispute arose from the termination of the contract by the claimant, 
a Mexican construction company, which was sub-contracted by the defendant, a Belgian 
company, in relation to a part of a construction project in Saudi Arabia. In the proceedings, 
the claimant sought for a declaration that the contract had been terminated legitimately for the 
defendant’s payment defaults. The contract authorized the arbitrators to decide as amiable 
composituers, and the arbitrators decided to apply “the widely accepted general principle 
governing commercial international with no specific reference to a particular system of 
law.”2602  The arbitrators first looked at the nature of the contract and characterized the 
contract as a lump sum contract setting forth a fixed price subject to modifications only in 
limited cases set out by the contract. The arbitrators stated that “Consistent with this principle 
of a lump sum contract, and more particularly with an international agreement drafted in 
English and using the Anglo-American approach of spelling out very detailed provisions 
entailing correspondingly strict adherence thereto, the parties have in effect agreed that the 
Contract’s price was not to be modified in case of failure by the Contractor to meet its 
obligations as regards quality of the Works to be performed and of the equipment to be 
supplied; in such cases, the remedy available to Defendant during the construction period was 
to request the Contractor, as spelled out in … the Contract, to remove and replace at its own 
cost any material not conformity with the contractual standards and specifications and to re-
execute at his own cost the Works, which did not meet such standards. Pursuant to [the 
Contract], had the Contractor not started corrective action within a 10 day period, after 
request by … Defendant, … Defendant had the right to employ other contractors at 
Contractor’s expenses.” The arbitrators considered that, under such a contract, the failure of 
the contractor to meet its obligations concerning the conformity and the quality of the 
equipment and services supplied had no direct impact on the contract price or on the payment 
procedure and such a failure was to be remedied by the specific procedures set out in the 
contract. The arbitrators observed that “when attempting to justify its payment withholding to 
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Claimant, Defendant identified specific grounds spelled out in the contract, and did not relate 
it to, or invoke, Claimant’s failure to perform under its general obligations as contractor.”2603  
 
Thus, the arbitrators sought to establish whether the defendant’s payment defaults justified 
termination by the claimant, and whether the claimant’s termination was in compliance with 
the contract, which particularly required that claimant’s termination should not be arbitrary. 
Under the circumstances, the normal contractual remedy available to the defendant under the 
contract was either to seek with the claimant an agreed upon amendment or to request the 
claimant to suspend the progress of the works, being subject to financial obligations spelled 
out in the contract. The arbitrators found that the defendant never attempted to negotiate a 
settlement with the claimant and, rather than applying the existing contractual procedure of 
suspension, elected to make unilaterally a deduction in an amount which it fixed itself. 
Moreover, the arbitrators considered that the abruptness of its deduction without advance 
warning was not in keeping with the good faith spirit which should have prevailed in the 
performance of the contract. Thus, the arbitrators held that the defendant had no right to make 
unilateral deduction and, in doing so, failed to pay the claimant amounts which had become 
due under the contract.
2604
 Subsequently, the arbitrators found that the claimant had met all 
the formal requirements for termination under the contract. As to the issue of arbitrariness of 
termination, the arbitrators considered that the amount in dispute was substantial, even if it 
represented only a percentage of about 3.35% of the total amount of the contract price. 
According to the arbitrators, the claimant’s operations under the contract were clearly 
underfinanced and the non-payment of the amounts due was very likely to jeopardize the 
financial capability of the claimant to continue performance under the contract. More 
importantly, the arbitrators noted that the defendant’s attitude was very rigid in its refusal to 
pay, and the defendant had already taken preliminary steps to have the claimant replaced by 
another company.
2605
 Thus, the arbitrators held that the contract was terminated legitimately 
and not arbitrarily by the claimant in accordance with its terms. 
 
The failure of the party to cure its defective performance when it is invited by the aggrieved 
party to do so may become an important factor for the decision maker in determining whether 
the termination for fundamental non-performance is justified on the ground that the non-
performance gives the aggrieved party reason to believe that it cannot rely on the other party's 
future performance. In a case decided under the auspices of Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce, the claimant and the defendant concluded an agreement for the license and 
manufacture of certain products in China, but the factory never reached the production stage 
and was closed by the defendant. The claimant terminated the contract since the agreement 
placed the responsibility for the setting up of the plant and for the manufacture and production 
basically on the defendant. The contract did not contain a choice of law clause, and the 
arbitral tribunal decided to apply Chinese law to the substance of the dispute. The arbitral 
tribunal considered the closure of the plant by the defendant as an indication that, in view of 
the totality of existing deficiencies in the plant, the defendant saw no possibility to get 
production started and to usefully continue to perform its duties. The tribunal took into 
account the fact that the breach of contract was never actually cured by the defendant despite 
notifications by the claimant. Thus, the tribunal concluded that the breaches of contract by the 
defendant were so serious and enduring as to entitle the claimant to give notice of termination, 
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and the defendant was liable in damages towards the claimant. The tribunal also rejected the 
defendant’s argument that under Chinese law, the claimant was not entitled to terminate and 
instead had a right merely to suspend the contract. According to the tribunal, suspension was 
an alternative remedy that was open to the claimant, but in the prevailing situation, where the 
defendant consistently failed to cure its breaches of contract after notification, it was not 
mandatory.
2606
  
 
In another case concerning the request for termination, the claimant, a U.S distributor, 
terminated a one year exclusive sale and distribution agreement and brought an action before 
the Centro de Arbitraje de México against the defendant, a Mexican grower, arguing that the 
defendant had breached the contract by not providing the goods referred to in the contract and 
by violating the exclusivity clause. The UNIDROIT Principles were applicable in the case as 
a result of the choice of parties to that effect. In the arbitral tribunal’s opinion, the non-
performance by the defendant was fundamental since at least three of the criteria laid down in 
Article 7.3.1 (2) were met: first, the defendant’s failure to deliver deprived the claimant of the 
goods it was entitled to expect under the contract; second, the defendant’s violation of the 
exclusivity clause was intentional; and, third, these two circumstances were enough to give 
the claimant reason to believe that it could not rely on the defendant’s future performance. 
Thus, the tribunal held that the contractual violations of the defendant constituted a 
“fundamental breach” under Article 7.3.1 of the UNIDROIT Principles, and enabled the 
claimant to exercise its right to terminate the contract in accordance with Article 7.3.2 of the 
UNIDROIT Principles.
2607
 
 
In ICC Case No. 9797, i.e. Andersen case, Andersen Worldwide Société Coopérative 
(“AWSC”), was found by the tribunal to be obliged under the Member Firm Interfirm 
Agreements (“MFIFAs”) within the Arthur Andersen Group to exercise its best efforts to 
ensure co-operation, co-ordination, and compatibility between the practices of Andersen 
Consulting Business Unit member firms (“ACBU”) and Arthur Andersen Business Unit 
member firms (“AABU”). Referring to the criteria set forth in Article 7.3.1 (2) of the 
UNIDROIT Principles, the tribunal found that the AWSC’s failure amounted to a 
fundamental non-performance on the basis of following considerations: first, AWSC’s failure 
to exercise its best efforts to co-ordinate the member firms’ practices substantially deprived 
ACBU members of the co-operative benefits they were entitled to expect under MFIFAs
2608
; 
second, strict compliance with the obligation to co-ordinate was of the essence of MFIFAs, as 
co-ordination amongst member firms was the ‘cornerstone’ of these agreements2609; third, 
AWSC’s non-performance gave ACBU members reason to believe that they could not rely on 
AWSC’s future performance2610; and fourth, AWSC could not possibly suffer a 
disproportionate loss as a result of the preparation or performance if ACBU member firms’ 
MFIFAs were terminated, because AWSC was an instrumentality for the purpose of 
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coordinating the member firms' professional practice and would only be paid as long as the 
inter-firm agreements remained in force.
2611
  
 
The last factor that was taken into account by the tribunal in ICC Case No 9797 in 
determining fundamental non-performance is that of Article 7.3.1 (2) (e) of the UNIDORIT 
Principles, i.e. whether the non­performing party will suffer disproportionate loss as a result 
of the preparation or performance if the contract is terminated. Similarly, the tribunal in the 
Ad Hoc Award dated November 3, 1977, took into account this factor of reliance, and found 
that the party exercising its right to terminate was liable for damages resulting from its 
termination of the contract. In the case, the arbitrators, empowered to decide as amiable 
composituers, were asked to decide on the claim that the contract was terminated under 
circumstances devoid of all good faith. The dispute arose from a license contract whereby 
MMM, a Belgian company, granted part of its exclusive distributorship to Mechema, an 
English company. Mechema initiated arbitral proceedings claiming that MMM’s termination 
was without sufficient notice and contrary to good faith. Mechema argued that MMM had 
devised a business plan which would disloyally set Mechema aside in favor of one of MMM’s 
own branch, and this branch was to hire Mechema’s sales managers, who had a thorough 
knowledge of the organization and its clients. MMM responded that it had terminated the 
contract because of Mechama’s lack of interest and competing industrial activities and it had 
notified Mechema as prescribed by the contract. The arbitrators decided to apply lex 
mercatoria to the substance of the dispute in the exercise of their power as amiable 
composituers. The arbitrators found that there was no plan to set Mechema aside, and the 
hiring of those employees did not constitute a disloyal action. Moreover, the arbitrators 
considered that Mechema had become a competitor to MMM, rather than a concessionaire in 
regard to their clients. While admitting that MMM had the right to terminate the contract in 
accordance with the stipulated notice of three months in advance, the tribunal considered the 
exercise of this right in the particular circumstances as a violation of equity since, even if 
devoid of any intention of causing damage, there was disparity between the advantage that the 
exercise of the right to terminate procured to MMM and the damage which results therefrom 
for Mechema, particularly under a sale concession agreement by which two companies were 
linked together for long-term operations and where termination of relations especially affects 
the concessionaire.
2612
 Thus, the arbitrators held that damages should be awarded to 
Mechema.       
 
The intention of one the parties to terminate the contract, even if it results in a 
disproportionate loss to the other party or it is otherwise unfounded, may imply the rupture of 
continuing relationship between the parties, particularly when the contractual relationship 
requires the existence of a certain degree of cooperation.
 
Thus, even if termination by one 
party is not justified, the decision maker applying lex mercatoria should take into account the 
negative impact of a termination notice, which will often lead to a loss of confidence between 
the parties, making it difficult for them to continue to work together. In those cases, unlawful 
termination should effectively end the contractual relationship, enabling the aggrieved party 
to claim damages.
2613
 In ICC Case No. 10422, as to the effects of an unjustified termination of 
                                                 
2611
 Ibid., at 185-186 
2612
 Ad hoc Award, November 3, 1977, Mechema Ltd vs. S.A. Mines, Minerais et Metaux, Yearbook 
Commercial Arbitration, 7 (1982), at 80 
2613
 ICC (Final) Award in Case No. 5946, 1990, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, (1991), at 109: The 
arbitrator applying New York law to an exclusive agency agreement stated that “This termination of the 
Agreement was legally effective irrespective as to whether it was justified.” Ad Hoc UNCITRAL Award of 17 
November 1994, Banque Arabe et Internationale d’Investissements et al v Inter-Arab Investment Guarantee 
 704 
 
a contract, the tribunal observed that in civil law systems, unjustified termination is 
ineffective, with the result that such a contract will remain in force and the parties will 
continue to have to fulfill their obligations, whereas, in common law systems, even an 
unjustified termination puts an end to the contractual relationship, and the party who has 
unjustifiably terminated the contract is liable for damages to compensate the loss the other 
party has suffered. The tribunal considered that the second approach, which has the advantage 
of certainty in contractual relationships, is the one generally adopted in international trade 
law. According to the tribunal, the UNIDROIT Principles confirmed this point of view by 
providing in Article 7.3.2(1) that “The right of a party to terminate the contract is exercised by 
notice to the other party”, and in Article 7.3.5(1), that “Termination of the contract releases 
both parties from their obligation to effect and to receive future performance.” Accordingly, 
the tribunal decided that a notice of termination is effective even if unjustified with the result 
that the other party may not require specific performance of the contract but can only claim 
damages for the unjustified termination.
 2614
 
 
The decision maker applying lex mercatoria may deem the breach of an implied obligation by 
a party as so substantial that the aggrieved party may no longer reasonably expect the 
possibility of proceeding with the contractual relationship. In such a case, the decision maker 
may interpret the articulated rules to the effect that the aggrieved party is enabled to terminate 
the contract without following the process set out by the contract regulating the termination 
for the violation of specific contractual obligations. In this sense, the termination of contract 
for the violation of implied obligations can be considered as an instance of the termination for 
just cause under some national legal systems, to the extent the termination of contract is 
justified on the ground that the reasonable expectations of the aggrieved party from the future 
of the contractual relationship are substantially impaired by the conduct of the other party. 
 
In an award rendered under the auspices of Italian Arbitration Association, the arbitral 
tribunal considered that the breach of an implied obligation to cooperate by one party could 
justify the termination by the other party of an exclusive distributorship contract without 
following the procedures set out in the contract for its termination. The parties chose Italian 
law as the applicable law. The claimant, the Danish distributor, commenced arbitration 
proceedings against the defendant, the licensee for Europe of a fashion product and its 
trademark, seeking termination of the distributorship contract and damages. The claimant 
argued that the defendant breached its obligation to protect the trademark and the claimant 
was compelled to undertake expensive court proceedings in the country of the original 
licensor. The contract provided that the defendant and its licensor were responsible for the 
protection and maintenance of the trademarks in connection with the products in the territory, 
and would bear all costs and expenses relative to such protection and maintenance in the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Corporation, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, (1996), at 36-37: The tribunal applying the common legal 
principles prevailing in the Arab world and international law at large stated that, in the case of an unjustified 
termination of a loan guarantee agreement, the aggrieved party had the right either to withhold performance of 
such of its obligations as were correlative to the unperformed obligations of the other party or to treat the 
contract as terminated and sue for compensation in lieu of performance, which occurred in this case. Chamber of 
National and International Arbitration of Milan, Final Award in Case No. 1795, December 1, 1996, Yearbook 
Commercial Arbitration, (1999), at 201-206: The sole arbitrator, applying UNIDROIT Principles to the question 
of unlawful termination of contract in a case dealing with an exclusive agency contract, held that, upon 
unfounded termination, both parties were freed of their obligations and could no longer rely on their rights under 
the contract. 
2614
 ICC Award in Case No. 10422, 2001, Excerpts of the original French version of the award have been 
published in Journal du droit international, (2003), pp. 1142-1150 Available in English at 
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=2&do=case&id=957&step=FullText  
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territory.
2615
 According to the claimant, the defendant should have acted for the protection of 
the trademark against parallel imports in the claimant’s territory of products coming from the 
country of the original licensor of the defendant. The defendant argued that it had satisfied its 
obligation to defend the trademark by putting together a team of lawyers with the task of 
combating parallel imports in Europe.  
 
The arbitral tribunal noted that the contractual clause provided for defendant only an 
obligation to protect the trademark, without saying anything about the means to be used to 
engage in such protective action and, thus, the defendant was free to adopt the strategy 
considered most appropriate. However, the tribunal maintained that, even though the 
defendant may not have had the duty to engage in specific legal actions against exporters 
and/or parallel importers, it should at least have cooperated with claimant, providing it with 
appropriate support. In the tribunal’s opinion, “it is true that strictly such a contractual duty of 
cooperation in the event of legal proceedings was provided to be borne only by claimant, in 
the case of similar initiatives being undertaken by defendant or its licensor, but this does not 
mean that, in general terms, a similar duty of assistance and cooperation should not be borne 
by defendant in the converse case, that is on the basis of the duty under Art. 1375 CC to 
perform a contract in accordance with good faith, ‘to be understood as an “undertaking of 
cooperation and protection of the interests of the other party to the contract”, operating 
“beyond the specific provisions” of the agreement and not capable of exclusion by the will of 
the parties’.”2616  
 
Thus, the tribunal held that there was a conduct not in compliance with the principle of good 
faith since the defendant failed to give due cooperation to claimant, when the latter embarked 
upon its own legal actions against the exporters in the country of the original licensor. The 
tribunal considered that, according to Article 1453 of the Italian Civil Code, a party in 
compliance with the contract may request the cancellation of the contract when the other party 
is in breach and Article 1455 provides that the cancellation may not be adjudicated if the 
breach is of little importance. The tribunal stated that “defendant, on account of its 
insufficient defence of the trademark, has breached the fundamental principle of performance 
in good faith (Art. 1375 CC). It is thus in breach in relation to claimant, fatally flawing the 
possibility of proceeding with the contractual relationship between the parties.” 2617 However, 
the claimant had not followed the termination procedures set out in the contract, which 
required the aggrieved party to notify the other in writing requesting correction and, in the 
event of failure to correct within the following twenty days, the aggrieved party would have 
the right to terminate by giving simple notice to that effect. Instead, the claimant had simply 
informed the defendant that it would have recourse to arbitration proceedings in order to 
obtain termination of the contract.
2618
 The tribunal noted that the claimant failed to implement 
the procedure contractual envisaged and to insist on performance prior to being able to invoke 
the effect of termination. According to the tribunal, the parties were in a state of mutual 
breach, and, referring to Italian case law, determined that the culpable breach was committed 
by the defendant, whose conduct was such as to preclude any future possibility of working 
together as had been foreseen by the parties at the time of making the contract. Thus, the 
                                                 
2615
 Italian Arbitration Association, Final Award in Case No. 76/98, November 24, 1999, Yearbook Commercial 
Arbitration, (2000), at 376 
2616
 Ibid., at 377 
2617
 Ibid., at 380 
2618
 Ibid., at 379 
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arbitral tribunal pronounced the termination of the contract for the overriding fault of the 
defendant.
 2619
  
 
b. Termination Process 
 
Under lex mercatoria, even if the particular circumstances of the case justify the termination 
of the contract by a party, such a party is still, in principle, required to follow the process of 
termination set out by the terms of contract or the applicable default rules, for the validity of 
termination. Under national legal systems, the process of termination of the contract in cases 
of non-performance is essentially aimed at controlling the uncertainty arising from the 
standards of substantial performance or serious non-performance and, thus, the ground and 
process of termination are closely intertwined. Some legal systems provide a fallback line for 
cases where the seriousness of breach might be uncertain, by the instrument of a request of the 
aggrieved party, which makes the obligation of the essence by setting a period of grace, while 
other legal systems are based on a general requirement that the aggrieved party first has to set 
an additional period of time to allow the non-performing party a second chance, but that such 
an additional period of time is considered unnecessary in cases of an obviously fundamental 
or incurable breach.
2620
 In both cases, since the delicate balancing of interests that is required 
in termination for non-performance cases is pre-eminently a matter of interpretation and 
judicial discretion, an evaluation of reasonable expectations of the parties with regard to the 
process of termination is indispensable almost in every case.
 
 
 
Some legal systems generally require the aggrieved party to seek termination in legal 
proceedings before a court. This requirement can be considered as a result of the prevalence 
of the idea of enforceability of contractual promises over the determination of available 
remedies for non-performance. In those legal systems, the enforceability of contract blends 
with the available remedy for non-performance, which leads to the conclusion that 
termination must be judicial so that, once bound, the parties may not set themselves free from 
the contract, unless the parties clearly indicate their intentions to that effect, or the conduct of 
the debtor makes the continuation of the contractual relationship impossible or unbearable for 
the creditor. In this context, contracts are meant to be performed and, since termination is 
opposed to performance, specific performance is naturally considered to be the primary 
remedy, which is no longer distinguished from the enforceability of contracts.
2621
  
 
However, the enforceability of contracts means that the connection established between the 
parties is legally enforceable. It is embodied in the principle of pacta sunt servanda that a 
party who does not abide by his contractual obligations is subject to a sanction, in the same 
way as any individual who does not respect the law. Because its conduct does not comply 
with the norm, the party in breach of contract shall be liable to accept the remedial 
consequences of the infringement. Thus, enforceability should not be confused with the 
remedies for breach of contract. In essence, there is no opposition between the principle of 
enforceability of contracts and termination of the contract.
2622
 The former allows legally 
                                                 
2619
 Ibid., at 380 
2620
 Schlechtriem, Peter, The German Act to Modernize the Law of Obligations in the Context of Common 
Principles and Structures of the Law of Obligations in Europe, Oxford U Comparative L Forum, 2 (2002), at 
ouclf.iuscomp.org, text after note 37 
2621
 Laithier, Yves-Marie, Comparative Reflections on the French Law of Remedies for Breach of Contract, in 
Nili Cohen & Ewan McKendrick, Comparative Remedies for Breach Of Contract, Oxford: Hart, 2005, at 117 
2622
 Ibid. 
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formed agreements to penetrate the sphere of the law, so that the contract becomes legally 
enforceable. The latter, as with any other remedy, requires a balance to be struck between the 
conflicting interests of the parties in the presence of a contractual dispute in order to give 
effect to the reasonable expectations of the parties. In cases of termination of contract, the 
principle of good faith and fair dealing requires the decision maker to take into account not 
only the interests of the aggrieved party, but also those of the non-performing party in 
determining whether termination is justified. However, the enforceability should not be 
concerned with determining the scope of the remedies available to the parties without 
obtaining a judicial order.  
 
Unless the parties chose the default rules of those national legal systems that require a judicial 
decision for the termination of the contract, the decision maker applying lex mercatoria 
should consider termination of contract as a form of self-help remedy, which can be done 
without obtaining a judicial order, in accordance with the approach of many national legal 
systems and international instruments. Thus, the decision maker may consider as idiosyncratic 
and disregard the rules of those national legal systems that require a judicial decision for 
termination, when they are applicable to the substance of the dispute pursuant to the 
established rules of conflict. The aggrieved party may terminate the contract by giving notice 
to the other party. Unless there are circumstances justifying immediate termination without 
notice, the period of notice may also be considered as a perquisite for the exercise of the right 
to terminate the contract, since the notice period mitigates the harsh consequences of 
termination by enabling transition particularly in long term relationships. Moreover, the 
decision maker applying lex mercatoria should consider at an abstract level the contracting 
practices of drafting termination clauses in terms of problem solutions, which incorporate into 
those clauses the safeguards against termination under the national legal systems, such as the 
mechanisms of adequate assurance, Nachfrist and cure. On the basis of such an abstract 
reasoning, the decision maker should determine, in the context of the specific circumstances 
of the case, the proper process of termination by taking into account the degree to which each 
party is entitled to good faith cooperation from the other, the extent to which the aggrieved 
party should be entitled to get exactly what was promised to him, the importance of the 
particular obligation for the aggrieved party and the foreseeability of this importance for the 
non-performing party, and the level of need for preserving the contractual relationship even 
when things have gone wrong by giving additional chances to perform. 
 
In most cases, the decision maker may determine the validity of the process of the termination 
of the contract by examining the terms of the contract and facts of the case. Thus, the decision 
maker applying lex mercatoria should consider the contractual clauses, the nature and purpose 
of the contract, as well as the surrounding circumstances in deciding on the question of 
whether the right to terminate the contract is effected through a proper process. In ICC Case 
No 9797, i.e. Andersen case, the tribunal held that AWSC's conduct amounted to a 
fundamental nonperformance of its obligations under the MFIFAs. AWSC argued that the 
ACBU member firms ignored the termination provisions of MFIFAs. The tribunal examined 
the MFIFAs’ relevant provisions as to the process of termination. MFIFA allowed a member 
firm or AWSC to terminate the member firm's MFIFA upon receipt of a notice of termination 
in the event of breach or default. The tribunal noted that Paragraph 14 of the MFIFAs 
enumerated several termination events, among them, the provision governing unilateral 
termination by a wronged party and, separately from the unilateral termination clause, the 
MFIFAs also contained certain arbitration provisions for the resolution of any and all disputes 
which cannot be settled amicably, arising out of or in connection with the MFIFAs (Paragraph 
22.1 of the MFIFAs) and regardless of whether the complaining party seeks to be released 
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from its obligations under the MFIFAs. According to the tribunal, those two paragraphs 
clearly regulated different events and offered a wronged party the alternative rights to 
terminate its MFIFA when a material breach has occurred or to resort to arbitration in search 
of a final decision that will resolve a dispute with another party. The tribunal stated that while, 
in the event of unilateral termination, the notice of breach was an essential condition for the 
aggrieved party to be relieved from its obligations insofar as it set in motion the procedure 
regulated in Paragraph 14.2 (F), such notice was not established, as a condition precedent to 
the commencement of an arbitration proceeding. The tribunal held that the ACBU member 
firms elected to exercise their right to arbitration under Paragraph 22 of the MFIFAs, instead 
of unilaterally terminating their MFIFAs and therefore were not under the obligation to serve 
AWSC with a notice of breach, and they did not file the arbitral proceeding in disregard of the 
notice provisions contained in the MFIFA.
2623
 Thus, the tribunal held that on account of 
AWSC's fundamental non-performance, the ACBU member firms were released from all their 
obligations to AWSC and the AABU member firms under the MFIFAs as of the date the 
award was notified to the parties.
 2624
 
 
In ICC case No. 9839, the claimant Q Inc., an international mergers and acquisitions firm, 
specializing in cross-border transactions, had entered into an agreement with the defendant Q-
Z. Pursuant to the agreement, the defendant became the exclusive representative of the 
claimant in the United States for the so-called “pipeline deals”. The parties chose the law of 
New York as the applicable law. From the inception of the agreement, the claimant and the 
defendant had differences, which culminated in the termination of the agreement a few 
months later. The agreement contained a mixture of different grounds and procedures for 
termination, each having different effects on the rights and obligations of the parties. Clause 
8(1) allowed either party to terminate the agreement for any reason upon one month’s notice. 
Clause 8 (3) provided that the agreement could be terminated in the event of “a breach by the 
other party of any material term of the Agreement, which remains unremedied for 21 days 
after receiving written notice thereof.” Clause 9 (2) (1) of the agreement provided that, if the 
agreement was terminated in accordance with Clause 8 (3), the representative would not be 
entitled to a portion of any future gross fee income to which it would otherwise be entitled for 
all transactions initiated during the term of the agreement but concluded after its 
termination.
2625
  
 
The claimant terminated the agreement in accordance with Clause 8 (1) due to the defendant’s 
poor performance. However, before the termination, the defendant had been involved in the 
acquisition of a company, and it received a success fee for the transaction from the acquirer. 
                                                 
2623
 ICC Award in Case No. 9797, July 28, 2000, Andersen Consulting Business Unit Member Firms vs. Arthur 
Andersen Business Unit Member Firms and Andersen Worldwide Societe Cooperative, World Trade and 
Arbitration Materials, 12-5 (2000), at 196-197 
2624
 Ibid., at 210; In the discussions of the Working Group for the preparation of UNIDROIT Principles 2010 as 
to the rules on termination of long term contracts for just cause, the Andersen case was mentioned as a good 
example, where due to supervening circumstances, the fiduciary relationship on which relational contracts by 
their very nature are based was irremediably destroyed and where the only appropriate remedy was the ending of 
the contract with immediate effects. UNIDROIT 2006 - Study L - Misc. 26, October 2006,at 38; It is argued that 
arbitral tribunal had considerable difficulty in justifying the termination of the agreement with immediate effects 
by merely relying on the terms of the contract and Articles 1.7 and 7.3.1 of the UNIDROIT Principles. It is 
suggested that the same result could have been justified in a much more linear and convincing manner if there 
had been provisions on termination of long term contracts for just cause. UNIDROIT 2008 - Study L - Misc.28, 
October 2008, at 68 
2625
 ICC Award in Case No. 9839, 1999, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, (2004), at 73 
 709 
 
Pursuant to the fee sharing arrangement of the agreement, the defendant was obligated to pay 
the claimant a percentage of the success fee. The defendant failed to remit the fee to the 
claimant. Several days after having notified the defendant that the contract was terminated in 
accordance with Clause 8 (1), the claimant also notified the defendant that it considered the 
defendant’s failure to remit the fee a material breach of the agreement. The agreement 
terminated twenty-one days after the notice and several months later, the claimant initiated 
arbitration proceedings, arguing that the defendant’s material breach of the agreement 
precluded it under Clause 8 (3) from sharing any gross income fee. The defendant responded 
that since the claimant failed to terminate the agreement according to the agreement’s 
procedures and the claimant’s termination of the agreement was in a bad faith, the defendant 
was released from any contractual obligation to pay.  
 
First, the tribunal found that the defendant materially breached the agreement by failing to pay 
the contractual percentage from the fee, since, pursuant to the agreement, the defendant was 
required to transmit the relevant amount to the claimant “without delay”, but the defendant 
withheld the claimant’s portion for a variety of purported reasons after the claimant’s initial 
notice of termination and, failed to cure the breach within the twenty-one days’ notice 
period.
2626
 Then, the tribunal held that the defendant was barred from recovering any fees it 
could otherwise have been entitled to under the agreement, because the defendant materially 
breached the agreement under Clause 8 (3), and the claimant did not violate the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in terminating the agreement. The tribunal observed 
that the claimant terminated the agreement under Clause 8 (1) due to the defendant’s poor 
performance, but following the defendant’s failure to remit the claimant’s portion of the fee, 
the claimant notified the defendant that the defendant had committed a material breach under 
Clause 8 (3). In the tribunal’s view, the claimant followed the procedure under the agreement 
when it notified the defendant of material breach. Moreover, the tribunal considered that the 
defendant's assertions were not supported by a preponderance of the evidence, and the 
claimant provided ample evidence that it initially terminated the agreement due to the 
defendant’s poor performance, rather than in a bad faith effort to prevent the defendant from 
developing business.
2627
 Accordingly, the tribunal held that “[the claimant] followed the 
procedure under the Agreement when it notified [the defendant] of a material breach… [the 
defendant] failed to cure the breach within twenty-one days of notice from [the claimant].  As 
a result, [the defendant] forfeited its right to any pipeline deals that it otherwise would have 
been entitled to under the Agreement… Therefore, the arbitral tribunal concludes that [the 
defendant] is not entitled to any of the fees that were or may have been generated by the 
foregoing transactions according to the terms of Clause 9 (2) (1) of the Agreement.” 2628  
 
In principle, the parties are required to follow the process determined by the decision maker 
on the basis of the contract or the applicable default rules for its valid termination. In ICC 
Case No. 5948, the arbitral tribunal dealt with a number of issues regarding the termination by 
the employer of a contract which was governed by the law of the Employer’s State, and based 
on the FIDIC conditions for Civil Engineering Works, Second Edition. The employer 
terminated the contract in reliance upon a certificate of the engineer under Clause 63, which 
                                                 
2626
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 Ibid., at 75 
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corresponds to Clause 15 of the 1999 Edition of the FIDIC Conditions.
2629
 The case 
concerned the construction contract between the Ministry of Public Works of an Arab state, as 
the employer, and an American contractor. The contractor was given notice referring to 
Clause 63 (1), and expelled from the site. The tribunal stated that Clause 63 is a “forfeiture 
clause and if it is to be relied upon, its machinery must be complied with strictly”.2630 Thus, 
the tribunal reasoned that “There can be no entry and expulsion under that clause … unless in 
the first instance the Engineer has certified in writing to the [Employer] as far as is herein 
relevant that in his opinion the Contractor was not executing the Works in accordance with 
the Contract or was persistently or flagrantly neglecting to carry out his obligations. If and 
only if such certificate is addressed by the Engineer to the [Employer], the latter may give 14 
days’ written notice to the Contractor enter upon the site, and expel the Contractor 
therefrom.”2631 The tribunal held that the document relied upon by the employer as a 
certificate of the engineer under Clause 63(1) was not a certificate satisfying the requirements 
of that Clause because it was not addressed to the employer but to the contractor, it was 
“debatable” whether it was a communication from or an opinion of the engineer or the 
employer, and the document did not, in form, “certify” anything at all. Acknowledging that 
these were “very technical objections,” the tribunal emphasized that the Clause was a 
“forfeiture clause”, and in the context of interpreting a forfeiture clause, these objections were 
valid.
 2632
  
 
In view of the arguments of the employer that the contractor was not executing the works in 
accordance with the contract, or was persistently and flagrantly neglecting to carry out its 
obligations under the contract, the tribunal noted that “one would expect that under most 
systems of law, this would entitle the [Employer] to terminate the contract and expel the 
Contractor from the site.” The tribunal stated that “Nothing in Clause 63 of the Contract 
provides that the [Employer]'s right to exercise the option conferred upon it by that clause is 
to be the exclusive remedy for persistent and flagrant neglect on the part of the Contractor to 
carry out his obligations.” Thus, the tribunal examined the applicable rules of the chosen 
national law. The applicable law required a formal notice putting the non-performing party in 
default, and a judicial decision for the termination of the contract, in the absence of an 
agreement of the parties on the termination of contract by the operation of law. The tribunal 
found that there was no agreement under which the contract was to be brought to an end 
"automatically", and no contractual provision that dispenses with the need for formal notice. 
The tribunal noted that there was no declaration in writing by the contractor that it was not 
willing to carry out its contractual obligations and, prior to the arbitration, the employer did 
not express an intention in the nature of a formal notice to terminate the contract, but on the 
contrary, by the various documents invoking Clause 63, the employer asserted that the 
contract was not terminated. The tribunal concluded that the necessary pre-requisites under 
the applicable law for a valid termination of the contract by the employer had not been 
established. Accordingly, the tribunal found the employer’s termination of the contract to 
have been wrongful.
2633
  
                                                 
2629
 Seppälä, Christopher R., International Construction Contract Disputes: Commentary on ICC Awards Dealing 
with the FIDIC International Conditions of Contract, ICC International Court of Arbitration Bulletin, 9-2 (1998), 
at 43  
2630
 ICC Award in Case No. 5948, 1991, ICC International Court of Arbitration Bulletin, 9-1(1998), at 77 
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In ICC Case No 10892, in order to build a sports stadium, a Caribbean state engaged the 
services of the Employer, a Caribbean company, which, in turn, entered into a construction 
contract with the Contractor, also a Caribbean company, which the Employer terminated on 
account of the Contractor's alleged default. The Contractor initiated arbitration proceedings, 
claiming the termination of the contract was wrongful, and sought damages. The construction 
contract incorporated the FIDIC Conditions Parts I and II, Fourth Edition. However, the 
Employer never filled in the name of the Engineer in Clause 1.1 of Part II of the FIDIC 
conditions, thereby leading to a dispute over the Engineer's identity. The tribunal found that, 
in these circumstances, the Engineer was the Employer itself, and the Contractor had tacitly 
accepted the Employer as the Engineer, because “a Contract governed by the FIDIC 
Conditions of Contract is unworkable without an Engineer”.2634  
 
The Employer purported to terminate the contract for the Contractor’s failure to comply with 
the instructions of the Engineer under Clause 39.1 of the FIDIC Conditions, empowering the 
Engineer to issue instructions for removal from the site of any materials or Plant which, in the 
opinion of the Engineer, are not in accordance with the Contract. The tribunal found that, in 
the case, it was not the Engineer (Employer) who issued the certificate of failure by the 
Contractor to carry out instructions, which led to termination, but its delegate, B. According 
to the tribunal, “[B] was entitled to issue a certificate of non-performance by [Contractor] 
upon which [Employer] could rely to terminate the Contractor because [Contractor] impliedly 
accepted [Employer] as the Engineer and [B] as the Engineer's delegate (however grudgingly 
and however ambiguous the appointment) by continuing to work.” The tribunal noted that 
Clause 63.1(e) of the FIDIC Conditions requires that “the Employer may, after giving 14 
days' notice to the Contractor, enter upon the Site and the Works and terminate the 
employment of the Contractor…” The tribunal found that the Employer gave a 14-day notice 
of its intent to terminate the Contract, but it did not wait 14 days to enter the premises. The 
Employer obtained a court injunction, on the date of its notice, ejected the Contractor from the 
site the same day, and seized the Contractor's equipment and records for its use. The tribunal 
considered that the failure to wait 14 days to take possession was a violation by the Employer 
of Clause 63.1(e). The tribunal also stated that “In determining whether the termination was 
substantively proper, it must be kept in mind that [B] did not recommend termination and did 
not believe that the two items that were the subject of his … instructions justified 
termination…. I do not find that the termination was proper.”2635 
 
When the terms of the contract or the applicable default rules do not include such safeguards 
against the termination of the contract as the mechanism of Nachfirst or right of the non-
performing party to cure its deficient performance, the decision maker applying lex 
mercatoria should not imply into the contract those safeguards in a manner that invalidates the 
termination, unless the case falls under the narrow frames and requirements of those 
safeguards in accordance with the sources of abstractions. In ICC Case No 10422, the 
distributor argued that the termination was ineffective because, the manufacturer did not 
formally put the distributor into default (“mise en demeure”) thereby giving it the chance to 
remedy its alleged non-performance and, in any case, notice of termination was not given 
timely. The arbitral tribunal considered that the position of the clamant would be justified if 
there were a contract term imposing a duty on the party giving notice of termination to grant 
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the other party an additional period of time within which to remedy the alleged breach, as 
frequently happens in Anglo-American contract practice. The tribunal, referring to Article 
7.3.2(1) of the UNIDROIT Principles, according to which the right to terminate the contract is 
exercised by notice without any further formality, rejected the claimant’s argument that the 
defendant before terminating the agreement should have put the claimant formally into 
default. However, the arbitral tribunal also stated, by referring to Article 7.3.2 (2) of the 
UNIDROIT Principles, that the principle of good faith imposes on the party intending to 
terminate the contract on account of the other party’s non-performance the duty to inform it of 
its intention within a reasonably short period of time from the moment when it came to know 
of the non-performance. The tribunal held that the manufacturer’s notice of termination had 
not been given timely.
2636
  
 
When a national law that governs the substance of the dispute contains such safeguards 
against termination, the decision maker applying lex mercatoria may consider primarily the 
reasonable expectations of the parties in determining the process of a valid termination of the 
contract, through the flexibility that is provided by the rules of interpretation of the parties’ 
intentions and termination of contract under the applicable national law. In ICC Case No. 
2114, the dispute arose from a licensing contract whereby Meiki, a Japanese corporation 
granted Bucher, a Swiss corporation, the exclusive right, license and privilege to manufacture 
certain specified plastics machines and Bucher agreed to manufacture Meiki’s products 
“strictly in accordance with Meiki’s designs and specifications”. Meiki also granted Bucher 
the exclusive right to sell those products as manufactured by Bucher in various European 
countries, and Bucher was to pay Meiki a percentage of the net selling price of all of Meiki’s 
products manufactured and sold by Bucher. However, Bucher did not manufacture Meiki’s 
products under the terms of licensing contract on the ground that they were not well-suited for 
the European market and, instead, Bucher designed a new product, which was substantially 
different from Meiki’s design. Bucher offered Meiki to pay the royalty only on the products 
designed according to Meiki’s specifications. Meiki refused this offer and requested royalty 
over the entire price of machines sold. When Bucher refused to pay that royalty, Meiki 
terminated the licensing contract for material breach, as provided in the contract. The 
licensing contract did not contain a choice of law clause, and the arbitrator decided to apply 
Swiss law as the law of the country with which the contract had the closest territorial 
connection.
2637
  
 
The arbitrator held that Bucher, by refusing to pay Meiki the full amount of the royalties, had 
breached the contract. The arbitrator based his reasoning on the principle of good faith under 
Article 2 (1) of the Swiss Civil Code, and stated that “Having made what could be considered 
as a poor business decision in entering into this licensing agreement with [Meiki] to 
manufacture the machines listed in [the agreement] on the ground that they could not be 
marketed in Europe at a profit, [Bucher] cannot then use part of [Meiki’s] know-how and 
components in order to manufacture different models that would sell and then refuse to pay 
the royalties stipulated in the agreement”. The arbitrator observed that “Prior to the signing of 
the licensing agreement, [Bucher] did not possess all the necessary know-how to manufacture 
[the relevant products]”, and although many features of the products manufactured by Bucher 
was new, its progress could not have taken place without the knowledge of Meiki’s technique.  
                                                 
2636
 ICC Award No. 10422, 2001, Excerpts of the original French version of the award have been published in 
Journal du droit international, (2003), pp. 1142-1150 Available in English at 
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=2&do=case&id=957&step=FullText  
2637
 ICC Award in Case No. 2114, 29 December 1972, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, (1980), at 189 
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Thus, the arbitrator concluded that the defendant must pay the agreed upon royalty on the net 
selling price of the whole of these machines and not just proportionally to the parts or know-
how used, on the ground that this must have been the intention of the parties, who must 
discharge their contractual obligation in good faith. According to the arbitrator, any other 
conclusion would destroy the principle of sanctity of contractual obligations freely entered 
into by the parties. The arbitrator considered that “when [Meiki] entered into the licensing 
agreement and provided the defendant with the necessary know-how, it did not expect that the 
defendant, by modifying the machines, would no longer have to pay the royalties due of 
[Meiki].” 2638 
 
Bucher argued that Meiki had not given proper notice of the termination of the contract, 
particular, in view of Article 107 of the Swiss Code of Obligations, which requires the party 
not receiving performance in due course to grant an additional time limit for performance and, 
upon failure of performance during that period, to express the intention not to accept the 
performance. The arbitrator observed that Meiki, on several occasions, requested that Bucher 
pay the royalty to which he was entitled, and Bucher refused. As Bucher merely proposed a 
new agreement, the arbitrator considered that no additional period for performance was 
necessary in view of Bucher’s attitude, according to Article 108 (1) of the Swiss Code of 
Obligations, which does not require the fixing of an additional period if the behavior of the 
obligor indicates that this would be in vain. Thus, the arbitrator held that the contract was 
validly terminated by Meiki and it could, in addition, recover the damages which resulted 
from the termination of the contract for material breach. The arbitrator awarded the damages 
to Meiki on the basis of the royalties on the machines sold by Bucher during the term of the 
contract.
2639
 
 
Moreover, the decision maker applying lex mercatoria may reject a party’s argument that 
termination is invalid due to the terminating party’s failure to strictly follow termination 
process set out by the contract, depending on the seriousness of the circumstances that justify 
the termination of the contract In ICC Case No 4629, the parties entered into a construction 
contract, whereby the claimants undertook an obligation to finish and furnish the defendant’s 
hotel. The contract provided for the application of Swiss law to the relationship between the 
parties. Given the difficulties with respect to timely fulfillment of the defendant’s financial 
obligations as well as its fulfillment of the technical matters, which were indispensable for the 
completion of the work, the claimants introduced a request for arbitration, asserting that they 
had been entitled to terminate the contract. The arbitral tribunal found that the claimants were 
certainly entitled to terminate the contract with compensation in view of the defendant’s 
failure to live up with its contractual obligations. However, the tribunal noted that the 
claimants did not follow exactly the procedure provided by the contract. According to the 
contract, the party entitled to terminate must, prior to termination, give notice to the defaulting 
party to fulfill its obligations within 30 days. The claimants suspended the work after a notice 
                                                 
2638
 Ibid., at 190 
2639
 Ibid., at 191-192; It should be noted that, upon request of Meiki, the arbitrator also ordered Bucher, as of the 
date of the award, to cease the manufacture and sale of Meiki’s products listed in the contract, and not to use, 
disclose or sell Meiki’s know-how, which has not fallen in the public domain, since the arbitrator considered that 
those activities would constitute a case of unfair competition contrary to the Swiss Federal Law on Unfair 
Competition. However, this part of the award was set aside by the Swiss Supreme Court. Switzerland, Tribunal 
Federal, March 17, 1976, Bucher-Guyer S.A. (Switzerland) vs. Meiki Co. Ltd. (Japan), Yearbook Commercial 
Arbitration, (1980), at  224 
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of ten days in December 1982 and, the contract was definitely terminated in February 1983. 
The contract did not rule expressly the event of suspension of the work.
2640
  
 
The tribunal referred to the exceptio non adimpleti contractus under Article 82 of the Swiss 
Code of Obligations, which allows one party to withhold his performance of the contract as 
long as the other party does not fulfill or refuses to fulfill his part of the contract. According to 
the tribunal, the owner’s obligation to place at the contractor’s disposal the building in a 
condition permitting to work, to submit the necessary drawings and to obtain import licenses 
were of utmost importance, and the claimants were entitled by virtue of law to refuse to work 
until the owner had performed his own obligation. Moreover, the tribunal stressed that the 
claimants were entitled to terminate the contract already by December 1982, even though the 
contractual delay of 30 days had not yet elapsed, since the defendant made clear by its telex 
that he rejected the legitimate demands of the claimants. The tribunal referred to Article 108 
of the Swiss Code of Obligations and to the practice of Swiss Federal Court that the 
expiration of time limit is not necessary when the defaulting party declares in advance that he 
will not perform. The tribunal stated that “being therefore entitled to terminate the contract 
without delay, claimants were a fortiori justified in suspending their work. The situation did 
not change during the first two months of 1983 and the claimants were still entitled to 
terminate the contract and to claim damages when they filed their request of arbitration.” 2641  
 
c. Effect of Termination  
 
Under lex mercatoria, the rule that termination of contract does not preclude the aggrieved 
party from claiming damages can be considered as an established rule in the order of 
international commerce. The Iran US Claims Tribunal stated that ”although the laws of 
various countries are not in full accord, the better view and the view adopted by this Chamber 
is that termination of the contract does not preclude a damage remedy.”2642 In ICC Case No 
12193, the arbitral tribunal determined the law of Lebanon as the applicable law to a 
distribution contract between a German manufacturer, and a Lebanese distributor. The 
tribunal was of the opinion that lex mercatoria could be applied if Lebanese law provided no 
right to damages in the event of termination of the distribution, but this was not the case. The 
tribunal referred to Article 7.4.1 of the UNIDROIT Principles, as a general principle of law 
granting the right to damages for breach of contract, in order to demonstrate that the Lebanese 
law was in accordance with the lex mercatoria.
2643
 In the Italian Arbitration Association case 
cited above, the arbitral tribunal, applying Italian law, held that on account of the defendant’s 
insufficient defence of the trademark, the claimant was entitled to terminate the exclusive 
distributorship contract. The tribunal considered awarding damages to the claimant for the 
early extinction of the contractual relationship, arising from termination of contract through 
the overriding fault of the defendant. The tribunal rejected the claim for an order of payment 
by the defendant of the costs borne by the claimant for the conduct of legal proceedings in the 
country of the original licensor since “the obligation breached by defendant was not that of 
initiating a legal action against the exporters in the country of the original licensor…, but 
rather the autonomous obligation of good faith arising in the performance of the contract, to 
                                                 
2640
 ICC Award in Case No. 4629, 1989, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, (1993), at 22 
2641
 Ibid., at 23 
2642
 Iran US Claims Tribunal Award in Case No. 255 (176-255-3) April 26, 1985, DIC of Delaware, Inc., 
Underhill of Delaware, Inc. v. Tehran Redevelopment Corp., The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, (1986), at 338 
2643
 ICC Final Award in Case No. 12193, ICC International Court of Arbitration Bulletin, 19-1 (2008), at 122  
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afford proper co-operation and assistance to the suing claimant”. In the absence of a reliable 
criterion demonstrated by the party for the determination of the damages, the tribunal had 
recourse to the equitable criterion referred to in Article 1226 of the Italian Civil Code.
 2644
 
 
When the contract is validly terminated, the decision maker applying lex mercatoria should 
enforce the established rule in the order of international commerce that the contractual 
clauses, which are intended by the parties to operate after termination or to regulate the 
consequences of termination, survive the termination of the contract. In ICC Case No. 3267, 
the arbitrators considered the effect of termination, between the parties, on the bank 
guarantees furnished under the contract. The arbitrators interpreted the contract to the effect 
that there are two alternative methods to compensate the claimant for the consequences of a 
termination due to the defendant’s default. First remedy was a claim for damages for the items 
listed in the contract, including loss of expected profits, whereas the second allowed the 
claimant to exercise its rights under the Risk Exposure Bank Guarantee (REG), which 
actually led to the liquidation of damages on the basis of a pre-determined agreed figure. 
Given that the claimant’s request to exercise the second remedy, the arbitrators observed that 
second method of computing damages was of general use in construction contracts and there 
was “nothing unusual in resorting to liquidated damages in an international building contract 
drafted following the techniques and phraseology of the Common law world.”2645 The 
arbitrators noted that, under the REG, the parties agreed on an estimate of the amount of the 
investments not covered by the monthly payments and on the loss of profit arising from a 
cancellation of the contract at any time during the contract. Although, the amounts payable 
under the REG were very substantial, the arbitrators considered that this fact did not deprive 
the claimant from its right to call the entire amount thereof but, by claiming under the REG, 
the claimant waived its right to the outstanding amounts under the contract with the exception 
of unsettled claims, if any. The arbitrators held that “Whereas, in many legal systems, the 
amount of penalty would be reviewed by the Courts or by the arbitrators, the amounts of 
liquidated damages are not subject to such review. The Arbitral Tribunal adopts this view. It 
will not therefore review the amount agreed between the parties as liquidated damages.”2646   
 
Since transactions governed through legal uncertainty will usually arise from long-term 
contractual relationships, the effects of termination will be prospective in most cases, where 
imposing a retrospective regime of mutual restitution may be inappropriate or impossible. In 
ICC Case No 9797, i.e. Andersen case, the ACBU member firms sought restitution of the 
transfer payments made to the AABU member firms, including the transfer payments placed 
in escrow, plus interest thereon upon termination. The tribunal noted that the performance of 
MFIFAs extended over a period of more than ten years, and the ACBU member firms, during 
that time, received several benefits from their association with the AABU member firms, e.g. 
the use of the Andersen name and client referrals by the AABU member firms. According to 
the tribunal, the restitution of the benefits received by the ACBU member firms was 
impossible, and if the tribunal were to grant the restitution of transfer payments made by the 
                                                 
2644
Italian Arbitration Association, Final Award in Case No. 76/98, November 24, 1999, Yearbook Commercial 
Arbitration, (2000), at 381  
2645
 ICC Award in Case No. 3267, 14 June 1978, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, (1982), at 104 
2646
 Ibid., at 104-105 
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ACBU member firms, they would be unjustly enriched. Thus, the tribunal did not grant the 
ACBU member firms the restitution they requested.
2647
 
 
As to the other consequences of the termination, the tribunal held that the ACBU member 
firms must meet each and all of their obligations through and including the effective date of 
termination of their MFIFAs, namely July 28, 2000.
2648
 Moreover, the tribunal held that, 
effective on December 31, 2000, the ACBU member firms shall cease using the “Andersen” 
name or any derivative thereof, or any other name AWSC is authorized to regulate and shall 
cease to represent themselves as in any way associated with AWSC or the AABU member 
firms. The date of December 31, 2000 was fixed by the tribunal in order to allow the ACBU 
member firms a reasonable time frame to make the necessary changes and adjustments.
 2649
  
 
It is argued that the tribunal's decision with regard to the prohibition of the ACBU member 
firms from using the “Andersen” name, not with immediate effect as of the date of the award, 
but at a later date was surprising and could only find its justification in the light of Article 
6.2.3(4) of the UNIDROIT Principles on the effects of hardship, which allows the tribunal to 
“if reasonable . . . terminate the contract at a date and on terms to be fixed”. Thus, it is 
suggested that perhaps the tribunal considered that, in addition to AWSC's breach, there was 
another reason for putting an end to the MFIFAs, namely the frustration of their purpose as a 
result of irreconcilable differences between the parties, which comes very close to hardship 
and therefore justified similar effects.
2650
 In the Andersen award, the reasoning of the tribunal 
applying lex mercatoria to the exclusion of any particular national law was naturally shaped 
by the submissions of the parties during the proceedings as well as the contextual 
interpretation of the MFIFAs, rather than the various and competing doctrines of termination 
for fundamental breach, termination for good cause or irreconcilable differences or hardship 
as provided by a national law or international restatements of contract principles. Thus, the 
Andersen award illustrates the primacy of the knowledge of particular circumstances of time 
and place over the pre-defined legal structures or formal consolidations, which incline the 
reasoning of the decision maker towards categorizations thereby rendering the accuracy in 
giving effect to the reasonable expectations of the parties a matter of secondary importance. 
Under lex mercatoria, non-consensual bases of legal considerations in the form of formal 
consolidations may yield to the interpretation of the contract and supplementation of it with 
individualized terms on the basis of the reasonable expectations of the parties in a particular 
case. However, the tribunal should have elaborated on its reasoning that allowed a transition 
period for the ACBU member firms, as to whether it was based on the interpretation of the 
contract or its supplementation with individualized terms, as he did with regard to the effect 
of termination on the “Andersen Technology”2651, particularly in the presence of a specific 
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 ICC Award No. 9797, July 28, 2000, Andersen Consulting Business Unit Member Firms vs. Arthur 
Andersen Business Unit Member Firms and Andersen Worldwide Societe Cooperative, World Trade and 
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2648
 Ibid., at 216 
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Andersen Consulting Business Unit Member Firms v. Arthur Andersen Business Unit Member Firms and 
Andersen Worldwide Société Coopérative, Arbitration International 17 (2001), at  260 
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2000, Andersen Consulting Business Unit Member Firms vs. Arthur Andersen Business Unit Member Firms and 
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provision in the MFIFAs “for the event of termination, whereupon no member firm or any of 
its individual partners may use the Andersen name or any of its derivatives or represent itself 
to be associated with AWSC or the member firms without the written permission of 
AWSC.”2652 
 
The significance and primacy of the knowledge of particular circumstances of time and place 
should also be upheld in cases, where the decision maker applying lex mercatoria may be 
required to consider restitutionary remedies in a particular case. In such cases, the decision 
maker should utilize the restitutionary flexibility under the default rules applicable to the 
contract with regard to retrospective effect of termination, within the context of competing 
interests of the parties, as a means of achieving justice in a particular case. In its 
considerations, the decision maker should keep in mind any restitutionary intervention as a 
result of termination of the contract must be sensitive to the particular circumstances of the 
case. The focus should be on whether or not a particular transfer is regulated by the contract, 
whether there is a binding allocation of risk ascertained through interpretation, and whether it 
is possible to identify an implicit allocation of risk through supplementation, for an accurate 
reflection of the reasonable expectations of the parties to the particular contract. If the 
decision maker is unable to find an accurate solution to the problem of restitution on the basis 
of these considerations, it may invite the parties to settle their differences by providing 
guidelines in a partial award for the parties to facilitate such a settlement, and once the parties 
fail to settle, the decision maker may render a final award by utilizing the increased 
knowledge of the particular circumstance of time and place that can be derived from the 
parties’ discussions during the failed attempt of settlement. 
 
In ICC Case No. 8782, the claimant, a Belgian company, ordered an automated fish-sorting 
machine from the defendant, a Danish manufacturer. The contract incorporated the General 
Conditions for the Supply and Execution of Plant and Machinery for Import and Export No. 
188 A of March 1957 of United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE 
Conditions), and it was governed by Danish law. The defendant was not able to meet the 
delivery date and the parties agreed to two amendments to the contract, according to which, 
the machine was scheduled for delivery in two phases, and the total price was adjusted. The 
machine did not perform properly in either of these phases and the claimant initiated 
arbitration claiming that it was entitled to cancel the contract for the defendant’s fundamental 
breach, to return the machine and to be refunded the amount paid for the machine. The 
defendant argued that although the claimant knew that the machine was a new concept and 
riddled with serious problems right from the beginning, it actually accepted delivery of the 
machine, and thus, it was barred from cancelling the contract.
 2653
  
 
The sole arbitrator observed that the defendant, with its technical background and expertise, 
was in a better position than the claimant to judge if this concept could be successful. Thus, in 
the arbitrator’s opinion, it would have been prudent for the defendant to make more 
reservations in the contract on the chance of success or failure than it actually did, and in the 
absence of such reservations, the defendant assumed the risk of failure of the machine. The 
contract did not contain any explicit provision with regard to cancellation, termination or 
dissolution of the contract. Considering that the principles of Danish law either incorporate 
the relevant provisions of the CISG or they are essentially same as these provisions, the 
arbitrator applied the CISG to the issue. Applying Article 25 of the CISG, the arbitrator found 
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that the machine, as delivered and installed, did not perform on essential points as the 
claimant could reasonably expect under the contract, the claimant can be considered to be 
substantially deprived of what it was entitled to expect under the contract, and the defendant 
foresaw such detrimental results. Thus, the arbitrator held that the claimant’s request for a 
ruling that its notification of cancellation of the contract was rightful and should be 
awarded.
2654
  
 
Then, the arbitrator considered whether the cancellation of the contract should have a 
retrospective effect, as requested by the claimant, thereby requiring the return of the contract 
price and the machine. In this respect, the arbitrator considered the residual allocation of 
contractual risks. In the arbitrator’s opinion, although the risk of contracting for and 
delivering the machine was in principle more for defendant than for the claimant, the claimant 
also took a serious risk that the machine might not work in accordance with the terms of the 
contract when the defendant made clear that it might not able to deliver a machine in 
accordance with the contract and raised the issue of cancellation of the contract before the 
signing of the amendments. Thus, the arbitrator questioned “if the claimant could – and 
should – not have mitigated its damages by relieving the defendant from its obligation to 
deliver the machine in accordance with the terms of the Contract.”2655 The arbitrator stated 
that “in general, there is an obligation for a creditor who is suffering damages or is confronted 
with the possibility that he might suffer damages to limit or prevent same.” Moreover, the 
arbitrator reasoned that “if it is true that the defendant, at the time when it delivered the 
machine, could foresee its detrimental results, the same is true for the claimant.” Although it 
was not clear either or to what extent these considerations could be invoked under Danish 
law, the arbitrator sought a basis for those in Clause 26 (1) of the UNECE Conditions and 
Article 74 of the CISG, both of which provide that the amount of damages that can be 
recovered by the aggrieved party may not exceed the loss which the party in breach foresaw 
or ought to have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the contract, and Clause 26 (2) of 
the UNECE Conditions, which contained the aggrieved party’s duty to mitigate, and Article 
76 of the CISG, which sets forth an alternative means of determining damages on the basis of 
market price in cases where the contract was avoided but the aggrieved party did not resell the 
goods in question or, did not purchase any goods in replacement in a reasonable manner and 
within a reasonable time after avoidance.
2656
  
 
In view of these applicable provisions, the arbitrator stated that he was under the impression 
that claimant could have limited damages which it allegedly suffered if it had cooperated in 
terminating the contract before taking final factual delivery of the machine. However, the 
arbitrator, having determined the contract had been rightfully terminated, concluded with a 
partial award inviting the parties to settle the remaining issues, such as whether the machine 
was to be replaced by a new system or if the machine would be used despite its defects, and 
the quantum of damages, taking into account the considerations as laid down in the award, 
and to report to the arbitrator about the status of their discussions.
2657
 Thus, the arbitrator 
considered the competing interests of the parties to a contract for the turnkey supply of an 
industrial machine. In the particular circumstances of the case where the parties residually 
shared the risk of failure of the machine, the arbitrator was not able to strike a balance 
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between the harsh consequences for the supplier resulting from dismantling of the machine 
and returning the contract price, and the reasonable expectations of the purchaser from the 
machine in achieving its purpose, and deferred rendering a final decision until the parties fail 
to settle the remaining issues. 
 
3. Concluding Remarks 
 
The parties’ right to terminate the contract under lex mercatoria requires the decision maker to 
focus on the contract and the default rules chosen by the parties pursuant to the basic 
principles of freedom of contract and pacta sunt servanda. To the extent there are gaps or 
standards in the articulated rules in relation to the specific issues of termination raised in the 
proceedings, the abstract reasoning of the decision maker should be motivated by the 
consideration that certain circumstances, whether it is non-performance of express or implied 
obligations, or another unforeseen or foreseen event, may justify the exercise of the right to 
terminate the contract by a party, and affect the process of termination set out by the 
articulated rules, to the extent such a party cannot be reasonably expected to continue with the 
contractual relationship under such circumstances.  
 
The decision maker applying lex mercatoria should determine through a contextual approach 
whether the particular circumstances have attained a sufficient degree of seriousness so as to 
enable a party to leave the bond of pacta sunt servanda, by considering the risk allocation 
agreed by the parties, submissions of the parties during the proceedings, their interests in 
continuing or ending the contractual relationship, the other circumstances surrounding the 
contract, nature and purpose of the contract as well as the articulated rules in a particular 
dispute. Under the transactions governed through legal uncertainty, the decisive factor in 
determining whether a particular circumstance justifies the termination by a party will be the 
extent of its detrimental effect on that party’s reasonable expectations from the contractual 
relationship and from the future performance of contractual obligations. 
 
Upon the occurrence of such circumstances that justify the termination of the contract, the 
entitled party should exercise its right to terminate by giving notice to the other party within a 
reasonable period of time, in accordance with the established rule in the order of international 
commerce, unless the parties leave the matter entirely to the default rules of their choice, 
which require a judicial decision for the termination of the contract. The requirement of 
termination notice mitigates the negative consequences of termination for the other party 
preparing his performance in the context of international contracts. When it is necessary to 
enable transition, the decision maker should also consider allowing for a sufficient notice 
period in the particular circumstances of the case. However, the incorporation into the process 
of termination of such safeguards as the mechanism of Nachfirst or right of the non-
performing party to cure its deficient performance depends on the articulated rules, the 
applicable default rules pursuant to the established rules of conflict, or the ex post 
supplementation of the contract by the decision maker with individualized terms within the 
narrow frames and requirements of those safeguards in accordance with the sources of 
abstractions. The degree of seriousness of the circumstances that justify the termination of the 
contract is also relevant to the determination of to what extent the party exercising its right to 
terminate the contract should follow the process of termination set out by the terms of the 
contract or the applicable default rules.  
 
Under lex mercatoria, the termination of the contract has mainly a prospective effect, 
discharging the parties from their obligations of future performance, since transactions 
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governed through legal uncertainty will usually arise from long-term contractual relationships, 
where imposing a retrospective regime of mutual restitution may be inappropriate or 
impossible. It is an established rule in the order of international commerce that the termination 
of contract does not preclude the aggrieved party from claiming damages for non-
performance, or from invoking such contractual clauses that are intended to operate even after 
termination, unless termination has resulted from a gap in the risk allocation with regard to 
such unforeseen events that excused the non-performance. In cases where the decision maker 
is required to give effect to the retrospective effect of termination, such as contracts for the 
turnkey supply of an industrial plant, the decision maker should examine the restitutionary 
consequences of termination within the context of the competing interests of the parties, and 
contractual risk allocations, which are to be determined and ascertained through interpretation 
or supplementation, to the extent that the decision maker is enabled to exercise its abstract 
reasoning on the basis of these considerations by the flexibility of the default rules that are 
applicable to the substance of the dispute, pursuant to the choice of the parties or the 
established rules of conflict. 
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vi. Damages for non-performance 
 
Under lex mercatoria, when the liability for the non-performance of a specific or residual 
contractual obligation is established and it is not excused due to unforeseen contingencies, the 
aggrieved party may resort to the remedy of damages as a substitutionary relief. The 
aggrieved party, either in conjunction with or as an alternative to its right to terminate the 
contract, may claim the relief of damages. It is a form of compensation for not having 
received the proper performance of contractual obligation. The conventional analysis of 
contract law is based on the principle that the purpose of damages is to compensate the victim 
of non-performance for his injury.
2658
 This principle limits the extent of recoverable damages 
in various ways. First, damages are based on loss to the aggrieved party and not on the gain to 
the non-performing party. Secondly, the aggrieved party cannot recover more than his loss. 
Thirdly, damages for non-performance of contract are compensatory, so “punitive” (or 
“exemplary”) damages will not be awarded for breach of contract.2659 The fourth limitation is 
that no damages are recoverable if the aggrieved party has suffered no loss.
2660
  
 
Although these basic considerations are common across most national legal systems, the rules 
regarding the assessment of damages leave much to the decision maker’s discretion, since it is 
very difficult to establish ex ante, namely before the actual non-performance, the kind of 
situation that will emerge after it is committed. The remedy of damages requires an ex post 
perspective since it deals with such situations that arise after an obligation has been breached. 
Thus, the default rules on damages under the national legal systems must account for the 
practical way of correcting the wrong or otherwise restoring the balance between the parties 
in the particular circumstances of the case.
 2661
  
 
Particularly in the presence of complex, innovative or long-term contractual relationships, it is 
difficult for the party to appraise ex ante the extent of his liability in damages for non-
performance, unless some aspects of that remedy are regulated by the contract, through 
contractual clauses that limit or stipulate beforehand the recoverable amount of damages for 
non-performance, such as exemption or limitation of liability clauses, or penalty or liquidated 
damages clauses, to the extent allowed by the freedom of contract. In this context, the remedy 
of damages is an issue, in which the decision maker in almost any judicial setting is allowed 
to resort to equity infra legem in the assessment of damages, for which most of the national 
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legal systems recognize a margin of discretionary power. Thus, the abstract reasoning of the 
decision maker plays a decisive role in the issue of damages for non-performance under lex 
mercatoria.  
 
1. Sources of Abstractions 
 
a. National Laws 
 
Article 1149 of the French Civil Code provides that, subject to exceptions and modifications, 
the damages due to the creditor consist of two elements: the loss, which he has suffered, and 
the gain, which he has failed to make. These elements refer to the civil law distinction 
between damnum emergens (actual loss) and lucrum cessans (lost gain). French law appears 
not to make a distinction between the expectation loss and reliance loss, i.e. between the loss 
of benefits which would have accrued to the creditor if the contract had been performed and 
the loss incurred by the creditor in reliance on the debtor’s promise to perform.2662 There are 
three main limitations that determine the extent of the loss for which damages will be awarded 
under French law.  
 
Firstly, Article 1150 provides that debtor is only liable for such damages as he could have 
foreseen at the time of contracting. This first limitation is based on the premise that the parties 
can reasonably be expected to have entered into the agreement on the basis of foreseeable 
risks.
2663
 Under the foreseeability test, the debtor is held liable for loss, which a reasonable 
person could have foreseen. The limitation does not apply where the default in performance is 
due to the “dol” (fraud) of the debtor.2664 “Fraud” in this context means a deliberate breach of 
contract or one committed in bad faith, and it is generally agreed that fraud also includes gross 
negligence.
2665
 The second limitation is provided under Article 1151 of the French Civil 
Code. The damage must be an “immediate and direct consequence” of the non-performance 
of the contract. The limitation of liability to “direct” damage is distinct from that of 
foreseeable damage. Even a debtor who is guilty of “fraud” and liable for unforeseeable 
damage is not liable for “indirect” damage. Where the debtor is not guilty of fraud, the 
requirements of foreseeability and directness must both be satisfied, and “directness” imports 
a requirement of causation.
2666
 Thirdly, there is no right of recovery in respect of hypothetical 
future damages.
2667
 The damages must be certain, but this limitation is applied flexibly and 
future damages are awarded if they are reasonably capable of being calculated by the court 
upon an estimate of their probability.
2668
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Under French law, the assessment of damages will be made by the court exercising its power 
of discretion under the basic principle that damages should compensate the creditor for the 
loss suffered.
2669
 The Cour de Cassation in principle still controls the question of the character 
of loss for which the damages should be awarded, and requires the lower courts to formulate 
their judgments in such a way to enable that control.
2670
 The French Civil Code does not lay 
down a specific time for the assessment. It is argued that the general principle is that damages 
are to be evaluated at the time of judgment, except where this will result in awarding the 
creditor more than compensation.
2671
 Under Article 1146 of the French Civil Code, damages 
begin to run only from the moment at which the debtor is “put in delay” (“mise en demeure”). 
The initiation of a court action constitutes a mise en demeure, but the debtor is liable only for 
damage occurring after that moment.
2672
 Mise en demeure is not required where the nature of 
obligation is such that it can only be performed at a certain time and that time elapsed, or 
where it would serve no purpose, such as when the debtor expressly refused to perform. 
Moreover, the requirement of mise en demeure is generally limited by both courts and the 
doctrine to claims for damages for delay.
2673
 Pursuant to Article 1339 of the French Civil 
Code, the parties may agree to dispense with the requirement of mise en demeure, and this 
agreement may be implicit.
2674
  
 
In French law, if there is a market price for the substitute at the relevant time, the court may 
base its award on market price, in assessment of damages. The assessment of damages can 
also be based on the actual cost incurred by the creditor in procuring a substitute contract. 
Article 1144 of the French Civil Code provides that the creditor may be authorized to perform 
himself at the expense of the debtor. Thus, the creditor requires the authority of the court 
before proceeding with a substitute contract, and the court may in its discretion refuse to 
authorize him to do this.
2675
 Once the authorization is obtained, the debtor may be ordered to 
pay for the substitute performance in advance, thereby relieving the creditor of the risk of 
failing to recover its cost. French law recognizes exceptions to the requirement of judicial 
authorization for substitute performance, particularly, in the commercial sales of goods and in 
cases of urgency where the immediate nature of the creditor’s need for a substitute 
performance overrides the debtor’s right to perform.2676  
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Under French law, there is no duty to mitigate the loss for the aggrieved party. In principle, an 
award of damages must accord full compensation in respect of all of losses of the aggrieved 
party, subject to certain requirements. The scope of specific performance is extensive and, 
according to the French Civil Code, the substitute transaction is only an optional possibility 
that the creditor must, in principle, request before the court. Thus, it is argued that the court 
may not dismiss a claim for specific performance on the sole ground that the creditor had the 
possibility, and therefore, the duty to find a substitute for himself, and that the introduction of 
the principle of mitigation in French contract law would restrict the right to specific 
performance where a substitute transaction on a market is reasonably feasible.
2677
 However, 
courts developed other techniques serving the similar purposes. A French court invoked the 
doctrines of remoteness and foreseeability in holding that a trader, who had been supplied 
with defective products in breach of contract, should have limited the loss flowing from the 
breach by finding an alternative intermediate solution, and considered any damage resulting 
from his failure as unforeseeable by the parties at the time of contracting and, thus, 
irrecoverable.
2678
 In another case, it was held that a creditor, who fails to warn the debtor that 
the contract is breached and allows damages to mount up, will not recover additional loss, 
which will be treated as his own fault.
2679
 It is also argued that the French courts could rely on 
the principle of good faith under Article 1134 of the Civil Code, requiring the parties to co-
operate with each other even after non-performance.
2680
 
 
There is no provision in the French Civil Code, which provides for a doctrine of contributory 
negligence in the cases of breach of contract. Even so, the courts referred to the need for a 
causal link between the loss and non-performance in dealing with the relevant questions. If 
the loss is due to the act or fault of the victim, the liability of the defendant may be 
extinguished or attenuated. It is extinguished if the act of the victim can be said to be the sole 
cause of the loss, and attenuated if the fault of both parties has contributed to the loss.
2681
 
Thus, the courts, on the basis of their discretionary power, may reduce an aggrieved party’s 
damages on the ground of his contributory fault (“faute de la victim”), regardless of the 
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content of the obligation on the breach of which he relies, whether de résultat or de 
moyens.
2682
  
 
Under French law, it is in principle open to the parties to specify in advance the amount of 
damages for non-performance. Article 1152 of the Civil Code provides that when an 
agreement provides for the payment of a certain sum by way of damages in case of non-
performance by one party, i.e. penalty clauses, the other may not be awarded either a larger or 
a smaller sum. However, if the debtor is guilty of fraud or gross negligence, the creditor may 
claim full damages and is not limited to the amount agreed in the penalty clause.
2683
 The 
original provision excluded any power in the court to review the stipulated sum under the 
penalty clause.
 2684
 In order to prevent possible abuses, the law was amended to give the 
courts the power to control the stipulated sum. A second paragraph was added to Article 1152, 
providing that the courts can, of their own motion or otherwise, diminish or increase the 
agreed penalty if it is manifestly excessive or derisory, and any provision in the contract to the 
contrary shall be deemed not to have been made. In exercising this discretionary power, the 
court must indicate in what respect the agreed amount is excessive or derisory, it must 
observe the requirement that discrepancy must be manifest, and it may not reduce the amount 
below the level of the actual damages.
2685
 Moreover, Article 1231 of the Civil Code provides 
that when the obligation has been performed in part, the court can, of its own motion or 
otherwise, reduce the agreed penalty in proportion to the advantage which the part 
performance has given to the creditor, and any provision to the contrary shall be deemed not 
to have been made.  
 
Thus, under French law, the parties may agree on an upper limit for the amount of damages 
recoverable for nonperformance.
2686
 In this sense, the penalty clauses may serve the purpose 
of limiting the debtor’s liability and act as a limitation of liability clause in some cases. 
However, the court may strike down if such limits are considered derisory. Moreover, even if 
the debtor benefits from such a penalty clause, the restrictions with regard to the limitation or 
exclusion of liability clauses under French law will be applicable. Accordingly, the clauses 
excluding one party’ liability for the non-performance or fixing an upper limit for his liability 
are held to be valid except in so far as the party invoking it is guilty of fraud or gross 
negligence. Thus, if the debtor is guilty of fraud or gross negligence, the creditor may claim 
full damages and is not limited to the amount in the penalty clause.
2687
 
 
Section 280 of the German Civil Code contains the main provision concerning damages for 
non-performance. It provides that if the debtor fails to comply with a duty arising under the 
contract, the creditor is entitled to claim compensation for the loss caused by such breach of 
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his duty. The claim for damages is based on the notion of fault, but fault is not, strictly 
speaking, a requirement for the claim, since it is the debtor who has to prove that he was not 
responsible for the breach of duty. Pursuant to Section 276 (1), the debtor is not only 
responsible for fault in the sense of deliberate and negligent acts or omissions, but may also 
be subject to a stricter or more lenient degree of liability if it is specified or to be inferred 
from the other subject matter of the obligation, in particular the assumption of a guarantee or 
the acquisition risk.
2688
 Section 276 (3) provides that the parties cannot agree in advance to 
relieve the obligor of liability for deliberate acts or omissions. 
 
The German Civil Code distinguishes between damages in lieu of performance and damages 
for delay. Damages in lieu of performance can be claimed only if the additional requirements 
of Sections 281, 282 or 283 of the Civil Code are met. The claim for damages in lieu of 
performance substitutes the performance. Thus, after receiving the damages the aggrieved 
party should be in the same financial position as it would have been had the contract been 
performed exactly in the way promised.
2689
 Pursuant to Section 281 (1), if the debtor does not 
perform, or does not perform properly, at the time when he has to perform, the creditor may 
claim damages in lieu of performance provided that he has fixed, without success, a 
reasonable period for effecting performance or remedying the defective performance. 
Moreover, if the debtor has performed only in part, the creditor may demand damages in lieu 
of performance only if he has no interest in performance in part. When the obligor has failed 
to perform properly, the obligee may not demand compensation in lieu of performance if the 
breach of duty is immaterial. Section 281 (2) dispenses with the requirement of fixing a 
period for performance if the debtor seriously and definitely refuses to perform or if there are 
special circumstances which, after each party’s interests are balanced, justify the immediate 
assertion of a claim for damages. Under Section 282, infringement of one of ancillary duties 
leads to a claim for damages in lieu of performance if the creditor can no longer reasonably be 
expected to receive performance. Section 283 enables the creditor to claim damages in lieu of 
performance in all cases of subsequent impossibility unless the debtor proves that he was not 
responsible for the impossibility to perform.
2690
 Thus, the position of German law with regard 
to the damages in lieu of performance corresponds to a great extent with the case of the right 
to terminate. The claim damages in lieu performance require a non-excused material non-
performance and a Nachfirst mechanism subject to certain exceptions.  
 
The detriments caused to the creditor until performance finally rendered may be compensated 
by a claim of damages for delay.
2691
 The damages for delay leave the debtor’s duty to render 
performance unaffected, and cover the loss that has arisen because the debtor has not 
performed in time. It includes gains lost or expenses incurred as a result of the delay as well 
as decline in value of the subject-matter during the period of delay. For the claim of damages 
for delay, Section 286 of the German Civil Code requires the creditor to serve a special 
warning (“Mahnung”) on the debtor, who has not performed after performance became due. 
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Under Section 286 (2), mahnung is not necessary, where a time for performance is fixed, the 
debtor seriously and definitely refuses to perform, or special reasons justify the occurrence of 
default with immediate effect. Finally, Section 280 (1) itself applies to the cases other than 
designated as those of damages in lieu of performance and damages for delay. It covers 
consequential loss, i.e. damage suffered by the creditor as a result of the breach of contract, 
with respect to other objects of legal protection.
2692
 In this case, the claim for damages does 
not substitute the original claim for performance, but exists beside the latter. 
 
The extent of damages available under German law is generally addressed in the general part 
of the law of obligations, which apply to all damage claims, whether they arise from tort, 
contract, or another source. Pursuant to Section 249 of the Civil Code, the basic principle in 
German law of damages is restitutio ad integrum, in the sense that a person who is liable in 
damages must restore the situation which would have existed if the circumstance rendering 
him liable to pay damages had not occurred. Thus, under German law, in principle, every 
pecuniary loss caused by non-performance of the contract may be recovered. This is called 
positive interest.
2693
 Under Section 284 of the Civil Code, instead of claiming damages in lieu 
of performance, the creditor may recover any expenses that he has incurred in the expectation 
of receiving performance and that he was reasonably entitled to incur, unless the purpose of 
these expenses would have been frustrated even without the debtor’s breach of duty. This is 
called negative interest and usually preferred by the creditor, if he finds it difficult to quantify 
his loss or to establish any loss at all.
2694
  
 
Under German law, the damages are not limited to losses which the non-performing party had 
or could have reasonably foreseen. Instead of foreseeability, the principle of adequate 
causation applies. The questions of causal connection depend to a great extent on the 
discretion of the judge. Even so, there are certain general principles which the judge is bound 
to observe. The theory of “adequate causation” holds that a wrongdoer is liable for a loss if 
his default appreciably increased the objective possibility of a loss that in fact occurred. On 
the other hand, the wrongdoer is under no liability if his default was, according to the ordinary 
course of things, quite indifferent with regard to the consequence which in fact occurred, and 
only became a condition of the occurrence of the loss as a result of unusual or intervening 
events.
2695
 The adequacy of causation is judged from the perspective of objective or optimal 
observer, having knowledge of all the circumstances of which a person of that kind could 
have known, as well as any additional circumstances of which the wrongdoer himself actually 
knew. Moreover, the loss for which compensation is sought must be within the protective 
purpose of the contract. This requires a determination of whether the duty which was 
breached was supposed to protect the creditor from the type of harm, which in fact resulted. 
The approach of protective purpose of the contract is usually seen as limiting the recoverable 
harm to a greater extent than the theory of adequate causation, since the debtor’s non-
performance may have increased the probability that harm of the relevant type would occur, 
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but such loss may still be held to be outside the purpose of the contractual norm. The precise 
scope of the protective purpose of the contract is a matter of fact to be determined in the light 
of the all the circumstances, including the intentions of the parties.
2696
 
 
Section 254 of the German Civil Code incorporates the doctrines of contributory negligence 
and mitigation of loss. It provides that if the fault of the aggrieved party contributed to his 
loss, the existence and extent of the damages depends on the circumstances and in particular 
on the question how far the loss was preponderantly caused by, or was due to the fault of, one 
or the other of the parties. This principle is expressly stated to apply to two special situations 
under Section 254 (2): where the fault of the aggrieved party is limited to failure to warn the 
other party of the risk of an exceptionally high loss; and where the injured party has omitted 
to take steps to avoid or reduce the loss.
 
This provision was in fact added in the place of a 
draft foreseeability rule, which provided that the liability for failure to perform of the person 
owing performance does not extend to compensation for harm the occurrence of which lay 
beyond the realm of probability given the awareness of circumstances which that person had 
or should have had.
2697
 The draft rule was deleted for being too restrictive, but Section 254 (2) 
has been used by the courts in the same manner that some French courts have used the 
foresseability rule.
2698
 
 
Lost profits are recoverable under Section 252 of the German Civil Code, which provides that 
a profit will be deemed to have been lost if it is one which would have been expected as 
probable to be made in the ordinary course of things or in the special circumstances, having 
regard to preparations and provisions made by the aggrieved party.
2699
 It will generally suffice 
for the aggrieved party to show that the circumstances envisaged by Section 252 exist. 
However, under the test of adequate causation, the defaulting party could still limit his 
liability by showing that the default did not appreciably increase the objective possibility of 
loss of a kind that in fact occurred.
2700
 
 
Under German law, there are two main theories for calculating the amount of damages in 
reciprocal contracts. First, according to the “exchange theory”, the creditor is entitled to the 
whole value of the debtor’s performance including lost profit, but only on condition of 
performing his own promise. The second theory is the “difference theory” whereby the 
creditor is on account of debtor’s non-performance is released from his obligation to perform 
his own promise, and he is entitled to claim the difference in value between the performance 
which was promised to him and that which was promised by him, but only if he has not yet 
rendered performance and wishes to retain it. The German courts have a general tendency to 
apply the difference theory due to the commercially inconvenient results arising from the 
exchange theory. There are also cases in which the difference theory would produce 
inconvenient results, and in these cases, the theory is not followed. For instance, where the 
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aggrieved party has already performed, the difference theory would require that he should 
take back his performance and recover the difference between its value and that of the 
promised performance. Moreover, the aggrieved party who has not yet rendered performance 
may have an interest in getting rid of the subject-matter of the performance. In such a case, he 
is entitled to tender performance and to claim damages on the basis of the exchange 
theory.
2701
 Thus, the courts will generally apply the difference theory, but they will not do so 
where it leads to inconvenient results and, thus, the aggrieved party may only demand the 
whole amount of damages under the exchange theory if he has already performed or if he has 
a particular interest in rendering his own performance.
 2702
 
 
German law recognizes two modes of assessment of damages: abstract assessments of 
damages, where the damages are measured by an abstract standard such as the market value 
of what the creditor would have received, and concrete assessment on the basis of a 
“concrete” substitute transaction. Under the general law of sale in Germany, when the seller 
fails to deliver, the buyer may seek to enforce either the concrete or the abstract measure of 
damages. Under the concrete measure, the buyer will recover the difference between the cost 
of actual substitute transaction and the contract price, or, if actual substitute is not available, 
the difference between the contract price and the price he would have obtained from selling 
the goods to a third party, i.e. the price of a hypothetical substitute purchase. Alternatively, 
the buyer may claim the difference between the contract price and the market price of the 
goods had he been able to resell them. An abstract assessment of damages in effect alleviates 
the burden of proving the loss which lies upon the creditor. In the case of a commercial sale of 
goods, the abstract measure of damages is privileged over a concrete assessment when the 
buyer or the seller claims damages for delay.
2703
 
  
In German law, the general principle is that a penalty clause is valid and enforceable. Section 
340 (1) of the Civil Code provides that where the penalty is promised for non-performance the 
creditor may claim the penalty in lieu of performance, and if he demands the penalty his claim 
for performance is excluded. Section 341 (1) provides that if the penalty is promised for 
failure to perform properly, including delayed performance, the creditor may demand the 
penalty in addition to performance. For both cases, Sections 340 (2) and 341 (2) provide that, 
where the creditor claims compensation for non-performance, he is entitled to the penalty as a 
minimum sum, and that a claim for further damages is not excluded. Section 343 of the Civil 
Code provides that if the penalty is unreasonably high it can be reduced by the court to a 
reasonable sum. The court applying this provision takes into consideration whether the 
penalty clause aimed at enriching a party or maliciously impoverishing the other party. It also 
considers the interest which the creditor had in performance, the previous behavior of the 
debtor, the economic position of the debtor, and the comparative fault of the parties. Section 
348 of the German Commercial Code prevents the courts from reducing the agreed amount of 
penalty promised by a merchant operating a commercial concern on the basis of Section 343 
of the Civil Code. However, in commercial cases, the enforcement of the penalty clause could 
still amount to an exercise of contractual rights against good faith, and Section 242 of the 
Civil Code may be applicable to allow for review of the amount of penalty. If the penalty 
clause is not challenged under these considerations, or the challenge has failed, the penalty 
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will be payable in case of non-performance regardless of whether loss has been suffered or 
not.
2704
 
 
In common law, damages are the primary remedy for breach of contract.
2705
 The basic 
principle with regard to the purpose and measure of damages for breach of contract was 
formulated in the case of Robinson v Harman in 1848: “the rule of the common law is, that 
where a party sustains loss by reason of a breach of contract, he is, so far as money can do it 
to be placed in the same situation, with respect to damages, as if the contract had been 
performed.”2706 This is the general rule under common law, and an award of damages for 
breach of contract principally seeks to protect the aggrieved party’s expectation interest.2707 
Under common law, the expectation interest covers the elements of actual loss and the loss of 
profits, because the contract will have been entered into with a view to making profit and the 
protection of that expectation of profit will adequately protect the interests of the aggrieved 
party. Even so, the remedy of damages is in principle based on expectation less the amount 
saved by the aggrieved party in consequence of the breach, which will include the expenses 
saved in consequence of being relieved of the obligation to perform.
2708
  
 
Originally, common law did not distinguish between the positive and negative interest. The 
American jurist Fuller, in his famous article with Perdue,
2709
 adopted the parallel distinction 
between the expectation interest, the reliance interest and the restitution interest,
2710
 and this 
terminology has influenced English and US case law.
2711
 Thus, under common law, an 
                                                 
2704
 Ibid., at 1058 
2705
 Treitel, G.H., Remedies for Breach of Contract (Courses of Action Open to a Party Aggrieved), International 
Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Vol. 7 Ch. 16, Tubingen: Mohr, 1976, at 24 
2706
 1 Ex Rep 850, 855 
2707
 McKendrick, Ewan, Contract law, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, at 404; Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 
Section 347 (Measure of Damages in General): “Subject to the limitations stated in §§350-53, the injured party 
has a right to damages based on his expectation interest as measured by (a) the loss in the value to him of the 
other party's performance caused by its failure or deficiency, plus (b) any other loss, including incidental or 
consequential loss, caused by the breach, less (c) any cost or other loss that he has avoided by not having to 
perform.” 
2708
 Treitel, G.H., Remedies for Breach of Contract (Courses of Action Open to a Party Aggrieved), International 
Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Vol. 7 Ch. 16, Tubingen: Mohr, 1976, at 52 
2709
 Fuller, L. L., & William R Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, Yale Law Journal, 46 
(1936), at 52-96 
2710
 An aggrieved party may assert the protection of restitution interest with a view to depriving the non-
performing party of a gain which he has made at the aggrieved party’s expense rather than getting compensated 
for the loss which he has suffered. However, the claimant can obtain restitutionary remedy only when he can 
establish that the defendant was enriched, that the enrichment was at the claimant’s expense and that it is unjust 
that the defendant retains the benefit without recompensing the claimant. Where the ground on which restitution 
is sought is the breach of contract, a restitutionary remedy is available only within very narrow confines. In 
English law, the aggrieved party may seek a restitutionary remedy either on the ground that the basis upon which 
he has conferred benefit on the other party has failed because of the breach of contract, or on the ground that the 
other party has, as a result of his breach of contract, obtained an unjust benefit, in the form of a profit which he 
would not otherwise have made. McKendrick, Ewan, Contract law, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, at 404, at 403, 
410-413; Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981), Section 344 (Purposes of Remedies), Comment c.; 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981), Section 373 (Restitution When Other Party Is In Breach), Comment 
a. 
2711
 Beale, Hugh, Denis Tallon, Stefan Vogenauer, Jacobien W. Rutgers & Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson, 
Contract Law (Ius Commune Casebooks for the Common Law of Europe): 5, Hart Publishing; 2
nd
 Revised 
edition, 2010, at 997; Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 344. (Purposes Of Remedies): “Judicial 
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aggrieved party may claim the protection of his reliance interest because, for example, the 
loss of profit is hard to prove.
2712
 In that case, the award of damages should compensate him 
to the extent that he has relied to his detriment upon the promise of the defendant and put the 
claimant in as good a position as he was in before the promise was made. Although the 
principle is that the aggrieved party is entitled to choose between claiming on an expectation 
and a reliance basis, sometimes the court may award reliance loss, even though the aggrieved 
party claims for loss of expectation, where the value of his expectation is too uncertain to 
enable the court to base an award upon it.
2713
 Moreover, in the United States, it is generally 
recognized that an aggrieved party claiming damages on a reliance basis should not be put 
into a position better than that in which he would have been if the contract had been 
performed.
2714
 In such cases that the loss suffered by the aggrieved party in excess of his 
expectation is suffered because the contract was a bad bargain for him, the principle is that the 
court will not, by an award of reliance loss, put the aggrieved party into a position 
demonstrably better than that in which he would have been if the contract had been 
performed.
2715
 Similarly, in English law, although the aggrieved party has a right to elect 
whether to claim for loss of bargain damages or for wasted expenditure, this general right of 
election is subject to an exception where the claimant seeks to recover his reliance loss in an 
attempt to escape the consequences of his bad bargain or to reverse the contractual allocation 
of risk.
2716
 In view of this limitation, the aggrieved party apparently has no effective right of 
election between expectation and reliance interest, because a claim for reliance interest is only 
available where the aggrieved party had not suffered or could not prove a loss of profit.
2717
 
 
English law refers mainly to an abstract method in the calculation of damages. For example, 
in sales contracts, the reasoning for the precedence of abstract method is that if the buyer has 
paid more than the current market price for the replacement of goods, he has not acted 
reasonably, and, if he has managed to get them for less, this is a profitable deal he would have 
                                                                                                                                                        
remedies under the rules stated in this Restatement serve to protect one or more of the following interests of a 
promisee: (a) his “expectation interest,” which is his interest in having the benefit of his bargain by being put in 
as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been performed, (b) his “reliance interest,” which is 
his interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on the contract by being put in as good a position as 
he would have been in had the contract not been made, or (c) his “restitution interest,” which is his interest in 
having restored to him any benefit that he has conferred on the other party.” 
2712
 McKendrick, Ewan, Contract law, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, at 404; Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 
Section 349, (Damages Based On Reliance Interest): “As an alternative to the measure of damages stated in § 
347, the injured party has a right to damages based on his reliance interest, including expenditures made in 
preparation for performance or in performance, less any loss that the party in breach can prove with reasonable 
certainty the injured party would have suffered had the contract been performed.” 
2713
 Treitel, G.H., Remedies for Breach of Contract (Courses of Action Open to a Party Aggrieved), International 
Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Vol. 7 Ch. 16, Tubingen: Mohr, 1976, at 36 
2714
 Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 349, Comment a.: “If the injured party's expenditures exceed the 
contract price, it is clear that at least to the extent of the excess, there would have been a loss. For this reason, 
recovery for expenditures under the rule stated in this section may not exceed the full contract price.” 
2715
 Treitel, G.H., Remedies for Breach of Contract (Courses of Action Open to a Party Aggrieved), International 
Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Vol. 7 Ch. 16, Tubingen: Mohr, 1976, at 37 
2716
 McKendrick, Ewan, Contract law, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, at 419 
2717
 Toohey and McHugh JJ in Commonwealth of Australia v. Amann Aviation Pty Ltd (1991) 174 CLR 64, 136, 
162 
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been able to make anyway so that he should keep any profit.
2718
 In the United States, the 
principle of concrete assessment of damages is available under the provisions of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, entitling a buyer of goods to cover and a seller to resell in good faith and 
in a commercially reasonable manner in the event of the opposite party’s breach.2719 If the 
aggrieved party does not resell or cover, damages are assessed abstractly, by reference to 
market prices.
 2720
 Where the aggrieved party does resell or cover, market prices are relevant 
only in determining whether the actual cover transaction satisfied the requirement of 
reasonableness.
2721
  
 
There are two additional measures of damages that can put the aggrieved party in the position 
which he would have been in had the contract been performed according to its terms, 
particularly in the cases involving construction contracts under common law. The first is the 
difference in value between what the aggrieved party has received and what he expected to 
receive, and the second is the cost of putting the aggrieved party into the position which he 
would have been in had the contract been fully performed. Section 348 (2) of the Restatement 
Second Contracts provide that if a breach results in defective or unfinished construction and 
the loss in value to the injured party is not proved with sufficient certainty, he may recover 
damages based on (a) the diminution in the market price of the property caused by the breach, 
or (b) the reasonable cost of completing performance or of remedying the defects if that cost 
is not clearly disproportionate to the probable loss in value to him. Thus, the Restatement 
recognizes these bases of assessment of damages in construction contracts provided that the 
loss in value to the injured party is not proved with sufficient certainty. However, the 
Restatement explains that if the damages based on the cost to remedy the defects would give 
the injured party a recovery greatly in excess of the loss in value to him, or if an award based 
on the cost to remedy the defects would clearly be excessive and the injured party does not 
prove the actual loss in value to him, damages will be based instead on the difference between 
the market price that the property would have had without the defects and the market price of 
the property with the defects, as this solution reflects the least possible loss in value to the 
injured party since he could always sell the property on the market even if it had no special 
value to him.
2722
 In such cases, if there is no diminution in market price of the property due to 
the defects, the injured party can recover only nominal damages.
2723
 
 
In English law, as implied by the House of Lords in Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd. 
v. Forsyth, the court is not confined to a straight choice between the two measures, in the 
sense that the rejection of one necessarily entails the adoption of the other but, if such a stark 
choice could produce an unjust outcome, the court may exercise its abstract reasoning in 
determining the recoverable amount of damages when a real loss has been established to 
                                                 
2718
 Beale, Hugh, Denis Tallon, Stefan Vogenauer, Jacobien W. Rutgers & Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson, 
Contract Law (Ius Commune Casebooks for the Common Law of Europe): 5, Hart Publishing; 2
nd
 Revised 
edition, 2010, at 1036 
2719
 UCC, Sections 2-706 (seller); 2-711 (2) (d) (buyer) 
2720
 UCC, Sections, 2-708 (seller); 2-713 (buyer)  
2721
 Treitel, G.H., Remedies for Breach of Contract (Courses of Action Open to a Party Aggrieved), International 
Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Vol. 7 Ch. 16, Tubingen: Mohr, 1976, at 45 
2722
 Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 348, Comment c. 
2723
 Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 348, Comment c., Illustration 4 
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exist.
2724
 In some cases, the diminution in value might be zero or a very small amount, and to 
award such an amount by way of damages for non-performance would make the non-
performing party’s promise illusory. On the other hand, it might be equally unsatisfactory if 
the cost of curing the defective performance was so high and out of all proportion to the 
benefit which the aggrieved party would obtain from it. The House of Lords underlined the 
role of reasonableness and common sense in deciding whether to award damages on a cost of 
cure basis or a diminution in value basis or, if both lead to unreasonable results in the 
particular circumstances of the case, on another basis that utilizes the abstract reasoning of the 
judge. Thus, the House of Lords set up a flexible framework to ensure a fair outcome in the 
assessment of damages through its employment of reasonableness as the controlling 
device.
2725
  
 
Under common law, the test of foreseeability determines the extent of liability for damages. 
This test is generally thought to have entered into the common law through the doctrine of 
remoteness, which can be traced back to the English case of Hadley v. Baxendale of 1854.
2726
 
Unlike the principle of foreseeability under French law, there is no suggestion in the rule in 
Hadley v. Baxendale of any special treatment of a debtor who is guilty of “fraud”. Both in 
England and in the United States, it has been very widely thought that Hadley v. Baxendale 
had adopted a test of “foreseeability” in its statement that “Where two parties have made a 
contract which one of them has broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive in 
respect of such breach of contract should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered 
either arising naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of things, from such breach of 
contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of 
both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it.”2727 
                                                 
2724
 Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd. v. Forsyth, [1996] 1 A.C. 344, Lord Mustill stated: “In my opinion 
there would indeed be something wrong if, on the hypothesis that cost of reinstatement and the depreciation in 
value were the only available measures of recovery, the rejection of the former necessarily entailed the adoption 
of the latter; and the court might be driven to opt for the cost of reinstatement, absurd as the consequence might 
often be, simply to escape from the conclusion that the promisor can please himself whether or not to comply 
with the wishes of the promisee which, as embodied in the contract, formed part of the consideration for the 
price. Having taken on the job the contractor is morally as well as legally obliged to give the employer what he 
stipulated to obtain, and this obligation ought not to be devalued. In my opinion, however, the hypothesis is not 
correct. There are not two alternative measures of damage, at opposite poles, but only one: namely the loss truly 
suffered by the promisee…. As my Lords have shown, the test of reasonableness plays a central part in 
determining the basis of recovery, and will indeed be decisive in a case such as the present when the cost of 
reinstatement would be wholly disproportionate to the non-monetary loss suffered by the employer. But it would 
be equally unreasonable to deny all recovery for such a loss. The amount may be small, and since it cannot be 
quantified directly there may be room for difference of opinion about what it should be. But in several fields the 
judges are well accustomed to putting figures to intangibles, and I see no reason why the imprecision of the 
exercise should be a barrier, if that is what fairness demands…. There is no need to remedy the injustice of 
awarding too little by unjustly awarding far too much. The judgment of the trial judge acknowledges that the 
employer has suffered a true loss and expresses it in terms of money.”; Lord Bridge of Harwich stated: “I agree 
with my noble and learned friend Lord Mustill in the reasons he gives for concluding that there is no reason in 
principle why the court should not have power to award damages of the kind in question and indeed that in some 
circumstances such power may be essential to enable the court to do justice.” Lord Lloyd of Berwick stated: “I 
am unable to accept that, in a case such as the present, the judge was presented with such harsh alternatives. He 
was not bound to award either too little or too much. The law of damages is not so inflexible.” 
2725
 McKendrick, Ewan, Contract law, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, at 410 
2726
 Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch 341 
2727
 Ibid., at 354-355; Treitel, G.H., Remedies for Breach of Contract (Courses of Action Open to a Party 
Aggrieved), International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Vol. 7 Ch. 16, Tubingen: Mohr, 1976, at 60; 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981), Section 351 (Unforeseeability And Related Limitations On Damages) 
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This test is divided into two parts. The first part qualifies a loss as recoverable if it occurs 
naturally or as a result of the usual course of things after a breach of contract. The second part 
allows the recovery of losses, which did not arise naturally, but were within the reasonable 
contemplation of both parties at the time they made the contract. As the non-performing party 
must at least know of the special circumstances under the second part of the test, the effect of 
this part is said to encourage the contracting party to disclose, prior to entry into the contract, 
the risk of exceptional losses which may be suffered as a result of the non-performance by the 
other party, and to require the former to pay for some premium in exchange of the latter’s 
assumption of the relevant unpredictable risk.
2728
 Recently, Lord Hoffman and Lord Hope 
implied the possible extension of this form of reasoning to the first part of the test in the 
House of Lords decision of Transfield Shipping Inc v Mercator Shipping Inc.
2729
  
                                                 
2728
 McKendrick, Ewan, Contract law, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, at 423-424   
2729
 [2008] UKHL 48. Lord Hoffmann and Lord Hope held that, even if a loss fell within the first part of test of 
Hadley v. Baxendale, it was not recoverable if, as a matter of construction of the contract, the loss was not one 
for which the party in breach agreed to accept responsibility at the time of contract. In their opinion, the 
appropriate test was not simply to determine whether the loss was “of a kind which the defendant, when he made 
the contract, ought to have realised was not unlikely to result from [the] breach”, as explained in the House of 
Lords decision of C Czarnikow Ltd v Koufos (The Heron II) [1969] 1 AC 350, at 382-383. In their view, it was 
more appropriate to ascertain the type and extent of the loss for which the party in breach could reasonably be 
expected to have assumed responsibility. Lord Hoffmann stated that “It seems to me logical to found liability for 
damages upon the intention of the parties (objectively ascertained) because all contractual liability is voluntarily 
undertaken. It must be in principle wrong to hold someone liable for risks for which the people entering into 
such a contract in their particular market, would not reasonably be considered to have undertaken. The view 
which the parties take of the responsibilities and risks they are undertaking will determine the other terms of the 
contract and in particular the price is paid. Anyone asked to assume a large and unpredictable risk will require 
some premium in exchange. A rule of law which imposes liability upon a party for a risk which he reasonably 
thought was excluded gives the other party something for nothing.”  Lord Hoffman concluded that “the 
implication of a term as a matter of construction of the contract as a whole in its commercial context and the 
implication of the limits of damages liability seem to me to involve the application of essentially the same 
techniques of interpretation. In both cases, the court is engaged in construing the agreement to reflect the 
liabilities which the parties may reasonably be expected to have assumed and paid for. It cannot decline this task 
on the ground that the parties could have spared it the trouble by using clearer language.” Lord Hope similarly 
noted that the point that was made in the Heron II case was “the more unusual the consequence, the more likely 
it is that provision will be made for it in the contract if it is to result in liability.” He concluded that “damages 
that are recoverable for breach of contract are limited to what happens in ordinary circumstances - in the great 
multitude of cases, as Alderson B put it in Hadley v Baxendale - where an assumption of responsibility can be 
presumed, or what arises from special circumstances known to or communicated to the party who is in breach at 
the time of entering into the contract which because he knew about he can be expected to provide for. This is a 
principle of general application. We are dealing in this case with a highly specialised area of commercial law. 
But the principle by which the issue must be resolved is that which applies in the law of contract generally.” 
Lord Rodger and Baroness Hale, on the other hand, decided the case on the basis of a narrower ground, and as a 
question of fact, in terms of whether the circumstances surrounding the case were within the reasonable 
contemplation of the parties, in contrast to Lord Hoffmann’s reasoning that recoverability of loss of profits was a 
question of law, in terms of discerning the intentions of the parties on an interpretation of the contract as a 
whole. Lord Rodger stated that “it is important not to lose sight of the basic point that, in the absence of special 
knowledge, a party entering into a contract can only be supposed to contemplate the losses which are likely to 
result from the breach in question - in other words, those losses which will generally happen in the ordinary 
course of things if the breach occurs. Those are the losses for which the party in breach is held responsible - the 
stated rationale being that, other losses not having been in contemplation, the parties had no opportunity to 
provide for them.” Baroness Hale stated that “The rule in Hadley v Baxendale asks what the parties must be 
taken to have had in their contemplation, rather than what they actually had in their contemplation, but the 
criterion by which this is judged is a factual one. Questions of assumption of risk depend upon a wider range of 
factors and value judgments.” In her opinion, although the result of the reasoning of Lord Hoffmann in this case 
may be to bring about certainty and clarity in the relevant shipping market, such an imposed limit on liability 
could easily be at the expense of justice in some future case, and could introduce much room for argument in 
other contractual contexts. 
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Under common law, the aggrieved party cannot recover for loss which he could have avoided 
or mitigated through his reasonable efforts.
2730
 The aggrieved party is under a duty to mitigate 
his loss, but he does not incur any liability if he fails to mitigate its loss. The classic 
formulation of principle relating to mitigation can be found in British Westinghouse Electric 
and Manufacturing Company Limited v Underground Electric Railways Company of London 
Limited, where Viscount Haldane LC said: “The fundamental basis is thus compensation for 
pecuniary loss naturally flowing from the breach; but this first principle is qualified by a 
second, which imposes on a claimant the duty of taking all reasonable steps to mitigate the 
loss consequent on the breach, and debars him from claiming any part of the damage which is 
due to his neglect to take such steps.” However, “this does not impose on the plaintiff an 
obligation to take any step which is reasonable and prudent man would not ordinarily take in 
the course of his business”.2731 Thus, where it is reasonable for an aggrieved party to obtain a 
substitute performance, an aggrieved party is both obliged and entitled to obtain a substitute 
performance from a third party without any prior judicial authorization or express provision in 
the contract itself.  
 
Similarly, Section 350 of the Restatement Second provides that damages are not recoverable 
for loss that the injured party could have avoided without undue risk, burden or humiliation. 
Thus, the amount of loss that the injured party could reasonably have avoided by stopping 
performance, making substitute arrangements or otherwise is subtracted from the amount that 
would otherwise have been recoverable as damages.
2732
 Under this rule, the injured party is 
expected to stop his own performance to avoid further expenditure once he has reason to 
know that performance by the other party will not be forthcoming, and to arrange a substitute 
transaction within a reasonable time after he learns of the breach, even if the breach takes the 
form of an anticipatory repudiation.
2733
 However, the injured party is not precluded from 
recovery for its failure to avoid the loss to the extent that he has made reasonable but 
unsuccessful efforts to avoid loss, and costs incurred in a reasonable but unsuccessful effort to 
avoid loss are recoverable as incidental losses. Section 350 aims at encouraging the injured 
party to make reasonable efforts to avoid loss by protecting him even when his efforts fail.
 2734
 
 
Another limitation under common law is that the aggrieved party will be unable to recover 
damages in respect of the loss which he has suffered if he cannot establish the causal link 
between his loss and the other party’s breach of contract.2735 The notion of causation is even 
reflected in the cases of duty to mitigate. English courts often use the language of causation 
and consider a claimant’s failure to mitigate as breaking the chain of causation between the 
defendant’s breach of contract and this unnecessary loss.2736 Similarly, an aggrieved party’s 
negligence may break the causal link between the defendant’s breach of contract and any loss 
                                                 
2730
 McKendrick, Ewan, Contract law, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, at 421; Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
(1981), Section 350 (Avoidability As A Limitation On Damages) 
2731
 [1912] A.C. 673 at 689 
2732
 Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981), Section 350, Comment b 
2733
 Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981), Section 350, Comments b and f 
2734
 Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981), Section 350, Comment h 
2735
 McKendrick, Ewan, Contract law, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, at 426 
2736
 Whittaker, Simon, Contributory Fault and Mitigation; Rights and Reasonableness: Comparisons between 
English and French Law, in L. Tich (ed.), Causation in Law, Univerzita Karlova v Praze, 2007, (at 2 on the file 
with author) 
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which may be attributable to it.
2737
 However, when the aggrieved party has been negligent and 
that negligence contributed to the damage which he has suffered, but it is not sufficient to 
break the chain of causation, the question then arises whether the damages, payable to the 
claimant can be reduced in the common law countries.  
 
Under the Restatement Second Contracts, contract law is strict liability without a contributory 
negligence defense. Thus, the promisor is liable to the promisee for breach, and that liability 
is unaffected by the promisor's exercise of due care or failure to take efficient precautions, and 
the promisor's liability is unaffected by the fact that the promisee, prior to the breach, has 
failed to take reasonable measures to reduce the consequences of nonperformance.
2738
 In 
England, the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 is primarily covers tort cases, 
and it has not been clear to what extent the Act also applies to cases of breach of contract. In 
order to determine the applicability of the Act to the breach of contracts, three categories are 
distinguished according to the nature of the obligation which is breached: (1) a breach of a 
strict contractual duty; (2) a breach of a contractual duty to take care, which does not 
correspond to a common law duty to take care; and (3) a breach of contractual duty of care 
where the breach also constitutes a tort. It is argued that contributory negligence can operate 
as a defense only in the third category, where the breach of contract is also a tort.
2739
  
 
Even so, there are many other legal devices under common law to address the problems 
related to the contributory or comparative negligence, since the aggrieved party’s contributory 
behavior can also be discussed under headings such as causation, remoteness or foreseeability 
of damages, or impossibility and frustration.
2740
 For instance, common law recognizes the 
issue of “concurrent delay” in the construction contracts. The issue arises where a 
construction has not been completed on time because of two or more delaying events that 
operate at the same time: one of the delaying events is the responsibility of the employer and 
the other is the responsibility of the contractor. However, there are various approaches 
suggested in the common law jurisdictions. First possible approach is the apportionment, 
which suggests that the delay and its consequences should be apportioned between the 
contractor and the employer by allocating financial consequences according to the court’s 
perception of the relative causative potency of the competing causes. However, this approach 
has attracted only very limited support because the courts of common law tend to apply the 
principles of causation in an ‘all or nothing’ manner, but it is observed greater readiness to use 
apportionment in Canada and in New Zealand.
2741
 The second possible approach is described 
                                                 
2737
 Sotiros Shipping Inc v Sameiet Solholt (The “Solholt”)  [1983] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 605, 608, Sir John Donaldson 
MR:  ‘[the plaintiff] is completely free to act as he judges to be in his best interests.  On the other hand, a 
defendant is not liable for all loss suffered by the plaintiff in consequence of his so acting.  A defendant is only 
liable for such part of the plaintiff’s loss as is properly to be regarded as caused by the defendant’s breach’. 
2738
 Scott, Robert E., In (Partial) Defense of Strict Liability in Contract, Michigan Law Review, 107 (June 2009), 
at 1382 
2739
 Beale, Hugh, Denis Tallon, Stefan Vogenauer, Jacobien W. Rutgers & Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson, 
Contract Law (Ius Commune Casebooks for the Common Law of Europe): 5, Hart Publishing; 2
nd
 Revised 
edition, 2010, at 1022-1023 
2740
 Treitel, G.H., Remedies for Breach of Contract: A Comparative Account, Clarendon Press, 1988, at 189-190 
2741
 Marrin, John, Concurrent delay, Construction Law Journal, 18-6 (2002), at 440-441: Marrin also noted some 
indication of a similar development in England. In Tennant Radiant Heat Limited v. Warrington Development 
Corporation, warehouse roof collapsed due to an accumulation of rainwater because of blocked outlets. The 
tenants' claim in respect of the goods which were damaged was met by a landlords' counterclaim for damages for 
breach of the repairing covenant. While recognizing that the apportionment provisions of the Law Reform 
(Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 did not apply, the Court of Appeal nevertheless apportioned the damages, 
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as the American approach, under which in cases of concurrent delay neither party will recover 
compensation, unless and to the extent that they can segregate delay associated with each 
competing cause and prove the delay upon which it relies. The usual result is that the 
contractor is granted an extension of time relieving it of liability for liquidated damages, but 
does not recover delay-related loss and damage because of its own inexcusable delay.
2742
 
Finally, there is the approach suggested by the English case of Henry Boot Construction (UK) 
Ltd v. Malmaison Hotel (Manchester) Ltd.
2743
 The judgment registered the common ground 
between the parties that: “it is agreed that if there are two concurrent causes of delay, one of 
which is a relevant event [e.g., the owner's change order], and the other is not [e.g., the 
contractor's insufficient resources], then the contractor is entitled to an extension of time for 
the period of delay caused by the relevant event notwithstanding the concurrent effect of the 
other event.” The approach suggests that in allocating risks as between themselves, the parties 
may be taken, first, to have recognized that any one delay or period of delay might well be 
attributable to more than one cause but, secondly, to have agreed nevertheless that provided 
one of those causes affords grounds for relief under the contract, then the contractor should 
have his relief.
2744
 The decision in the case of Royal Brompton Hospital NHS Trust v. 
Hammond (No 7) seemed to give further support to this approach, by holding that if the 
contractor was delayed in completing the works both by matters for which it bore the 
contractual risk and by relevant events within the meaning of the contract, the contractor 
“would be entitled to extensions of time by reason of the occurrence of the relevant events 
notwithstanding its own defaults.”2745 In the end, in common law, there is no single legal 
approach to the concurrency issue, although these issues are commonly raised in construction 
claims. This situation is criticized for leading to uncertainty and unpredictability in the 
outcome of claims.
2746
 
 
Common law requires that damages must be established with reasonable certainty, and 
damages, which are speculative, remote, imaginary, contingent, or merely possible, cannot be 
                                                                                                                                                        
treating the matter as one of causation. Dillon LJ stated that “in my judgment, the 1945 Act has no application to 
the present case… The problem which this court faces on the claim and counterclaim alike is in my judgement a 
problem of causation of damages. On the claim the question is how far the damage to its goods which the lessee 
has suffered was caused by the corporation’s negligence notwithstanding the lessee’s own breach of covenant. 
On the counterclaim the question is how far the damage to the corporation’s building which the corporation has 
suffered was caused by the lessee’s breach of covenant notwithstanding the corporation’s own negligence. The 
effect is that on each question apportionment is permissible. This is the same result as the 1945 Act would 
produce, but it is not reached through the Act, because the obstacle which the 1945 Act was passed to override is 
not there on either claim or counterclaim in the present case”. Croom-Johnson LJ stated “If the 1945 Act has no 
application, what is the position on the two claims? The evidence clearly indicates that the damage to the 
plaintiff's premises was attributable to two concurrent causes, both operating contemporaneously. One was the 
defendant's negligence and the other was the plaintiff's breach of covenant. I agree with the finding of Dillon L.J. 
that simply as a matter of causation, based upon the amount of water which was wrongfully on the roof, the 
plaintiff's breach of covenant was a factor of one-tenth of that united cause, and the defendant's negligence a 
factor of nine-tenths.” Tennant Radiant Heat Ltd v Warrington Development Corporation [1988] 1 E.G.L.R. 41 
2742
 Marrin, John, Concurrent delay, Construction Law Journal, 18-6 (2002), at 443-444 
2743
 [1999] 70 Con LR 32 
2744
 Marrin, John, Concurrent delay, Construction Law Journal, 18-6 (2002), at 448: This is the preferred option 
by John Marrin because, in his view, “it is readily justifiable on the grounds that it represents the kind of 
allocation of risk as between the parties which is only to be expected.” 
2745
  Royal Brompton Hospital NHS Trust v Hammond and Others (No. 7) [2001] 76 ConLR 148 
2746
 Ramsey, Vivian, Problems of Delay and Disruption Damages in International Construction Arbitration, in 
Yves Derains & Richard H. Kreindler, (eds.), Evaluation of Damages in International Arbitration, ICC 
Publication No. 668, 2006, at 204 
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recovered.
2747
 The certainty rule generally applies to the existence of loss, rather than the 
extent of loss. If the aggrieved party provides sufficient evidence of loss or damage, the fact 
that the amount of damages is difficult to assess is generally not a bar to recovery.
2748
 Doubts 
are generally resolved against the party in breach in view of the fact that the party in breach 
has forced the aggrieved party to seek compensation in damages and, thus, he should not be 
allowed to profit from his breach where it is established that a significant loss has 
occurred.
2749
 Accordingly, the courts in common law countries have been willing to award 
damages for lost profits and the loss of a chance.
2750
 Moreover, in the United States, while 
fault of the non-performing party has no bearing on liability for breach, the courts have been 
less demanding in applying the requirement of certainty if the breach was willful.
2751
 In the 
end, the rule of certainty underlines that damages need not be calculable with mathematical 
accuracy and are often approximate.
2752
 
                                                 
2747
 Treitel, G.H., Remedies for Breach of Contract (Courses of Action Open to a Party Aggrieved), International 
Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Vol. 7 Ch. 16, Tubingen: Mohr, 1976, at 83-84 
2748
 Gotanda, John Y., Damages in private international law, Receuil des Cours, 326 (2007), at 102; Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts (1981), Section 352, Comment a: “The requirement does not mean, however, that the 
injured party is barred from recovery unless he establishes the total amount of his loss. It merely excludes those 
elements of loss that cannot be proved with reasonable certainty.” 
2749
 Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981), Section 352, Comment a. 
2750
 Chaplin v. Hicks [1911] 2 KB 786: The plaintiff was a semifinalist in a beauty contest. The promoter of the 
event breached the contract by failing to notify the plaintiff of the time and place of the competition. The jury 
awarded damages in the amount of one fourth of the lowest prize. The Court of Appeals indicated the chance of 
winning had value which could be assessed by the law of averages. Allied Maples Group Ltd v. Simmons & 
Simmons [1995] 1WLR 1602: A solicitor's negligence deprived the claimant of an opportunity to negotiate a 
better bargain. The Court of Appeal held that where the loss depends on the hypothetical action of a third party, 
the claiming party only has to prove that there is a substantial chance that the third party would have acted so as 
to confer the benefit or avoid the risk, the evaluation of the substantial chance being a question of quantification 
of damages. Taylor v. Bradley, 39 N.Y. 129 (1868): A landowner breached its contract with a farmer by 
reneging on a promise to allow the latter to use the land. The Court of Appeals of New York determined that 
justice required the farmer receive the value of his contract and held that its damages were what he lost by being 
deprived of his chance of profit. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Company, 282 U.S. 555, 563 
(1931): the U. S. Supreme Court held that to deny an injured party the right to recover damages that clearly arise 
from the breach because it is of a kind that cannot be measured with certainty would allow wrongful acts to be 
profitable. The Court further explained that no part of the loss should be left upon the injured party simply 
because the defendant’s wrongful act prevented the precise amount from being fixed. Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, Section 348(3) (1981): “If a breach is of a promise conditioned on a fortuitous event and it is 
uncertain whether the event would have occurred had there been no breach, the injured party may recover 
damages based on the value of the conditional right at the time of the breach.” The comment explains that “a 
breach that occurs before the happening of the fortuitous event may make it impossible to determine whether the 
event would have occurred had there been no breach. It would be unfair to the party in breach to award damages 
on the assumption that the event would have occurred, but equally unfair to the injured party to deny recovery of 
damages on the ground of uncertainty. The injured party has, in any case, the remedy of restitution (see § 373). 
Under the rule stated in Subsection (3) he also has the alternative remedy of damages based on the value of his 
conditional contract right at the time of breach, or what may be described as the value of his “chance of 
winning.” The value of that right must itself be proved with reasonable certainty, as it may be if there is a market 
for such rights or if there is a suitable basis for determining the probability of the occurrence of the event.” 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 348(3) (1981) comment d. 
2751
 Gotanda, John Y., Damages in private international law, Receuil des Cours, 326 (2007), at 128; Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts (1981), Section 352, Comment a.: “A court may take into account all the circumstances of 
the breach, including willfulness, in deciding whether to require a lesser degree of certainty, giving greater 
discretion to the trier of the facts.” 
2752
 Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981), Section 352, Comment a.; The Heron II, Koufos v. Czamikow 
[1969] 1 A.C. 350, 425 (H.L. 1969): “the assessment of damages is not an exact science”.  
 739 
 
 
Common law divides contractual clauses for the payment of a sum of money in the event of 
breach into two kinds, as being penalty clauses and liquidated damages clauses. The 
distinction is based on the function of the clause. If the clause is a genuine attempt to pre-
estimate the loss, which is likely to arise from the breach, it is a valid liquidated damages 
clause, and can be enforced. The function of such a clause is to fix the sum which is to be paid 
irrespective of the actual loss. Thus, the aggrieved party is entitled to the agreed sum under a 
liquidated damages clause, whether his actual, or recoverable, loss amounted to more or to 
less. The aggrieved party cannot ignore such a clause and sue for his actual loss, and there is 
no judicial power to modify valid liquidated damages clauses.
 
On the other hand, if the clause 
is not a genuine pre-estimate of loss, it is a penalty clause and unenforceable. The function of 
such a clause is to punish the party in breach and intended as a means of coercing that party 
into performing its obligations. Such a clause is invalid and disregarded, and the aggrieved 
party can only claim his actual loss.
2753
 
 
The distinction between a liquidated damages clause and a penalty clause is based ultimately 
on the intention of the parties at the time of entry into the contract. Thus, it is a question of 
interpretation, and the courts have established a number of rules in deciding whether a 
particular clause is a penalty clause or a liquidated damages clause.
2754
 First, in English law, a 
stipulation will be a penalty if it is “extravagant and unconscionable in amount in comparison 
with the greatest loss that could conceivably be proved to have followed from the breach”.2755 
In the United States, a stipulation will be a penalty if the agreed amount is unreasonable in the 
light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach.
2756
 The second rule is that a 
stipulation will be regarded as a valid liquidated damages clause if the circumstances were 
such that an accurate or precise pre-estimate of damages was almost impossible, but the 
stipulated sum was in fact a genuine attempt to make a reasonable pre-estimate.
2757
 Thirdly, in 
the situation in which a single sum is payable on one or more or all of several breaches, which 
may occasion different amounts of damage, there is a presumption that the sum is a penalty on 
the ground that it cannot be a genuine pre-estimate of damage for all the breaches.
2758
 The 
                                                 
2753
 Treitel, G.H., Remedies for Breach of Contract (Courses of Action Open to a Party Aggrieved), International 
Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Vol. 7 Ch. 16, Tubingen: Mohr, 1976, at 101 
2754
 McKendrick, Ewan, Contract law, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, at 438-439 
2755
 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Company Ltd v. New Garage & Motor Co Ltd [ 1915 ] AC 79, at 87 
2756
 Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981), Section 356 (Liquidated Damages And Penalties); UCC, Section 
2-718; This approach was also adopted by the English case, Alfred Mcalpine Capital Projects Limited v Tilebox 
Limited [2005] EWHC 281 (TCC), where Jackson J stated that “There seem to be two strands in the authorities.  
In some cases judges consider whether there is an unconscionable or extravagant disproportion between the 
damages stipulated in the contract and the true amount of damages likely to be suffered. In other cases the courts 
consider whether the level of damages stipulated was reasonable…. these two strands can be reconciled. In my 
view, a pre-estimate of damages does not have to be right in order to be reasonable. There must be a substantial 
discrepancy between the level of damages stipulated in the contract and the level of damages which is likely to 
be suffered before it can be said that the agreed pre-estimate is unreasonable.” 
2757
 Treitel, G.H., Remedies for Breach of Contract (Courses of Action Open to a Party Aggrieved), International 
Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Vol. 7 Ch. 16, Tubingen: Mohr, 1976, at 101; Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre 
Company Ltd v. New Garage & Motor Co Ltd [ 1915 ] AC 79; Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981), 
Section 356, Comment b.: “The greater the difficulty either of proving that loss has occurred or of establishing 
its amount with the requisite certainty (see § 351), the easier it is to show that the amount fixed is reasonable.” 
2758
 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Company Ltd v. New Garage & Motor Co Ltd [ 1915 ] AC 79; Treitel, G.H., 
Remedies for Breach of Contract (Courses of Action Open to a Party Aggrieved), International Encyclopedia of 
Comparative Law, Vol. 7 Ch. 16, Tubingen: Mohr, 1976, at 102 
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fourth rule is that a stipulation is a penalty “if the breach consists only in not paying a sum of 
money, and the sum stipulated is a sum greater than that which ought to have been paid.”2759 
It should be noted that, in applying these rules, the courts consider the exceptional nature of 
invalidity of a contractual term as being penal or oppressive, particularly when the relevant 
clause has been agreed by commercial parties who are capable of protecting their own 
interests in the bargaining process.
2760
  
 
Under common law, a liquidated damages clause may validly provide for the payment of an 
amount, which is less than the estimated loss, but where the clause is held to exclude or 
restrict liability, it may be subject to, and invalidated by, the application of relevant rules on 
limitation of liability. In the Unites States, the doctrine of unconscionability
 
is relevant to the 
determination of validity of exemption or limitation clauses.
2761
 Although English law does 
not recognize the existence of a general doctrine of unconscionability, Unfair Commercial 
Terms Act 1977 provides means of controlling many exclusion or limitation clauses.
2762
 
According to Section 2 of the Act, a contract entered into in the course of business cannot 
exclude liability for death or personal injury resulting from negligence; nor for other loss or 
damage resulting from negligence except so far as the term is reasonable.
2763
 Thus, in those 
cases, the validity of limitation or exemption clauses will sometimes be assessed according to 
their “reasonableness”.2764 However, the Act does not apply to international contracts in 
certain cases.
2765
  
                                                 
2759
 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Company Ltd v. New Garage & Motor Co Ltd [ 1915 ] AC 79 
2760
 McKendrick, Ewan, Contract law, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, at 440 
2761
 Section 356 of the Restatement (Second) of the Contracts provides in Comment (a) that “A term that fixes an 
unreasonably small amount as damages may be unenforceable as unconscionable.” According to Section 208 of 
the Restatement (Second) of the Contracts, if a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract 
is made a court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the contract without the 
unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of any unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable 
result. Similarly, Section 2-719 of the UCC provides that the parties may limit or alter the measure of damages 
recoverable and limit or exclude consequential damages, unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. In 
more general terms, Section 2-302 of the UCC provides that if the court as a matter of law finds the contract or 
any term of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the 
contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable term, or it may so limit the 
application of any unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result.  
2762
 McKendrick, Ewan, Contract law, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, at 235 
2763
 “Negligence” is defined in Section 1 (1) as “the breach (a) of any obligation, arising from the express or 
implied terms of a contract, to take reasonable care or exercise reasonable skill in the performance of the 
contract; (b)of any common law duty to take reasonable care or exercise reasonable skill (but not any stricter 
duty); (c)of the common duty of care imposed by the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957 or the Occupiers’ Liability 
Act (Northern Ireland) 1957.” Moreover, Section 3 provides that a contract entered into, in the course of 
business, on the written standard terms of one party cannot enable that party to exclude liability for breach, to 
perform the contract substantially differently from that which was reasonably expected, or not to perform it at all 
except so far as such provision is reasonable. 
2764
 Section 11 (1) of the Act provides that “in relation to a contract term, the requirement of reasonableness … is 
that the term shall have been a fair and reasonable one to be included having regard to the circumstances which 
were, or ought reasonably to have been, known to or in the contemplation of the parties when the contract was 
made.” 
2765
 Section 26 of the Act provides that the limits imposed by this Act on the extent to which a person may 
exclude or restrict liability by reference to a contract term do not apply to liability arising under an international 
supply agreement, which is defined by Sections 26 (3) and (4), nor are the terms of such a contract subject to any 
requirement of reasonableness under Section 3 or 4. Moreover, Section 27 (1) provides that, where the law 
applicable to a contract is the law of any part of the United Kingdom only by choice of the parties, sections 2 to 
7 of this Act do not operate as part of the law applicable to the contract. However, Section 27(2) provides that 
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b. International Instruments  
 
Under the CISG, Articles 45 and 61 provide that if the seller or buyer fails to perform any of 
his obligations under the contract or the Convention, the other party may “claim damages as 
provided in Articles 74 to 77.”2766 The notion of breach of contract is the substantive 
condition for claiming damages, and means the non-fulfillment of any of the obligations 
undertaken by the seller or the buyer, regardless of whether they are of major or minor 
importance. Under the CISG, damages for non-performance are available independent of any 
fault. The claim for damages serves to complete the system of remedies under the CISG by 
providing the parties with compensation in cases where other remedies do not lead to an 
adequate compensation.
2767
 Thus, the aggrieved party “is not deprived of any right he may 
have to claim damages by exercising his right to other remedies”.2768 Finally, Articles 45 (3) 
and 61 (3) provides that no period of grace may be granted to the seller or the buyer by a court 
or arbitral tribunal when the other party resorts to a remedy for breach of contract, since it is 
thought that this would subject the parties to the broad discretionary power of a judge or 
arbitrator and lead to inappropriate consequences in the context of international commerce.
2769
 
Each party on its own motion may grant a period of grace to the other party without losing his 
right to claim damages.
2770
 
 
The basic principle for the calculation of damages is set forth in Article 74 of the CISG. It 
provides the general rule for the calculation of damages. Article 74 provides that “Damages 
for breach of contract by one party consist of a sum equal to the loss, including loss of profit, 
suffered by the other party as a consequence of the breach.” The article incorporates the 
expectation (positive) interest, a standard that is designed to place the aggrieved party in as 
good a position as if the other party had properly performed the contract.
2771
 Moreover, 
Article 74 is based on the principle of full compensation, where damages consist in 
compensation of damnum emergens and lucrum cessans. Under Article 74, damages are 
typically measured by the value of the benefit of which the aggrieved party has been deprived 
due to the breach, or by the costs of reasonable measures to bring about the situation that 
would have existed had the contract been properly performed.
2772
 For instance, where the 
seller delivers and the buyer retains defective goods, the loss suffered by the buyer might be 
measured in a number of different ways. The buyer is authorized to claim damages equal to 
                                                                                                                                                        
the controls contained in the Act cannot be evaded by the choice of law clause outside the United Kingdom as 
the governing law, if it appears that the choice of law was imposed wholly or mainly for the purpose of enabling 
the party imposing it to evade the operation of this Act. 
2766
 Articles 45(1)(b) and 61(1)(b) of the CISG 
2767
 Will, Michael, Article 45, in C. Massimo Bianca & Michael Joachim Bonell (eds.), Commentary on the 
International Sales Law: the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention, Milan, Giuffrè, 1987, at 331-332 
2768
 Articles 45(2) and 61(2) of the CISG 
2769
 Honnold, John O., Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 United Nations Convention, Kluwer 
Law International, 3
rd
 ed., 1999, at 303; Knapp, Victor, Article 61, in C. Massimo Bianca & Michael Joachim 
Bonell (eds.), Commentary on the International Sales Law: the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention, Milan, Giuffrè, 
1987, at 449 
2770
 Articles 47 and 63 of the CISG 
2771
 Honnold, John O., Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 United Nations Convention, Kluwer 
Law International, 3
rd
 ed., 1999, at 445 
2772
 CISG-AC Opinion No. 6, Calculation of Damages under CISG Article 74. Rapporteur: Professor John Y. 
Gotanda, Villanova University School of Law, Villanova, Pennsylvania, USA, 2006, at para. 3 
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the difference of the value of the goods as contracted and the value of the defective goods 
received. If the buyer is able to cure the defect, his loss would often equal the cost of the 
repairs.
2773
 The buyer may also claim loss of profits.  
 
Although the CISG does not provide specific guidance on calculating lost profits, CISG 
Advisory Council, in its Opinion No. 6, suggested that Article 74 should be understood as 
entitling the aggrieved party to claim net profits lost as a result of the breach of contract, 
which is to be calculated by subtracting from gross profits the expenses saved as a result of 
the aggrieved party being excused from performance.
2774
 Thus, since the remedy of damages 
must not place the aggrieved party in a better position than it would have enjoyed if the 
contract had been properly performed, the loss to the aggrieved party resulting from the 
breach should be offset, in calculating the amount of damages, by any gains to the aggrieved 
party resulting from the non-performance of the contract.
2775
 The Advisory Council also 
expressed the opinion that damages for the loss of a chance or opportunity to profit ordinarily 
are not recoverable under Article 74, but when the aggrieved party purposely enters into a 
contract in order to obtain a chance of earning a profit, the chance of profit should be 
considered as an asset, and allowing recovery in this circumstance would be consistent with 
the full compensation principle of Article 74.
2776
 
 
Article 74 also provides the principle of foreseeability: “damages may not exceed the loss 
which the party in breach foresaw or ought to have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of 
the contract, in the light of the facts and matters of which he then knew or ought to have 
known, as a possible consequence of the breach of contract.” Thus, the party in breach will be 
liable even for loss indirectly caused to the other party provided that this loss was foreseeable, 
within the meaning of Article 74, by the party in breach at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract. Under the foreseeability test, the party in breach will be considered as knowing the 
facts and matters enabling him to foresee the consequences of the breach of contract if such 
knowledge can be expected of him, having regard to his experience as a merchant in the 
particular case. The party in breach will also be considered as able to foresee the possible 
consequences of the breach, whenever the other party to the contract has drawn his attention 
to such possible consequences in due time.
2777
 However, Article 74 does not adopt the rule, 
which excludes the applicability of the foreseeability test if the non-performance of the 
contract was due to the fraud of the non-performing party. 
 
It is unclear whether the CISG contains a certainty requirement for awarding damages. The 
CISG does not explicitly require proof of harm in order for an aggrieved party to recover 
damages.
2778
 There has been controversy over whether the issue of certainty is addressed by 
                                                 
2773
 Knapp, Victor, Article 74, in C. Massimo Bianca & Michael Joachim Bonell (eds.), Commentary on the 
International Sales Law: the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention, Milan, Giuffrè, 1987, at 546 
2774
 CISG-AC Opinion No. 6, Calculation of Damages under CISG Article 74. Rapporteur: Professor John Y. 
Gotanda, Villanova University School of Law, Villanova, Pennsylvania, USA, 2006, at para. 3.14 
2775
 Ibid., at para. 9 
2776
 Ibid., at para. 3.15 
2777
 Knapp, Victor, Article 74, in C. Massimo Bianca & Michael Joachim Bonell (eds.), Commentary on the 
International Sales Law: the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention, Milan, Giuffrè, 1987, at 542 
2778
 In Delchi Carriers v. Rotorex Corp., the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed with 
the trial court that the claimant was only entitled to those damages that it could prove with sufficient certainty, 
and held that the traditional common law damage limitation that the claimant must provide sufficient evidence to 
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the Convention or whether it is a procedural matter that should be resolved by the applicable 
national law.
2779
 The CISG Advisory Council, in its Opinion No. 6, addressed the question 
and maintained that the aggrieved party has the burden to prove, with reasonable certainty, 
that it suffered a loss, and the extent of the loss, but need not do so with mathematical 
precision. This requirement of reasonable certainty was seen as consistent with the 
UNIDROIT Principles and the PECL, and in accordance with many national laws. The 
opinion was established on the basis of the need to promote the Convention’s international 
character and the need to promote uniformity in the Convention’s application, and in light of 
the purposes and policies of Article 74.
2780
  
 
Articles 75 and 76 of the CISG set forth methods for calculating damages when a contract has 
been avoided. Articles 75 and 76 do not replace Article 74, but provide the aggrieved party 
with alternative methods that may be used to measure damages when a contract has been 
avoided.
2781
 The major advantage for the parties of proceeding under Article 75 or 76 is that, 
as a rule, the foreseeability requirement under Article 74 will not be applicable as the types of 
damages described in those two provisions are deemed to be foreseeable.
2782
 Moreover, both 
Articles 75 and 76 explicitly provide that further damages may be claimed under Article 74. 
Article 75 adopts the concrete method for calculating the damages in case of avoidance, and 
entitles the aggrieved party to recover as damages the difference between the contract price 
and the price of the substitute transaction, provided that the aggrieved party made a substitute 
transaction in a reasonable manner and in a reasonable time after avoidance. For the substitute 
transaction to have been made in a reasonable manner within the context of Article 75, it must 
have been made in such a manner as would be likely to bring the highest price reasonably 
possible on a seller’s resale or the lowest price reasonably possible on a buyer’s cover 
purchase. The reasonable period of time for the resale or the cover purchase will not begin 
until the aggrieved party has in fact declared the contract avoided.
 2783
 In the event that the 
aggrieved party’s substitute transaction was unreasonable, damages may be calculated 
according to Article 76 or Article 74.
2784
 
 
If the aggrieved party has avoided the contract but has not entered into a substitute 
transaction, Article 76 allows the abstract calculation of damages under certain conditions. 
Under Article 76, an aggrieved party is entitled to recover as damages measured by “the 
difference between the price fixed by the contract and the current price”. Article 76 provides 
an alternative means to Article 75 for determining damages when the contract has been 
                                                                                                                                                        
estimate damages with reasonable certainty should apply since the CISG did not address the issue. Delchi 
Carriers SpA v. Rotorex Corp, l71 F. 3d 1024 (2d Cir. 1995), 1029, 1031 
2779
 Gotanda, John Y., Damages in private international law, Receuil des Cours, 326 (2007), at 155 
2780
 CISG-AC Opinion No. 6, Calculation of Damages under CISG Article 74. Rapporteur: Professor John Y. 
Gotanda, Villanova University School of Law, Villanova, Pennsylvania, USA, 2006, at para. 2 
2781
 CISG-AC Opinion No. 8, Calculation of Damages under CISG Articles 75 and 76. Rapporteur: Professor 
John Y. Gotanda, Villanova University School of Law, Villanova, Pennsylvania, USA, 2008, at para. 1.2 
2782
 Huber, Peter, & Alastair Mullis, The CISG: A New Textbook for Students and Practitioners, Sellier 
European Law Publishers, 2007, at 283 
2783
 Secretariat Commentary, art. 71 [draft counterpart to CISG art. 75], paras. 4-5 (available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/secomm/secomm-75.html ) 
2784
 CISG-AC Opinion No. 8, Calculation of Damages under CISG Articles 75 and 76. Rapporteur: Professor 
John Y. Gotanda, Villanova University School of Law, Villanova, Pennsylvania, USA, 2008, at para. 2.4; 
Secretariat Commentary, art. 71 [draft counterpart to CISG art. 75], para. 6 (available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/secomm/secomm-75.html ) 
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avoided. However, a concrete determination of damages under Article 75 is generally 
preferred to abstract determination under Article 76, and ordinarily takes precedence if the 
requirements of Article 75 are met.
2785
 Article 76 may be used, instead of Article 75, to 
calculate damages where the aggrieved party is constantly dealing in “market transactions” 
and it is therefore difficult or impossible to determine which particular transaction should be 
considered the cover for the breached contract.
2786
 Abstract method under Article 76 is only 
available if the contract goods have a current price, which is the price generally charged for 
such goods sold under comparable circumstances in the trade concerned. The time at which 
the current price is to be established is the time of avoidance, namely the moment when 
avoidance was declared.
2787
 However, pursuant to Article 76 (1), if the aggrieved party avoids 
the contract after taking over the goods, the current price is to be determined at the time of 
such taking over, which is prior to the time of avoidance. The latter provision aims at 
preventing speculation on price movements by the aggrieved party who has avoided the 
contract after taking over the goods, by postponing avoidance of the contract until the 
expected rise or fall in the current price of the goods in question.
2788
 The location at which the 
current price is to be established is the place where the delivery of the goods should have been 
made. If there is no current price at the place of delivery, Article 76 (2) provides that the 
current price will be “the price at such other place as serves as a reasonable substitute, making 
due allowance for differences in the cost of transporting the goods.”  
 
Article 77 sets forth the aggrieved party’s duty to mitigate the loss resulting from the breach. 
It requires a party wishing to assert claims based on breach of contract to take reasonable 
measures to mitigate his loss. A violation of this duty leads to a corresponding reduction in 
damages, which is the only remedy available for the violation of this duty. Thus, unlike other 
obligations of the seller and of the buyer under the Convention, the obligation under Article 
77 cannot be directly enforced, and failure to comply with it is no ground for avoidance of the 
contract.
2789
 The aggrieved party is not obliged to take measures which, although they may 
mitigate the loss, would be excessive. The expenses of the aggrieved party in taking measures 
to mitigate his loss will be recoverable even if those measures were in vain, provided that they 
were reasonable under the circumstances.
2790
 Reasonable measures to mitigate the loss will 
typically be a resale of the goods by the seller or a cover purchase by the buyer. The duty to 
mitigate the loss may also apply to an anticipatory breach of contract under Article 71. When 
it becomes clear that one party will commit a fundamental breach of contract, if the aggrieved 
party does not suspend his performance under Article 71(3) or declare the contract avoided 
under Article 72, but insists on specific performance of the contract, he risks, on claiming 
damages, being found to have failed to take appropriate measures to mitigate the threatened 
loss. In such a case, the aggrieved party, if he wishes to comply with Article 77, cannot await 
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the contract date of performance before declaring the contract avoided and taking measures to 
reduce the loss arising out of the breach by making a cover purchase, reselling the goods or 
otherwise.
2791
 It is argued that the mitigation rule is lex specialis in relation to the general rule 
requiring specific performance, and should prevail in those cases, except where a party’s need 
for requiring specific performance is so strong as to outweigh the mitigation principle of 
Article 77.
2792
 
 
The CISG does not expressly deal with the issue of contributory negligence in the assessment 
of the damages. Article 80 establishes the extent to which the non-performing party is excused 
from liability for non-performance due to the conduct of the aggrieved party. It provides that 
“a party may not rely on a failure of the other party to perform, to the extent that such failure 
was caused by the first party's act or omission.” Thus, a party cannot rely on the other party's 
failure to the extent that he contributed to it. As Article 80 is placed in Part III, Chapter V, 
Section IV “Exemptions”, it raises the question whether Article 80 governs only problems of 
exemption from liability or it modifies all of the remedial provisions of the Convention, as if 
it had been placed in Part III, Chapter I “General Provisions”. The legislative history of 
Article 80 links it closely to the rules on exemption in Article 79.
2793
 However, this rule is 
generally seen as the application of the principle of good faith, since it is considered contrary 
to good faith that the aggrieved party should obtain total compensation when he, himself, 
failed to perform one of his obligations under the contract or the Convention.
2794
  
 
Some view Article 80 as an all-or-nothing solution and argue that it is not suitable to deal 
with cases, where both parties have caused the non-performance, in an appropriate manner. 
Thus, it is argued that Article 80 should not, as a general rule, be applied directly to cases of 
joint responsibility, but the other provisions of the CISG should be applied to establish the 
mutual breach of the obligations by the parties, whereby one party’s claim for compensation 
of this damage will have to be discounted by the percentage of his part in the causation of the 
non-performance by the other party.
2795
 Others argue that it is both natural and fair to allocate 
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losses between the parties according to their contribution, since there are sufficient grounds 
for using this method in the CISG itself under the causation requirement and Article 80, or 
alternatively, Article 7.4.7 of the UNIDROIT Principles can he used to supplement the CISG 
in this respect.
2796
 It is also argued that since Article 80 only indicates that the causes must be 
apportioned, but does not specify how, two methods are conceivable. The first method, which 
is considered as being the most in harmony with the spirit and the letter of the text, consists in 
the apportionment of the causes depending on their degree to objective causation, and part of 
the damage must be imputed to the aggrieved party if it was highly probable that his behavior 
would entail the failure to perform. The second method consists of comparing the gravity of 
the respective behaviors of the parties, thus partially reverting to the notion of fault or to the 
concept of contributory negligence. Since the Convention has set the notion of fault aside, the 
first method of evaluation is seen as the better one, but not to be applied strictly: the judge 
should consider that “the more reprehensible the behavior of one party is, the more likely it is 
to have played an important causal role in the other party's failure to perform” thereby 
including tortious behavior in the evaluation as part of the good faith requirement, as long as 
the tort has a connection with the failure to perform.
2797
  
 
In general, it can be said that the prevailing view of legal writers is that apportionment of the 
loss must be possible under the wording of Article 80, since the second part of the provision 
provides that relying on the failure to perform is only excluded “to the extent” that such 
failure was caused by the aggrieved party’s behavior.2798 However, it is also pointed out that 
in the absence of any precise indication in the text of Article 80, the judge will have a quasi-
discretionary power and will eventually be led to seek guidance in the familiar rules of his 
own law in order to determine whether or not to award a lesser amount as damages to the 
aggrieved party through the “apportionment” of the causes between the parties and the extent 
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to which party in breach is exempted.
2799
 It should be noted that the national courts have not 
made such an apportionment with express reference to Article 80 of the CISG.
2800
 
 
Finally, the CISG does not deal with penalty clauses, liquidated damages clauses and 
exemption or limitation of liability clauses. Although there is general agreement that the 
Convention does not exclude such clauses and the parties may include such clauses in their 
contracts pursuant to Article 6, which incorporates the principle of contractual freedom to 
derogate from the Convention, their validity and effects are outside the scope of the 
Convention.
2801
 If the parties have included such a clause in their contract governed by the 
CISG, the validity of the clause will depend on the applicable national law pursuant to Article 
4 (a) of the CISG, which states that the Convention is not concerned with the validity of any 
of the provisions of the contract. The question of judicial reduction of the sum stipulated 
under the penalty or liquidated damages clauses is to be determined by the applicable national 
law, because this question is attached to and interwoven with the question of validity.
2802
  
  
The remedy of damages is located in the final Section of Chapter 7 of the UNIDROIT 
Principles. Article 7.4.1 provides that any non-performance gives the aggrieved party a right 
to damages either exclusively or in conjunction with any other remedies except where the 
non-performance is excused under the Principles. The Official Comments state that “This 
Article establishes the principle of a general right to damages in the event of non-
performance, except where the non-performance is excused under the Principles, as in the 
case of force majeure (see Article 7.1.7) or of an exemption clause (see Article 7.1.6). 
Hardship (see Article 6.2.1 et seq.) does not in principle give rise to a right to damages.”2803 
Under Article 7.4.1, the existence of the right of action for damages is based on proof of non-
performance, not on proof of harm and, thus, where the aggrieved party has not suffered any 
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harm as a result of the non-performance, the aggrieved party may nevertheless have a right to 
recover damages.
2804
  
 
Article 7.4.2 of the UNIDROIT Principles provides the principle of the aggrieved party’s 
entitlement to full compensation, and affirms the need for a causal link between the non-
performance and the harm. It provides that the aggrieved party is entitled to full compensation 
for harm sustained as a result of the non-performance. Article 7.4.2 does not define the 
concept of full compensation, but provides that the harm that the aggrieved party has 
sustained includes both any loss which it suffered and any gain of which it was deprived. Due 
to its similarity to the first sentence of Article 74 of the CISG, and the reference to that article 
in the Official Comment, it is possible to conclude that full compensation means the making 
good of losses suffered and compensation for profits lost, i.e. expectation (positive) 
interest.
2805
 The Official Comment explains that the notion of loss suffered must be 
understood in a wide sense, such as a reduction in the aggrieved party’s assets or an increase 
in its liabilities, and “the loss of profit or, as it is sometimes called, consequential loss, is the 
benefit which would normally have accrued to the aggrieved party if the contract had been 
properly performed.”2806 It is argued that there are two options available to a decision maker 
seeking to provide an aggrieved party with full compensation. The first is to award the 
aggrieved party the difference in value between what it received and what it expected to 
receive had the contract been performed according to its terms. The second is the cost of 
putting the aggrieved party in the position which it would have occupied had the contract been 
performed according to its terms.
2807
  
 
Article 7.4.2 explicitly requires the decision maker to take into account any gain to the 
aggrieved party resulting from its avoidance of cost or harm.
 
The Official Comment to Article 
7.4.2 states that the aggrieved party must not be enriched by damages for non-performance.
 
2808
 Thus, it is not possible for the aggrieved party to recover punitive damages. In awarding 
loss profits as damages, the decision maker shall take into account net profit as opposed to 
gross profit. Moreover, the aggrieved party may not escape from a bad bargain by recovering 
its wasted expenditure, where it would not have recovered that expenditure had the contract 
been performed according to its terms, since this would reverse the risk allocation agreed by 
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the parties and put the aggrieved party into a better position than he would have been in.
2809
 
On these bases, the aggrieved party is able to combine a claim for loss of net profit with a 
claim to recover damages for any wasted expenditure, which is recoverable in the course of 
the performance of the contract, and there is no element of double recovery or enrichment in 
such a combination.
2810
 The Official Comment also states that, in application of the principle 
of full compensation, regard is to be had to any changes in the harm, including its expression 
in monetary terms, which may occur between the time of the non-performance and that of the 
judgment.
2811
 Thus, it is argued that Article 7.4.2 entitles a decision maker, exercising its 
discretionary power, to assess the damages payable at the date of judgment rather than the 
date of breach, in a particular case.
2812
 
 
Article 7.4.3 (1) provides that compensation is due only for harm that is established with a 
reasonable degree of certainty. According to the Official Comments, both the occurrence and 
the extent of the harm, including harm which has not yet occurred, must be established by the 
aggrieved party with a reasonable degree of certainty.
2813
 Article 7.4.3 (2) explicitly provides 
that compensation may be due for the loss of a chance in proportion to the probability of its 
occurrence. According to Article 7.4.3 (3), where the amount of damages cannot be 
established with a sufficient degree of certainty, the court is empowered to make an equitable 
quantification of the harm sustained, rather than refusing any compensation or awarding 
nominal damages thereby enabling the decision maker to avoid the all-or-nothing 
consequences.
2814
 Article 7.4.3 complements the provision under Article 7.4.1, which 
implicitly presupposes a sufficient causal link between the non-performance and the harm. In 
the Official Comment to Art 7.4.3, reference is made to the fact that the harm must be a direct 
consequence of the non-performance, and it is stated the harm which is too indirect will 
usually also be uncertain as well as unforeseeable.
2815
 While the questions of certainty of 
harm and sufficient casual link are related, it is suggested that the decision maker should first 
identify the harm with a reasonable degree of certainty and, then, consider the sufficiency of 
the causal link.
2816
 
 
Article 7.4.4 sets forth the principle of foreseeability as a limitation of recoverable damages, 
as found in Article 74 of the CISG. Article 7.4.4 provides that the non-performing party is 
liable only for harm which it foresaw or could reasonably have foreseen at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract as being likely to result from its non-performance. The Official 
Comment stresses the importance of allocation of risk under the contract in the application of 
the foreseeability test and states that “the non-performing party must not be saddled with 
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compensation for harm which it could never have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract and against the risk of which it could not have taken out insurance.”2817 Article 7.4.4 
follows the example of the CISG and does not adopt the rule, which allows compensation 
even for harm which is unforeseeable when the non-performance is due to willful misconduct 
or gross negligence. Due to the absence of such a rule, the Official Comment states that a 
narrow interpretation of the concept of foreseeability is required, and the foreseeability relates 
to the nature or type of the harm but not to its extent, unless the extent is such as to transform 
the harm into one of a different kind.
2818
 It is further stated that what was foreseeable is to be 
determined by reference to the time of the conclusion of the contract, and the test is what a 
normally diligent person could reasonably have foreseen as the consequences of non-
performance in the ordinary course of things and the particular circumstances of the contract, 
such as the information supplied by the parties or their previous transactions.
2819
  
 
Article 7.4.5 of the UNIDROIT Principles, based on Article 75 of the CISG, provides for the 
concrete method of assessing damages in the case of termination. It provides that where the 
aggrieved party has terminated the contract and has made a replacement transaction within a 
reasonable time and in a reasonable manner it may recover the difference between the 
contract price and the price of the replacement transaction as well as damages for any further 
harm. The replacement transaction must generally have been entered into after the contract 
has been terminated with the exception of such cases that the non-performing party has made 
it clear that it will not perform its obligations under the contract. Moreover, the aggrieved 
party must have ‘made a replacement transaction’ with a third party, and demonstrate that it 
would not have entered into the transaction had it not been for the non-performance.
2820
 
Where the aggrieved party has attempted to enter into a replacement transaction but these 
attempts prove to be unsuccessful, the aggrieved party cannot recover the cost of these 
negotiations under Article 7.4.5, but it may be able to recover them under Article 7.4.8 as 
expenses reasonably incurred in attempting to reduce the harm.  
 
Article 7.4.6 incorporates the abstract method of calculation of damages and corresponds in 
substance to Article 76 of the CISG. Article 7.4.6 (1) provides that where the aggrieved party 
has terminated the contract and has not made a replacement transaction but there is a current 
price for the performance contracted for, it may recover the difference between the contract 
price and the price current at the time the contract is terminated as well as damages for any 
further harm. The current price for the performance of contract is defined in Article 7.4.6 as 
the price generally charged for goods delivered or services rendered in comparable 
circumstances at the place where the contract should have been performed or, if there is no 
current price at that place, the current price at such other place that appears reasonable to take 
as a reference. Both Article 7.4.5 and Article 7.4.6 establish only a minimum right of 
recovery, in the sense of presumptions which may facilitate the task of the aggrieved party, 
and operate alongside the general rules applicable to the proof of the existence and of the 
amount of the harm. The aggrieved party is allowed to obtain damages for additional harm 
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which it may have sustained as a consequence of termination, by proving that it has suffered 
such harm.
2821
 
 
Article 7.4.7 of the UNIDROIT Principles provides that where the harm is due in part to an 
act or omission of the aggrieved party or to another event as to which that party bears the risk, 
the amount of damages shall be reduced to the extent that these factors have contributed to the 
harm, having regard to the conduct of each of the parties. Article 7.4.7 is closely linked to 
Article 7.1.2, which corresponds to Article 80 of the CISG, and provides that a party may not 
rely on the non-performance of the other party to the extent that such non-performance was 
caused by the first party's act or omission or by another event for which the first party bears 
the risk. The Official Comment states that, in application of the general principle established 
by Article 7.1.2, Article 7.4.7 limits the right to damages to the extent that the aggrieved party 
has in part contributed to the harm.
2822
 Essentially, the Official Comment to Article 7.1.2 
states that when the Article applies, the relevant conduct does not become excused non-
performance, but loses the quality of non-performance altogether.
2823
 Thus, in such cases, the 
aggrieved party is not able to invoke non-performance and may not avail itself of any of the 
remedies under Chapter 7 of the Principles. However, as explained by the Official Comment, 
Article 7.1.2 contemplates the possibility that one party’s interference, which may also arise 
from an event the risk of which is expressly or impliedly allocated by the contract to that 
party, results only in a partial impediment to performance by the other party.
 2824
 Thus, in such 
cases it will be necessary to decide the extent to which non-performance was caused by the 
first party’s interference and, to that extent, the non-performing party will remain exposed to 
the remedies provided in Chapter 7 of the Principles. Accordingly, the interference of the 
aggrieved party will be taken into consideration at the stage of calculating damages and may 
result in a reduction in the damages payable to it under the specific provision of Article 
7.4.7.
2825
  
 
Under Article 7.4.7, the interference of the aggrieved party, which is considered as its 
contribution to the harm, may consist either in its own conduct or in an event for which it 
bears the risk. The conduct may take the form of an act or an omission. The Official Comment 
explains that most frequently such acts or omissions will result in the aggrieved party failing 
to perform one or another of its own contractual obligations, but they may equally consist in 
tortious conduct or non-performance of another contract.
2826
 As to the issue of apportionment 
of contribution to the harm, the Official Comment states that “The determination of each 
party’s contribution to the harm may well prove to be difficult and will to a large degree 
depend upon the exercise of judicial discretion. In order to give some guidance to the court 
this Article provides that the court shall have regard to the respective behaviour of the parties. 
The more serious a party’s failing, the greater will be its contribution to the harm.”2827 Finally, 
the Official Comment seeks to distinguish Article 7.4.7 from the principle of mitigation under 
Article 7.4.8 on the basis that Article 7.4.7 is concerned with the conduct of the aggrieved 
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party in regard to the cause of the initial harm, while Article 7.4.8 relates to that party’s 
conduct subsequent thereto.
2828
 
 
Article 7.4.8 of the UNIDROIT Principles incorporates the principle of mitigation, which can 
be found in Article 77 of the CISG. Article 7.4.8 (1) provides that the non-performing party is 
not liable for harm suffered by the aggrieved party to the extent that the harm could have been 
reduced by the latter party’s taking reasonable steps. The Official Comment states that the 
purpose of this Article is to avoid the aggrieved party passively sitting back and waiting to be 
compensated for harm, which it could have avoided or reduced. Any harm which the 
aggrieved party could have avoided by taking reasonable steps will not be compensated.
2829
 It 
is explained that the steps to be taken by the aggrieved party may be directed either to limiting 
the extent of the harm, above all when there is a risk of it lasting for a long time if such steps 
are not taken, or to avoiding any increase in the initial harm.
2830
 Article 7.4.8 (2) provides that 
the aggrieved party is entitled to recover any expenses reasonably incurred in attempting to 
reduce the harm. According to the Official Comment, the reduction in damages to the extent 
that the aggrieved party has failed to take the necessary steps to mitigate the harm must not 
however cause loss to that party.
2831
 Thus, reasonable expenses incurred by the aggrieved 
party can be recoverable even if the relevant actions failed to mitigate the loss or had the 
effect of increasing the total loss.
2832
 
 
Article 7.4.13 of the UNIDROIT Principles applies to penalty and liquidated damages 
clauses. Article 7.4.13 (1) provides that where the contract provides that a party who does not 
perform is to pay a specified sum to the aggrieved party for such non-performance, the 
aggrieved party is entitled to that sum irrespective of its actual harm. In the Official 
Comment, it is stated that “this article gives an intentionally broad definition of agreements to 
pay a specified sum in case of non-performance, whether such agreements be intended to 
facilitate the recovery of damages (liquidated damages according to the common law) or to 
operate as a deterrent against non-performance (penalty clauses proper), or both.”2833 In view 
of their frequency in international contract practice, Article 7.4.13 acknowledges the validity 
of any clauses providing that a party who does not perform is to pay a specified sum to the 
aggrieved party for such non-performance, and allows the aggrieved party to recover that sum 
irrespective of its actual harm.
2834
 Article 7.4.13 also enables the parties to specify the amount 
                                                 
2828
 Official Comment 4 to Article 7.4.7 of the UNIDROIT Principles 
2829
 Thus, the aggrieved party, who fails to take reasonable steps to limit the extent of the harm, or to avoid any 
increase in the initial harm, will not be entitled to recover damages in respect of the harm which flows from its 
failure to take these reasonable steps. It is also argued that that the text of Article 7.4.8 does not allow the 
decision maker to exercise its discretionary power to apportion the loss, when it has been established that the 
aggrieved party has failed to take reasonable steps to reduce the harm, since the text provides that the non-
performing party “is not liable” for the harm that is attributable to the failure to take reasonable steps. This is 
seen in contrast with the text of Article 7.4.7, where the amount of damages shall be reduced “to the extent that” 
the aggrieved party has contributed to the harm, having regard to the conduct of each of the parties. Vogenauer, 
Stefan & Jan Kleinheisterkamp (eds.), Commentary on the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts (PICC), Oxford University Press, 2009, at 903 
2830
 Official Comment 1 to Article 7.4.8 of the UNIDROIT Principles 
2831
 Official Comment 2 to Article 7.4.8 of the UNIDROIT Principles 
2832
 Vogenauer, Stefan & Jan Kleinheisterkamp (eds.), Commentary on the UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts (PICC), Oxford University Press, 2009, at 904 
2833
 Official Comment 1 to Article 7.4.13 of the UNIDROIT Principles 
2834
 Official Comment 2 to Article 7.4.13 of the UNIDROIT Principles 
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of recoverable damages at the time of contracting, thereby determining or limiting the 
recoverable sum as damages in case of non-performance. The aggrieved party can only 
recover the specified sum and cannot resort to an action in damages for the purpose of 
recovering the full extent of its loss, where the specified sum is lower than the actual loss 
which it has suffered.
2835
  
 
In order to prevent the possibility of abuse to which such clauses may give rise, Article 7.4.13 
(2) provides that, notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, the specified sum may be 
reduced to a reasonable amount where it is grossly excessive in relation to the harm resulting 
from the non-performance and to the other circumstances. According to the Official 
Comment, a sum is likely to be grossly excessive if it “would clearly be so to any reasonable 
person”.2836 Since it is provided that whether or not the sum is “grossly excessive” will be 
determined by comparing the sum against the “harm resulting from the non-performance”, it 
is argued that the actual harm is to be assessed at the time of the non-performance, not the 
time at which the contract was concluded, so that it should not be necessary for the aggrieved 
party to establish that the non-performing party could reasonably have foreseen the harm at 
the time of the conclusion of the contract.
2837
 The Official Comment does not discuss the 
content of the “other circumstances” in the qualification of an agreed sum as grossly 
excessive. It is suggested that that the decision maker should have regard to the equality of the 
bargaining power of the parties and the extent to which they were legally advised.
2838
  
 
Even where the conditions for reduction of agreed sum are established in a given case, the 
decision maker has discretion to reduce that sum, as a result of the use of word “may” rather 
than “shall” in relation to the power of the decision maker to reduce the agreed sum to a 
“reasonable amount” under Article 7.4.13. Moreover, the agreed sum may only be reduced, 
but cannot entirely be disregarded by the decision maker to award damages corresponding to 
the exact amount of the harm.
2839
 This suggests that “reasonable amount” is not necessarily to 
be identified with the actual harm which the aggrieved party has suffered and it can be higher 
than the actual harm. The decision maker enjoys a substantial discretion in fixing the amount 
that is reasonable. However, the agreed sum may not be increased, under Article 7.4.13, 
where the agreed sum is lower than the harm actually sustained. In such cases where the 
agreed sum has the effect of limiting the compensation, the non-performing party may not be 
entitled to rely on the term in question, if the conditions laid down under Article 7.1.6 on 
exemption or limitation of liability clauses are satisfied. Thus, such a clause that limits one 
party's liability for non-performance cannot be invoked when it would be grossly unfair to do 
so, having regard to the purpose of the contract, particularly if the non-performance was the 
result of intentional or grossly negligent conduct.
2840
 In those cases, the decision maker will 
                                                 
2835
 Vogenauer, Stefan & Jan Kleinheisterkamp (eds.), Commentary on the UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts (PICC), Oxford University Press, 2009, at 924 
2836
 Official Comment 3 to Article 7.4.13 of the UNIDROIT Principles 
2837
 Vogenauer, Stefan & Jan Kleinheisterkamp (eds.), Commentary on the UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts (PICC), Oxford University Press, 2009, at 925 
2838
 Ibid. 
2839
 Official Comment 3 to Article 7.4.13 of the UNIDROIT Principles 
2840
 Official Comment 4 and 5 to Article 7.1.6 of the UNIDROIT Principles; The Official Comment contains 
following illustration: “A enters into a contract with B for the building of a factory. The contract contains a 
penalty clause providing for payment of Australian dollars (AUD) 10,000 for each week of delay. The work is 
not completed within the agreed period because A deliberately suspends the work for another project which was 
more lucrative for it and in respect of which the penalty for delay was higher. The actual harm suffered by B as a 
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award the actual damages, due to the invalidity of the clause, and it may not modify the 
agreed sum under the relevant clause.
2841
 
   
Under the PECL, the rules on damages for non-performance are contained in Section 5 of 
Chapter 9. Article 9:501 (1) of the PECL provides that the aggrieved party is entitled to 
damages for loss caused by the other party's non-performance, which is not excused under 
Article 8:108. The Official Comment explains that it is not possible to recover damages for a 
breach which has caused the aggrieved party no loss, and the relevant section does not 
provide for nominal damages for a breach which has caused the aggrieved party no loss.
2842
 
Article 9:501 applies to all forms of failure in performance and does not require that the 
aggrieved party serve a notice to perform before it can recover damages for delay. The 
Official Comment emphasizes the need for a causal link between the non-performance and the 
loss, and states that the aggrieved party may not recover damages for loss not caused by the 
failure to perform.
2843
 Article 9:501 (2) provides that the loss for which damages are 
recoverable includes: (a) non-pecuniary loss; and (b) future loss which is reasonably likely to 
occur. According to the Official Comments, the latter type of loss is the loss expected to be 
incurred after the time damages are assessed and often takes the form of the loss of a chance. 
Accordingly, the decision maker is required to evaluate two uncertainties, namely the 
likelihood that future loss will occur and its amount.
2844
  
 
Article 9:502 of the PECL provides that “The general measure of damages is such sum as will 
put the aggrieved party as nearly as possible into the position in which it would have been if 
the contract had been duly performed. Such damages cover the loss which the aggrieved party 
has suffered and the gain of which it has been deprived.” Thus, it is more explicit than 7.4.2 
of the UNIDROIT Principles in its statement that what is protected is the expectation 
(positive) interest of the aggrieved party. Article 9:502 also combines the expectation interest 
basis of damages and the traditional rule of “damnum emergens” and “lucrurn cessans” of 
Roman law, by stating that recoverable damages cover the loss which the aggrieved party has 
suffered and the gain of which it has been deprived.
2845
 The Official Comment makes it clear 
that any loss suffered by the claimant after a breach of contract must be offset by any gain to 
the claimant caused by the breach of contract.
2846
 Article 9:503 provides the foreseeability test 
in assessing the recoverable damages according to which the non-performing party is liable 
only for loss which it foresaw or could reasonably have foreseen at the time of conclusion of 
the contract as a likely result of its non-performance. In contrast to Article 7.4.4 of the 
UNIDROIT Principles and Article 74 of the CISG, Article 9:503 of the PECL provides that 
the foreseeability test cannot be invoked by the non-performing part as a limitation to the 
recoverable loss of the aggrieved party if the non-performance was intentional or grossly 
                                                                                                                                                        
result of the delay amounts to AUD 20,000 per week. A is not entitled to rely on the penalty clause and B may 
recover full compensation of the actual harm sustained, as the enforcement of that clause would in the 
circumstances be grossly unfair in view of A’s deliberate non-performance.” 
2841
 Vogenauer, Stefan & Jan Kleinheisterkamp (eds.), Commentary on the UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts (PICC), Oxford University Press, 2009, at 765 
2842
 Lando, Ole & Hugh Beale (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Parts I and II, Kluwer Law 
International, 2000, at 434 
2843
 Ibid., at 435 
2844
 Ibid., at 436 
2845
 Ibid., at 438 
2846
 Ibid., at 439 
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negligent. Unlike the UNIDROIT Principles which explicitly require that damages be proven 
with a reasonable degree of certainty, the only reference to the certainty requirement is in the 
Notes to Article 9:503 of the PECL, which state that most systems “generally require a 
sufficient degree of ‘certainty’ of loss’ in order to award damages, but this is not to be taken 
literally.”2847 
 
Article 9:504 embodies the principle of contributory negligence, and provides that the non-
performing party is not liable for loss suffered by the aggrieved party to the extent that the 
aggrieved party contributed to the non-performance or its effects. The Official Comment 
states that Article 9:504 embraces two distinct situations: (i) where the aggrieved party's 
conduct was a partial cause of the non-performance; and (ii) where the aggrieved party, 
though not in any way responsible for the non-performance itself, exacerbated its loss-
producing effects by its behavior.
2848
 Article 9:504 of the PECL is also regarded as a 
particular application of the general rule set out in Article 8:101 (3), which corresponds to 
Article 7.1.2 of the UNIDROIT Principles and Article 80 of the CISG. According to the 
Official Comment, where the aggrieved party, though not in any way responsible for the non-
performance, exacerbates its adverse effects, he cannot recover damages for the additional 
loss which results.
2849
  
 
Article 9:505 incorporates the doctrine of mitigation, and provides that the non-performing 
party is not liable for loss suffered by the aggrieved party to the extent that the aggrieved 
party could have reduced the loss by taking reasonable steps, and the aggrieved party is 
entitled to recover any expenses reasonably incurred in attempting to reduce the loss. The 
Official Comment states that the aggrieved party may recover its full loss even if what at the 
time appears to be a reasonable step to reduce its loss in fact increases its full loss.
2850
 Articles 
9:506 and 9:507 provide respectively concrete and abstract method of calculation of damages 
in case of termination. They are very similar to those provisions under the UNIDROIT 
Principles. A notable difference is that Article 9:507 does not contain a definition of the 
“current price”, which can be found under Article 7.4.6 (2) of the UNIDROIT Principles. 
Moreover, neither the UNIDROIT Principles nor the PECL include a special provision, 
similar to Article 76(1) of the CISG, that in cases where the aggrieved party has terminated 
the contract pursuant to taking the goods, the current price is determined according to the time 
of the taking of the goods, instead of the time of avoidance of the contract. The lack of such a 
provision in the restatements can be explained by their approach of dealing with all 
contractual situations, while the said provision aims at preventing the aggrieved buyers in 
sales contracts, who have taken the goods from benefitting from deferring avoidance tactically 
or speculatively, until such time as a more favorable current price emerges. Even so, the 
restatements more overtly impose good faith obligations, which would presumably disallow 
such tactical or speculative behavior.
2851
 
 
                                                 
2847
 Ibid., at 443  
2848
 Ibid., at 444 
2849
 Ibid. 
2850
 Ibid., at 446  
2851
 Bruno Zeller, Art. 76 CISG-UP, and John Felemegas, Art. 76-PECL, in John Felemegas (ed.), An 
International Approach to the Interpretation of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods (1980) as Uniform Sales Law, Cambridge University Press, 2006, at 226 and 485 
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Finally, Article 9:509 contains a provision on agreed payment for non-performance, which 
substantially corresponds to Article 7.4.13 of the UNIDROIT Principles. Under the PECL, the 
decision maker must disregard the loss actually suffered by the aggrieved party and must 
award neither more nor less than the sum fixed by the contract except where the sum is 
grossly excessive in relation to the loss resulting from the non-performance and the other 
circumstances. The Official Comment to the PECL clarifies some aspects relating to the 
decision maker’s power to reduce the specified sum, which are not so explicit in the 
UNIDROIT Principles. The Official Comment states that in deciding whether the stipulated 
sum is excessive the decision maker should have regard to the relationship between that sum 
and the loss actually suffered by the aggrieved party, as opposed to the loss legally 
recoverable within the foreseeability principle embodied in Article 9:503, and the 
computation of actual loss should take into account that element of the loss which has been 
caused by the unreasonable behavior of the aggrieved party itself, e.g. in failing to take 
reasonable steps in mitigation of loss.
2852
 Moreover, the Official Comment expressly states 
that even though the decision maker has the power to reduce the agreed sum, when it is 
grossly excessive, this power has a limit in that the decision maker should respect the 
intention of the parties to deter default and therefore should not reduce the award to the actual 
loss, but has to fix an intermediate figure.
2853
  
 
The Official Comment also takes into account that liquidated damages clauses may operate so 
as to limit the recovery of the aggrieved party, and states that in such a case, the aggrieved 
party can demand full compensation if it can prove that the existence of the conditions of 
Article 8:109, which provides that remedies for non-performance may be excluded or 
restricted unless it would be contrary to good faith and fair dealing to invoke the exclusion or 
restriction.
2854
 The Official Comment states that while Article 9:508 allows the court to 
reduce the amount of a stipulated payment for non-performance where this is grossly 
excessive, the converse is not true of limitations of liability under Article 8:109, which does 
not give the court a discretion simply to increase the liability but leaves it to be assessed in 
accordance with the rules in Chapter 9 of the PECL, as there is no valid limitation of 
liability.
2855
 
 
c. Contracting Practices 
 
The contractual clauses in the context of the transactions governed through legal uncertainty 
have the effect on the amount of recoverable damages for non-performance in various ways. 
They may subject the aggrieved party’s claim for damages to a sequence of obligations, under 
which the aggrieved party’s contractual obligations are explicitly recognized as a condition to 
the proper performance of obligations by the other party and, thus, when the aggrieved party, 
having violated its obligations, claims damages for the non-performance of the other party, 
                                                 
2852
 Lando, Ole & Hugh Beale (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Parts I and II, Kluwer Law 
International, 2000, at 454 
2853
 Ibid. 
2854
 Ibid., at 385-386: It contains the following illustration, which closely resembles to that of the UNIDROIT 
Principles cited above: “The contract for the construction of a factory contains a penalty clause imposing liability 
for 10,000 francs per week for late completion. The work is completed late because the contractor has 
deliberately neglected the job in favor of another, more profitable one. If the loss suffered by the employer 
amounts to 20,000 francs per week, the latter may recover this amount despite the clause, as for the contractor to 
invoke it when it has deliberately disregarded the contract would be contrary to good faith and fair dealing”. 
2855
 Ibid., at 388 
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the decision maker is required to take into account the extent of contribution of the aggrieved 
party to the loss as a result of his failure to perform its own obligations.  
 
In construction contracts, the main issue, which is related to the extent of recoverable 
damages, is the time for completion of the work. The construction contracts carefully specify 
the time for completion of the works, and the events, which entitle the contractor to an 
extension of time and/or the associated costs, thereby determining the extent of the damages 
recoverable by the employer for the contractor’s delay. According to Sub-Clause 2.1 of the 
FIDIC Conditions, the Employer shall give the Contractor right of access to, and possession 
of, all parts of the Site. If the Contractor suffers delay and/or incurs cost as a result of a failure 
by the Employer to give any such right or possession, the Contractor shall give notice to the 
Engineer and shall be entitled to an extension of time for any such delay and payment of any 
such cost plus profit, which shall be included in the contract price. Thus, if the Employer fails 
to comply with this obligation, but later demands liquidated damages in case of contractor’s 
failure to perform the contract on time, the time for completion will be determined by taking 
into account any extension of time for completion under Sub-Clause 8.4, which includes any 
delay, impediment or prevention caused by or attributable to the Employer and any payment 
of cost plus profit to the Contractor. On the other hand, Sub-Clause 2.1 also requires the 
consideration of contribution of the Contractor to the loss suffered by it as a result of the 
Employer’s failure to give any such right or possession of the Site by providing that, “if and 
to the extent that the Employer’s failure was caused by any error or delay by the Contractor, 
including an error in, or delay in the submission of, any of the Contractor’s Documents, the 
Contractor shall not be entitled to such extension of time, Cost or profit.”  
 
The ICC model contract for the turnkey supply of an industrial plant contains a general 
provision on time schedules and cooperation. Article 7.2 declares that, the deadlines for 
performance by a party shall be automatically extended, to the extent they have been 
influenced by events, in which the other party (a) does not comply with the dates specified in 
the time schedule for its obligations; (b) does not perform in a timely manner any obligation 
upon which the performance of the other party’s obligation is conditional; or (c) otherwise 
causes situations which delay the timely performance.  
 
Such sequence of obligations can also be found in commercial agency contracts. In those 
contracts, the principal usually wants the agent to share the risk as to the financial status of 
customers in a foreign country, since the agent is in a better position to obtain necessary 
information for evaluating the financial risk involved in a sale. Thus, Article 10.1 of the ICC 
Model Commercial Agency Contract provides that the agent shall satisfy himself, with due 
diligence, of the solvency of customers whose orders he transmits to the principal. According 
to Article 10.1, the agent shall not transmit orders from customers of which he knows or 
ought to know that they are in a critical financial position, without informing principal in 
advance, and shall give reasonable assistance to the principal in recovering debts due. 
Pursuant to Article 16.2, the agent shall acquire the right to commission after full payment by 
the customers of the invoiced price. The terms of Article 16.2 regarding the time at which the 
right to commission is acquired are completely in favor of the principal. Thus, the principal 
does not run any risk of having to pay the agent a commission, which does not correspond to 
sums that he himself has received from the customer.
 2856
 In this context, the failure of the 
agent to perform its duties under Article 10.1 seems only to serve as a ground for the principal 
                                                 
2856
 Matray, Didier, Article 16, in Bortolotti, Fabio, (ed.), The ICC Agency Model Contract, A Commentary, ICC 
Publication No. 512, Paris, 1993, at 67 
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to claim damages. However, the problem of solvency of customers is primarily that of the 
principal, who has many other means for protecting himself, such as insurance and letters of 
credit. Thus, Article 16.2 provides that in case the principal is insured against the risk of non-
payment by his customers, the parties may agree that a commission be paid on the sums 
obtained by the principal from the insurer. In such cases, it is conceivable that the failure of 
the agent to perform its duties under Article 10.1 may serve as a ground for a reduction in the 
commissions to be paid on the sums paid by the insurer. Accordingly, Section 4 of Annex VI 
to the Model Contract offers a choice between two formulae for reduced commission in such 
cases: the agent may obtain either a half commission on the sums paid by the insurer or the 
whole commission on the sums paid by the insurer, after the deduction of the costs or 
expenses borne by the principal with reference to the non-payment.  
 
Moreover, it is conceivable that the parties to a commercial agency contract may agree on the 
formula of the acquisition of the agent’s entitlement to commission as from acceptance of the 
order by the principal, which is more balanced with regard to the interests of both parties, 
since it leaves the principal with the possibility of refusing orders, while the agent is entitled 
to commission once the order is accepted by the principal even if such an order was not paid 
for by the customer. In such cases, the failure of the agent to perform such duties as defined 
under Article 10.1 of the ICC Model Commercial Agency Contract may directly serve as 
limiting the extent of liability of the principal for its failure to pay commissions to which the 
agent is entitled.
2857
  
 
The contracting parties may also approach to the issue of mitigation of harm arising from non-
performance, by providing a sequence of obligations, which needs to be observed after non-
performance by one of the parties, and affects the extent of recoverable loss. Such contractual 
clauses determine the reasonableness of the measures, which need to be taken by the 
aggrieved party, to mitigate the harm, and failure to follow the measures specified by the 
contract renders his actions unreasonable, regardless of whether such actions would be 
deemed reasonable under the applicable default rules. Under such a clause, the aggrieved 
party is obliged to take those specified measures, after the other party fails to perform its 
obligations properly, and failure of the aggrieved party to do so becomes a limitation to the 
recoverable sum to be obtained as damages for non-performance.  
 
This approach can be observed in construction contracts with regard to the liability of the 
contractor for defective performance. Sub-Clause 11.2 of the FIDIC Conditions provides that 
the Contractor shall execute, at its own risk and cost, all work required to remedy defects or 
damage, as may be notified by the Employer on or before the expiry date of the defects 
notification period for the works, if and to the extent that the work is attributable to: (a) any 
design for which the Contractor is responsible, (b) plant, materials or workmanship not being 
                                                 
2857
 It should be noted that, in view of the difficulty to prove, in a specific case, that the agent has acted 
negligently under Article 10.1, the Model Contract provides the option for the parties to agree on del credere 
agent assuming the risk with regard to the solvency of the customers. Annex V to the Model Contract defines a 
del credere obligation as the agent’s undertaking to reimburse to the principal the total or partial amount of the 
unpaid sums that the principal is entitled to receive from customers and which have not been paid for reasons for 
which the principal is not responsible. Annex V provides different options for the limitation of the agent’s 
liability for unpaid sums, taking into account that it would be against good faith or mandatory national rules on 
del credere to shift the whole risk of non-payment on agent. The commentary advises that if the payment of the 
customer is to be warranted, the clause should cover the full amount or the major part of it, but only for specific 
customers, while if the parties only wish to increase the agent’s diligence in choosing customers, the clause 
should cover all customers for a limited percentage of the loss. Bortolotti, Fabio, Article 10, in Bortolotti, Fabio, 
(ed.), The ICC Agency Model Contract, A Commentary, ICC Publication No. 512, Paris, 1993, at 46 
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in accordance with the Contract, or (c) failure by the Contractor to comply with any other 
obligation.
2858
  Sub-Clause 11.7 provides that the Contractor shall have such right of access to 
the Works as is reasonably required in order to comply with this Clause, except as may be 
inconsistent with the Employer’s reasonable security restrictions. Thus, the Employer cannot 
simply rectify any defect itself or by means of a third party and then seek to recover the costs 
from the Contractor. It seems that the Employer’s failure to comply with those specified 
duties, whether by refusing to allow the Contractor to carry out the repairs or by failing to 
give notice of the defects, will limit the amount of damages to an amount, which it would 
have cost the Contractor to remedy the defects.
2859
  
 
Pursuant to Sub-Clause 11.4 of the FIDIC Conditions, only when the Contractor fails to 
remedy the defect or damage neither within a reasonable period of time nor by the date fixed 
by the Employer after that period and this remedial work was to be executed at the cost of the 
Contractor, the Employer may, at his option; (a) carry out the work himself or by others, in a 
reasonable manner and at the Contractor’s cost, but the Contractor shall have no responsibility 
for this work, and the Contractor shall pay to the Employer the costs reasonably incurred by 
the Employer in remedying the defect or damage; (b) require the Engineer to agree or 
determine a reasonable reduction in the contract price; or (c) if the defect or damage deprives 
the Employer of substantially the whole benefit of the Works or any major part of the Works, 
terminate the Contract as a whole, or in respect of such major part which cannot be put to the 
intended use.  
 
Article 31 of the ICC model contract for the turnkey supply of an industrial plant provides, in 
general terms, a similar sequence of obligations in remedying the defective performance by 
the Supplier. Article 31.4 (2) declares that if the Purchaser has not notified the Supplier of a 
defect as required by the provisions of Article 31, it forfeits its rights to have the defect made 
good in accordance with Article 31.1, which obliges the Supplier to remedy the defect. Even 
so, Article 31.6 entitles and obliges the Purchaser to apply all necessary measures to prevent 
or limit damage, if a defect requires immediate action due to the risk of resultant damage, and 
the Supplier cannot make immediately good the defect.  
 
A similar sequence of obligations, which imposes certain duties on the aggrieved party for the 
period after breach, and the disruption of which affects the extent of its recoverable loss, can 
be found in the ICC Model Mergers & Acquisitions Contract. According to Article 10, the 
buyer is required to give claim notice to the seller as soon as practicable, whenever the buyer 
becomes aware that an event has occurred from which there may arise a liability of the seller 
due to the breach of a warranty. If the buyer fails to give claim notice timely, the seller will 
                                                 
2858
 It is also provided in the same sub-clause that if and to the extent that such work is attributable to any cause 
other than those set out under Sub-Clause 11.2, the Contractor shall be notified promptly by the Employer, and 
the variation procedure shall apply. According to Sub-Clause 13.1, “Each Variation may include: (a) changes to 
the quantities of any item of work included in the Contract (however, such changes do not necessarily constitute 
a Variation), (b) changes to the quality and other characteristics of any item of work, (c) changes to the levels, 
positions and/or dimensions of any part of the Works, (d) omission of any work unless it is to be carried out by 
others, (e) any additional work, Plant, Materials or services necessary for the Permanent Works, including any 
associated Tests on Completion, boreholes and other testing and exploratory work, or (f) changes to the sequence 
or timing of the execution of the Works.” 
2859
 Glover, Jeremy, Simon Hughes, & Christopher Thomas, Understanding the New FIDIC Red Book: A Clause 
by Clause Commentary, Sweet & Maxwell, 2006, at 240; In Pearce and High v Baxter, (1999) BLR 101 (CA), it 
was held that when a contractor is denied the right to repair defects itself as required by the contract, the 
contractor will not be liable for the full cost of repairs carried out by third parties, and the employer could not 
recover more than the amount which it would have cost the contractor to remedy the defects. 
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have no liability, to the extent that the seller demonstrates that the buyer’s delay violated its 
obligation to use reasonable endeavors to mitigate loss. Article 11.4 provides that the seller 
shall have no liability under the contract unless it receives from the buyer a claim notice 
within the agreed period of time after closing.  
 
Thus, contractual obligations of the aggrieved party, which needs to be performed not only 
before but also after the non-performance by the other party, are directly relevant to its claim 
for damages. If and to the extent that the aggrieved party fails to perform those contractual 
duties, the liability of the non-performing party for damages will be limited in a manner 
similar to the application of the rules relating to the causation, or the aggrieved party’s 
contribution to or mitigation of loss under the national legal systems and the international 
instruments. 
 
Moreover, the contracts sometimes allocate to a party the risks of certain events other than the 
breach of its contractual obligations, which may contribute to its harm arising from the other 
party’s non-performance thereby limiting the extent of its recoverable damages for non-
performance. Under the FIDIC Conditions, the risk of costs and delays in the works arising 
from the actions of Engineer, any other contractors, and the personnel of any legally 
constituted public authorities are allocated to the Employer. Sub-Clause 1.9 entitle the 
Contractor to an extension of time for completion and payment of any associated cost plus 
profit, in the event that the Engineer fails to issue a necessary drawing or instruction within a 
reasonable time after the Contractor’s notice to the Engineer. However, Sub-Clause 1.9 
declines extension and payment to the extent that the Engineer’s failure was caused by any 
error or delay by the Contractor. Furthermore, Sub-Clause 8.8 of the FIDIC Condition allows 
the Engineer at any time to instruct the Contractor to suspend progress of part or all of the 
works. During such suspension, the Contractor shall protect, store and secure such part or the 
Works against any deterioration, loss or damage. According to Sub-Clause 8.9, if and to the 
extent that the cause of suspension is notified by the Engineer and is not the responsibility of 
the Contractor, the Contractor shall be entitled to an extension of time for any such delay, if 
completion is or will be delayed, and payment of any cost, which shall be included in the 
contract price. However, the Contractor shall not be entitled to an extension of time for, or to 
payment of the cost incurred in making good the consequences of the Contractor’s faulty 
design, workmanship or materials, or of the Contractor’s failure to protect, store or secure in 
accordance with Sub-Clause 8.8. Under Sub-Clause 4.6 with regard to the duty of cooperation 
of the Contractor, the Contractor shall, as instructed by the Engineer, allow appropriate 
opportunities for carrying out work to the Employer’s personnel, any other contractors, and 
the personnel of any legally constituted public authorities. If the Contractor complies with this 
duty of cooperation, any such instruction of the Engineer shall constitute a variation of time 
for completion and/or contract price to the extent that it causes the Contractor to suffer delays 
and to incur unforeseeable costs. 
 
Under Sub-Clause 17.2 of the FIDIC Conditions, the Contractor is required to take full 
responsibility for the care of the works, goods or contractor’s documents from the 
commencement date until the taking-over certificate is issued for the works. If any loss or 
damage happens to the works, goods or contractor’s documents, other than due to 
“Employer’s Risks”, the Contractor must rectify this loss or damage at its cost, so that the 
works, goods or contractor’s documents conform to the contract. According to Sub-Clause 
17.3, “Employer’s Risks” are generally events or circumstances over which neither party will 
have any control (e.g. war, hostilities and the like) or events or circumstances caused by the 
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Employer, directly or indirectly.
2860
 If the loss or damage occurs due to an Employer’s Risk, 
the Contractor must rectify this loss or damage to the extent required by the Employer or the 
Engineer requires rectification, and the Contractor may be entitled to an extension of time and 
to any cost if it suffers delay and incurs cost in the performance of the contract. Sub-Clause 
17.4 (b) of the FIDIC Conditions entitle the Contractor to recover profit in addition to the cost 
of rectification in two cases of loss or damage due to the Employer’s Risk: (1) use or 
occupation by the Employer, and (2) design of any part of the Works by the Employer. In 
those two cases, there is Employer’s breach of contract and the Contractor is entitled to 
recover his profit, whereas in the other cases the Employer does not have the control of the 
circumstances resulting in loss and, there is a further sharing of risk by the Contractor, by his 
giving up an entitlement to profit.
 2861
 
 
The penalty or liquidated damages clauses are common in international contracts, yet the 
expressions “liquidated damages” and “penalty” are often used indiscriminately in 
practice.
2862
 The purpose of those clauses varies depending on the choice of parties. They aim 
at fixing in advance the damages payable in the event of non-performance, limiting a non-
performing party’s liability, or providing a means of pressure on the debtor so as to coerce 
him into performing his obligation. They are particularly common in contracts for the 
performance of continuing obligations of a recurrent and largely unchanging nature, contracts 
for major projects with the characteristics of complex long-term contracts, as well as 
construction and large industrial projects.
2863
 Moreover, ease or difficulty in proving breach of 
the relevant obligation appears to play an important role in the insertion of a penalty or 
liquidated damages clause. It has been observed that such clauses are more appropriate for 
obligations to achieve a specific result than for obligations of best efforts.
2864
 Finally, in the 
contracting practice, a liquidated damages clause is frequently inspired by the obligor as a 
means for him to limit his liability.
2865
 Under such a clause, the recoverable loss is limited to a 
given ceiling or capped by a global ceiling. 
 
Under most of the construction contracts, if a contractor goes beyond the stipulated time, he 
becomes liable to pay liquidated damages or penalty for late completion. Sub-Clause 8.7 of 
the FIDIC Conditions provides the liquidated damages in case of contractor’s failure to 
perform the contract on time. If the Contractor fails to complete the works by the time for 
completion, with any extension under Sub-Clause 8.4, the Contractor shall pay delay damages 
                                                 
2860
 Seppälä, Christopher R., FIDIC's New Standard Forms of Contract – Risks, Force Majeure, Claims and 
Termination, International Business Law Journal, (2000), at 1013 
2861
 Ibid., at 1016 
2862
 Fontaine, Marcel & Filip De Ly, Drafting International Contracts: An Analysis of Contract Clauses, Brill 
Academic Publishers, 2009, at 344; These expressions may affect the judicial decisions determining whether the 
clause in question will be found valid or invalid under common law, but it should be noted that the decision 
maker is not bound by the terminology chosen by the parties. 
2863
 Cremades, Bernardo M., Liquidated Damages, Penalty Clauses and Punitive Damages within International 
Contracts, International Business Law Journal, (2002), at 330 
2864
 Fontaine, Marcel & Filip De Ly, Drafting International Contracts: An Analysis of Contract Clauses, Brill 
Academic Publishers, 2009, at 332; Report of the Secretary-General: Liquidated Damages and Penalty Clauses 
(II) (A/CN.9/WG.2/WP.33), 12 February 1981, Yearbook of the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law, 12 (1981), at 39-40 
2865
 Fontaine, Marcel & Filip De Ly, Drafting International Contracts: An Analysis of Contract Clauses, Brill 
Academic Publishers, 2009, at 339; Report of the Secretary-General: liquidated damages and penalty clauses 
(A/CN.9/161), Yearbook of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 10 (1979), at 41 
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to the Employer for this default. The delay damages shall be the sum stated in the contract 
data, which shall be paid for every day, which shall elapse between the relevant time for 
completion and the date stated in the taking-over certificate. However, the total amount due 
under this Sub-Clause shall not exceed the maximum amount of delay damages stated in the 
contract data. The liquidated damages under Sub-Clause 8.7 highlights the function of 
limitation to liability for delay by specifying an overall maximum amount and by providing 
that these delay damages shall be the only damages due from the Contractor for such default, 
other than in the event of termination by the Employer prior to completion of the works. It is 
also made clear that these damages shall not relieve the Contractor from his obligation to 
complete the works, or from any other duties, obligations or responsibilities which he may 
have under the contract. This last stipulation reflects the approach of some civil law systems, 
which distinguishes between a penalty imposed specifically for non-performance and a 
penalty clause relating to delay or defective performance, and allows combination of penalty 
with a right to claim proper performance only in the latter category.
2866
   
 
According to Article 29.1 of the ICC model contract for the turnkey supply of an industrial 
plant, if delivery of the equipment occurs later than specified in the time schedules, and 
provided such delay is neither the result of force majeure nor the result of circumstances for 
which the purchaser is responsible, the purchaser shall be entitled to liquidated damages, 
which will be determined according to the length of delay, unless it is evident that the 
purchaser has suffered no loss due to delay. Under Article 29.2, the purchaser is entitled to 
liquidated damages irrespective of his loss if take-over of the plant occurs later than specified 
in the time schedule, and provided such delay is neither the result of force majeure nor the 
result of circumstances for which the purchaser is responsible. The cumulated amount of these 
liquidated damages is capped by Article 29.3 as a percentage of the contract price. 
Additionally, Article 29.4 provides that if the plant does not reach the guaranteed 
performance, but does reach the minimum performance levels at the latest time for taking-
over specified in the time schedule, provided this lack of performance is neither the result of 
force majeure nor the result of circumstances for which the purchaser is responsible, the 
purchaser shall be entitled to liquidated damages, which will denote a percentage of the 
contract price and not exceed the maximum amount agreed by the parties. Article 32 provides 
that the remedy mentioned in Article 29 shall be the purchaser’s sole remedy for supplier’s 
delay and failure to reach the guaranteed performance. 
 
International contracts commonly contain clauses limiting the scope of warranty or liability. 
These clauses allow the obligor to discard certain risks, or make them foreseeable and 
bearable.
2867
 In view of the uncertainty of the remedies granted under the applicable default 
rules, many contracts exempt the obligor from any liability for consequential damages by 
                                                 
2866
 Article 1229 of the French Civil Code; Sections 340 and 341 of the German Civil Code; The UNCITRAL 
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Penalty Clauses (II) (A/CN.9/WG.2/WP.33), Yearbook of the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law, 12 (1981), at 37 
2867
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Academic Publishers, 2009, at 351 
 763 
 
listing various types of such damages, including loss of profit, cost of replacement supplies, 
damages caused to goods other than supplied, and claims by third parties.
2868
 Some clauses 
also envisage and exempt liability for unforeseeable losses. Usually, the clauses make it clear 
that the liability will not be limited or exempted in case of fraud or willful misconduct or 
some other specific event.
2869
 For example, Article 32.2 of the ICC model contract for the 
turnkey supply of an industrial plant excludes any liability for any indirect and consequential 
damages, such as but not limited to loss of profit, production, or contracts, and declares that 
this limitation of liability shall not apply in case of fraud or willful misconduct. 
 
Sub-Clause 17.6 of the FIDIC Conditions provide that, neither party is liable to the other 
party for loss of use of any works, loss of profit, loss of any contract or for any indirect or 
consequential loss or damage which may be suffered by the other party in connection with the 
contract, other than as specifically provided in other clauses.
2870
 In addition to that, Sub-
Clause 17.6 provides that the total liability of the Contractor to the Employer, under or in 
connection with the Contract other than under certain sub-clauses
2871
, shall not exceed the 
sum resulting from the application of a multiplier (less or greater than one) to the accepted 
contract amount, as stated in the contract data, or (if such multiplier or other sum is not so 
stated), the accepted contract amount. Sub-Clause 17.6 excludes these limitations to liability 
in any case of fraud, deliberate default or reckless misconduct by the defaulting party. 
 
In some contracts, the degree of limitation of liability for non-performance and, thus, the 
recoverable damages directly results from the parties’ risk allocations as to such events that 
may lead to the non-performance by one of the parties. In share purchase agreements, the 
parties’ risk sharing with regard to the facts covered by the representation or warranty 
determines how and to what extent the knowledge available to the buyer can affect the 
buyer’s right to be compensated for breach of representation or warranty, particularly where a 
due diligence investigation has been made. In most of the cases, the parties agree on an 
autonomous meaning of “representations” and “warranties”, independent of their legal 
meanings under national legal systems, and they expressly provide in the contract the legal 
consequences of a breach of representation or warranty. These representations and warranties 
concern the correctness of the target company’s financial statements, the absence of liabilities 
other than those reflected in its latest balance sheet, the seller’s title to the asset-part of the 
sale and compliance with applicable laws.
2872
 They aim at defining the critical factors in 
relation to the business, upon which the buyer is prepared to offer the purchase price, and 
their breach will result in a reduction of the value of the target business and, thereby, a 
                                                 
2868
 Ibid., at 376 
2869
 Article 10.3.4, Execution version of a Share Purchase Agreement dated 12 June 2006, on file with the author: 
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2870
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2871
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2872
 Ehle, B. D., Arbitration as a Disputes Resolution Mechanism in Mergers and Acquisitions, Comparative Law 
Yearbook of International Business, (2005), at 294 
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reduction of the purchase price. The agreement will state a provisional price, which will then 
be adjusted after closing pursuant to adjustment criteria provided for in the contract.
2873
  
 
In this context, each warranty states a positive guarantee, e.g. all the taxes have been paid. 
Possible exceptions, e.g. there is a problem with the taxes of a certain period, are disclosed by 
the seller to the buyer in the contract or in a separate contractual document, called “disclosure 
letter”.2874 Thus, the parties agree that those exceptions to the warranties, which are expressly 
stated in the contract or in the disclosure letter, will limit the seller’s liability for the breach of 
warranties. The buyer may rely on the warranty for the purpose of obtaining compensation to 
the extent that the relevant events are not expressly set out in the contract or the disclosure 
letter as exceptions to the warranties. The seller bears the risk for not having disclosed within 
the contractual documents certain facts, as a consequence of which the buyer will be entitled 
to seek damages for breach of warranty, even if the buyer was aware of relevant facts that 
imply a breach of warranty. For example, Article 8.3 of the ICC Model Mergers & 
Acquisitions Contract provides that the right to damages for breach of any warranties in the 
agreement will not be affected by any investigation conducted or any knowledge acquired 
with respect to the accuracy or inaccuracy of or compliance with any such warranty. Article 
9.1 declares that the seller shall be liable to the buyer for any liability, loss, damage, cost 
expense, which the buyer or the target company may incur as a result of any warranty breach. 
Article 9.2 provides that the liability of the seller in accordance with Article 9.1 shall be 
treated as any one of the following, as the buyer shall choose and direct: a reduction of the 
purchase price, or a payment to the buyer, a payment to the target company, or a direct 
payment to the creditors of the target company. However, the seller will often wish to qualify 
some representations and warranties, particularly with respect to matters that are beyond its 
control. The liability of the seller for the relevant risk may be limited by those contractual 
clauses, under which certain representation and warranties are preceded by the words “as far 
as the seller is aware” or “to the best knowledge of the seller”. These clauses imply that the 
parties are not fully aware of the facts covered by the representation or warranty and that the 
parties share the resulting risk, which has most likely had an effect on the purchase price.  
 
It is argued that the international contracting practices governing the amount of recoverable 
damages for non-performance are evolved in an attempt to reach a synthesis of the civil law 
and common law traditions, at the same time offering to the parties to international contracts a 
discipline as uniform and as certain as possible in spite of the different approaches of the 
various national laws.
2875
 Essentially, those different approaches lead the contracting parties 
to devise contractual mechanisms, which aim at restricting the scope of judicial discretion by 
providing, as much as possible, clarity as to their risk allocation, the sequence of contractual 
obligations and consequences of its disruption, and the limitations of liability for non-
performance to the extent that the freedom of contract allows them to do so.   
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2. Arbitral Decision Making 
 
The decision maker, applying lex mercatoria, may derive many established rules as to the 
issue of damages for non-performance in the order of international commerce from the 
national legal systems and international instruments through the specialized consolidations on 
the basis of an abstract reasoning. However, it is observed that, although there has been an 
almost universal consensus among arbitral tribunals that damages for breach of contract 
should place the aggrieved party in the position that it would have been in had the contract 
been performed, the assessment of the amount of recoverable loss and the resulting awards of 
damages by arbitral tribunals deciding international contract disputes have varied greatly.
2876
 
This variety results from the fact that almost all national legal systems allow the ex post 
decision maker to resort to equity infra legem, where the exact calculation of the amount of 
damages is not possible. The International Court of Justice made this point in judgment in the 
North Sea Continental Shelf case in 1969: “in short it is not a question of applying equity 
simply as a matter of abstract justice, but of applying a rule of law which itself requires the 
application of equitable principles.”2877 This is particularly relevant to the resolution of state 
party disputes, where the tribunals have to determine the value lost, as a result of 
expropriation or breach by the state party, on the basis of projected future earnings that may 
be greatly affected by ever-changing and often unpredictable economic circumstances. 
 
In order to overcome the criticisms of splitting the difference in terms of compromise awards 
and the unpredictability of outcomes in the arbitral proceedings, the decision maker applying 
lex mercatoria should reflect clearly as possible, in the award, the abstract reasoning as to the 
determination of the amount of recoverable damages, by resorting to limitations both 
articulated by the parties in the contract or their choice of default rules, and found by the 
decision maker in the form of the established rules in the particular case. In the particular 
cases, the arbitrators rightfully feel themselves more concerned with the outcome than a 
formalistic reference to a specific legal provision. However, this flexibility should not relieve 
the arbitrators from their duty to give reasoned awards, which should be considered as one of 
the procedural principles of lex mercatoria. The respect for articulated rules, the search for 
established rules, and the reasoned decision making, as required by lex mercatoria, may result 
in more principled decisions, which accurately give effect to the reasonable expectations of 
the parties to a particular dispute, as opposed to the criticism of uncertainty associated with 
the institution of arbitration in relation to the determination of the amount of damages. 
 
a. Principle of Full Compensation  
 
Under national legal systems and international instruments, the damages for non-performance 
are granted for the compensation of the loss incurred by the aggrieved party. Thus, in 
assessing the loss suffered by the aggrieved party, the first established rule in the order of 
international commerce to be considered by the decision maker applying lex mercatoria is the 
principle of full compensation, which includes loss suffered (damnum emergens), and the 
profit lost (lucrum cessans). It is argued that, the arbitral tribunals recognize the rule of full 
compensation as a general principle of law, and consider the aggrieved party entitled to 
recover both losses incurred as well as gains of which it was deprived because of the non-
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performance.
 2878
 In the ICSID Amco I Award, the tribunal stated that “the full compensation 
of prejudice, by awarding to the injured party the damnum emergens and the lucrum cessans 
is a principle common to the main systems of municipal law, and therefore, a general 
principle of law which may be considered as a source of international law.”2879 In the 
Sapphire Award, the arbitrator explained the principle of full compensation as follows: 
“According to the generally held view, the object of damages is to place the party to whom 
they are awarded in the same pecuniary position that they would have been in if the contract 
had been performed in the manner provided for by the parties at the time of its conclusion. . . . 
This rule is simply a direct deduction from the principle of pacta sunt servanda, since its only 
effect is to substitute a pecuniary obligation for the obligation which was promised but not 
performed. It is therefore natural that the creditor should thereby be given full compensation. 
This compensation includes loss suffered (damnum emergens), for example expenses incurred 
in performing the contract, and the profit lost (lucrum cessans), for example the net profit 
which the contract would have produced.”2880 
 
In ICC Case No 10578, the arbitral tribunal referred to general principle of full compensation 
to guide its decision rather than specific legal texts cited by the claimant. The dispute arose 
from a distributorship agreement governed by Swedish law, pursuant to which the claimant, 
an Italian company, acquired exclusive rights to market in Italy products manufactured and 
supplied by the Swedish defendant. The claimant initiated arbitration proceedings, alleging 
the termination of the agreement by the defendant to be invalid and claiming damages for the 
violation of its rights. The arbitral tribunal, held that the claimant was entitled to be 
compensated for all damages, including loss of profits it suffered due to defendant’s breach of 
the agreement, in accordance with general principles of Swedish law on compensation of 
damages for breach of contract, which provide that the victim of a breach of contract may 
claim to be put, in terms of financial compensation, in the same situation it would have been 
in if the breach had not occurred. The tribunal stated that “The legal texts cited by [the 
claimant] do merely reflect in specific areas this wider principle under Swedish law. Given 
that the relation between the parties is neither one of simple sales contracts nor of a 
commission agency, but an exclusive distributorship, such general principle of Swedish law 
on compensations will guide the Arbitral Tribunal in its decision on the quantum of [the 
claimant]'s claims.”2881 
 
In awarding damages in accordance with the established rule of full compensation, the 
decision maker applying lex mercatoria may use two different bases of assessment, namely 
cost of cure or difference in value, which are recognized by many legal systems and applied 
according to which one is more appropriate in the particular circumstances of the case. The 
difference in value can be based, if available, on the cost of an actual or hypothetical 
substitute performance, with respect to which many legal systems draw a distinction between 
the “concrete” and “abstract” method of quantifying that cost, but neither method necessarily 
forms the limit of recovery, which may include incidental and consequential loss. Particularly, 
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it is generally recognized that contract may give rise to two quite separate expectations: that 
of receiving the promised performance and that of putting into some particular use.
2882
  
 
In the application of the principle of full compensation, the sole arbitrator in ICC Case No 
5294 used the cost of cure as the basis of assessment of loss. In this assessment, the arbitrator 
considered the cost of both an actual and hypothetical substitute performance in order to 
determine the appropriateness of the costs of actual cure. The case concerned a construction 
contract whereby a Danish firm subcontracted an Egyptian firm with regard to the erection of 
certain buildings in Egypt for an Egyptian employer. The agreement was governed by Swiss 
law. Due to disputes about delays in the execution of the works, the Danish firm took over the 
further execution of the works, as provided for in an amendment agreement, and finished the 
unexecuted part of the works itself. The Danish firm initiated the arbitral proceedings 
claiming compensation for the part of the works, which it had executed itself. The arbitrator 
noted that the documents submitted did not contain indications that would prove the delays 
were attributable to reasons beyond the defendant’s control. The tribunal stated that the case 
can and must be decided under Article 7 of the amendment agreement, which provided a 
specific procedure for the method of compensation for delays in the works, without further 
inquiries into Swiss law.
2883
  
 
The arbitrator found that the claimant was entitled to invoke Article 7 and acted correctly 
under that provision in rejecting the defendant’s further services and continuing by a third 
party or itself a construction work which ought to have been done by the defendant. Thus, the 
arbitrator considered that claimant was entitled to recover the cost expended in good faith for 
such completion of the works, less the amounts received for such work from the employer. 
However, the arbitrator noted that the cost expended by the claimant to complete the works 
substantially exceeded the total sum contractually allotted to the performance of all the civil 
works. In order to check the appropriateness of the expenses incurred, the arbitrator appointed 
an expert to produce an estimate of what the cost of completing the works would have been if 
done by an Egyptian civil contractor and, alternatively, if done by an international civil 
contractor. In view of the higher costs incurred by an international contractor in the expert’s 
report, the arbitrator questioned whether the defendant must absorb the additional expense 
caused by the claimant assuming the work itself rather than using another Egyptian 
contractor. The arbitrator was satisfied that claimant’s action was, under the circumstances, a 
reasonable if not only solution. Given that there already had been considerable delays in 
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execution of the project, which was undertaken as a whole under a tight time schedule vis-à-
vis the employer, the arbitrator deemed reasonable to assume that the involvement of another 
Egyptian contractor would have involved more time for getting started the job and the risk of 
not meeting the employer’s deadlines, and would have complicated the scheduling and 
installation of the works. Thus, the arbitrator held that claimant was acting diligently and in 
good faith in carrying out the work itself in lieu of the defendant, and was, therefore, entitled 
to full recovery of its expenses.
2884
 
 
Unless required by the default rules chosen by the parties or determined as governing the 
contract by means of the application of lex mercatoria at the stage of conflict of laws, the 
decision maker applying lex mercatoria does not have to discuss the distinction made by the 
national legal systems between expectation (positive) interest and reliance (negative) interest, 
according to which the latter interest is generally awarded when it is not possible to establish 
lost profits with a reasonable degree of certainty. The decision maker may instead adopt the 
simpler solution that can be derived from the international instruments, under which the loss 
consists of the accrued losses (damnum emergens), and the lost profits (lucrum cessans), 
while taking into account any gain resulting to the aggrieved party from the non-performance, 
and damages can be rejected whenever the existence of loss cannot be established with 
reasonable certainty. 
 
In ICC Case No. 10422, the arbitral tribunal took into account the avoided costs by the 
aggrieved party as a result of the non-performance of the other party. The case concerned an 
unlawful termination of an exclusive distribution agreement by the principal. The tribunal 
decided to apply “general principles and rules of international contracts, i.e. the so-called lex 
mercatoria”, and to refer in this context to the UNIDROIT Principles. Considering that the 
principal unjustifiably terminated the agreement, the tribunal held that the principal was 
obliged to compensate the harm caused to the distributor by the termination. The distributor 
requested damages for lost profits. The distributor, considering the total amount of sales based 
on wholesale prices in a certain period of performance before the termination of the 
agreement, argued that it would be reasonable to expect at least similar results in the relevant 
period after termination. The arbitral tribunal noted that the claimant applied a gross margin 
with respect to the volume of business based on the wholesale price. The tribunal held that 
lost profits should be calculated, not on the basis of the gross margin of the forecast sales 
volumes, but on the basis of the net margin, i.e. the net gain after all expenses have been 
deducted, which is the difference between the gross margin and the avoided costs or harm 
and, and in this respect, referred to Article 7.4.2 of the UNIDROIT Principles. The tribunal 
stated that this principle has on numerous occasions been recognized in arbitral awards. In the 
absence of any indication concerning the calculation of net margin, the tribunal held that it 
had to use the criterion contained in Article 7.4.3 (3) of the UNIDROIT Principles, according 
to which where the amount of damages cannot be established with a sufficient degree of 
certainty, the assessment is at the discretion of the court.
2885
 
 
In ICC Case No. 8362, the claimant distributor concluded an exclusive distributorship 
agreement with the defendant manufacturer for the distributorship in Europe of a product 
manufactured by the defendant. The agreement was governed by the law of New York. The 
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claimant claimed damages arising from the unlawful termination by the defendant of the 
agreement. The claimant calculated its expectation interest as equal to the estimated gross 
profits that it would have received over the duration of the distributor agreement, but later 
amended its claim and calculated its expectation interest as equal to its lost net profits, namely 
estimated lost gross profits less variable costs that would have been incurred in connection 
with its performance under the distributor agreement. The parties agreed that under New York 
law the proper measure of recoverable damages is lost net profits, but disagreed as to the 
meaning of “net profits”.2886  
 
The sole arbitrator stated that “Under New York law, the proper measure of expectation 
damages is net losses as measured essentially, in a case such as this, by lost net profits. The 
case authorities cited by the parties, however, do not provide a specific general rule for 
calculating net profits to be consistently applied in all cases, in particular as regards the 
question of deduction of operating expenses. In ascertaining the essential principle of New 
York law, it is necessary to look at the facts of the cases cited and the purpose underlying the 
decisions, which is to grant a party no more nor less than its reasonable expectation interest.” 
The arbitrator considered that the essential principle was that a party must deduct from gross 
profits the costs associated with the performance that have been avoided, but there was not 
any rule of general application that expectation damages are equal to the net accounting profit 
(or loss) of the business entity as a whole, or any general rule that only variable costs, in an 
accounting sense, are deducted from gross revenues in determining lost profit. The arbitrator 
stated that “The intent of the court is that the aggrieved party be placed in the same economic 
position that it would otherwise have enjoyed, but for the breach. This requires no more than 
that the benefit of avoiding performance – the cost avoided – be deducted from the value to be 
received through performance. This is fundamentally what the courts mean by 'lost net 
profits', regardless of what specific deductions the courts have required, or not required, in 
given cases.”2887 Thus, the arbitrator decided to deduct from gross revenues only the cost 
avoided by the claimant. 
 
While there is relatively little difficulty as to the basis of assessment of the accrued loss 
(damnum emergens), which is in principle the expense incurred by the aggrieved party, 
although some of this may be too remote, lost profits (lucrum cessans) can be calculated in 
various ways depending on the circumstances of the case, but none of them will provide a 
mathematical precision and the estimate of the decision maker will be highly influential on 
the outcome. In the case of an ongoing contractual relationship, the measure of damages for 
lost profits arising from the termination of contract will usually be based on the past 
performance of the party in breach. This measure will be awarded for the period up to the 
time when the contractual recognition of entitlement ends, which depends on the 
circumstances of a particular case, such as up to the time a valid basis for contractual 
termination exists. Thus, lost profits will be awarded until ordinary expiry of the contract or 
until such time when the contract could have been terminated ordinarily or under its own 
provisions.  
 
ICC Case No 5418 concerned an agreement under which, the Hungarian exporter granted the 
English importer the sole and exclusive rights for the import and sale in the territory of the 
United Kingdom of certain Hungarian wines for a period of ten years between 1977 and 1987. 
The English exporter claimed for damages consisting mainly of loss of profits, which resulted 
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from the wrongful termination of the agreement by the Hungarian exporter in 1985. The 
agreement designated Hungarian law as the applicable law.
2888
 The arbitral tribunal stated that 
the compensation of damages under Hungarian law includes loss of profit. According to the 
tribunal, when estimating the damages the tribunal has to try to arrive at an amount of damage 
which is plausible under the given circumstances, which has to be proven by the claimant, 
who has the burden of proof for damages. The tribunal stated that “The estimation of a loss of 
profit is mainly based on expectations of the future. In this context the tribunal has to start by 
taking into account the history of developments in the past. It was, therefore, an appropriate 
method of the claimant to present the calculation of their profit during the years 1980 through 
1984 and for the first three months of 1985”.2889 According to the tribunal, a claimant who 
seeks to recover damages for loss of profit upon wrongful termination of a long-term sales 
contract and who seeks to persuade a tribunal that the lost of profit would be more substantial 
that had been earned in the period immediately preceding termination of the contract has to 
adduce strong and compelling evidence that marketing circumstances would have 
significantly improved had the contract continued. The tribunal considered that since forward 
predictions are necessarily to some extent speculative, the tribunal, which is asked to award 
damages for loss of increased future sales, should require a high standard of proof that such 
increases were probable. The tribunal required such evidence that established a substantial 
and sustained increase in actual demand for the relevant wines after 1984. However, the 
evidence adduced by the claimants in the case fell well short of convincing the tribunal that 
such an increase would probably have occurred. Thus, the tribunal concluded that the sales 
volumes for 1985, 1986 and 1987 would probably be about the same overall as the average of 
the three previous years, and awarded the net profit which the claimant would have derived 
from the agreement, had the agreement been performed until the end of its term in 1987.
2890
 
 
In ICC Case No. 5946 regarding an exclusive agency agreement for two varieties of 
controlled wines bottled and supplied by the claimant, the arbitrator, having found that the 
claimant’s termination and subsequent refusals to sell were unlawful, held the claimant liable 
to the extent that respondent was able to show that it suffered damages proximately caused to 
the respondent by such improper behavior of claimant. Applying New York Law, the 
arbitrator stated that “An aggrieved party may recover all damages suffered from a breach of 
contract, including losses sustained as well as gains prevented .... The object is to put a party 
in the posture he would have enjoyed had the contract not been breached .... While the burden 
of proof rests upon Plaintiff in a case of this kind, damages need not be established with 
absolute certainty.... In the context of a breached exclusive dealership in which a 
manufacturer terminates the services of an exclusive distributor, sales consummated and 
business performed by the distributor in the exclusive territory before the breach or by the 
manufacturer after the breach often form the basis for a reasonable accurate estimate of the 
profits the distributor might have realized had the relationship not been terminated.”2891 The 
arbitrator considered that the defendant had almost entirely concentrated on the first variety of 
wine, and its performance regarding the second variety of wine was very poor. The arbitrator 
stated that even if the agreement had not been terminated by the claimant, it could not have 
been expected that the defendant would have attained a substantial volume regarding the 
second variety of wine. Accordingly, the arbitrator held that the defendant failed to show any 
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loss of business regarding the second variety of wine on account of the termination of the 
agreement, and thus, it was not entitled to damages regarding the second variety of wine. 
With regard to the first variety of wine, the arbitrator took into account a drop in sales volume 
in the period preceding termination, and, assuming this diminution of turnover would have 
continued through the remaining term of the agreement, the arbitrator calculated the lost 
hypothetical profits accordingly.
2892
  
 
In such a calculation of damages, the obligations of best efforts may have a limiting effect on 
the amount of damages recoverable by the aggrieved party. In distributorship agreements, the 
principal’s lost profits will commonly be measured by the past sale performance of the agent. 
If the agent only undertook a best effort obligation in this regard, which places the burden of 
proving whether the obligor has satisfied the requirements of its obligation onto the obligee, 
the principal will have to prove that the agent did not exert its best efforts in its sales 
performance and could have achieved better, in order to increase the basis of calculation for 
its lost profits. Where the principal fails to satisfy its burden of proof, the amount of damages 
for lost profits of the principal will be limited to a sum determined on the basis of the actual 
sale performance of the agent in the past period.  
 
In ICC Case No. 7006, the supplier initiated arbitral proceedings against the distributor, by 
claiming recovery of damages caused by the illegal termination of the distribution agreement 
by the distributor. The agreement was governed by French law. In calculating the recoverable 
damages, the arbitrator first defined the obligations of the distributor under contract as 
obligations to use best efforts, due to the absence of any contractually stipulated purchase or 
sales quota to attain. According to the arbitrator, the scope of obligation of best efforts would 
preclude unilaterally terminating the contract, even when allegedly motivated by solicitude 
that the supplier might more profitably distribute its products through other channels.
2893
 In 
the arbitrator’s view, the distributor must develop and maintain the market for the product in 
the assigned territory to the best of its ability with the means at its disposal. The arbitrator 
stated that “all that can be expected of the distributor is that it do its best with the resources – 
financial, material and human – present when the contract was entered into, or reasonably 
within its reach.”2894 Thus, the arbitrator considered that the loss of profits which the supplier 
may claim should be confined to those lost sales to the distributor which would probably have 
been made in order to replace inventory which, in the absence of any other guide, would 
presumably have continued to be sold by the distributor at the sale volume it attained before 
its performance of the contract ceased. In the absence of any contractually stipulated quota, or 
proof by the supplier that the distributor’s failure to attain higher levels of sales was due to its 
breach of an obligation of best efforts, the arbitrator concluded that until the distributor 
abandoned all further market activity, it in fact complied with such an obligation, and that 
sales it did achieve should form the measure of claimant’s loss after the abandonment.2895 
Thus, the best efforts obligation indirectly limited the amount of recoverable damages due to 
the supplier by making the allegedly poor sale performance of the distributor as the basis for 
the measure of damages for lost profits, in the absence of proof by the supplier that the 
distributor failed to use its best efforts.  
 
                                                 
2892
 Ibid., at 111-112 
2893
 ICC (Final) Award in Case No. 7006, 1992, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, (1993), at 61 
2894
 Ibid., at 62 
2895
 Ibid. 
 772 
 
b. Established Limitations to the Amount of Damages 
The principle of full compensation requires the decision maker to give effect to the 
expectation of the aggrieved party from the performance of the contract by putting it into as 
good a financial position as that in which it would have been if the contract had been duly 
performed. The reasonableness of this expectation is assured by various limitations to the sum 
recoverable by the aggrieved party as damages, under other established rules. All national 
legal systems agree in placing such limitations on the recoverability of damages for non-
performance.
2896
 The decision maker will apply those established rules, the knowledge of 
which is considered as part of the contracting parties’ cost of enabling the correspondence of 
the expectations in the order, in making the allocational ex post decision with regard to the 
residual contractual rights and obligations and risk allocations. Thus, the aim of fully 
compensating the aggrieved party’s loss must often give way to the aggrieved party’s costs of 
enabling correspondence of expectations, which lay down certain limits beyond which the 
non-performing party will not be held liable in damages. Due to the underlying standard of 
reasonableness in these limitations, these rules regarding the assessment of damages leave 
much to the decision maker’s discretion. The need to deal with such a situation that cannot 
always be foreseen in advance is reflected in the flexibility of the default rules relating to 
damages for non-performance.
2897
 In view of these considerations, the decision maker 
applying lex mercatoria should be as explicit as possible in its award in relation to the 
consideration of the established limitations to the amount of damages. 
1. Causation 
 
The aggrieved party may only recover its loss that was directly caused by the non-
performance of the other party. This simple and logical rule apparently determines the amount 
of recoverable damages as a matter of fact. However, in practice, particularly in the 
transactions governed through legal uncertainty, the task of determining the causes of the loss 
claimed by the aggrieved party due to the non-performance may be much more difficult than 
the prima facie simplicity of the rule would suggest. By the application of this limitation, the 
decision maker applying lex mercatoria should determine through a contextual approach 
whether the loss allegedly incurred by the aggrieved party was caused directly by the non-
performance of the other party. Where the decision maker establishes that there are multiple 
causes of the alleged loss, only the loss directly caused by the non-performance may be 
included in the amount of damages. If the share of non-performance in the alleged loss cannot 
be determined with mathematical precision, the concern for accuracy under lex mercatoria 
requires a discretionary assessment of the respective weight of all causes and, if necessary, a 
subsequent reduction in the amount of the alleged loss, rather than all-or-nothing solutions. 
Such a contextual approach and discretionary assessment may precede, as a matter of 
interpretation of contract and its supplementation with individualized terms, the approach of 
national legal systems, which mainly apply the principle of causation as a means for either 
establishing liability for non-performance or excusing the party from the liability for non-
performance.  
 
In ICC Case No. 5948, the arbitral tribunal applied the requirement of causality to reduce the 
alleged loss of the contractor arising from the employer’s delay in making advance payment, 
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on the basis of its discretion and customs in the construction industry. In the case, an advance 
payment had been duly certified by the engineer and the contractor had promptly provided the 
employer with an advance payment guarantee. However, the advance payment was paid with 
a delay of 202 days and, consequently, the contractor claimed damages for late payment of the 
amount involved. The tribunal noted that, “in principle, and consistently with the law of 
obligations of the Employer's State”, the contractor should be able to recover any net extra 
expenditures and liabilities incurred by it which (i) were caused by the breach, (i.e. which 
were rendered abortive by the lateness of the advance payment or would not have been 
incurred at all but for that lateness), and (ii) were a reasonably foreseeable consequence of 
that breach.
2898
 With respect to the issue of foreseeability, the tribunal considered that it was 
from the outset reasonably foreseeable, and in fact, foreseen by the employer that any failure 
to make payments was quite likely to result in delay to the work. However, the tribunal stated 
that “the burden is on the [contractor] to establish with reasonable particularity the nature and 
extent of the losses it claims to have suffered” and the tribunal cannot simply assume that the 
contractor was unable to do any productive work at all during the 202 days or that a 202 day 
delay in effecting the advance payment caused as much loss to the contractor as if every 
subsequent contractual payment had also been deferred by 202 days. The tribunal added that 
“on any view the amount recoverable as damages would not include the value of work 
performed which earned remuneration under the Contract.”2899  
 
In determining what costs “caused by the breach of contract” and “rendered abortive by the 
lateness of the advance payment”, the tribunal first assessed the total costs incurred over the 
period of 202 days, and then deducted from that amount its assessment of costs allocable to 
productive work performed in that period. Since no evidence was presented by either party in 
respect of any calculation for the value of productive work, the tribunal referred to the custom 
in the industry. According to the custom, upon the award of a contract, the main activities of a 
contractor concern preparatory work, which includes mobilization and logistics for the entire 
project whereby special emphasis lies on the site installation, the recruitment of personnel, the 
purchasing of plant, equipment and materials and their transport to the site. The costs of those 
preparatory works, which can be used when the project starts at a later date, become abortive 
to the extent that the personnel in charge of the project is no longer in a position to achieve 
productive work, but cannot be dismissed or directed to other projects in view of the 
expectation that the works may actually continue at any time. According to the tribunal, the 
period of the advance payment delay in the case was ultimately of such length that most of the 
personnel and other time-related costs became abortive. In view of these considerations, the 
tribunal found that “a percentage of 20% of the allowable costs for home office overheads, 
staff salaries, medical insurance, staff expenses, postage and DHL, air fares, sundry expenses, 
hotel accounts, visa fees, site electricity and telephone/telex was not abortive and 20% thereof 
should be deducted as the value of productive work.”2900  
 
Thus, the tribunal applied the requirement of causality in the event of the employer’s late 
payment to determine the extent of loss suffered by the contractor, on the basis of a contextual 
approach, by focusing on the customs in the relevant industry, which indicated that the 
contractor had the ability to do some productive work during the period of delay. The tribunal, 
referring to those customs, made a distinction between, on the one hand, the contractor’s costs 
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that were rendered abortive by the employer’s breach of contract, on the other hand, the 
contractor’s costs that could be put in furtherance of its performance of the work, despite the 
employer’s breach of contract. The share of the latter costs in the amount of alleged loss 
incurred by the contractor during the period of delay was apparently determined on the basis 
of a discretionary power. Then, those costs were deducted from the alleged loss, since they 
were considered as being required and still useful to achieve the completion of the works and, 
thus, covered by the remuneration under the contract. In this sense, those costs did not cause 
any loss to the contractor.  
2. Foreseeability 
 
In the order of international commerce, it is an established rule that the non-performing party 
is only be liable for such damages as he could have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of 
the contract. The basic premise of this limitation is that the parties can reasonably be expected 
to have entered into the agreement on the basis of foreseeable risks. It rests on the claim that, 
had the breaching party actually known of the extent of losses his breach might cause, he 
would not have contracted at all or would have contracted on different terms.
2901
 Under the 
economic analysis of law, it is argued that this limitation implies that, where a risk of loss is 
known to only one party to the contract, the other party is not liable for the loss if it occurs 
and, thus, the party with knowledge of the risk is induced either to take any appropriate 
precautions himself or, if he believes that the other party might be the more efficient loss 
avoider, to disclose the risk to that party and pay him to assume it.
2902
 In accordance with 
these considerations, the application of this limitation is an issue of risk allocation under lex 
mercatoria and will be based on the specific allocation of risks as agreed between the parties, 
and the residual allocation of risks as determined through the contextual approach of the 
decision maker in ascribing a certain degree of knowledge to the parties respectively. The 
decision maker will attribute to the reasonable person the knowledge of surrounding 
circumstances which such a person could normally be expected to have, and also such 
additional knowledge as the party in breach in fact had.  
 
It is argued that the principle of foreseeability has an international scope and the reasoning of 
the arbitrators is consonant with both the English case of Hadley v. Baxendale and Article 
1150 of the French Civil Code.
2903
 Some awards have held, by way of a general principle, that 
only direct and foreseeable losses are capable of giving rise to compensation. Those awards 
commonly implied a close link between the foreseeability and causation, particularly through 
the concept of remoteness. This was also apparent in ICC Case No 5948, which was 
examined above in relation to the causation. In the ICSID Amco I Award, the tribunal stated 
that “according to principles and rules common to the main national legal systems and to 
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international law, the damages to be awarded must cover only the direct and foreseeable 
prejudice. The requirement of directness is but a consequence of the requirement of a causal 
link between the failure and the prejudice; and the requirement of foreseeability is met 
practically everywhere.”2904 Similarly, in an ad hoc award, the tribunal stated that “There is … 
a common legal principle [prevailing in the Arab countries]…., namely the compensatory 
principle: a party may claim the damnum emergens (ma lahaqahu min darar) and the lucrum 
cessans (ma fatahu min ribh) suffered by it as a direct result of a breach of contract, provided 
(in the absence of wilful default (ghish) or grave fault (khata' gasim)) such result was 
reasonably foreseeable by the parties when they entered into the contract.”2905 Thus, it is 
observed that in arbitral practice, causation often becomes blurred with the notion of 
foreseeability since, under the foreseeability test, the claimant is first to establish causation by 
showing that the breach and the damages are linked, the latter being the necessary 
consequence of the former or a direct and immediate result.
2906
 
 
In ICC Case No 10346, the defendant’s non-performance of its obligations to collaborate 
resulted in the failure to register their contract for the sale of electricity in the public registry, 
which was the condition for the final efficacy of the contract.
 2907 
The contract contained a 
choice of law clause in favor of Colombian law. The arbitral tribunal held that the defendant’s 
failure to collaborate with the claimant in order to adjust the provisions of the contract to the 
requirements of the public authority thereby obtaining the registration of the contract blocked 
all possibility of the performance of the contract and gave rise to the obligation to make full 
compensation. The tribunal, referring to the relevant articles of the Colombian Civil Code, 
stated that “the question of compensation would appear to be resolved merely by applying the 
concepts of damnum emergens and lucrum cessans, the first of which means a reduction in 
net worth (an outlay) and the second a frustrated gain (income not received)”.2908 The tribunal 
further noted that in Colombian law, “for a loss to be compensated it must be “certain” rather 
than a “contingent” loss.” The tribunal considered that the classification of damage as certain 
or as contingent, arising out of situations which were prevented from occurring, constitutes a 
necessary filter for the determination of the reasonable losses. The tribunal stated that 
“Having set out the aforementioned framework as the reference to evaluate the absence or 
presence of recoverable losses, the Tribunal also comes up against clause 14.3 of the Contract, 
the text of which clearly has its origins in the Anglo-Saxon legal systems and makes it 
necessary to venture into the area of "direct" and "indirect" loss in order precisely to 
understand the provision, which is consonant with the principle that the reparation for the 
loss, whilst it has to compensate the aggrieved party, which is a mandatory parameter in the 
evaluation, cannot impose exaggerated burdens on the liable party.”2909  
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According to the tribunal, “It is not however enough to denote a loss as direct, as regard must 
also be had to the distinction between "foreseeable" and "unforeseeable" losses, with 
compensation being payable in relation to the former but not in relation to the latter, save 
where the debtor had acted fraudulently.” In this regard, the tribunal referred to the English 
decision in Hadley v. Baxendale and Article 7.4.4 of the UNIDROIT Principles, for 
characterizing the loss to the criterion of what is in the contemplation of the parties, 
considering that Colombian law has a limited development in case law on the rule of 
foreseeability of loss.
2910
 Accordingly, on the question of the connotations of having a strict 
causal relationship and the need for the loss of profit (lucrum cessans) claimed by the 
claimant to have been foreseeable, the tribunal considered it sufficient to mention, in relation 
to the first point, that the only reason proved in these proceedings for the frustration of the 
claimant's expectations was the inexcusable non-performance of the defendant and, in terms 
of the second point, the requirement of "foreseeability" was clearly met since, whatever 
method of analysis was used, the loss of profit corresponds, as Article 7.4.4 of the 
UNIDROIT Principles states, to "what [defendant] could have reasonably have contemplated 
at the time of entering into the contract as the probable consequence of its breach", or to what 
was "in the contemplation of both parties", as stated in Hadley v. Baxendale. According to the 
tribunal, it was quite clear that the essential objective of the claimant in taking part in the 
public tender and, naturally, in entering into the contract with the defendant, was to obtain a 
return on its investment. Thus, the tribunal ordered the defendant to pay damages, 
corresponding to the claimant's loss of profit.
2911
 
 
Particularly, the decision maker applying lex mercatoria should consider that the element of 
lost profits under the established rule of full compensation is in principle foreseeable for the 
party in breach in the context of international commercial contracts. Accordingly, it is argued 
in the doctrine that the recoverability of lost profits is a general principle, and it is not 
invalidated by the notions that indirect, consequential or speculative damages are 
excludable.
2912
 In ICC Case No 5418, the long-term supply agreement, underlying the dispute, 
designated Hungarian law as the applicable law. The defendant, the Hungarian foreign trade 
company, argued that even if the claimant, the English importer, had suffered losses as a 
result of the defendant’s breach of the agreement, the defendant was not liable for its lost 
profits, among others, on the basis of a Hungarian rule, which provided that the party who 
caused the damage shall redress the damage which is direct consequence of his conduct and 
which he could take into consideration as a possible consequence of breach of contract at the 
time the contract was made.
2913
 The defendant also requested that the arbitral tribunal should 
ask for independent information about Hungarian law. The tribunal rejected this request and 
decided to do its own research and to hear the experts of the parties.
2914
 The tribunal 
considered that the loss of profit for which the claimant claimed compensation in damages 
was a direct consequence of the breach of agreement by the defendant in failing to make 
continued deliveries under the long-term supply agreement. The tribunal further stated that 
this was just the kind of loss which, at the time when the agreement was entered into, was the 
reasonably foreseeable consequence of refusal to continue supplies to the claimant as 
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exclusive British distributor, and which would result from the subsequent marketing of the 
relevant goods by another British distributor.
2915
 
 
It is argued that the intentional breach should be recognized as an exception to the 
foreseeability limitation since, while the foreseeability limitation requires that the defendant 
should not have to bear, without compensation, the risks of breaching a contract and paying 
damages, there is no reason he should be charging extra in compensation for the risk of its 
intentional breach, which he could eliminate by simply deciding to abide by its contract. In 
this view, if the defendant intentionally breaches the contract, there is no injustice in holding 
him liable for deliberately destroying the claimant’s property, even though the contract price 
did not compensate him for bearing the risk of doing so.
2916
 However, under lex mercatoria, 
the element of the absence of intentional breach in the requirement of foreseeability should be 
relevant only to those cases, where the terms of the contract or the applicable default rules 
require so. In other cases, the extent of recoverable damages should not be determined on the 
basis of the character of the non-performance, such as negligent or intentional breach. In such 
cases, any exception to the limitation of foreseeability should be considered as a matter of risk 
allocation between the parties, which must be ascertained on the basis of the terms of the 
contract and the surrounding circumstances, since it relates to the determination of whether 
the non-performing party can be considered as having assumed the risk that, when it decides 
to breach the contract intentionally, it will have to bear the full loss incurred by the aggrieved 
party regardless of its foreseeability.  
 
Unless, the non-performing party can be considered as having assumed such a risk under the 
risk allocation articulated in terms of the contract and default rules chosen by the parties, or 
implied from the surrounding circumstances through a contextual approach, its intentional or 
greatly negligent breach should only be considered as a factor relaxing the requirement of 
certainty with regard to proving the existence of the loss, in order not to reward the party in 
breach by depriving the other party of compensation merely because of the uncertainty as to 
the existence of the loss. However, the element of intentional or negligent breach should not 
be considered as an exception of the foreseeability, in the form of an established rule in the 
order of international commerce. 
3. Certainty 
 
Another limitation in the form of an established rule in the order of international commerce is 
that damages will be awarded only for the loss that is proven by the aggrieved party with a 
reasonable degree of certainty. This limitation will rather be relevant to the existence of loss, 
than its extent, since the basic principle of good faith and fair dealing under lex mercatoria 
will not allow a party in breach to escape from liability for damages merely because no 
precise basis for determining the extent of damages exists. Once the existence of loss is 
established, the decision maker applying lex mercatoria will rely on its estimate as to the 
extent of damages, even if it cannot be established with a sufficient degree of certainty. Thus, 
where there is considerable uncertainty as to the determination of the extent of damages, the 
decision maker will assume the task of controlling that uncertainty, usually by means of the 
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default rules applicable in the case or by the established rule of certainty, rather than rejecting 
to award damages for the existing loss.  
 
In ICC Case No. 8362, the sole arbitrator considered the issue of certainty of claimant's claim 
for lost profits arising from the unlawful termination of its exclusive distributorship 
agreement by the defendant. The parties agreed that some standard of certainty must be met, 
under the applicable New York law, with respect to (i) the causal link between the breach and 
the alleged damages, and (ii) the amount of damages claimed to have been suffered. However, 
the parties disagreed as to what the applicable standard of certainty was and whether that 
standard had been met. The arbitrator stated that, under New York law, the claimant must 
show “(i) that it has suffered harm, (ii) that such harm was caused with certainty by the 
breach, and (iii) that the amount of its damages is established with reasonable certainty” The 
arbitrator determined that as the right to resell at a profit was what was contemplated by the 
parties upon concluding the agreement, the loss of profit suffered from the withdrawal of that 
right was clearly within the contemplation of the parties. According to the arbitrator, the 
damages incurred by the claimant directly flowed from the breach, which was the immediate 
and proximate cause thereof. Thus, the arbitrator held that the claimant established with 
certainty that it suffered a loss and that such loss resulted from the breach of the distributor 
agreement.
2917
 With respect to the calculation of damages, the arbitrator noted that while the 
amount of damages cannot be the product of sheer speculation unsupported by tangible 
evidence, the law will not reward a party in breach by depriving the other party of 
compensation merely because no precise basis for determining the amount of damages exists. 
After calculating the avoided cost, the arbitrator calculated the lost net profit as a percentage 
of the estimated lost sales equal to gross margin less avoided cost. With respect to the time 
period to which lost profits related, the arbitrator determined the earliest possible date for the 
exercise of defendant’s right to terminate under the agreement, and assumed the agreement 
would have been terminated as of that date.
2918
  
 
The requirement of certainty is particularly relevant to the recovery of lost profits. The arbitral 
tribunal in ICC Case No. 8445 found that a German manufacturer, the defendant, breached a 
technology licensing agreement with an Indian manufacturer, the claimant, by failing to 
provide the claimant with certain documents as provided for in the agreement. The claimant 
requested damages for lost profits. The tribunal first noted that the applicable law, the Indian 
Contract Act, provided that, “in order to recover for breach of contract, the aggrieved party 
must show that such damage arose naturally in the usual course of things from such breach, or 
was damage which the parties knew when they made the contract would be likely to 
result.”2919 The tribunal found that the claimant’s loss of profits arose naturally from the 
respondent's breach of the agreement, on the ground that “the claimant unquestionably 
expected to make a profit from the local manufacture and sale of products, and its inability to 
do so naturally led to a loss of profits, a result which both parties must have known at the time 
they entered into the Agreement.” The tribunal then rejected the defendant’s argument that the 
claimant failed to provide adequate proof of loss. The tribunal stated that under “Indian 
jurisprudence, an injured claimant is not required to prove the amount of damage with 
absolute certainty, where such certainty is not possible, as is in the case of lost profits, and ... 
[all that is required] is a reasonable estimate of loss, based on such elements as are 
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available.”2920 The tribunal determined that the claimant met this requirement by providing 
detailed and reasoned estimates of the costs of manufacturing the products, the prices at which 
they could be sold, its prospective market share and projected sales growth, and the ensuing 
profit that would have been made. The tribunal awarded the claimant lost profits for the 
duration of the agreement, but discounted by 15% to take into account the “uncertain nature 
of the calculations.”2921 
 
In ICC Case No. 7181, the arbitral tribunal awarded damages for lost profits, which was based 
on the ground that the useful life of the agreement was diminished. The case concerned a joint 
venture agreement concluded in 1985 between two software designers for the development, 
marketing and support of software packages to build an interface device, allowing concurrent 
use of banking applications. The agreement provided that a Common Software Environment 
(also referred to as the Central Part) would be jointly maintained and shared by the parties to 
support the defendant’s Software 1 and Software 2 as well as the claimant’s payment system 
software. In 1990, the claimant was informed of the development of Release 5 of Software 1 
by the defendant. The claimant complained that the changes made to Software 1 violated “the 
provision (of the Agreement) for maintaining a Central Part of the software common to the 
Software 1 and the claimant's system”. Although the claimant disagreed with the development 
of Release 5, the defendant announced its issuance and initiated its marketing. The claimant 
refused the implementation of the short-term integration plan, which was agreed upon by the 
claimant and the defendant in a meeting in 1991. This led to the interruption of the claimant’s 
commercial efforts, because after the development of Release 5, the claimant's customers 
could not rely on access to the future releases of Software 1. The arbitration clause provided 
for the application of Belgian law.
2922
  
 
The parties indicated the possibility of appointing an expert to look into this question of 
damages for the claimant’s loss of part of the agreement’s useful life. In the opinion of the 
arbitral tribunal, this question required an assessment, firstly, of the period during which the 
claimant could not avail itself of the benefits of the agreement, and secondly, of the number 
and profitability of transactions claimant would have been able to enter into during that 
period. The arbitral tribunal maintained that while the first assessment was linked to an 
appreciation of the behavior of the parties, the second was of a factual nature and an expert 
appraisement could not give the arbitral tribunal precise elements of valuation of these 
factors. Thus, the tribunal preferred, rather than appointing an expert, to determine, without 
further delay, the amount of damages ex aequo et bono under Belgian law, which entitles the 
judge to “assess the damage ex aequo et bono provided that, as in this case, he indicates why 
the assessment proposed by the parties cannot be accepted and why the damages can only be 
assessed ex aequo et bono.”2923  “Taking into account, on the one hand, the average number of 
claimant’s new clients since the implementation of the joint venture agreement, and on the 
other hand, the time necessary after the announcement of Release 5, to reach agreement on 
restoration of the integration and then to implement the 1991 short-term integration plan and 
for claimant to take up again its interrupted commercial effort”, the tribunal determined ex 
aequo et bono the amount of compensation. The tribunal rejected the claimant’s other claims 
for out-of-pocket expenses, software technology and client base as these contributions were 
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made by the claimant in furtherance of the agreement, and the claimant did not call for 
termination of the agreement and was being compensated for the loss of part of the 
agreement’s useful life. 2924  
 
Although the decision makers applying lex mercatoria should be reluctant to provide 
compensation for losses with inherently speculative elements, they should consider the fact 
that, in the order of international commerce, the parties enter into an agreement with a view to 
making a profit, and the aggrieved party’s loss of profits or loss of opportunity to make profit 
can be a direct and foreseeable consequence of the non-performance. Particularly, in the case 
of a loss of opportunity to make profit, the decision maker applying lex mercatoria should 
consider awarding damages in proportion to the probability of its occurrence in its discretion. 
 
In ICC Case No. 8331, where the claimant was found to be in breach of its obligations to 
exert its best efforts in respect of forming and establishing with the respondent the assembly 
of the claimant’s vehicles in Iran, the tribunal, applying UNIDROIT Principles, stated that 
“the damages suffered by the Respondent in that respect may not be accurately determined 
due to the fact that they relate to assumptions on what would have been the benefit for the 
Respondent.” Referring to Article 7.4.3 of UNIDROIT Principles, the tribunal considered that 
the claimant should compensate the respondent for the loss of the chance to enjoy the 
probable benefits of the two aborted projects, and the respondent was legally justified in 
calling the performance guarantee, being payable on demand, and covering the good 
execution of the claimant's contractual obligations. The tribunal, by exercising its 
discretionary power, determined the amount of damages, but, as it was lower than the amount 
of performance guarantee already cashed by the respondent, the tribunal ordered the 
respondent to reimburse the balance to the claimant.
2925
 
 
In ICC Case No. 8423, two Portuguese companies, the claimants, entered into an association 
agreement with a subsidiary of a French company, the defendant, for the purpose of 
exploitation of certain plants through a jointly owned company. The claimants claimed that 
the defendant breached the noncompetition agreement by submitting offers for the 
construction and exploitation of four separate projects in which the joint company was also 
interested. The tribunal noted that, under the applicable Portuguese law, contractual liability 
presupposes a wrongful failure to perform an obligation, damage and causal relationship 
between the wrongful failure to perform and damage.
2926
 The tribunal held that, while the 
defendant violated the noncompetition clause, there was no causation between the joint 
company’s claimed damage and the defendant’s wrongful participation in the first three 
projects since the joint company did not submit bids to participate in those projects and failed 
to prove it had the ability to do so or would have done so. However, with respect to the fourth 
project, the tribunal held that adequate causation existed because the joint company did 
submit an offer for that project. While the tribunal noted that it could not “affirm with 
certainty that [the joint company] would have obtained the contract if the defendant French 
parent company had not submitted an offer”, the defendant’s action “was such as to diminish, 
according to the ordinary course of things and general business experience, the chance of 
success of the submission by the [joint company]”2927. Although the tribunal noted that it was 
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“difficult to assess [the joint company’s] loss of opportunity to the French parent company’s 
breach of contract”, in part, because the claimants “failed to submit sufficient evidence of 
[their lost] profit”, it awarded the claimants as damages what it estimated to be the claimant’s 
share of the loss of possible profit.
2928
 
 
Even if the applicable national law does not explicitly enable the decision maker to award 
damages on the basis of the loss of opportunity to make profit, the decision maker applying 
lex mercatoria will be able to award such damages by exercising its discretionary power on 
the basis of the rules of the applicable law relating to the assessment of damages, as long as 
the existence of such loss can be proven with reasonable certainty by the aggrieved party. 
However, in cases where the national law chosen by the parties explicitly denies awarding 
such damages, the decision maker should consider the relevant rules of the applicable law as 
part of the bargain between the parties, and as limiting the recoverable amount of damages.  
 
In ICC Case No. 9078, the claimant argued that the defendant violated their agreement under 
which the defendant was required to transfer to the claimant all know-how concerning the 
licensed product and to stop manufacturing and selling that product and to cancel an 
agreement with an existing licensee. The claimant requested damages for lost opportunities on 
the ground that the defendant allowed its existing licensee and another company, which it had 
an interest, to continue manufacturing equipment and machinery using the licensed know-
how, enabling them to make a number of orders, which would otherwise have gone to the 
claimant. The parties designated German law as the governing law of the contract. The 
claimant based its damage claim on the assumption that the sub-licensees of the claimant 
would have been able to enter into contracts for the supply of the relevant equipment and 
machinery to the named purchasers if the defendant had not offered and supplied the 
corresponding machinery and equipment to such potential customers. The tribunal considered 
that the basis of this claim was an assumption of a probability of lost profits, which, by its 
very nature, could not be proven in the strict sense of legal evidence. In the tribunal’s view, 
the claimed damage was actually “a damage for a lost opportunity, respectively the value of 
the missed chance or opportunity of concluding a deal and realising a profit on such deal”.2929  
 
The tribunal stated that the claimant did not submitted materials which would support the 
existence of clear rules under German law as to how damages for lost opportunity should be 
dealt with, and the tribunal could not find such rules clearly established by learned authors or 
precedents. However, according to the tribunal, it must be admitted that damage resulting 
from lost opportunities is real damage and the possibility to claim the compensation of such 
damage caused by a breach of contract must be upheld. In this regard, the tribunal referred to 
French and Swiss laws and to the UNIDROIT Principles, all of which recognized the 
principle of compensation for harm suffered as a result of a lost opportunity and allowed a 
certain degree of judicial discretion in the assessment of the damages. The tribunal also stated 
that it had not become aware of any opinions under German law to the effect that the 
principles should not apply in Germany. The tribunal noted that since, in such circumstances, 
neither the actual occurrence of the damage nor the extent of the potential damage could be 
strictly proven, the damages to be awarded must be assessed by a tribunal based on the degree 
of probability for the realization of the opportunity and based on a likelihood of the profit 
margin which might have been obtainable by the claimant on the lost transaction. According 
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to the tribunal, although strict evidence was not possible, sufficient proof had to be required 
from the claimant to demonstrate at least a very high probability for three elements: “(i) the 
loss of the business, (ii) the causal nexus between the breach of the contractual obligation by 
Defendant and the loss of the transaction, and (iii) for the net profit which the Claimant could 
have realised on the lost transaction.” The tribunal concluded that “Since the award of 
damages in such circumstances is ultimately based on the degree of probability of certain 
assumptions, the Arbitral Tribunal has to assess the degree of probability of the loss of 
opportunity and of the lost profit. This necessarily implies a certain range of discretion for the 
valuation to be made by the Arbitral Tribunal when deciding on the damages to be 
awarded.”2930 
4. Mitigation 
 
In the doctrine, there is a general consensus that the principle of mitigation of loss has become 
a general principle of law.
 2931
 It is argued that even arbitrators applying national law, which 
does not expressly recognize the duty to mitigate, understand that it is part of the transnational 
law of commerce.
2932
 Alternatively, it is suggested that the principle that the victim of a 
breach of contract cannot recover damages in respect of a loss that he ought to have avoided 
by taking reasonable steps is clearly recognized in practically all legal systems.
2933
 Indeed, it 
can be easily observed that there is a general tendency of arbitrators to take into account the 
principle of mitigation of loss whenever, an issue related to it arises in the proceedings and, 
thus, it has been consistently applied in the arbitral awards.
2934
  
 
A number of tribunals have considered it as a general principle, without referring in particular 
to a national legal system.
2935
 For example, in ICC Case No. 2478, the arbitral tribunal stated 
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that “it must not be forgotten that under the general principles of law, which moreover are 
reflected in Articles 42, section 2, and 44, section 1 of the [Swiss] Federal Code of 
Obligations, it is up to the injured party to take all necessary measures so as not to increase 
the injury.”2936 In an ICSID Award, the tribunal stated that “The duty to mitigate damages is 
not expressly mentioned in the BIT. However, this duty can be considered to be part of the 
General Principles of Law which, in turn, are part of the rules of international law which are 
applicable in this dispute according to Art. 42 of the ICSID Convention.”2937 In ICC Case No 
10346, the tribunal, applying Colombian law, stated in a footnote that “[the principle that the 
reparation for the loss cannot impose exaggerated burdens on the liable party], which is firmly 
rooted in the lex mercatoria, is contained in article 7.4.8 of the Unidroit Principles… The 
purpose of this article is to avoid the aggrieved party passively sitting back and waiting to be 
compensated for harm which it could have avoided or reduced. Any harm which the 
aggrieved party could have avoided by taking reasonable steps will not be compensated. 
Evidently, a party who has already suffered the consequences of non-performance of the 
contract cannot be required in addition to take time-consuming and costly measures. On the 
other hand, it would be unreasonable from the economic standpoint to permit an increase in 
harm which could have been reduced by the taking of reasonable steps. The steps to be taken 
by the aggrieved party may be directed either to limiting the extent of the harm, above all 
when there is a risk of it lasting for a long time if such steps are not taken (often they will 
consist in a replacement transaction: see art. 7.4.5), or to avoiding any increase in the initial 
harm.”2938 
 
In the abstract reasoning of the decision maker applying lex mercatoria, the issue of 
mitigation of loss will firstly arise, when the aggrieved party can be considered as having 
failed to perform its specific or residual contractual obligations relating to the period after the 
non-performance by the other party. Such contractual obligations may arise from the contract, 
the chosen default rules or trade usages in the narrow sense, or within the confines of the 
contextual approach to the supplementation of the contract with individualized terms. 
However, they should not be implied by the decision maker solely on the basis of an abstract 
conception of good faith, which would neglect or disturb the equilibrium of contract by 
creating costs that cannot be considered as reasonable.  
 
In an award rendered under the German Coffee Association, the tribunal found a trade usage 
including the obligation to mitigate loss and applied such usage directly and without any 
discussion of the applicable law. In the case, the buyer received a shipment of coffee from the 
seller that did not correspond with the quality description in the contract. According to 
Hamburg coffee trade usage, the buyer should then have determined the price of the agreed 
goods at the time of the incorrect performance by making a “coverage deal”, i.e. by buying a 
certain quantity of coffee of the contractually agreed quality. However, due to a temporary 
lack of suitable coffee on the market, the buyer bought coffee of a higher quality. The buyer 
also sold the coffee supplied by the seller to a third party and claimed damages in arbitration 
for the lower price he obtained for it. The tribunal found that, while it was acceptable for the 
buyer to buy higher quality coffee for a coverage deal if there was a shortage of suitable 
coffee on the market, “the buyer breached its obligation under the Hamburg usages by failing 
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to mitigate damages and to inform the seller of its intention to re-sell the coffee to a third 
party”, as the seller was thus incapable of “influencing the sale and the sale's timing”.2939 
 
In ICC Case No 5073, the tribunal, applying the laws of California, considered that the 
aggrieved party could have mitigated its loss arising from the abrupt termination of the other 
party by negotiating with the latter, which had made a reasonable offer to continue with their 
contractual relationship after the termination. The case concerned an agreement, under which 
the claimant, a US exporter, appointed the defendant, an Argentine distributor, as its 
distributor for the sale of certain products in Argentina. The agreement originally provided for 
a duration of two years, but the parties entered into several short term extensions. The 
claimant informed the defendant that claimant was in the process of updating the agreement 
and that it would be a few months before the new instrument was completed. Thus, the 
claimant extended the existing agreement until two months after the claimant should present 
the defendant the new one, thus allowing time for the latter to consider it. However, the new 
agreement was never submitted to the defendant. In the meantime, the claimant wished to 
appoint another company, better qualified in its judgment, to act as partner and distributor, so 
decided to terminate the existing agreement with the defendant upon two months’ notice. The 
claimant filed a request for arbitration seeking an award declaring that the original agreement 
had been properly and effectively terminated. The original agreement provided that it shall be 
governed by the laws of California.
2940
 
 
The tribunal found that the claimant extended the agreement for an indefinite period of time, 
as it would expire two months after the unspecified moment of presentation to defendant of a 
new agreement. Thus, either party could terminate the agreement of indefinite duration 
without a good cause provided that a reasonable length of time has elapsed and sufficient 
notice is given to the other party.
2941
 However, the tribunal also noted that the claimant’s 
actions raised the defendant’s expectations about the prospect of a long term relationship, and 
thus, the claimant could not plausibly maintain the same degree of freedom in terminating the 
relationship as if those actions had not taken place. The tribunal held that the claimant’s 
termination of the contract upon two months’ notice was unreasonably abrupt.2942 However, 
the tribunal believed that the offer of the claimant, sent after its abrupt termination, to extend 
the existing agreement upon the same terms and conditions as in the past constituted a good 
faith and reasonable proposal to continue performing under the original contract. According to 
the tribunal, upon receipt of the offer, the defendant could have expressed any specific 
objections to its terms, thus allowing the claimant to consider modifications of its offer. 
However, the defendant chose to regard the offer as absolutely unacceptable and malicious, 
and expressly rejected it. In this context, the tribunal considered that the defendant was 
entitled to compensation for the loss resulting from the abrupt notice of termination, though 
presumably only for the loss or damages suffered as of that period of time ending when the 
defendant improperly rejected the offer of delayed performance.
2943
 The tribunal found this 
result in conformity with the rule of California law on mitigation of damages. The tribunal 
stated “That rule required defendant to mitigate the damages flowing from claimant’s abrupt 
termination of the contract. At a minimum, it appears that claimant’s offer … to renew the 
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contract for two years presented defendant with an appropriate opportunity to mitigate its 
damages. The tribunal believes that it would be unfair for one of the parties to deny the other 
the opportunity to correct a certain situation created by its improper conduct.”2944  
 
Thus, the duty to mitigate the loss will be specified in the particular circumstances of the case, 
as an instance of the general duty to cooperate, such as the duty to inform the other party after 
non-performance by the other party, or the duty to consider a reasonable offer by the non-
performing party to cure its breach. However, the failure of the aggrieved party to cooperate 
relating to the period subsequent to the non-performance for the mitigation of its loss will not 
grant the non-performing party an affirmative claim. The decision maker will take into 
account such failure of the aggrieved party in determining the recoverable amount of 
damages. This is because the issue of mitigation of loss can be considered, at an abstract level, 
as an instance of the application of causality, which requires decision maker to ascertain to 
what extent the aggrieved party’s failure to perform its specific or residual obligations relating 
to the period subsequent to the non-performance by the other party can be considered as the 
cause of the loss incurred by the aggrieved party.  
 
The causality component in the issue of mitigation becomes more apparent in such cases that 
the aggrieved party is required to seek substitute performance. This implies the consideration 
of the ordinary course of events by the decision maker in order for him to determine whether 
the aggrieved party is under a duty to mitigate through the concept of reasonableness. In the 
going order of actions in the context of international commerce, the non-performing party 
may reasonably expect that aggrieved party will continue with its business after the non-
performance, and will not remain idle for excessive periods on the sole ground of non-
performance. Thus, the decision maker should take into account that the risk of the aggrieved 
party’s prolonged inactivity in the order of international commerce may not be considered as 
being fully assumed by the non-performing party, unless it is explicitly provided so in the 
contract, or that risk can be residually allocated by the decision maker on the basis of the 
consideration of ordinary course of events in the order of international commerce. In this 
sense, the duty to mitigate requires that the aggrieved party take such measures as are 
reasonable in the circumstances, while excluding such measures that, although they may 
mitigate the loss, exceed reasonable expectations in the circumstances. Thus, the risk of 
prolonged inactivity of the aggrieved party may be allocated to the non-performing party to 
the extent that non-performance creates unreasonable costs for the aggrieved party to proceed 
with its ordinary business, such as when substitute performance cannot be obtained through 
the aggrieved party’s ordinary conduct of business due to highly transaction-specific 
investments or other interdependencies
2945
, or where the breach itself destroys the business of 
the aggrieved party, or substantially deprives the aggrieved party of its ability to conduct its 
business in an ordinary manner
2946
.  
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ICC Case No 5885 concerned two sales contracts under which the claimant was to provide 
two cargoes of a commodity and the defendant was to provide confirmed letters of credit 
within a certain time. The claimant, however, rejected the letters of credit offered by the 
defendant on the ground that they were not rectified within the time stipulated in the contract. 
The claimant terminated the contracts and claimed damages for non-performance. The sole 
arbitrator ruled that the dispute should be resolved according to the English law, and held that 
the contracts had been rightfully terminated due to the lack of confirmed letters of credit. The 
arbitrator found that the market price of the commodity rose subsequent to the claimant's 
termination of the contracts. Thus, the tribunal considered that a seller having terminated a 
contract of sale for the commodity would normally benefit from the rising market and be able 
to avoid a loss of the kind which claimant alleged to have suffered. The arbitrator stated that 
“claimant, in a rising [commodity] market, should have been able to avoid any financial loss 
resulting from their termination of the contracts by making better use of the firm offer from 
the [supplier] which, I conclude, had not expired at the time when claimant terminated the 
contracts with defendant. Thus, I cannot find that claimant has met its burden of proving that, 
in spite of the rising market price of [the commodity], they were unable to avoid the loss of 
profit allegedly resulting from the termination.” Nevertheless, the arbitrator found it probable 
that the claimant may have been unable to avoid every loss resulting from the termination. 
The arbitrator awarded damages to the claimant, apparently on the basis of a discretionary 
assessment. The arbitrator considered that the claimant at least must have incurred substantial 
expenditure and loss of time for contracts, which they were entitled to terminate and did 
lawfully terminate because of defendant's breach.
2947
 
 
In ICC Case No. 8817, the dispute arose from the unlawful termination of an agreement for 
the exclusive distribution and sale of food products between a Spanish company, as 
distributor, and a Danish company, as principal. The arbitrator considered that the CISG and 
its principles, as elaborated in the UNIDROIT Principles were perfectly suited to resolving 
the dispute and the provisions of the contract, being the law of the parties, should apply.
2948
 
The arbitrator held that, as the grounds invoked by the principal to justify the termination 
without notice of the exclusive distributorship agreement was not legally valid, the principal 
should have observed the one-year notice, as provided by the contract, before terminating the 
                                                                                                                                                        
company under the control of a cooperative established under Indonesian law for the welfare of active and 
retired Indonesian Army personnel. On 9 July 1980, the Indonesian Capital Investment Board (BKPM) revoked 
Amco's Foreign Capital Investment Licence. BKPM’s decision caused Amco to lose its licence to engage in 
business ventures in Indonesia, but did not in terms cause Amco to lose all its rights under some contracts. 
Indonesia contended that Amco could still have sold its interests in these contracts to a third party and should 
indeed have done so, to mitigate any loss sustained by the decision to terminate its licence. Indonesia argued that 
both Indonesian and international law pointed to such a duty to mitigate damages. Amco did not contest that 
Indonesian law and international law both acknowledge the principle of mitigation, but claimed that there was no 
realistic prospect of it being able to mitigate its loss. The tribunal considered that the events that had occurred 
since the beginning of April 1980 would have made it virtually impossible to find interested purchasers. Thus, 
the tribunal found that there was no failure on PT Amco's part to mitigate damages. Final award of 5 June 1990 
in case no. ARB/81/8 and Decision on Supplemental Decision and Rectification of 17 October 1990, ICSID 
Award, AMCO Asia Corp. et al. v. The Republic of Indonesia, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, (1992), at 97 
para. 78-79; Even so, it is observed that international investment law generally recognizes the duty of mitigation 
and that failure to comply with this duty, if upheld by a tribunal, will have a limiting effect on the amount of 
recoverable damages. Ripinsky, Sergey, & Kevin Williams, Damages in International Investment Law, London: 
British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2008, at 322-325 
2947
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contract.
2949
 The agent claimed lost annual profits in damages for having been unable to 
distribute the principal’s products. The arbitrator held that the agent may claim an indemnity 
of one year of profit, being the notice period, and one year of fees.
2950
 The agent also claimed 
damages on the ground that, failing deliveries by the principal, the agent could not 
manufacture and sell certain compound products. The arbitrator found that the sudden, 
unexpected interruption of deliveries caused damages to the distributor, consisting in the form 
of difficulties in adapting to a new situation requiring changes in manufacturing 
arrangements. However, the arbitrator noted that the distributor did not prove that this 
difficult situation lasted one year, and that it did not supply any proof of its endeavors to solve 
this situation or of its difficulties in adapting to new conditions and products. The arbitrator 
agreed with the principal’s argument that it is one of the principles of European commercial 
law that the damaged party must take all necessary measures to mitigate its damage. Thus, 
referring to Article 77 of the CISG, and Article 7.4.8 of the UNIDROIT Principles, the 
arbitrator concluded that, in the absence of evidence of efforts made by the distributor during 
the alleged year of inactivity, economic inactivity was partly due to the distributor’s 
inertia.
2951
  
 
While the most common reasonable measure, for an aggrieved party proceeding with its 
ongoing business, to mitigate its loss is a substitute arrangement, the decision maker may find 
that an adequate substitution would not be reasonable as a means of mitigating the loss in the 
particular circumstances of the case. In ICC Case No 5418, the parties designated Hungarian 
law as the applicable law to their agreement under which, the Hungarian exporter granted the 
English importer the sole and exclusive rights for the import and sale in the territory of the 
United Kingdom of certain Hungarian wines. The English exporter claimed for damages 
consisting of loss of profits, which resulted from the wrongful termination of the agreement 
by the Hungarian exporter. The tribunal referred to Section 340(1) of the Civil Code, which 
provided that “The injured person shall make such effort in order to prevent or to mitigate the 
damages as might reasonably be expected generally in the given situation. Such part of the 
damages as has been caused by the injured person having omitted to comply with the said 
duty does not entitle him to compensation.” The tribunal was of the view that the English 
importer was not acting unreasonably in declining to attempt to expand their sales of 
Hungarian generic wines. The tribunal accepted the evidence that the importer could not 
substantially increase sales of generic wines and to have any chance of increasing such sales 
would have required the launching of a new brand, which would have involved a very 
substantial capital investment presented by promotion costs, with great uncertainty as to likely 
degree of success. The tribunal considered that the prospects of increased sales of generic 
wines were so uncertain and the capital expenditure in launching them was so great that the 
claimants were quite justified in refusing to take the risk of losing their capital in proceeding 
with their ongoing business. Thus, the tribunal held that there was no breach of the duty to 
mitigate.
2952
 
 
In a case decided under the auspices of Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, the claimant and 
the defendant concluded an agreement for the manufacture of industrial batteries in China. 
Under the agreement, the claimant granted to the defendant a twenty year exclusive license to 
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sell and distribute the products which it would manufacture to entities within China, while the 
claimant held the exclusive right to market the products outside of China. The agreement 
placed the responsibility for the setting up of the new factory on the defendant, but the 
defendant failed to do so. The claimant urgently needed delivery of the batteries because of 
the termination of a contract with another supplier. Thus, the claimant terminated the 
agreement and requested damages. The contract did not contain a choice of law clause, and 
the arbitral tribunal decided to apply Chinese law to the substance of the dispute. The tribunal 
stated that, “under Chinese law, the liability for damages in a breach of contract situation is 
based on the principle that the party breaking the contract is liable to pay compensation to the 
other party in an amount equal to the actual loss suffered by the latter. That liability does, 
however, not go beyond what was a foreseeable loss at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract. The Tribunal also understands that the claiming party under Chinese law has a duty 
to mitigate its actual losses as far as possible.”2953  
 
The claimant calculated the actual losses on the basis of detailed forecasts of expected results 
during the relevant time period, including the forecasted production capacity of a factory that 
the respondent failed to complete, and the forecasted sales of the product that was to be made 
at the factory, which were based largely on statements from the claimant's customers that they 
would have bought certain quantities of the product at prices that were competitive with those 
offered by the claimant's competitors. The tribunal accepted “that the claimed amount of loss 
of profit fairly represents what the claimant would have earned during the relevant period of 
time, if production according to the Agreement had been performed.”2954 The tribunal then 
considered whether, during this period, the claimant could have procured replacement 
supplies of similar batteries and thereby mitigated the loss. The customer witnesses and other 
witnesses testified that such possibilities did not exist, since no existing factory was prepared 
to supply such batteries to the claimant at prices making profitable a resale to the claimant’s 
purchasers, who all manufacture or market assembled batteries, due to production costs, 
environmental constraints, competitive factors and other reasons. The witnesses stated that the 
only alternative method was to wait for a new factory to be established in the same way as the 
factory figuring in the agreement underlying the dispute. The claimant actually had chosen 
that solution, but it necessarily took a lot of time to achieve such a resolution of the problem. 
The tribunal concluded that the claimant could not provide replacement supplies earlier than it 
did and, thus, its claim for lost profits included the period until the time the supplies from the 
new factory would likely commence.
2955
  
 
Under these considerations, even if the applicable national law does not formally recognize a 
doctrine of mitigation of damages, the decision maker applying lex mercatoria may enforce a 
specific duty to mitigate, where it is provided by the contract, or imply a residual duty to 
mitigate from trade usages in the narrow sense in the particular circumstances of the case. 
Moreover, in the absence of specific or residual allocation of the risk of prolonged inactivity 
of the aggrieved party to the non-performing party, a certain part of damages may be 
considered as being remote and unforeseeable and, thus, may not be recovered by the 
aggrieved party as its failure to mitigate its loss, even if the applicable national law does not 
recognize such a duty. 
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In ICC Case No. 7006, the arbitrator applied the rules on the foreseeability and directness of 
damages under French law, which was applicable pursuant to the choice of the parties, and 
reached the conclusion that the damages resulting from the failure of the aggrieved party to 
mitigate its loss were irrecoverable. In the case, the supplier argued that the distributor 
breached the distribution agreement, by terminating it illegally and ceasing its distribution 
activities before the date on which the supplier was definitely informed about the 
discontinuation of the distribution. The agreement was concluded for a three-year term 
commencing July 1987. The arbitrator found that the distributor ceased to distribute the 
product from at least as early as March 1988, and no sales were made through normal 
distribution channels until September 1988, when the distributor definitely advised the 
claimant that it was discontinuing distribution of the product and it would no longer continue 
to represent the supplier.
2956
 Applying the principles of French law, the arbitrator held that the 
damages to which the supplier was entitled must be direct and foreseeable consequences of 
the distributor’s breach. In arbitrator’s view, the claimant needed sufficient time for itself 
directly or through other distributors indirectly to re-attain the relatively modest level of sales 
which the defendant had reached. The supplier did not make a single sale of the products in 
the designated market between April 1988 and March 1990. The arbitrator concluded that one 
year from the time that claimant was apprised of the defendant’s decision not to continue with 
the contract, i.e. until September 1989, would have been sufficient time for it to achieve the 
status quo ante, and the beginning point of its loss of profits should be March 1988.
 2957
   
 
In other words, the arbitrator found that the supplier could have mitigated its losses after 
September 1989 and, thus, it did not award the portion of the lost profits it claimed relating to 
the period between September 1989 and the date of expiration of the contract, i.e. July 1990. 
Thus, the measure of the supplier’s lost profit was determined as what it would have realized 
until one year after it received formal notice of termination if the distributor had continued to 
sell inventory of the same category and at the same rate as it did during the period of 
contract’s performance until March 1988, and had replaced the inventory by additional 
purchases assuming the continuance of the supplier’s price and its gross profit margin. On the 
other hand, the arbitrator considered the direct costs, such as sale promotion allowances, 
contribution to the salary of the principal employee of the distributor in charge of developing 
the market for the product and publicity and labeling expenses, as a loss to the supplier which 
was caused by the defendant’s breach. According to the arbitrator, the contract was short lived 
and the distributor’s sales volume so meager that it may be assumed that the supplier would 
never have chosen to incur these costs had they foreseen the outcome. The tribunal concluded 
that the supplier was entitled to recover all these costs since the supplier would in normal 
circumstances have reasonably expected that the distributor would perform the contract to the 
best of its ability for the full three years, and not abandon it when it had barely started.
2958
 
5. Contribution 
 
The aggrieved party’s contribution to its loss can be considered as another instance of the 
application of the causation requirement.
2959
 The aggrieved party may have failed to perform 
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its specific or residual contractual obligations, or may have assumed explicitly or implicitly 
the risks of certain events relating to the period before the non-performance by the other 
party. The aggrieved party’s failure to perform or the occurrence of such an event can become 
one of the causes that gave rise to its loss arising from the other party’s non-performance. In 
determining the recoverable amount of damages, the decision maker applying lex mercatoria 
should take into account to what extent the aggrieved party’s failure to perform such 
obligations, or the event, the risks of which it undertook, caused its loss allegedly arising from 
the non-performance of the other party, in order to accurately give effect to the reasonable 
expectations of the parties. The aggrieved party’s failure to perform those obligations or the 
occurrence of the relevant event may be considered either as breaking the chain of causation 
between the non-performance and a particular loss, thereby leading to rejection of the claim 
for damages for such a loss, or as otherwise contributing to a particular loss, thereby requiring 
the decision maker to apportion that loss between the parties on the basis of the extent of their 
contribution.  
 
In MTD v. Chile, the ICSID tribunal had to determine to what extent the claimant investors’ 
unwise business decisions or lack of diligence caused its loss from a failed investment project 
of developing a satellite city in a Chilean municipality. In the case, despite the fact that the 
investment project was approved by the Chilean Foreign Investment Commission (FIC), the 
project did not comply with Chilean urban regulations and, thus, the investor eventually failed 
to secure a permit necessary to begin construction. The tribunal held that the approval of an 
investment by the FIC for a project that was against the urban policy of the Government was a 
breach of the obligation to treat an investor fairly and equitably. However, the tribunal 
considered that Chilean responsibility was limited to the consequences of its own actions to 
the extent they had breached the obligation to treat the claimants fairly and equitably, and it 
was not responsible for the consequences of unwise business decisions or for the lack of 
diligence of the investor.
 2960
 The defendant state contended that the claimants decided to 
invest in Chile without conducting meaningful due diligence, and contrasted the practices of 
the claimants with those followed by diligent foreign investors, who “routinely seek 
contractual protections against losses arising from difficulties in obtaining governmental 
authorizations by incorporating related representations and warranties, covenants, conditions 
precedent or subsequent, or other protective provisions”.2961 The ICSID tribunal stated that 
“The BITs are not an insurance against business risk and the Tribunal considers that the 
Claimants should bear the consequences of their own actions as experienced businessmen. 
Their choice of partner, the acceptance of a land valuation based on future assumptions 
without protecting themselves contractually in case the assumptions would not materialize, 
including the issuance of the required development permits, are risks that the Claimants took 
irrespective of Chile’s actions.”2962 The tribunal stated that “the Claimants… had made 
decisions that increased their risks in the transaction and for which they bear responsibility, 
regardless of the treatment given by Chile to the Claimants. They accepted to pay a price for 
the land with the Project without appropriate legal protection. A wise investor would not have 
paid full price up-front for land valued on the assumption of the realization of the Project; he 
would at least have staged future payments to project progress, including the issuance of the 
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required development permits.”2963 The tribunal held that the claimants should bear part of the 
damages suffered and estimated that share to be 50% of the damage they had suffered.
2964
  
 
Thus, the tribunal identified a risk of the event that the investment project may not comply 
with local legal requirements for obtaining necessary approvals and permits, and allocated 
that risk to the claimants on the basis of the practices of diligent foreign investors. It can also 
be said that the tribunal derived a residual contractual obligation from those practices of 
foreign investors, which required the claimants to perform reasonable diligence in seeking out 
information to protect their own interests. The assumption of this risk or obligation by the 
claimants was also confirmed by the Foreign Investment Contract between FIC and the 
claimants, which provided that: “In any event, it is established that the Foreign Investor shall 
be subject to the current laws and regulations in effect regarding its activities. The present 
authorization is without prejudice to any others which, pursuant to such laws and regulations 
must be granted by the competent authorities.” The parties did not dispute the word “others” 
in this clause referred to other authorizations required by Chilean laws and regulations.
2965
 In 
this context, Chile also had an obligation to act coherently and apply its policies consistently, 
independently of how diligent an investor is.
2966
 The tribunal then took into account both 
parties’ respective failures as causes of the loss, in assessing the amount of damages 
recoverable by the claimants. 
 
Chile filed an application requesting the annulment of the award. It argued that even if some 
apportionment of responsibility was appropriate, the Tribunal gave no reason for apportioning 
the loss on a 50:50 basis. In Chile’s view, the real and evident cause of the claimants’ loss 
was their failure to conduct adequate due diligence.
2967
 Thus, it requested the annulment of 
the award “[d]ue to the Tribunal’s failure to state its reasons upon which it diminished the 
Award by an arbitrary and unexplained fifty percent (and not 100 percent), as well as its 
manifest failure to apply any law that the Parties agreed to in the BIT (whether the Tribunal 
applied equity or other unidentified precepts to make its fifty percent reduction)”.2968 The ad 
hoc Committee agreed that some further reasons for a 50:50 split of damages could have been 
offered. However, the Committee rejected to consider it as a ground for annulment. Although 
the tribunal, in apportioning the loss, did not refer to any related doctrines under international 
law, and did not even use the terms, such as contributory fault or negligence, the Committee 
referred to Article 39 of the ILC’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts of 2001, which contained the provision titled “Contribution to the injury”.2969 
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The Committee considered that since the ILC’s Articles included claims brought on behalf of 
individuals, there is no reason not to apply the same principle of contribution to claims for 
breach of treaty brought by individuals.
2970
 It stated that “the Tribunal had already analysed 
the faults on both sides in some detail, holding both to be material and significant in the 
circumstances. As is often the case with situations of comparative fault, the role of the two 
parties contributing to the loss was very different and only with difficulty commensurable, 
and the Tribunal had a corresponding margin of estimation. Furthermore, in an investment 
treaty claim where contribution is relevant, the respondent’s breach will normally be 
regulatory in character, whereas the claimant’s conduct will be different, a failure to safeguard 
its own interests rather than a breach of any duty owed to the host State. In such 
circumstances, it is not unusual for the loss to be shared equally. International tribunals which 
have reached this point have often not given any “exact explanation” of the calculations 
involved. In the event, the Tribunal having analysed at some length the failings of the two 
parties, there was little more to be said – and no annullable error in not saying it.”2971 
 
The approach under lex mercatoria to the issue of causation contrasts with the general 
solutions of some legal systems, with regard to the requirement of causality, which generally 
assume either that the party in breach is fully liable, or that he is not liable at all, and largely 
neglect or avoid the possibility of awarding damages to a reduced extent. On the other hand, 
other national legal systems, which have introduced a specific rule to apportion liability for 
breach of contract, such as contributory negligence, distinguish the issue of contribution from 
that of causation.
2972
 In ICC Case No 11440, the parties entered into a Master Agreement by 
which the defendant sold its business to the claimant. The parties agreed that the agreement 
was to be governed by German substantive law without reference to other laws, and excluded 
the application of the CISG. The buyer alleged that the seller violated representations, 
warranties and other obligations and initiated ICC arbitration, claiming compensation from 
the seller. The buyer argued that it was entitled to compensation from the seller for the costs it 
had to pay for the renewal of non-transferable software licences (the Licences). In the view of 
the buyer, the Licences were assets and should be transferred as part of the business. 
According to the buyer, by not including them on the list of Licences specified in the 
agreement, the seller did not disclose their non-transferability and had violated its specific 
duty of information.  The seller argued that the Licences could not be qualified as assets, and 
that the buyer was aware of the non-transferability of the Licences.
2973
 
 
The arbitral tribunal noted that the agreement provided that a list should be supplied of 
licences for intellectual property rights which would not be able to be used by buyer. The 
tribunal held that the seller did not provide such a list, implying that there were no licences of 
that category and, thus, violated its duty of information. Moreover, the tribunal stated that “As 
usual in M&A transactions the duty of disclosure and of correct information is expressed 
several times and conceptualized as a guarantee.” On the basis of the provisions of the 
contract and the concept of the agreement as a whole, the tribunal discussed the issue of 
transferability under the aspect of correct and complete information.
2974
 Given that the seller 
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did not provide the buyer with the correct and complete information regarding the Licenses, 
although the problem of transferability was an issue in the discussions and remained 
unresolved in the negotiations, the tribunal considered that the violation of the duty of 
information was apparent.
2975
 The tribunal stated that “In principle, violations of information-
duties are cured by a specific mechanism: The person that has the right to be correctly 
informed has to be put in the position it would have if it had received the correct information 
in time. Thus, if damage results from the incorrect or incomplete information that damage 
must be compensated. The [agreement] provides a different solution that stems from the 
practice of M&A contracts. In these contracts, information-duties are conceptualized as 
guarantees. Consequently, they have been included in the [agreement]… in the category of 
‘Representations and Warranties.’ It follows that a breach of an information-duty which is 
understood as guarantee must have consequences that correspond to that legal qualification.” 
The tribunal considered that the buyer should be entitled to claim damages calculated on the 
hypothesis that the respective representation or warranty was considered true.
2976
 
 
As to the argument of the seller that the buyer’s claim must be reduced due to contributory 
negligence, the tribunal stated that “With regard to the technique of an M&A transaction and 
to its typical mechanism of representation and warranties it may generally be true that there is 
no room for the application of a contributory negligence rules as Sect. 254 BGB. However, in 
the case at hand the parties have explicitly agreed upon the applicability of Sect. 254 BGB… 
Therefore the Arbitral tribunal has to take into consideration any contributory negligence of 
the buyer.”2977 The tribunal considered that it is a generally accepted principle of contract law 
that the parties already have mutual obligations in their pre-contractual relationship, which 
include the duty of fair dealing and avoiding damages for both future partners. According to 
the tribunal, the buyer violated this duty by its negligence with regard to the advice of the 
buyer’s witness that the Licences were an open issue and that nothing was filed in the due 
diligence data room, since if that advice had been followed up, the damage caused could have 
partially been avoided, e.g. by reduction of the purchase price. The tribunal took into account 
this negligence on the basis of Section 254 of the German Civil, Code and assessed the 
contributory negligence of claimant as one third of the amount claimed by the buyer for the 
costs of the renewal of the Licences.
2978
  
 
However, despite the existence of the rule of contributory negligence in the applicable 
German law, the tribunal apparently based its reasoning on a contextual approach of causation 
as a matter of risk allocation between the parties in the particular case. The tribunal 
considered at an abstract level that, in the practice of M&A transactions, the risk of events not 
disclosed by the seller during the due diligence investigation of the buyer is allocated to the 
seller, and the materialization of that risk would entitle the buyer to claim damages for its 
entire loss caused by the seller’s non-disclosure. The tribunal also took into account a clause 
in the agreement, which provided that “Sect. 254 BGB shall apply to all claims under 
indemnities, representations and warranties.” On the basis of this clause, the tribunal 
considered that the risk of events not disclosed by the seller was shared between the seller and 
the buyer. According to this risk allocation, the seller was obliged to disclose certain 
information, while the buyer was obliged to exercise diligence in seeking out such 
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information and raise problematic issues for further discussions during the negotiations and in 
the determination of the purchase price. The tribunal eventually declined to award the share of 
the loss that was caused by the buyer’s failure to comply with this residual obligation that 
arose from the agreement. 
 
Essentially, the law of causation directs the decision maker, first, to decide, as a matter of law, 
what causal connection the law requires and, then, to decide, as a question of fact, whether the 
party claiming the causal connection has satisfied the requirements of the law.
2979
 Where the 
decision maker is granted sufficient flexibility to look beyond the formal consolidations of the 
legal systems through the interpretation of the contract and its supplementation with 
individualized terms, he may decide the first question, by focusing on the law between the 
parties to a particular contract and seeking causal connections between the alleged loss and 
the specific and residual contractual rights, obligations and risk allocations, and the second 
question, on the basis of estimates and approximations in the particular circumstances of the 
case, as long as the causal connection is reasonably certain, in accordance with the established 
limitation of certainty of damages.  
 
The issue of the contribution of the aggrieved party to the harm or loss it has suffered as a 
result of non-performance will usually be brought before the decision maker through the 
counterclaims of the defendant. In ICC Case No. 5835, the claimant, the sub-contractor, 
sought damages and release of performance bonds under a contract for the supply, installation 
and maintenance of electrical works. It argued that, despite completion of work by the 
claimant, the defendant, the main contractor, wrongfully withheld sums due and refused to 
release performance bonds. The defendant counterclaimed damages arising from the delayed 
completion of work, alleging that such delay was due to several failures to perform by the 
claimant. The arbitral tribunal decided to apply Kuwaiti law and, to the extent necessary, 
principles generally applicable in international commerce.
2980
 In an interim award, the arbitral 
tribunal had decided that the claimant was responsible for the delay of the project and shall be 
liable, in principle, for the damages suffered by the defendant. The tribunal reserved the 
determination of the extent of the claimant’s liability and the amount of damages to the final 
award. For that purpose, the tribunal asked the expert, inter alia, to determine the extent of the 
delay for which the claimant is responsible, taking into account all relevant circumstances, 
including other sub-contractors’ delays and the defendant’s conduct.2981  
 
The expert proceeded to determine the allocation of the responsibility for delay on the basis of 
two different global approaches due to the lack of adequate evidence supporting a detailed 
allocation of delay to one or the other party. In a first global approach, the expert listed the 
main causes of the delay, which were suggested by the parties, and found by the expert, and 
allocated certain percentages of weight to them. In a second global approach, the expert based 
his assessment of the development of the works mainly on the monthly payment certificates, 
and found that that “twelve months of the total 44 months was [the defendant]'s own 
responsibility whereas Claimant bears the responsibility for a total of 32 months (72%)”. The 
tribunal considered Article 300 (1) of the Kuwaiti Civil Law, and stated that “The wording of 
Article 300 Sect. 1 …. ("Compensation shall be estimated by the court . . .") indicates that 
apart from the debtor's failure other factors which may have contributed to the extent of the 
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damages, will have to be taken into consideration when the quantity of damage claims is to be 
assessed. This is particularly true with respect to the creditor's conduct as a contributing 
factor.” According to the tribunal, this generally accepted principle was summarized by 
Article 7.4.7 of the UNIDROIT Principles. Applying these principles and considering the 
conduct of each of the parties as described in the interim award and in the expert's report, the 
tribunal concluded that the amount of damages to be awarded to the defendant should be 
reduced by one quarter.
2982
  
 
In order to give effect to the reasonable expectations of the parties, the decision maker 
applying lex mercatoria should not be precluded from considering the contribution of the 
aggrieved party to its loss as an issue of causation and from exercising its discretionary power 
in relation to the assessment of the amount of recoverable damages, by the strict position of 
the national legal systems as to the doctrine of contributory negligence. In ICC Case No. 
9594, the arbitrator considered the extent of contribution of both parties to the harm suffered 
by the aggrieved party, under the applicable English law. In the case, the claimant, a Spanish 
company, agreed to manufacture and install industrial machinery for the defendant, a 
company based in India. Following the installation of the equipment, various technical 
problems arose, which led the defendant to withhold the final part of its payment, despite the 
claimant's efforts to solve the defects and overcome their differences. The claimant initiated 
arbitration proceedings, claiming damages for the defendant’s breach of its contractual 
obligations. The defendant responded with a counterclaim in which it accused the claimant of 
various breaches of contract concerning, amongst other things, equipment defects and delayed 
performance. The defendant also claimed consequential damages, since the defendant began 
to use the machinery thereby manufacturing defective goods which gave rise to claims for 
damages by its customers. The arbitrator referred to the general principle concerning damages 
under English contract law that the party who suffered the damages should be put in the same 
position as it would have been if the contract had been performed. The arbitrator noted that 
there are two limitations to this principle: “(1) the degree of likelihood, namely, the types of 
damage which a contract breaker shall be responsible for and (2) mitigation of the loss, a duty 
of the party who suffered the damages to limit or altogether avoid the consequences of the 
breach.”2983  
 
With regard to the first limitation, the arbitrator, referring to the case Hadley v. Baxendale, 
stated that it may be presumed that when the claimant entered into the agreement, it knew that 
the defendant wanted to purchase the machinery to produce parts for their consequent sale to 
the relevant industry, that the delay in the planning scheduled could cause the defendant to 
suffer damages, and that, if the machinery did not comply with quality requirements, it would 
have consequences in its productivity. The arbitrator considered that the claimant could have 
foreseen that if it did not conclude the whole commissioning process of the machinery within 
a reasonable time and that if the machinery did not comply with quality requirements, the 
defendant would suffer significant loss. According to the arbitrator, the question was whether 
the claimant could have foreseen that its delay would cause the large amount of loss claimed 
by the defendant. In this regard, the arbitrator noted that, both parties were responsible for 
delays and quality damages to the machinery. The arbitrator concluded that, “While 
[Claimant] should be held responsible for specific items where it is contractually liable and 
compensation is awarded to [Defendant], it is difficult, if not impossible, to assign 
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responsibility for consequential damages when both parties share in that responsibility. 
Furthermore, it is necessary to take into account [Defendant]'s obligation to mitigate the 
losses”.2984  
 
As to the principle of mitigation of loss, the arbitrator not only referred to the leading English 
cases stating the duty of mitigation, but also stated that “a similar standard has been 
established internationally, primarily in the UNIDROIT Principles.”2985 The defendant argued 
that it acted to mitigate its loss by accepting the machinery since, should it have rejected the 
machinery it would have certainly incurred much greater losses. However, the arbitrator, 
referring to a relevant English case, was of the opinion that the defendant should have 
considered the options of mitigating its loss through negotiation and accommodation, and 
should have accepted the offers made by the claimant after the commissioning to sign a 
provisional acceptance of the line. Moreover, even if it was supposed that the defendant could 
have deemed this offer unacceptable, the arbitrator took into account that the defendant 
continued using the machinery to produce a large amount of parts, in spite of its alleged 
collapsing state, without taking serious measures to repair the defects in the machinery in a 
timely manner. According to the arbitrator, the defendant had ample opportunity to mitigate 
its losses, but it only took reasonable steps to do so once these arbitration proceedings were 
filed. The arbitrator rejected the recovery of losses due to the claimant’s alleged breach of 
quality, on the ground that the losses could have been mitigated by the defendant through 
either further negotiation (by accepting the claimant’s offer) or by having taken the timely 
steps required to repair the machinery.
2986
  
 
Although it is not perfectly clear from the published excerpts, it can be said that the arbitrator 
took into account both the defendant’s contributions to its loss, where the defendant caused 
some of the delays and quality damages to the machinery, and the defendant’s failure to take 
all reasonable steps to mitigate the loss, and those causes culminated in the arbitrator’s 
decision to reject the defendant’s claim for damages for the consequential loss arising from 
the claimant’s breaches. In essence, in English law, there is some support for apportioning the 
loss by taking account of the aggrieved party’s contribution to its loss as a matter of 
causation.
2987
   
 
c. Contractual Limitations to the Amount of Damages 
 
The contractual limitations to the amount of damages for non-performance are such 
mechanisms that aim at restricting the scope of judicial discretion in relation to the assessment 
of damages for non-performance. The limitation or exemption of liability clauses can be 
considered as the main examples of such mechanisms. However, in cases where the contract 
contains a limitation or exemption of liability, the first issue that needs to be determined by 
the decision maker is the common intention of the parties as to the scope of such a clause and 
whether it is applicable in the particular circumstances of the case. In ICC Case No. 8362, the 
manufacturer unlawfully terminated its exclusive distributorship agreement with the claimant 
and assigned the claimant’s rights under the agreement to a third party. The claimant sought 
damages for its lost profits. The agreement contained a limitation of liability clause, which 
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provided that, in the event of any breach of the manufacturer’s warranty with regard to the 
product, the manufacturer shall not be liable for any special, indirect, punitive, exemplary or 
consequential damages, whether foreseeable or not, including but not limited to lost profits 
from any cause whatsoever. The defendant argued that, under the applicable New York law, 
mere placement of a provision containing a waiver of consequential damages within a clause 
addressing the seller’s liability for product use does not limit the general effect of the waiver, 
and the language “from any cause whatsoever” in the relevant clause was intended as a 
general blanket exclusion of recovery of lost profits.
2988
 The claimant contended that the 
proper construction of the relevant clause required that it be considered in the context in 
which it appeared, and the context clearly showed that it was intended to be an exclusion of 
certain types of damages arising out of breach of product warranties. According to the 
claimant, its argument was supported by the fact that the types of damages excluded were 
those that are generally relevant to a tort or breach of warranty action.
2989
  
 
The arbitrator considered that the context of the limitation of liability clause clearly indicated 
that it was intended to apply to product and trademark warranties alone. According to the 
arbitrator, the limitation of liability clause was clearly limited to damages other than direct or 
general damages, and its lost profits exclusion was clearly restricted to lost profits within the 
categories of damages enumerated. The arbitrator noted that the conveyance by the defendant 
of the claimant’s rights to a third party in breach of the distributor agreement deprived the 
claimant of the essence of what it bargained for: the exclusive right to resell the products in a 
defined territory at a profit. Thus, the arbitrator stated that the damages incurred by the 
claimant were direct or general damages. The arbitrator was of the opinion that the plain 
intent of the disclaimer of liability for lost profits under the relevant clause was to exclude lost 
profits caused by the breach of warranty that are in the nature of special, indirect, punitive, 
exemplary or consequential damages. As the damages claimed by the claimant were direct 
damages, the arbitrator held that the limitation of liability clause did not apply.
2990
  
 
A contract term providing that a party who does not perform is to pay a specified sum to the 
aggrieved party for such non-performance may also have the effect of limiting the amount of 
recoverable damages. However, given that the functions of penalty or contractual assessment 
of damages are generally perceived in the doctrine as the primary function of such clauses, the 
focus have been put on the issue of excessive penalty clauses and their treatment under the 
general principles of law. It is argued that it should be possible for the arbitrators to apply a 
principle, based on comparative law, whereby the effects of excessive penalty clauses should 
be tempered, which is also in accordance with the approach of international restatements of 
contract principles, since, in this view, reducing the effects of penalty clauses, rather than 
holding such clauses void altogether, would be more in keeping with the spirit of international 
commercial law, particularly in cases where the parties have submitted their disputes to 
general principles of law or remained silent as to the applicable law.
2991
  
 
There is a fundamental difference in this regard between the approaches of common law and 
civil law systems. Under common law, the court, which finds that an agreed damages clause 
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is a penalty clause, does not reduce the amount that can be recovered under the clause, but 
relegates the aggrieved party to its claim at common law for damages where the aggrieved 
party must prove the loss which it has suffered as a result of the breach. In contrast, under 
civil law systems, the courts may reduce a contractually specified sum under certain 
conditions, but it is not required to award damages limited to the aggrieved party’s actual loss, 
and may impose more than the amount of actual damages in order to preserve the clause’s 
punishment function. In view of this fundamental difference, the approach of civil law 
systems cannot be considered as the established rule in the order of international commerce. 
The decision maker will have to seek the established rule in the particular case by applying 
lex mercatoria at the stage of conflict of laws and in the public policy considerations. Only 
where the parties chose lex mercatoria to govern the substance of the dispute to the exclusion 
of any particular national law, the decision maker will assume, to some extent, the control of 
the resulting legal uncertainty and seek an appropriate solution in the particular circumstances 
of the case. In order to give effect to the reasonable expectations of the parties in accordance 
with the public policy considerations, the decision maker may prefer either to refer to the 
international restatements, which adopt the civilian approach, to assist his abstract reasoning, 
or to resort to the common law approach if the dispute is particularly connected to the 
common law jurisdictions.  
 
This fundamental difference between civil and common law approaches may lose its 
importance, in the circumstances of a particular case, where the clause’s function of limiting 
the amount of recoverable damages for non-performance prevails over its function as 
punishment for non-performance, and the relevant clause becomes a contractual limitation to 
the scope of judicial discretion in relation to the assessment of amount of damages for non-
performance. In ICC Case No 4629, the parties’ intentions indicated that the limitation 
function of the liquidated damages clause in the particular circumstances of the case militated 
against its traditional conception as a penalty under the applicable civil law system. The 
dispute concerned a construction contract, whereby the claimants undertook an obligation to 
finish and furnish the defendant’s hotel. The claimants were found to be entitled to terminate 
the contract and to claim liquidated damages under the contract. The contract provided that 
the liquidated damages must be computed as “10% of the sums paid or due in accordance 
with this contract if the defaulting party is the owner.” The contract also provided that if 
termination occurs for any reason, the claimants were entitled to be paid for the work 
effectively done.
2992
  
 
The tribunal stated that the understanding that the liquidated damages would have increased in 
proportion to the degree of completion of the work would not make sense, since the contractor 
would not have been entitled to any liquidated damages if the contract had been terminated 
before the beginning of the work, while the contractor would have been entitled to claim 
almost the full amount of the liquidated damages if the termination had occurred at the time 
when the work was almost finished, when his real damages were much less than in the first 
case. Thus, the tribunal considered that the phrase “sums paid or due” cannot refer to anything 
else but to the total price of the contract, regardless of the state of completion of the contract 
at the time of termination. After having examined the possibility of reducing contractually 
agreed liquidated damages under the applicable Swiss law, the tribunal decided not to modify 
them. The tribunal stated that “the parties are in better position than the judge to estimate the 
amount of the liquidated damages applicable to their relations.” The tribunal also considered 
reduction as an exceptional remedy, which must be applied only when the liquidated damages 
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are so high that they exceed any common measure and are therefore incompatible with the 
idea of justice and equity. Having considered the various circumstances relevant in the case 
law, such as disproportion between the real damages and liquidated damage, gravity of the 
defendant’s default, financial situation of the parties, the tribunal decided not to reduce the 
liquidated damages.
 2993
  
 
Given that, in addition to liquidated damages, the defendant had to pay the unpaid part of the 
price due for the work already performed at the time of the termination, the tribunal discussed 
whether the total price must be reduced for the failures of the claimants to fulfill their 
contractual obligations. On the basis of the expert evidence, the tribunal first determined that 
the proportion of the work that was achieved at the time of termination was 77.05% of the 
total work.
2994
 The tribunal then investigated whether the amount must be further reduced due 
to some defaults or criticism made by the expert regarding the quality of some of the materials 
used by the claimants. The tribunal noted that the expert report stated a few minor defects in 
the construction, and considered it highly probable that part of the defects noted by the expert 
were due to the claimant’s fault. The tribunal found it difficult, on the sole basis of the expert 
report, to determine the exact amount of the reduction to be made. Thus, the tribunal reduced 
the total price on the basis of its discretion by applying Article 42 (2) of the Swiss Code of 
Obligations, which provides that damages which cannot be established in amounts shall be 
assessed by the judge in his discretion, having regard to the ordinary course of events and the 
measures taken by the damaged party.
2995
  
 
Finally, the arbitral tribunal rejected the claimant’s request for damages for all other losses 
and damages caused by the defendant’s delay or failure to perform the contractual obligations. 
The tribunal noted that the contract was a lump sum contract, in which the price had been 
contractually fixed, and the price can be increased only if extraordinary circumstances, which 
could not have been foreseen, impede the completion or render it exceedingly difficult, 
pursuant to the Swiss Code of Obligations. The losses claimed by the claimants were 
additional costs related to the prolongation of the employment of their workers, extension of 
insurances and guarantee. The tribunal stated that these circumstances could have foreseen by 
the claimants, since they had started to work on the site before the effective date, i.e. at a date 
when they had no guarantee that the owner would live up with his contractual obligation, and 
the claimants were already indemnified for the damages occurred due to the defendant’s 
defaults by substantial liquidated damages.
2996
 Thus, while the liquidated damages clause, to 
some extent, restricted the tribunal’s scope of judicial discretion and limited the amount of 
damages recoverable by the contractor, the tribunal was still able to exercise its discretionary 
power, and even took into account the contractor’s contribution as a result of its failure to 
perform its obligations, in determining the final amount of compensation through the 
reduction of the contract price, which the contractor was entitled to claim, in addition to the 
liquidated damages, to the extent of the work performed by the time of the termination. 
  
In ICC Case No. 13278, the sole arbitrator considered a penalty clause as a liquidated 
damages as well as a limitation of liability clause under the applicable Spanish law in the 
particular circumstances of the case. The dispute arose from a sponsorship agreement between 
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the agent of a professional motorbike racer and a corporation, which was concluded for two 
seasons. The penalty clause provided that, in the case of termination by either party after the 
first season, the terminating party would have to fulfill its financial obligations by paying the 
salary of the biker for the second season. The biker terminated the agreement at the end of the 
first season and entered into another agreement with a third party for the second season. The 
corporation initiated arbitration proceedings, seeking payment of contractual penalty as well 
as damages. The arbitrator held that the defendant prematurely terminated the agreement, 
which provided for two years of cooperation.
2997
 The defendant argued that the general 
principles of Spanish Civil Code relating to the interpretation of contract did not govern the 
interpretation of penalty clauses, pursuant to the Spanish Supreme Court, which developed 
specific principles in this regard. The arbitrator did not accept this argument and decided to 
interpret the agreement in accordance with the general principles of interpretation under the 
Spanish Civil Code, bearing in mind the holding of Spanish Supreme Court that to the extent 
there is a doubt as to the existence or scope of the penalty clauses in the agreement, such 
clause is to be interpreted restrictively.
2998
 The arbitrator considered that the mere insertion of 
a penalty clause corroborated the interpretation of the agreement as a two-season 
commitment, since the penalty clause acted as a deterrent to end their relationship 
unreservedly at the end of the first season, in accordance with “the main function of a penalty 
clause under Spanish law”, which is “to guarantee the fulfillment of the obligation secured by 
the penalty”.2999 Thus, the arbitrator held that there was no doubt as to the existence or scope 
of the penalty clause in the agreement and there was no ground for restrictive 
interpretation.
3000
  
 
The defendant requested the arbitrator to reduce the penalty. According to Article 1154 of the 
Spanish Civil Code, the court shall equitably modify the penalty when the principal obligation 
has been partly or irregularly performed. Thus, in the event of partial or irregular performance 
of the obligation the penalty clause intended to secure, the provision leaves no discretion to 
the court and mandates reduction. The arbitrator dismissed this request since, in her opinion, 
there was not partial or irregular performance but rather a total lack of performance, 
considering that the defendant terminated the agreement at the end of the first season, which 
was precisely the action the penalty clause sought to deter.
3001
 The claimant argued that the 
defendant was further liable to pay damages on the ground that the penalty cannot be 
construed as a limitation of liability. The defendant argued that under Spanish law a penalty 
clause bars a creditor from claiming damages in addition to the penalty clause, subject to the 
parties agreeing to the contrary.
3002
 The arbitrator considered that “under Spanish law, the 
predominant function of a penalty clause is to liquidate damages beforehand and to replace 
the payment of damages accordingly, it being specified that a contrary agreement is 
admissible if it is unequivocal.”3003 The arbitrator considered that there was no contrary 
agreement allowing the parties to claim damages beyond the amount of the penalty, and held 
that the penalty clause under the agreement was intended to deal fully with all the financial 
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consequences of the termination of the agreement for the second season.
3004
 Thus, although 
admitting that the “main function” of a penalty clause under the applicable Spanish law was to 
guarantee the fulfillment of the obligations, the arbitrator gave more weight to its function of 
limiting the amount of recoverable damages in the particular circumstances of the case, by 
considering that, under Spanish law, the “predominant function” of a penalty clause is to 
liquidate damages beforehand in the absence of contrary agreement.  
 
In the application of such clauses that limit the non-performing party’s liability for damages 
in the event of non-performance, the decision maker applying lex mercatoria will also take 
into account the limits of binding effect of the contract, which is freely entered into by the 
parties, under the relevant public policy considerations. In ICC Case No. 13278, the arbitrator 
also considered the factors that may invalidate the limitation function of the penalty clause. 
The claimant argued that the biker breached the agreement willfully and deliberately and, 
also, continued giving assurances until the very last minute that he would fulfill his 
contractual commitments for the second season, thereby putting the claimant in a position that 
prevented it from procuring the services of another top biker. According to the claimant, the 
claimant acted with dolo, a concept under Spanish law roughly equivalent to bad faith that 
comprises the elements of willfulness and consciousness of the breach, but does not require a 
level of malicious intent. The claimant further argued that the defendant demonstrated not 
only dolo but also actual bad faith, since he confirmed to the claimant his intent to honor his 
commitment for the second season, while he had no intention of doing so, and, then he waited 
too long to communicate his intention to terminate. The claimant submitted that the 
defendant’s dolo and bad faith pursuant to the Spanish Civil Code, entitled the claimant to all 
of its damages suffered as a result of the defendant’s breach.3005  
 
It was not disputed that the requirement of willfulness for dolo was met in the case, since it 
was the defendant’s deliberate decision to end the agreement. Therefore, the arbitrator 
examined whether the second requirement of consciousness was met. On the basis of the 
record, the arbitrator found that the parties discussed the future of the defendant and the 
defendant leaving the team, despite his two-year commitment, which the claimant repeatedly 
stressed during the meetings, but it remained unsettled whether the defendant would stay or 
not, and the defendant expressed its discontent with the team and never said he would stay 
unreservedly.
3006
 Regarding the claimant’s argument that the defendant’s decision to leave 
was untimely, the arbitrator noted that the decision not to renew for the second season 
belonged to both parties under the penalty clause of the agreement. The arbitrator considered 
that the circumstances led the defendant to believe that the claimant would undoubtedly 
replace him and the defendant could not have inferred that his leaving the team would cause 
any damage to the claimant.
3007
 Thus, the arbitrator did not consider that the defendant gave 
assurances that he would stay until the very last minute. Moreover, the arbitrator did not deem 
the defendant conscious that his leaving at the end of the first season would cause damage to 
the claimant under the circumstances. Accordingly, the arbitrator held that the defendant was 
fully aware that the financial consequences of his leaving at the end of the first season would 
be the payment of his salary for the second season as penalty, and it was not shown that the 
defendant was aware that his leaving would cause any damage beyond the penalty amount. As 
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a result, the tribunal decided that the second requirement of consciousness for dolo, which 
would give rise to damages in addition to the penalty, was not met and, thus, damages could 
not be claimed under Spanish law.
3008
  
 
The fraud or willful breach on the part of the party in breach will usually invalidate the 
clauses limiting or excluding liability, as this will be the most common solution that can be 
found under the relevant national legal systems in this regard. However, the effect of gross 
negligence of the party in breach on the validity of clauses that limit the recoverable amount 
of damages require a more refined approach to the facts of the particular case, the purpose and 
nature of the contract as well as the mandatory rules of the relevant national legal systems.  
 
In ICC Case No. 5835, the tribunal was of the opinion that it is an established rule in the order 
of international commerce that the gross negligence of the non-performing party invalidates 
the clauses that limit the amount of damages recoverable by the aggrieved party. The case 
concerned a construction contract between the claimant, the sub-contractor, and the 
defendant, the main contractor for the supply, installation and maintenance of electrical 
works. The contract was governed by Kuwaiti law and, to the extent necessary, by the 
principles generally applicable in international commerce. The defendant claimed damages 
arising from the delayed completion of work by the claimant. The claimant argued that the 
damages to be awarded to the defendant for the claimant’s delay had already been assessed by 
the parties in the contractual penalty clause. The claimant submitted that the defendant should 
not be awarded damages in excess of stipulated amount for the reason that the claimant did 
not commit “fraud or grave mistake”, by referring to Article 304 of the Kuwaiti Civil Law.3009  
 
The arbitral tribunal found that the delay of the claimant was the result of its gross mistake, 
i.e. gross negligence. The tribunal explained the gross mistake as a conduct, which “grossly 
violates a fundamental rule of the art or if he repeatedly or continuously fails to perform in a 
timely manner important parts of his obligations.” According to the tribunal, the intent to 
harm the contractual party does not constitute a prerequisite of a culpa grave claim for 
contractual negligence. The tribunal stated that “a party's conduct is grossly negligent if it 
shows an elementary failure of attention for the consequences of one's action and if it leads to 
a performance substantially different from what the other party reasonably expected.” In this 
regard, referring to Article 7.1.6 of the UNIDROIT Principles, the tribunal stated that ““Gross 
mistake” under Kuwaiti law is not different from this generally accepted definition” and “had 
a narrower definition of “gross mistake” been established under Kuwaiti law, the Tribunal 
would have had to follow “principles generally applicable in international commerce”. The 
tribunal noted that the claimant's failures were extremely numerous and related to many 
important activities and the delay reached the extremely disproportionate period of 44 months. 
The tribunal concluded that the claimant's failures in the timely performance of the 
Agreement amounted to “grave mistake” in the sense of Article 304 of the Kuwaiti Civil Law 
and rejected the claimant's defense relating to the penalty clause.
3010
  
 
Although the tribunal’s conclusion is justified in the case on the basis of the facts and the 
applicable legal rules, its consideration of Article 7.1.6 of the UNIDROIT Principles as the 
established rule in order of international commerce seems both questionable and, thus, 
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unnecessary. Essentially, the decisive finding for the invalidity of the penalty clause in 
limiting the amount of recoverable damages in the case was that the requirement of “gross 
mistake” under Kuwaiti law, which was closely connected to the contract, was met in the 
particular circumstances of the case. In the case, as noted by the tribunal, the relevant 
requirements of Kuwaiti law coincided with those of Article 7.1.6 of the UNIDROIT 
Principles.
3011
 However, as a product of abstract reasoning and specialized consolidations of 
its drafters, Article 7.1.6 of the UNIDROIT Principles was merely available to the tribunal in 
support of its finding and interpretation under Kuwaiti law, but might not have prevailed over 
the latter, as argued by the tribunal, if the latter had a narrower approach, given that the 
differences among the national legal systems in their approach to the effect of gross 
negligence of the party in breach on the validity of limitation of liability clauses preclude the 
identification of such substantive standards as “the principles generally applicable in 
international commerce”. 
 
In ICC Case No 6320, which was actually cited by the tribunal in ICC Case No 5835, in 
support of its definition of gross negligence, the arbitral tribunal considered the effect of gross 
negligence on the validity of limitation of liability clauses, and found that neither the 
applicable law nor comparative law provided a clear answer in that regard. The tribunal 
concluded that the gross negligence was not an invalidating factor for such clauses in the 
particular circumstances of the case by referring to the risk allocation between the parties 
under their contract and a subsequent settlement protocol. In the case, the claimant, a utility 
company, and the defendant, a power plant equipment manufacturer, entered into a contract 
concerning the design, supply and other services relating to a power plant to be built in the 
claimant’s country. The contract provided for the application of Brazilian law. The 
completion of the project was delayed by a number of defects and problems. Many of them 
were subject to settlement in a protocol, which led to the claimant’s acceptance of the plant. A 
dispute arose between the parties in connection with their disagreement as to the scope and 
purpose of the contract and as to their contractual obligations. In the arbitration proceedings, 
the claimant sought to recover damages, both historical and future damages, related to the 
major components of the power plant, which, according to the claimant, had not specifically 
been settled in the protocol. The defendant asserted that there were a number of limitations in 
both the protocol and the contract, which operated to exclude entirely its alleged liability, or at 
least reduce it significantly.
3012
  
 
The arbitral tribunal noted that the protocol was drafted in far-reaching and comprehensive 
terms that reflected the intention of the parties to exclude all claims except those expressly 
admitted by the protocol itself. According to the tribunal, the language of the protocol 
indicated a general waiver, leaving only to determine which claims were covered by its terms 
and were thus not excluded. The tribunal held that there were only two categories of claims 
that were not excluded: claims with respect to defects occurring after the date of protocol, and 
claims, which were specifically set forth in the protocol.
3013
 The protocol provided that any 
claim in the first category were to be handled strictly as per the terms of the contract’s 
warranties provision. The tribunal noted that none of the claimant’s claims fell under the 
                                                 
3011
 The Official Comments to Article 7.1.6 of the UNIDROIT Principles explicitly provides that a party may not 
rely on a clause which limits or excludes its liability for non-performance, where the non-performance is the 
result of grossly negligent conduct. Official Comment 5 to Article 7.1.6 of the UNIDROIT Principles 
3012
 ICC Final Award in Case No. 6320, of 1992, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, (1995), at 64-65 
3013
 Ibid., at 75 
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second category of the claims.
3014
  The claimant argued that such prospective waivers in the 
protocol would not be admissible or recognized under the applicable law. The tribunal stated 
that the applicable law does not recognize prospective waivers of dolo (fraud) claims, and 
found this in conformity with “a generally recognized rule that claims based on fraud cannot 
validly be waived.” However, the tribunal noted that there are different opinions on the status 
of the applicable law with respect to culpa grave claim, which was defined by the tribunal as 
“a claim for contractual negligence not commonly found among men or gross negligence or 
elementary failure of attention or reckless disregard for the consequences of one’s 
actions.”3015 The tribunal also considered that there is no clear conclusion from a comparative 
basis, considering that while United States and German law permit such waivers under certain 
conditions, French law does not. However, the tribunal stated that it did not have to decide 
whether a prohibition of such a waiver is compulsory under the applicable law, although the 
protocol must be interpreted as intending to apply also to culpa grave claims. The tribunal 
considered that, even if the applicable law prohibits such waivers, the claimant is estopped 
from invoking such a prohibition and, thereby, rescinding on “its part of the deal” under the 
protocol, having accepted the payments that the defendant made in fulfillment of its 
obligations under the protocol.
3016
  
 
Subsequently, the tribunal examined whether the defendant’s liability was limited by the 
contract, but only with regard to the claims that were not excluded by the protocol. The 
tribunal similarly considered that dolo claims were not excluded by the provisions of the 
contract because they are not waivable. As to the culpa grave claims, the tribunal stated that 
the principle of estoppel with regard to contractual waivers was even more applicable in view 
of the fact that the claimant accepted the comprehensive waiver in the various provisions 
together with the equally far-reaching “legal opinion provision” of the contract.3017 The legal 
opinion provision required the claimant to provide to defendant legal opinions on the legality 
and validity of the contract under the applicable law, without the defendant having to request 
them. No such legal opinion had been provided. In these circumstances, the tribunal 
considered that the defendant could rely on the legality and validity of all contractual 
provisions under the applicable law. The tribunal concluded that the claimant was estopped 
from invoking the invalidity of any contractual provision, since it did not fulfill its obligation 
to furnish a legal opinion to the defendant as was its obligation under the contract.
3018
 Thus, 
the tribunal held that, due to the findings concerning the limitations on the defendant’s 
liability from the protocol and the contract, all of the claimant’s possible claims were 
excluded, with the exception of dolo claims, and any warranty claims that would be within the 
warranty periods, as extended by the protocol.
3019
  
 
As to the dolo claims, the tribunal considered that burden of proving dolo was a heavy one: 
since fraud is a very serious accusation, it had to be satisfactorily proven.
3020
 However, the 
claimant did not satisfy its burden of proof, and the tribunal concluded that there was not 
                                                 
3014
 Ibid., at 76 
3015
 Ibid., at 87 
3016
 Ibid., at 77 
3017
 Ibid., at 80 
3018
 Ibid., at 81 
3019
 Ibid., at 82 
3020
 Ibid., at 85 
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fraud in the performance of the contract.
3021
 The claimant demanded compensation for losses 
it suffered in connection with the failure of the power plant’s electric generator. The tribunal 
found that the failure of the electric generator occurred within the warranty period. However, 
the tribunal could not determine beyond all doubt whether the failure was caused only by the 
defects asserted by the claimant or only by other disturbances. Given the impossibility to 
attach in retrospect a precise percentage to either of these causes, the tribunal held that, on the 
basis of the evidence, each cause should be given equal weight, and, thus, defendant was 
liable to claimant for half of the otherwise compensable losses that resulted from the failure of 
the electric generator, which consisted of costs for repairs in connection with that failure.
3022
 
Thus, while the limitation or exemption of liability clauses can be considered as mechanisms 
restricting the scope of judicial discretion in relation to the assessment of damages for non-
performance, the factual and contextual considerations of causality may enable the decision 
maker to exercise an abstract reasoning in relation to such matters that were not covered by 
those mechanisms, and ultimately determine the amount of recoverable damages. 
 
d. Particularities of State Party Disputes 
 
The basic precedent in relation to the application of the principle of full compensation in the 
context of state party contracts can be found in the case of Chorzow Factory from 1928. The 
issue in the case was Poland’s expropriation of a nitrate factory owned by German nationals, 
in contravention to the provisions of the Convention concerning Upper Silesia concluded at 
Geneva on May 15th, 1922 (the Geneva Convention) between Germany and Poland. The 
Permanent Court of International Justice stated that “The essential principle contained in the 
actual notion of an illegal act - a principle which seems to be established by international 
practice and in particular by the decisions of arbitral tribunals - is that reparation must, as far 
as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which 
would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed. Restitution in kind, 
or, if this is not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a restitution in 
kind would bear; the award, if need be, of damages for loss sustained which would not be 
covered by restitution in kind or payment in place of it-such are the principles which should 
serve to determine the amount of compensation due for an act contrary to international 
law.”3023 Many international tribunals have cited Chorzow Factory case as the paramount 
compensation principle to guide determinations of the appropriate measure of damages for the 
expropriation of investment.
3024
 However, the claims for compensation in cases involving 
expropriations or other breaches of contracts by the state party raise special problems for 
tribunals, since the state party’s actions often not only injures the private party’s business, but 
usually destroys it, and the tribunal must determine the value lost on the basis of projected 
future earnings that may be greatly affected by ever-changing and often unpredictable 
economic circumstances, such as interest rates and energy prices.
3025
  
 
                                                 
3021
 Ibid., at 86 
3022
 Ibid., at 93 
3023
 Factory at Chorzów (Claim for Indemnity) (Merits) (F.R.G. v. Pol.), 1928 Permanent Court of International 
Justice, Series A, No. 13 (September 13, 1928), at 47 
3024
 E.g., Metalclad Corp. v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award of Aug. 30, 2000, 
International Legal Materials, 40 (2001), at 52; Amco Asia Corp. v Indonesia, Award of Nov. 21, 1984, 
International Legal Materials, 24 (1985), at 1037; Iran-US Claims Tribunal, Amoco Int‘l Finance Corp. v. Iran, 
15 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R., at 189, et seq., paras. 189-232 
3025
 Gotanda, John Y., Damages in private international law, Receuil des Cours, 326 (2007), at 173 
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In state party disputes, the compensation reflecting the capital value of property taken or 
destroyed is generally assessed on the basis of the “fair market value” of the investment, 
which will be calculated according to reasonable criteria, i.e. an amount that a willing buyer 
would normally pay to a willing seller after taking into account the nature of the investment, 
the circumstances in which it would operate in the future and its particular characteristics, 
including the period in which it has been in existence, the proportion of tangible assets in the 
total investment and other relevant factors pertinent to the specific circumstances of each 
case.
3026
 Since 1945, some valuation techniques for the reasonable determination of the 
market value of an investment have been developed to factor in different elements of risk and 
probability.
3027
 The discounted cash flow (DCF) method has gained some favor, especially in 
the context of a “going concern”, which means “an enterprise consisting of income-producing 
assets which has been in operation for a sufficient period of time to generate the data required 
for the calculation of future income and which could have been expected with reasonable 
certainty, if the taking had not occurred, to continue producing legitimate income over the 
course of its economic life in the general circumstances following the taking by the State”.3028  
 
The DCF method determines the value of the business by projecting the net cash flow for a 
certain period of time into the future and then discounting it back to present value as of the 
date of the breach. It uses a discount rate that may include the components of currency 
fluctuations, inflation figures, commodity prices, interest rates and other commercial risks.
3029
 
As an income based method to value the asset lost, in theory, the DCF fully compensates the 
claimant by awarding an amount that reflects both the loss incurred and gain of which it was 
deprived. Under the DCF method, the claimants ascertain a projected amount representing 
their future profits, often taking into account the remaining period of the contract or license, in 
addition to the alleged market value of the assets. In Amco I Award, P.T. Wisma, a company 
under the control of a cooperative established under Indonesian law for the welfare of active 
and retired Indonesian Army personnel, entered into a lease and management profit-sharing 
agreement with an American investor, Amco, which was to complete the construction of a 
hotel and undertake its management afterwards for a limited period of time. The hotel 
construction was completed substantially as planned, but P.T. Wisma persuaded the 
Indonesian government to revoke its investment license to Amco. The tribunal after laying 
down the principle that damages are to compensate the whole prejudice, whose two classical 
components are the loss suffered (damnum emergens) and the expected profits which are lost 
(lucrum cessans), stated that “the only prejudice to be taken into account for awarding 
damages is the loss of the right to operate the [hotel], that is to say the loss of a going concern. 
Now, while there are several methods of valuation of going concerns, the most appropriate 
                                                 
3026
 The World Bank, Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, International Legal Materials, 
31 (1992), at 1382; The Guidelines condemned the taking of private foreign property in the absence of public 
interest and appropriate compensation, which should be based, inter alia, on the fair market value of the property. 
The Guidelines are non-binding as the expert group felt that the time was not ripe for a binding multilateral code 
on investment. However, in the 1990s, a liberalization of the regime for foreign investment was generally 
favored with a proliferation of bilateral and regional treaties on investment, and the developing countries had for 
various reasons given up the attempt to create a New International Economic Order. Sornarajah, M., The 
International Law on Foreign Investment, Cambridge University Press; 3
rd
 ed., 2010, at 237  
3027
 Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, 2001, Text 
adopted by the International Law Commission at its fifty-third session, in 2001, and submitted to the General 
Assembly as a part of the Commission’s report covering the work of that session (A/56/10), at 103 
3028
 The World Bank, Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, International Legal Materials, 
31 (1992), at 1383 
3029
 Gotanda, John Y., Damages in private international law, Receuil des Cours, 326 (2007), at 173 
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one in the present case is to establish the net present value of the business, based on a 
reasonable projection of the foreseeable net cash flow during the period to be considered, said 
net cash flow being then discounted in order to take into account the assessment of the 
damages at the date of the prejudice, while in the normal course of events, the cash flow 
would have been spread on the whole period of operation of the business…. Accordingly, the 
net discounted cash flow value and the net present value will be calculated from April 1, 1980 
to September 30, 1999 inclusive, this being the time limit of the profit sharing agreed upon by 
P.T. AMCO and P.T. Wisma.” 3030  
 
It is argued that the DCF method ascribes undue importance to lucrum cessans as a 
component of full compensation and, thus, it is resorted to by investors when they seek a 
substantial amount of compensation based on speculation, for which it would be difficult to 
find any legal rationale.
3031
 However, the problems relating to awarding lost profits in the 
context of state party disputes are not specific to the use of the DCF method. Even if the 
arbitral tribunals do not resort to the DCF method, the calculation of the amount of damages 
in state party contracts may still appear as arbitrary or rendered without reason, where the 
investment was a new venture and, the investor had never earned any profits. In MINE v. 
Republic of Guinea, the dispute concerned the agreement for ocean transportation of bauxite 
and the establishment, for thirty years, of a mixed-economy company, called SOTRAMAR 
for exercising Guinea’s freight rights. MINE argued that Guinea breached the agreement 
when it secretly negotiated and subsequently contracted with AFROBULK, a third party, to 
use the freight rights. The tribunal held that Guinea prevented SOTRAMAR from performing 
under the agreement, and breached the agreement when Guinea entered into agreement with 
AFROBULK. MINE put forward various theories under which it was entitled to damages 
measured by the profits it lost on the basis of “the expectancy of MINE’s share of the net 
profits that SOTRAMAR would have earned if Guinea had performed the convention by 
letting SOTRAMAR go into operation.”3032 However, the tribunal noted that SOTRAMAR 
never earned any profits, and considered that because it was a new venture, the projection of 
the expectancy of net profit was too speculative to use in assessing damages. Even so, the 
tribunal held that the lost profits need not be proven with complete certainty, nor should 
                                                 
3030
 ICSID Award Amco Asia Corp. et al. v. Republic of Indonesia, International Legal Materials, 24 (1985), at 
1037; The Republic of Indonesia applied for the annulment of the award, arguing that the tribunal, by finding 
that Amco's investment shortfall was not material and did not justify the revocation of the investment license, 
had manifestly exceeded its powers, had seriously departed from a fundamental rule of procedure and had failed 
to state the reasons on which it based the award. The ad hoc Committee found that the tribunal in calculating 
Amco's investment had manifestly exceeded its power in failing to apply fundamental provisions of Indonesian 
law and had failed to state reasons for its calculation. Thus, the ad hoc Committee annulled the part of the award 
relating to the illegality of the revocation order and granting Amco damages on this account. However, the 
tribunal’s finding as to the illegality of the action by army and police personnel and that Amco was entitled to 
damages therefore from Indonesia was not annulled. Ad hoc Committee Decision on the Application for 
Annulment of May 16, 1986, International Legal Materials, 25 (1986), at 1458-1463; The dispute was 
resubmitted to the ICSID. In the second award, which is examined in detail below, the second tribunal not only 
awarded damages for losses caused as a result of the illegal police and army intervention, but also held that the 
circumstances surrounding the decision revoking the license made it unlawful and that non-speculative profits 
under the management contract were recoverable. Final award of 5 June 1990 in case no. ARB/81/8 and 
Decision on Supplemental Decision and Rectification of 17 October 1990, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, 
(1992), at 73 et seq. 
3031
 Chatterjee, Charles, The Use of the Discounted Cash Flow Method in the Assessment of Compensation, 
Comments on the Recent World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, Journal of 
International Arbitration, 10 (1993), at 21 
3032
 ICSID Award January 6, 1988, Maritime International Nominees Establishment (MINE) v. The republic of 
Guinea, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, (1989), at 88 
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recovery be denied simply because the amount is difficult to ascertain.
3033
 The tribunal found 
that MINE's loss of profits could be measured adequately by the AFROBULK agreement, i.e. 
the amount per ton which AFROBULK received from Guinea for the right to carry bauxite 
during a two-year period rightfully belonged to SOTRAMAR. The tribunal stated that, “it 
seems fair to conclude that such an arrangement could have been extended, or negotiated with 
others, to a total period of 10 years.” According to the tribunal, even if the agreement was to 
last 30 years, the ten-year period was reasonable, considering that the agreement contained 
provisions for early termination and the bauxite receivers were bound to Guinean bauxite for 
only 20 years.
3034
 
 
The portion of the tribunal’s award relating to damages was annulled by the ad hoc 
Committee established pursuant to Article 52 of the ICSID Convention for failure to state the 
reasons on which it is based. The Committee noted that pursuant to the agreement between 
the parties, all MINE would be entitled to if Guinea had breached that agreement was 
damages for one year. According to the Committee, the tribunal either failed to consider this 
contractual clause, or it did consider it but thought that Guinea's arguments should be rejected, 
but that did not free the tribunal from its duty to give reasons for its rejection as an 
indispensable component of the statement of reasons on which its conclusion was based.
3035
 
Moreover, the Committee stated that MINE’s "worst case" scenario and the damages 
calculation by the tribunal had in common that they did not purport to estimate profits that 
SOTRAMAR would have made, but rather took as a base either the actual or hypothesized 
profits under the substitute AFROBULK arrangements. The Committee stated that “The 
theory underlying this approach, which was not articulated either by the parties or by the 
Tribunal, may have been that for Guinea to keep the fruits of the substitute arrangements, 
which according to the Tribunal's ruling on breach of contract it had concluded in violation of 
the Agreement, would have constituted unjust enrichment, and that MINE should therefore be 
awarded the same share of those profits as it was entitled to receive if they had been 
SOTRAMAR profits.”3036 However, the Committee noted that the tribunal assumed, without 
explanation and contrary to what really happened, that arrangements yielding the royalty rate 
of the AFROBULK agreement could have been concluded for a period of ten years. In the 
Committee’s view, the tribunal contradicted itself by adopting "damages theory" which 
disregarded the real situation and relied on hypotheses as a basis for the calculation of 
damages, despite having concluded that theories of MINE with regard to the calculation of 
damages were unusable because of their speculative character.
3037
  
 
In this context, the tribunals should generally adopt a cautious and reasoned approach to the 
calculation of lost profits in state party disputes. In the case of the DCF method, this approach 
is clearly necessitated by the absence of clear rules and the existence of many assumptions, 
estimates and other subjective elements for determining the two factors used in the DCF 
method: (i) projecting the company’s earnings based on a wide variety of factors, including 
the company’s past earnings history, its projected outlook, and the industry outlook, and (ii) 
                                                 
3033
 Ibid., at 89 
3034
 Ibid., at 90 
3035
 Ad Hoc Committee, Maritime International Nominees Establishment v. Republic of Guinea, Decision 
partially annulling the award, December 22, 1989, ICSID Review—Foreign Investment Law Journal , 5 (1990), 
at 124 
3036
 Ibid., at 125 
3037
 Ibid. 
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setting the discount rate, that takes into account multiple variables, including the expected rate 
of inflation, the real rate of return, and the riskiness of the income stream.
3038
 Thus, it is 
argued that, although income-based methods have been accepted in principle, there has been a 
decided preference for asset-based methods.
3039
 An asset-based valuation method for 
investments focuses on the determination of net book value, i.e. the difference between the 
total assets of the business and total liabilities as shown on its books.
3040
 Its advantages are 
that the figures can be determined by reference to market costs, they are normally drawn from 
a contemporaneous record, and they are based on data generated for some other purpose than 
supporting the claim for damages.
3041
 However, the book value method has also been 
criticized as not accurately reflecting the value lost, since it is based on historical figures and 
not actual costs, and it fails to take into account the intangible assets and future profitability of 
the business as the purpose for which the figures were produced does not consider the 
compensation context and any rules specific to it.
3042
  
 
While the DCF method provides for the flexibility for determining the full extent of damages 
incurred by the investor, it should not be used in determining the amount of compensation, 
where the claim of lost profits is only based on the speculation that an investment would have 
earned some profits for the remaining period of the relevant contract or license had the assets 
not been taken. As required by the established rule that damages should be awarded only for 
the loss the existence of which is proven by the aggrieved party with a reasonable degree of 
certainty, the decision makers should be particularly reluctant to provide compensation for 
claims with inherently speculative elements in the context of state party contracts. The 
claimants are required to demonstrate that an anticipated income stream has attained sufficient 
attributes to be considered a legally protected interest of sufficient certainty to be 
compensable as lost profits.
3043
 Thus, the decision maker should refuse to award damages 
consisting of lost profits where the business was not a going concern due to the uncertainty as 
to the existence of loss of profits.  
 
In Asian Agricultural Products v. Sri Lanka, which involved a claim for the destruction of the 
claimant's shrimp farm by security forces, in violation of undertakings to provide “full 
protection and security” contained in a UK/Sri Lanka investment treaty, the ICSID tribunal 
granted compensation based on an evaluation of tangible assets, but it rejected all claims for 
intangible asset and loss of future profit of the newly established business. The tribunal 
considered that “goodwill” and “profitability” had to be taken into account only to the extent 
                                                 
3038
 Wälde, T., Introductory Note to SVEA Court of Appeals: Czech Republic v. CME Czech Republic B.V., 
International Legal Materials, 42 (July 2003), at 917-918.  
3039
 Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, 2001, Text 
adopted by the International Law Commission at its fifty-third session, in 2001, and submitted to the General 
Assembly as a part of the Commission’s report covering the work of that session (A/56/10), at 104 
3040
 The World Bank, Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, International Legal Materials, 
31 (1992), at 1383 
3041
 Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, 2001, Text 
adopted by the International Law Commission at its fifty-third session, in 2001, and submitted to the General 
Assembly as a part of the Commission’s report covering the work of that session (A/56/10), at 103  
3042
 Friedland, P., & E. Wong, Measuring Damages for the Deprivation of Income-Producing Assets: ICSID 
Case Studies, ICSID Review—Foreign Investment Law Journal, 6 (1991), at 405-406 
3043
 Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, 2001, Text 
adopted by the International Law Commission at its fifty-third session, in 2001, and submitted to the General 
Assembly as a part of the Commission’s report covering the work of that session (A/56/10), at 104. 
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that, if proven, they could add a certain premium over the value of the tangible assets that the 
prospective purchaser would be prepared to pay as the reasonable market value of the 
business. The tribunal held that the assumptions upon which the claimant's projections were 
based in the case were insufficient in evidencing that the business was effectively, by the day 
preceding the events which led to the destruction of the value of the claimant’s investment, a 
“going concern” that acquired a valuable “goodwill” and enjoying a proven “future 
profitability”, particularly in the light of the fact that there was no previous record in 
conducting business for even one year of production.
3044
   
 
In Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, the tribunal determined that Metaclad’s 
investment was completely lost as a result of Mexico’s actions, which effectively and 
unlawfully prevented Metalclad from operating a hazardous waste landfill that it 
constructed.
3045
 The tribunal stated that “Normally, the fair market value of a going concern 
which has a history of profitable operation may be based on an estimate of future profits 
subject to a discounted cash flow analysis.”3046 However, the tribunal added that, “where the 
enterprise has not operated for a sufficiently long time to establish a performance record or 
where it has failed to make a profit, future profits cannot be used to determine going concern 
or fair market value.”3047 The tribunal agreed with Mexico that a discounted cash flow 
analysis was inappropriate in the case because the landfill was never operative and any award 
based on future profits would be wholly speculative. The tribunal decided that in this case fair 
market value was best arrived “by reference to Metalclad’s actual investment in the project.” 
In other words, the value of the expropriated property was to be determined by the tribunal by 
estimating the claimant’s investment in that property. In the tribunal’s view, this approach 
was consistent with the principles set forth in the Chorzow case, “namely that where the state 
has acted contrary to its obligations, any award to the claimant should, as far as is possible, 
wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would in all 
probability have existed if that act had not been committed (the status quo ante).”3048 
 
In the ICSID Case of Aucoven v. Venezuela, where Aucoven was forced to abandon a project 
for the construction and general maintenance of highway systems, the tribunal was disinclined 
to award lost profits because the claimant had not shown future lost profits with a sufficient 
degree of certainty under the relevant standards of both Venezuelan and international law. 
The tribunal stated that “In the present case, the fact remains that Aucoven had no record of 
profits and that it never made the investments in the project nor built the Bridge required by 
the Concession Agreement. In these circumstances, the Tribunal considers that Aucoven's 
claim for future profits does not rest on sufficiently certain economic projections and thus 
appears speculative. Hence, it does not meet the standards for an award of lost profits under 
Venezuelan law, nor would it meet these standards under international law, if the latter were 
applicable.”3049 The tribunal further considered that “a claim cannot be valued without 
                                                 
3044
 Asian Agricultural Products Limited v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/87/3), Award and Dissenting Opinion of June 27, 1990, ICSID Review—Foreign Investment Law Journal, 
6 (1991), at 564-570 
3045
 Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States, (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1), International Legal 
Materials, 40 (2001), at 50 para. 106 
3046
 Ibid., at 52 para. 119 
3047
 Ibid., at 52 para. 120 
3048
 Ibid., at 52 para. 122 
3049
 Autopista Concesionada de Venezuela, C.A. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/00/5), Award of the Tribunal (September 23, 2003), at para. 362 
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consideration of its environment, i.e., without consideration of social, economic, political or 
other factors which may affect it.” Under the circumstances, the tribunal noted that the 
evidence showed that the project was unlikely to generate profits.
3050
 Thus, the tribunal held 
that “Aucoven has not established a loss of future profits pursuant to the standards governing 
under Venezuelan law, being specified that the same conclusion would stand had international 
law been applicable.”3051 
 
In the state party disputes, the compensation usually requires cash flow projections, which 
have an element of speculation associated with it. Thus, lost profits may be awarded in the 
cases of the temporary loss of use and enjoyment of the income-producing asset, or the taking 
of income-producing property. In the latter category of cases, lost profits can be awarded on 
the basis of projections for the period up to the time when the legal recognition of entitlement 
ends, which depends on the circumstances of a particular case, such as up to the time a valid 
basis for contractual termination exists. However, the element of speculation increases with 
the number of years to which a projection relates. Thus, it becomes disputable whether a 
tribunal can use it at all for the valuation of compensation. The Iran US Claims Tribunal 
stated, in Amoco v. Iran, that “One of the best settled rules of the law of international 
responsibility of States is that no reparation for speculative or uncertain damage can be 
awarded. This holds true for the existence of the damage and of its effect as well. Such a 
rule… does not permit the use of a method which yields uncertain figures for the valuation of 
damages, even if the existence of damages is certain.”3052 As the period of time that forms the 
basis of the projections into the future increases, they may not be used by the decision maker 
as the measure of compensation. Particularly, in dealing with the compensation claims for the 
value of such investments that have an insufficient history of profits for projecting future 
profitability, the subsequent events, which further render the future profitability of business 
highly speculative, may support the decision to deny a claim for lost profits on the ground of 
uncertainty, even if the prospect of profits can be considered as reasonably certain when the 
investor engaged in the project.   
 
In ICC Case No 3493, the dispute arose from the cancellation by government decrees of a 
joint venture tourism project between Southern Pacific Properties (SPP), the Ministry of 
Tourism of Egypt and the Egyptian General Organization of Tourism and Hotels (EGOTH). 
The tribunal noted that the government initially defended the project in as much as politically 
feasible and finally gave up and issued the decrees which cancelled the project. Although this 
background did not exclude a contractual breach by the government, the tribunal was 
convinced that the breach was not fraudulent or grossly negligent in the sense that it would 
not be held liable for damages greater than those which could normally have foreseen at the 
time of entering into contract, as required by Article 221 of the Egyptian Civil Code. The 
claimant quantified damages on the basis of the discounted cash flow method as of date of 
cancellation of the project, which produced a figure substantially higher than the amount the 
claimant actually invested. The tribunal rejected the discounted cash flow calculation in the 
particular case for a variety of reasons: (i) that the risk factor was much higher than had been 
assumed in the projections, (ii) that the political and economic climate had a number of new 
elements unfavorable to the venture’s prospects by the date of cancellation, (iii) that there was 
a considerable risk in change in the tax status of the venture after the initial five year period, 
                                                 
3050
 Ibid., at para. 364 
3051
 Ibid., at para. 365 
3052
 Amoco International Finance Corporation v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Partial Award of 14 July 1987, 
International Legal Materials, 27 (1988), at para. 238-239 
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(iv) that the great majority of the work had still to be done by the date of cancellation, (v) that 
the calculation put forward by the claimant produced a disparity between the amount of the 
investment made by the claimant and its supposed value at the material date, and (vi) that 
there was a possibility, although a remote one, that there would be some recovery from the 
proceedings involving the joint venture company. Thus, the tribunal considered it more 
appropriate to take the amount of the claimant’s actual investment and add to that an 
incremental factor representing the increase in the value of the investment over its actual 
cost.
3053
  
 
In the case Levitt v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the Iran US Claims Tribunal recognized that, in 
principle, lost profits may be awarded in the case of a breach of contract, but denied the claim 
for such profits due to the failure of the claimant to establish, to the Tribunal's satisfaction, 
that such profits would have accrued if the contract had proceeded to completion. The dispute 
arose from a contract between a company, formed by Mr. William J. Levitt, and the Housing 
Organization of Iran for the construction of housing, together with infrastructure and civic 
services, on land which the Housing Organization had acquired for the purpose. Due to the 
Iranian Revolution, the company wound up its operations in Iran after the end of 1979, and 
Levitt claimed damages comprising expenses allegedly incurred but not reimbursed, and 
anticipated lost profits due to the alleged breaches by the Organization of its various 
contractual obligations. The Tribunal held that the Organization was in breach, which 
rendered further performance by the company impossible, and thus, the organization was 
liable in damages. While awarding damages for unreimbursed expenses, the Tribunal stated 
that “the basis for the [lost profits] claim . . . is highly speculative. . . . By the time the 
Contract came to an end only initial stages of clearing and grading had been completed, and 
no construction work had begun on buildings. The project therefore reached only an early 
stage. Initially, the prospects looked favourable. The level of interest shown by prospective 
purchasers before the Revolution was encouraging, and government approval had been given 
for the grant of the mortgage financing. Indeed, [the Organization] was obliged by the terms 
of the Contract to use its best endeavours to obtain such financing. The demand for such 
housing might well have survived the events of the Revolution. However, the evidence 
indicates that [the company] would have experienced considerable difficulties in proceeding 
with the major phases of the construction under the prevalent conditions of disruption and 
unrest, particularly in view of the fact that it was the first such project Mr. Levitt had 
undertaken in Iran. It is most unlikely that the project could have been completed according to 
the time schedule originally envisaged, or that the cost would not have been greatly increased 
by difficulties in providing supervision by the Levitt organisation and in obtaining imported 
materials.” In this context, the Tribunal found that the claimant did not establish with a 
sufficient degree of certainty that the project would have resulted in profit.
3054
 
 
It is generally believed that the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the taking of assets has a 
bearing upon the determination of the quantum of compensation payable in a given case. 
Where it has been unequivocally established that the taking of assets was in the public interest 
of the host country and made in an non-discriminatory manner, there exists an obligation to 
                                                 
3053
 ICC Award in Case No. 3493, 1983, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, (1984), at 121-123; However, it 
should be noted that this award was annulled by Court of Appeal in Paris (Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, 10 
(1985), at 113-122) whose decision was upheld by the Cour de Cassation (Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, 13 
(1988), at 152-155) on the ground that Egypt was not a party to the agreement on which the claimant relied to 
found ICC jurisdiction. SPP filed a request for ICSID Arbitration. 
3054
 Levitt v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 14 Iran-US C.T.R, (1987), at 209-210 
 813 
 
pay compensation according to the market value of the assets on the date of the taking 
property and in accordance with such formulas “prompt, adequate and effective”, or “just”, 
“appropriate”, or “equitable” compensation under customary international law.3055 The 
principle on which compensation should be computed in the event of an unlawful taking of 
private foreign assets is found in the Chorzow Factory case. The Court in Chorzow Factory 
case made a distinction between legal and illegal expropriations. It is argued that this 
distinction was based on the Court’s opinion that the expropriation should be illegal in order 
to be able to award lost profits, i.e. lucrum cessans, in addition to the book value of the 
expropriated business, i.e. damnum emergens.
3056
  
 
However, in most cases, the value of an enterprise is not only the enterprise itself, but also the 
stream of profits it can be expected to produce over its lifetime, and this value determines the 
price that the hypothetical willing buyer would pay the hypothetical willing seller. In this 
                                                 
3055
 Reisman, W. Michael, & R.D. Sloane, Indirect Expropriation and its Valuation in the BIT Generation, 
British Yearbook of International Law, 74 (2003), at 134; Weisburg, Henry, & Christopher Ryan, Means to be 
Made Whole: Damages in the Context of International Investment Arbitration, in Yves Derains & Richard H. 
Kreindler, (eds.), Evaluation of Damages in International Arbitration, ICC Publication No. 668, 2006, at 167; 
Shahin Shaine Ebrahimi v. Iran, Iran-US Cl. Trib. Award 560-44/46/47-3 of 12 October 1994, at para. 88: “The 
Tribunal believes that, while international law undoubtedly sets forth an obligation to provide compensation for 
property taken, international law theory and practice do not support the conclusion that the "prompt, adequate 
and effective" standard represents the prevailing standard of compensation. … Rather, customary international 
law favors an "appropriate" compensation standard. … The gradual emergence of this rule aims at ensuring that 
the amount of compensation is determined in a flexible manner, that is, taking into account the specific 
circumstances of each case. The prevalence of the "appropriate" compensation standard does not imply, 
however, that the compensation quantum should be always "less than full" or always "partial."”; Compañia del 
Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica (ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1), February 17, 2000, 
ICSID Review—Foreign Investment Law Journal, 15 (2000), at 192, para. 69: “The vocabulary describing the 
amount of compensation properly payable in respect of a lawful taking has varied considerably from time to 
time. It comprises such words as “full”, “adequate”, “appropriate”, “fair” and “reasonable”. Sometimes, the 
descriptive adjective is elaborated by the additional mention of “market value”.; Libyan American Oil Co. 
(LIAMCO) v. Libyan Arab Republic, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, (1981), at 110, 113: ‘The classical 
doctrine required the payment of “prompt, adequate and effective” compensation for the nationalized property of 
an alien… This classical doctrine was not always accepted neither in the inter-war period nor after World War II. 
… It retains only the value of a technical rule for the assessment of compensation, and a useful guide in reaching 
settlement agreement, as was well and justly asserted… It stands only as a maximum rarely attained in 
practice…. In such confused state of international law, as is evident from the foregoing precedents and 
authoritative opinions and declarations, it appears clearly that there is no conclusive evidence of the existence of 
community or uniformity in principles between the domestic law of Libya and international law concerning the 
determination of compensation for nationalization in lieu of specific performance, and in particular concerning 
the problem whether or not all or part of the loss of profits (lucrurn cessans) should be included in that 
compensation in addition to the damage incurred (damnum ernergens)… In compliance with Clause 28, para. 7, 
of LIAMCO’s Concession Agreements, and in such absence of principles common to domestic law of Libya and 
international law applicable to the matters in dispute, it is necessary to refer therefore to the general principles of 
law as may have been applied by international tribunals. ‘One of these general principles of law is Equity, which 
is commonly and unanimously recognized as a supplementary source of law in Libyan law (Article I of the Civil 
Code), Islamic law (Istihsan) and international law (Article 39, para. 2, of the Statute of the International Court 
of Justice). Taking Equity into consideration, it would be reasonable and just to adopt the formula of “equitable 
compensation” as a measure for the estimation of damages in the present dispute. This formulation is certainly in 
complete harmony with the general trend of international theory and practice on the concepts of sovereignty, 
destination of national wealth and natural resources, nationalistic motivations in the attitude and behavior of 
“Third World” nations, the lawfulness and frequency of nationalization, and the recent declarations affirmed in 
successive United Nations Resolutions by the majority members of the General Assembly.” 
3056
 Brownlie, Ian, Principles of public international law, Oxford University Press, 7
th
 ed., 2008, at 539; Hunter, 
Martin & Anthony Sinclair, Aminoil Revisited: Reflections on a Story of Changing Circumstances, in Todd 
Weiler (ed.), International Law and Arbitration: Leading Cases from the ICSID, NAFTA, Bilateral Treaties and 
Customary International Law, Cameron May, 2005, at 366  
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regard, the argument that, in an unlawful expropriation, the victim must be awarded the value 
of the expropriated property and lost profits implies a form of double-counting. Thus, it is 
alternatively argued that the difference between legal and illegal expropriation might be 
reflected in the so-called “moral damages”3057 or in the component of lucrum cessans to 
penalize egregious expropriations and to deter them in the future
3058
. In essence, the principle 
established by the Court in the Chorzow case provides an important guideline about the effect 
of the events subsequent to the expropriation on the amount of damages recoverable by the 
investors.  
 
The Court in Chorzow Factory case established the standard to value damages for illegal 
expropriations as of the date of the award, as an alternative to the calculation of such damages 
as of the date of expropriation, thereby allowing damages to be computed as the greater of the 
fair market value at the date of the expropriation and at the date of the award. The Court 
stated that “the compensation due to the German Government is not necessarily limited to the 
value of the undertaking at the moment of dispossession, plus interest to the day of payment. 
This limitation would only be admissible if the Polish Government had had the right to 
expropriate, and if its wrongful act consisted merely in not having paid … the just price of 
what was expropriated; in the present case, such a limitation might result in placing Germany 
and the interests protected by the Geneva Convention, on behalf of which interests the 
German Government is acting, in a situation more unfavourable than that in which Germany 
and these interests would have been if Poland had respected the said Convention. Such a 
consequence would not only be unjust, but also and above all incompatible with the aim of 
Article 6 and following articles of the Convention–that is to say, the prohibition, in principle, 
of the liquidation of the property, rights and interests of German nationals and of companies 
controlled by German nationals in Upper Silesia–since it would be tantamount to rendering 
lawful liquidation and unlawful dispossession indistinguishable in so far as their financial 
results are concerned.”3059  
 
Accordingly, the Court in Chorzow Factory case asked the experts to compute the fair market 
value of the factory at the date of expropriation (Question 1A), to value the financial results 
(profits or losses) for the interim period between the date of expropriation and the date of 
indemnification if the expropriation had not occurred (Question 1B), and to compute the fair 
market value of the factory as of the date of the award if it had remained in the hands of the 
expropriated owners, and had either remained substantially as it was at the date of 
expropriation or had been developed proportionately on lines similar to those applied in the 
                                                 
3057
 Park, William W., “Framing the Case on Quantum” in Damages in International Arbitration, World 
Arbitration & Mediation Review, 2 (2008), at 61 citing Desert Line Projects LLC v. Yemen, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/17 (Award) (Feb. 6, 2008), at paras. 289-290:In the case, armed individuals, threatening the investor’s 
personnel, were used to expel the investor, which was building asphalt roads in Yemen. The ICSID tribunal 
found that the violation of the BIT by the respondent, in particular the physical duress exerted on the executives 
of the claimant, was malicious and is therefore constitutive of a fault-based liability. Therefore, the tribunal 
stated that the respondent shall be liable to reparation for the injury suffered by the claimant, whether it be 
bodily, moral or material in nature. According to the tribunal, the claimant’s prejudice was substantial since it 
affected the physical health of the claimant's executives and the claimant’s credit and reputation.  The tribunal 
considered that, based on the information it had and the general principles, an amount of USD 1,000,000 should 
be granted for moral damages, including loss of reputation. The tribunal noted that this amount is more than 
symbolic yet modest in proportion to the vastness of the project.  
3058
 Reisman, W. Michael, & R.D. Sloane, Indirect Expropriation and its Valuation in the BIT Generation, 
British Yearbook of International Law, 74 (2003), at 137 
3059
 Factory at Chorzów (Claim for Indemnity) (Merits) (F.R.G. v. Pol.), 1928 Permanent Court of International 
Justice, Series A, No. 13 (September 13, 1928), at 47 
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case of other undertakings of the same kind, controlled by the expropriated owners (Question 
2).
3060
 
 
The Court explained that the purpose of Question 1 was “to determine the monetary value, 
both of the object which should have been restored in kind and of the additional damage, on 
the basis of the estimated value of the undertaking including stocks at the moment of taking 
possession by the Polish Government, together with any probable profit that would have 
accrued to the undertaking between the date of taking possession and that of the expert 
opinion”. The Court stated that Question 2 was to ascertain the value at the date of the award, 
leaving aside the situation presumed to exist at the date of expropriation, and the Court 
considered that the hypothetical nature of this question was considerably diminished by the 
possibility of comparison with other undertakings of the same nature directed by the 
expropriated owners.
3061
 As regards the lucrum cessans, in relation to Question 2, the Court 
noted that the cost of upkeep of the corporeal objects forming part of the undertaking and 
even the cost of improvement and normal development of the installation and of the industrial 
property incorporated therein, are bound to absorb in a large measure the profits, real or 
supposed, of the undertaking and, thus, up to a certain point, any profit may be left out of 
account, since it will be included in the real or supposed value of the undertaking at the date 
of award. However, the Court stated that if the reply given by the experts to Question 1B 
should show that there remained a margin of profit after making necessary deductions for the 
years during which the factory was working at a loss, and for the cost of upkeep and normal 
improvement during the following years, the amount of such profit should be added to the 
compensation to be awarded. According to the Court, if the normal development presupposed 
by Question 2 represented an enlargement of the undertaking and an investment of fresh 
capital, the amount of such sums must be deducted from the value sought for.
3062
  
 
Thus, the Court implied that, in cases of illegal expropriation, damages were to be computed 
either as the fair market value at the date of the expropriation, or as the fair market value at 
the date of the award, and the fair market value could include the lost profits. In both cases, 
the lost profits relating to the interim period between the date of expropriation and the date of 
award could be based on the historical data that was available to the experts, who would 
utilize such data on the basis of the assumption that the factory remained with the 
expropriated owners. The concept of lucrum cessans as developed in the Chorzow factory 
case related to the interim period between the date of expropriation and the date of the award, 
where the relevant information is available to and may be used by the ex post decision maker. 
 
Thus, the concept of lucrum cessans in the Chorzow factory case is distinct from the concept 
of fair market value, which already includes all future lost profits if there is sufficient history 
of profits, from the date of expropriation to the end of the project. This fair market value can 
be calculated according to the DCF method, and this value, despite the defects of the DCF 
method mentioned above, has still a good chance to reflect an amount that a willing buyer 
would normally pay to a willing seller after taking into account the nature of the investment, 
by taking into account some important variables, including the period in which it has been in 
existence, and other relevant factors pertinent to the particular circumstances of the case. 
Under the Chorzow Factory standards, the compensation in cases of illegal expropriation will 
                                                 
3060
 Ibid., at 51-52 
3061
 Ibid., at 52 
3062
 Ibid., at 53 
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be the fair market value of the undertaking, either at the date of the expropriation or at the 
date of award. In both cases, the compensation includes the profits, which would have been 
earned after the relevant date, had the expropriation not occurred, and the portion of the 
profits relating to the period between the date of expropriation and the date of the award may 
be determined on the basis of the actual data. The profits determined on the basis of the actual 
data will considered as absorbed to a great extent by the investment, when the valuation is 
made as of the date of award, but if there remains a margin of profit, it will be added to the 
fair market value of the investment as of the date of award. In this context, the amount of 
compensation under these alternatives of valuation may yield the identical result and confirm 
each other, when they are both calculated according to the same method. If, on the contrary, 
these amounts had been different, the Court in the Chorzow Factory case expressly and fully 
reserved its right to review the expert's valuations and to determine the sum to be awarded in 
conformity with the legal principles set out in the judgment by making the necessary 
adjustments.
3063
 The choice between the two alternatives was never made because the parties 
reached an out of court settlement. Conceivably, had the alternative of valuation as of the date 
of award yielded a value, which was lower than the value at the time of the expropriation, the 
higher value would have prevailed.
3064
 
 
The approach of Chorzow factory case highlights the importance of hindsight information in 
evaluating the amount of damages and the consideration of ex post risks, up to the time of the 
award, associated with the expropriated investment, in cases of unlawful expropriations.
3065
 If 
the investment has increased in value in the absence of state measures in the interim period 
between the date of the expropriation and the date of the award, the state ought not to benefit 
from its illegal actions that lead to taking advantage of a rising market without a genuine 
public interest, and the amount of compensation should be calculated by the alternative 
standard of valuation at the date of the award.
3066
 If the investment has lost value in the same 
period in the absence of state measures, the state ought not to benefit by paying a lower 
compensation and, thus, the compensation should be valued as of the date of 
                                                 
3063
 Ibid., at 53-54 
3064
 For the same interpretation see Iran-US Claims Tribunal, Amoco Int‘l Finance Corp. v. Iran, 15 IRAN-U.S. 
C.T.R., at 250, para. 204 (stating in a footnote that “This does not seem to have been questioned by any of the 
judges, although Judge Rabel, in "observations" appended to the judgment, expressed his regrets that this was 
not expressly said by the Court. The other judges dissenting on this point considered that the compensation 
should be limited to the value of the undertaking at the date of the taking without any right to an enhanced 
value.”) 
3065
 Abdala, Manuel A., & Pablo T. Spiller, Chorzów’s Standard Rejuvenated Assessing Damages in Investment 
Treaty Arbitrations Chorzów’s Standard Rejuvenated, Journal of International Arbitration, 25-1 (2008), at 108 
3066
 In Siemens v Argentina, the ICSID tribunal stated that “Under customary international law, Siemens is 
entitled not just to the value of its enterprise as of May 18, 2001, the date of expropriation, but also to any greater 
value that enterprise has gained up to the date of this Award, plus any consequential damages.” The tribunal also 
noted that “In the Factory at Chorzów case, the PCIJ asked the experts to calculate the value of the undertaking 
as of the date of the taking and as of the later date of its prospective judgment, and such value to include the 
lands, buildings, equipment, stocks and process, supply and delivery contracts, goodwill and future prospects. It 
is only logical that, if all the consequences of the illegal act need to be wiped out, the value of the investment at 
the time of this Award be compensated in full. Otherwise compensation would not cover all the consequences of 
the illegal act.” The tribunal concluded that “the value of the investment to be compensated is the value it has 
now, as of the date of this Award, unless such value is lower than at the date of expropriation, in which event the 
earlier value would be awarded.” Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8), Award 
rendered on February 6, 2007, paras. 352, 353, 360 
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expropriation.
3067
 In both cases, the Chorzow standards of valuation function to preclude the 
possibility of the expropriating state to benefit from its own illegal act, given that the investor 
was forced to transfer its investment to the state, and prevented from exercising the option of 
selling it at arm’s length when the business conditions were better.  
 
In the ICSID Case of ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC & ADMC Management Limited v 
Republic of Hungary, where the issue was damages payable in the case of an unlawful 
expropriation, the tribunal stated that the customary international law standard for the 
assessment of damages resulting from an unlawful act is set out in the Chorzow Factory case, 
and this standard has subsequently been affirmed and applied in a number of international 
arbitrations relating to the expropriation of foreign owned property.
3068
 The tribunal stated 
that “The present case is almost unique among decided cases concerning the expropriation by 
States of foreign owned property, since the value of the investment after the date of 
expropriation (1 January 2002) has risen very considerably while other arbitrations that apply 
the Chorzów Factory standard all invariably involve scenarios where there has been a decline 
in the value of the investment after regulatory interference. It is for this reason that application 
of the restitution standard by various arbitration tribunals has led to use of the date of the 
expropriation as the date for the valuation of damages.”3069 According to the tribunal, in the 
case, the application of the Chorzow Factory standard required that the date of valuation 
should be the date of the award and not the date of expropriation, since this is what is 
necessary to put the claimants in the same position as if the expropriation had not been 
committed. The tribunal found support for this approach in the statement of the Court in the 
                                                 
3067
 In Amaco v. Iran, Judge Brower in his concurring opinion, suggested, when the value of the undertaking as it 
appears at the time of judgment is awarded is less than the value assessed as of the date of taking, it would have 
the anomalous result of rewarding the expropriating state for its unlawful conduct. In this regard, Judge Brower 
stated that, “Absent any consequential damages, which the Court in Chorzow Factory would award, or 
consideration of punitive damages, which the Award here flatly rejects …, the host State would pocket the 
difference between the lower value the undertaking was shown by post-taking experience to have had and the 
higher value it objectively enjoyed at the moment of taking. As no system of law sensibly can be understood as 
intended to reward unlawful conduct, Chorzow Factory must be read as I have suggested, a reading supported by 
other portions of the judgment (see, e.g., the statement at page 50 that "the value of the undertaking at the 
moment of dispossession does not necessarily indicate the criteria for the fixing of compensation") and the 
Observations of Judge M. Rabel: “[T]he principles resulting from the unlawful nature of the expropriation . . . 
are applicable in practice whenever the damage caused appears greater than the compensation which would be 
due if expropriation had been lawful . . . . It is in fact obvious that the expropriator's responsibility must be 
increased by the fact that his action is unlawful . . . . [I]t is . . . also obvious that the unlawful character of his 
action can never place the expropriator in a more favourable position . . . by reducing the indemnity due . . . . 
This point of view, with which the Court in its judgment has not thought fit expressly to deal, appears to me to 
be in accordance with the general principles of law.” 28 P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 17 at 66. This understanding of the 
judgment is confirmed by the Dissenting Opinions of Judges Lord Finaly, id. at 73, and M. Ehrlich, id. at 90. The 
Award here correctly accepts this reading of Chorzow Factory.” Concurring Opinion, Iran-United States Claims 
Tribunal: Partial Award in Amoco International Finance Corporation v. Islamic Republic of Iran, International 
Legal Materials, 27 (1988), at 1399-1400 fn 22 
3068
 ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC & ADMC Management Limited v. Republic of Hungary (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/16) October 2, 2006, at para. 484-486; citing S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, UNICTRAL (NAFTA) 
Award (Merits), 13 November 2000, at para.311, Metalclad Corporation v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, 30 August 2000, at para. 122, CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Award, Case No. ARB/01/8, 12 May 2005, at para.400, Petrobart Limited v. The Kyrgyz 
Republic, Arbitration No. 126/2003, Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (Energy 
Charter Treaty), 29 March 2005, at pages 77 and 78, MTD Equity Sdn Bhd and MTD Chile SA v. Chile, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/01/7, 25 May 2004, para.238 
3069
 ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC & ADMC Management Limited v. Republic of Hungary (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/16) October 2, 2006, at para. 496 
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Chorzow Factory case that damages are “not necessarily limited to the value of the 
undertaking at the moment of dispossession” and in the decisions of Iran US Claims 
Tribunal
3070
 and the European Court of Human Rights
3071
. The tribunal concluded that it must 
assess the compensation to be paid by the respondent to the claimants in accordance with the 
Chorzow Factory standard, i.e., the claimants should be compensated the market value of the 
expropriated investments as at the date of the award and preferred to apply the DCF method 
in calculating the final amount of damages.
3072
 The tribunal stated that the claim for damages 
under this approach fell into two parts: (a) the estimated value of the claimants’ stake in the 
project company as of the award date; and (b) all unpaid dividends and management fees from 
the date of expropriation until the date of the award.
3073
  
 
The Chorzow’s compensation criterion should not be interpreted to the effect of adding some 
punitive element to the valuation of damages or leading to double counting of the recoverable 
damages, as those would contradict the basic premises of the principle of full compensation. 
The Chorzow decision should be construed as implying that, the state, which unlawfully 
expropriates a going concern and, thereby, prevents the investor from selling its undertaking 
when the business conditions were better, residually assumes the risk that the increase in the 
value of the undertaking, due to the changing business conditions during the interim period 
between the date of expropriation and the date of the award, will be reflected to the amount of 
damages payable by the state to the investor. Thus, the value of the relevant undertaking, in 
cases of both lawful and unlawful expropriation, may, in principle, be determined on the basis 
of the projections and business conditions that existed at the time of expropriation, but in case 
of unlawful expropriation, the value of the undertaking will exceptionally reflect the increase 
resulting from the business conditions that have improved by the time of the award. Due to 
such a risk allocation between the parties, the Chorzow decision can be considered as 
comparable to the exception to the principle of foreseeability of loss by the party in breach at 
the time of contracting under some national legal systems, which prevents the party in breach 
from invoking the foreseeability limitation in cases of intentional or fraudulent breach of the 
contract. Thus, in the calculation of the damages arising from the unlawful expropriations, the 
effect of changing business conditions that increase the value of the undertaking and, thus, the 
amount of compensation will be taken into account, regardless of whether the relevant events 
subsequent to the expropriation were unforeseeable by the state party at the time of 
expropriation, as a result of residual risk allocation under the customary international law.  
 
In Amco II Award, the issue of foreseeability was raised by the defendant state in order to 
limit the amount of damages recoverable by the claimant due to unlawful state measures. The 
ICSID tribunal found that the general background to the decision of Indonesia to revoke 
Amco's investment license in 1980 constituted a denial of justice, and caused harm to Amco 
through an unlawful action.
3074
 The tribunal held that, as with Indonesian law, the loss must 
be attributable to the wrongful act and foreseeable, and non-speculative loss may be 
                                                 
3070
 Amoco International Finance Corporation v. Iran, 15 IRAN–U.S. C.T.R., at 189 and 247 para.196 
3071
 Papamichalopoulos v Greece (A/330-B), European Court of Human Rights, 31 October 1995, (1996) 21 
E.H.R.R. 439 
3072
 ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC & ADMC Management Limited v. Republic of Hungary (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/16) October 2, 2006, at para. 499 and 514 
3073
 Ibid., at para. 518 
3074
 Final award of 5 June 1990 in case no. ARB/81/8 and Decision on Supplemental Decision and Rectification 
of 17 October 1990, ICSID Award, AMCO Asia Corp. et al. v. The Republic of Indonesia, Yearbook 
Commercial Arbitration, (1992), at 98 
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recovered. Indonesia argued that, if compensation was due at all, only those foregone profits 
that could be foreseen in 1980 were compensable. The tribunal rejected this argument. It 
referred to the Chorzow decision with regard to the principle that, in an unlawful 
nationalization, there must be restitution to establish the situation that would otherwise have 
existed, or, “if this is not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to the value which 
restitution in kind would bear”.3075 The tribunal stated that “If the purpose of compensation is 
to put Amco in the position it would have been in had it received the benefits of the Profit-
Sharing Agreement, then there is no reason of logic that requires that to be done by reference 
only to data that would have been known to a prudent businessman in 1980. It may, on one 
view, be the case that in a lawful taking, Amco would have been entitled to the fair market 
value of the contract at the moment of dispossession. In making such a valuation, a Tribunal 
in 1990 would necessarily exclude factors subsequent to 1980. But if Amco is to be placed as 
if the contract had remained in effect, then subsequent known factors bearing on that 
performance are to be reflected in the valuation technique.” According to the tribunal, 
foreseeability is linked to causation, rather than to the quantum of profit, and it would be an 
inappropriate test for such damages that approximate to restitutio in integrum. The tribunal 
concluded that while subsequent known events of a general nature may appropriately be an 
element in the valuation process, the effects of the taking itself must be excluded, since it is 
well established in international law that the value of property or contract rights must not be 
affected by the unlawful act that removed those rights.
3076
  
 
The tribunal further stated that “where there has been an unlawful taking of contract rights, 
lost profits are in principle recoverable”. The tribunal’s findings applied to non-speculative 
profits that would have been due to Amco over the remaining period of the contract.
3077
 The 
tribunal divided its assessment of profits lost by Amco as a result of Indonesia’s wrongful 
conduct into two periods: (1) period preceding the award (from 1980 until the end of 1989); 
and period subsequent to the award (from 1990 until 1999). As the first period of 1980-1989 
referred to the past, the tribunal used known data for relevant factors, including the year-by-
year inflation rate, as well as actual exchange and taxation rates.
3078
 From 1 January 1990 
(1989 being the last full year for which known factors are available) onwards, the tribunal 
found the DCF method “appropriate to establish the net present value of PT Amco’s rights for 
the remaining period of the lease, by capitalizing earnings and expenditures which would 
otherwise have been spread over the future years of the life of the 1978 Profit Sharing 
Agreement.”3079 According to the tribunal, the DCF method is entirely consistent with 
Indonesian law and international law. The tribunal emphasized that the DCF method was “not 
a mechanistic device”. It stated that “The method itself relies on the application of 
assumptions which are necessarily judgmental. The DCF method is at once a flexible tool, 
that allows for an application of factors and elements judged as relevant. At the same time, it 
allows for the application of these judgmental elements to be articulated.”3080 In determining 
the amount of lost profits, the tribunal did not use the actual profits earned during the interim 
period between 1980 and 1989 by the management that overtook the undertaking from Amco, 
but instead took the average monthly net profit for the period between 1979 and 1980, when 
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Amco actually was managing the undertaking, as a basis for the interim period between 1980 
and 1989, and adjusted this base-period profit to account for inflation and other factors, 
already known at the time of the award. The tribunal, then, used the profits figure for the year 
1989 obtained under this analysis for the remaining period between 1990 and 1999, and 
discounted the resulting amount by the sum of the inflation rate and the risk factor. The 
tribunal adopted a relatively low risk factor for such reasons that the level of assumed profit 
had been kept steady in real terms, and the projected earnings had been based on known 
historic results. 
 
The measure of compensation as contemplated by the Court in Chorzow Factory case is only 
relevant to the event of an unlawful expropriation. Thus, it is not applicable in cases of lawful 
expropriation. However, as stated by the Iran US Claims Tribunal, “the lawful/unlawful 
taking distinction, which in customary international law flows largely from the Case 
Concerning the Factory at Chorzow …, is relevant only to two possible issues: whether 
restitution of the property can be awarded and whether compensation can be awarded for any 
increase in the value of the property between the date of taking and the date of the judicial or 
arbitral decision awarding compensation. The Chorzow decision provides no basis for any 
assertion that a lawful taking requires less compensation than that which is equal to the value 
of the property on the date of taking.”3081  
 
In the Aminoil case, it seemed that the characterization of the expropriation as lawful or 
unlawful would not affect the final amount of compensation due to the investor. The case 
concerned an oil concession that was granted in 1948 by Kuwait to Aminoil for a period of 
sixty years. In November 1974, three Gulf States met at Abu Dhabi and resolved to increase 
royalties to 20 per cent and income tax to 85 per cent of posted prices, effective immediately. 
This became known as the “Abu Dhabi formula”, and it was adopted by OPEC in December 
1974.
3082
 Negotiations then took place in the next period between Kuwait and Aminoil, 
concerning, the application of the “Abu Dhabi Formula”. In 1977, Kuwait passed Decree Law 
No 124, which provided that Aminoil’s concession should be terminated, that Aminoil’s 
assets in Kuwait should revert to the state, and that ‘fair’ compensation should be paid to 
Aminoil.
3083
 Aminoil argued that the concession contained provisions that, in their combined 
effect, to constitute a "stabilisation clause" and to preclude the Government from terminating 
or varying the concession unilaterally.
3084
  
 
The ad hoc tribunal stated that the case of nationalization was certainly not expressly provided 
against by the stabilization clauses of the concession, and rejected the argument of Aminoil 
that notwithstanding this gap, the stabilization clauses were cast in such absolute and all-
embracing terms as to suffice in themselves, unconditionally and in all circumstances, for 
prohibiting nationalization. The tribunal considered that although contractual limitations on 
the state's right to nationalize are possible, it would have to be expressly stipulated for, and it 
should cover only a relatively limited period given the particularly serious nature of such an 
undertaking. However, according to the tribunal, the relevant provisions were far from having 
lost all their value and efficacy since, by impliedly requiring that nationalization shall not 
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have any confiscatory character, they reinforce the necessity for a proper indemnification as a 
condition of it. The tribunal also stated that “While attributing its full value to the 
fundamental principle of pacta sunt servanda, the Tribunal has felt obliged to recognize that 
the contract of concession has undergone great changes since 1948: changes conceded often 
unwillingly, but conceded nevertheless - by the company. These changes have not been the 
consequence of accidental or special factors, but rather of a profound and general 
transformation in the terms of oil concessions that occurred in the Middle-East, and later 
throughout the world. These changes took place progressively, with an increasing 
acceleration, as from 1973. They were introduced into the contractual relations between the 
Government and Aminoil through the play of [an adaptation clause], or else as the result of at 
least tacit acceptances by the Company, which entered neither objections nor reservations in 
respect of them. These changes must not simply be viewed piece-meal, but on the basis of 
their total effect, - and they brought about a metamorphosis in the whole character of the 
Concession.”3085  
 
The tribunal held that the concession had become over time a contract governed by a changed 
regime in which, as “in most legal systems, the state while remaining bound to respect the 
contractual equilibrium, enjoys special advantages.” The tribunal emphasized that the case 
was neither one of a fundamental change of circumstances (rebus sic stantibus), nor a case of 
a change involving a departure from a contract, but a change in the nature of the contract 
itself, brought about by time, and the acquiescence or conduct of the parties.
3086
 Thus, the 
tribunal concluded that the nationalization in 1977 was not inconsistent with the contract of 
concession, provided always that the nationalization did not possess any confiscatory 
character.
3087
 The tribunal considered that Decree Law No 124, where the government had 
provided that fair compensation should be paid, did not constitute a violation by Kuwait of its 
obligations towards Aminoil, as these stood in 1977.
3088
 
 
As to the standard of damages, the tribunal first made a general observation that the 
determination of an indemnification has always presented technical difficulties, not only in 
regard to indemnifications due in consequence of illicit acts, where it is as the equivalent of a 
restitutio in integrum that the calculation is in principle effected, but also for indemnities due 
in consequence of acts of expropriation or of legitimate nationalizations. The tribunal noted 
that in the latter case, the difficulties are added to by controversial questions of foreign 
investments, and operations involving an important economic complex.
3089
 The tribunal 
observed two tendencies in the approaches of different states: one of which seeks to “reduce 
compensation almost to the status of a symbol”, and the other “assimilates the compensation 
due for a legitimate take-over to that due in respect of illegitimate one”.3090 According to the 
tribunal, the most general formulation of the rules applicable for a lawful nationalization was 
contained in the UNGA Resolution 1803, which provided that in cases of nationalization, “the 
owner shall be paid appropriate compensation”. The tribunal did not attempt to determine the 
general principles underlying the notion of “appropriate” compensation, but considered that 
the determination of the amount of an award of “appropriate” compensation is better carried 
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out by means of an enquiry into all the circumstances relevant to the particular concrete case, 
than through abstract theoretical discussion.
3091
 Moreover, it decided to confine itself to 
registering that in the case there was no room for rules of compensation that would make 
nonsense of foreign investment.
3092
 Both parties invoked the notion of “legitimate 
expectations” for deciding on compensation. The tribunal based its approach on this notion, 
and stated that: “That formula is well advised, and justifiably brings to mind the fact that, with 
reference to every long-term contract, especially such as involve an important investment, 
there must necessarily be economic calculations, and the weighing-up of rights and 
obligations, of chances and risks, constituting the contractual equilibrium. This equilibrium 
cannot be neglected ― neither when it is a question of proceeding to necessary adaptations 
during the course of the contract, nor when it is a question of awarding compensation. It is in 
this fundamental equilibrium that the very essence of the contract consists.”3093 For 
assessment of that equilibrium and the determination of the legitimate expectations of the 
parties, the tribunal took into account not only the text of contract, but also the amendments, 
the interpretations, and the behavior manifested along the course of its existence. 
 
In ascertaining the basis of Aminoil's compensation, the tribunal first noted that the 
concession did not expressly provide for the possibility of a termination prior to the maturity 
of the concession, but merely provided that at the expiry of the sixty-year period of the 
concession, the entire undertaking should be handed over to the Government without 
compensation. The tribunal did not consider this solution as being appropriate to the 
circumstances.
3094
 In order to determine the factors that have to be taken into account for the 
indemnification of Aminoil, the tribunal considered the arguments of the parties. Aminoil 
suggested a choice between two methods: (i) a method based on the sum total of the 
anticipated profits, reckoned to the natural termination of the Concession, but discounted at an 
annual rate of interest and without taking account of the value of the assets that would have 
been transferred to Kuwait without compensation upon that termination; and (ii) a method 
whereby total anticipated profits are counted and discounted in the same way over a limited 
period of years only, but taking countervailing account of the value of the assets.
3095
 The 
tribunal agreed in principle that both of the methods suggested by Aminoil are acceptable, and 
preferred to employ a combination of methods, according to the different factors that have to 
be taken into account. However, the tribunal disagreed with Aminoil's assumptions and 
calculations on two basic points. First, the tribunal disagreed with the Aminoil’s calculation 
of anticipated profits on the exclusive basis of the financial arrangements of 1961, and 
decided to take into account the combination of later arrangements, including the negotiations 
between the parties about the application of the “Abu Dhabi formula”. Secondly, the tribunal 
stated that Aminoil’s projection had not been based on the “reasonable rate of return”, a 
concept adopted by the parties in the course of their relations and negotiations.
3096
  
 
The tribunal rejected the “net book value” method proposed by Kuwait as a particular rule, of 
an international and customary character, specific to the oil industry, which, Kuwait claimed, 
generated “a lex petrolea that was in some sort a particular branch of a general universal lex 
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mercatoria.”3097 In this regard, the tribunal noted that the precedents of compensation for 
nationalization, to which Kuwait referred, were reached through negotiations rather than 
arbitrations, and their results had usually been a complex deal between an investor and a state, 
which involved, in addition to compensation for a nationalized concession, a preferential 
relationship, prospects for future advantages or other arrangements suitable to the investor. 
According to the tribunal, those precedents had not constituted an expression of opinio iuris 
and therefore could not be viewed as rules of international law. The tribunal stated that 
consents of investors had been given under the pressure of very strong economic and political 
constraints, which had nothing to do with law, and could not enable them to be regarded as 
components of the formation of a general legal rule.
3098
  
 
Subsequently, the tribunal examined the basis on which the evaluation of the legitimate 
expectations of Aminoil must proceed. First, the tribunal recalled that whereas the contract of 
concession did not forbid nationalization, the stabilization clauses inserted in it were 
nevertheless not devoid of all consequence, for they prohibited any measures that would have 
had a confiscatory character. According to the tribunal, these clauses created for the 
concessionaire a legitimate expectation that must be taken into account.
3099
 The tribunal 
considered Aminoil in the position of an undertaking whose aim was to obtain a “reasonable 
rate of return” and not speculative profits. The tribunal stated that, although the attitudes taken 
up by a party over the long course of a negotiation that eventually broke down could not be 
made the basis of an arbitral or judicial decision, there was no question in the case that, over 
the years, Aminoil had come to accept the principle of a moderate estimate of profits, and that 
it was this that constituted its legitimate expectation.
3100
 In this context, the tribunal decided to 
assess separately “the value, on the one hand of the undertaking itself, as a source of profit, 
and on the other of the totality of the assets”, and to add together the results obtained.3101  
 
As to the method for valuing the physical assets, the tribunal stated that the “net book value” 
would be suitable only in cases of recent investment, where the original cost of assets was not 
far from the present replacement cost. In other cases, taking account the pace of inflation, the 
tribunal considered that “it would be unfair” to calculate the value of depreciating assets “on 
the basis of a superannuated cost consisting of the original purchase price, when that price has 
no relation to the actual present cost.” The tribunal stated that the “net book value merely 
gives a formal accounting figure which, in the present case, cannot be considered 
adequate.”3102 Thus, the tribunal considered appropriate a depreciated replacement value. On 
this basis, fixed assets were evaluated. For non-fixed assets, the tribunal relied on the figures 
in the joint report, without explanation of the valuation method used.
3103
 In the valuation of 
the undertaking as going concern, the tribunal stated that it considered the undertaking itself 
“as an organic totality – or going concern – therefore as a unified whole, the value of which is 
greater than that of its component parts, and which must also take account of the legitimate 
expectations of the owners”. However, the tribunal did not separately quantify, in the award, 
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an amount of compensation for the undertaking as a going concern, but stated that “These 
principles remain good even if the undertaking was due to revert, free of cost, to the 
concessionary Authority in another 30 years, the profits having been restricted to a reasonable 
level.”3104 The tribunal neither specified the number of years it used to calculate Aminoil’s 
return. 
 
Thus, the tribunal summed up the values of the fixed and non-fixed assets and took account of 
the legitimate expectations of the concessionaire to calculate the overall amount of 
compensation due when Decree Law No 124 was passed. The award did not reflect how the 
tribunal reached that sum, and no indication was given as to how the total sum had been 
allocated between the assets and the lost profits. The tribunal deducted from the total sum the 
amount that the Government was entitled in its counterclaims for the certain liabilities of 
Aminoil after the Government took over the enterprise, as well as unpaid installments of 
royalties and taxes.
3105
 The tribunal adjusted the resulting amount of compensation to account 
for inflation. The rate of inflation was fixed by the tribunal at 10%, determined by reference 
to the price of refined petroleum products on the American market.
3106
 Thus, the 
compensation was established as of the date of the nationalization decree (1977), and the 
relevant values were then adjusted to the date of the award (1982). 
 
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, a member of the tribunal, in his separate opinion, disagreed with the 
majority as to the principle of interpretation of the stabilization clauses.
3107
 Fitzmaurice noted 
that the question in the case was not that of the right to nationalize in abstracto, “but of the 
right to nationalise in the face of a contractual undertaking not to do so, if that exists: or more 
accurately, in terms of the present case, to nationalise where this involves terminating a 
concession before its time in spite of a provision to the contrary.”3108 In his view, there was 
absolutely nothing in the stabilization clauses to warrant the view that they were intended to 
be confined to the case of confiscatory measures only, since those clauses were not really 
concerned with confiscation at all, in the direct senses, but concerned with is any measure 
terminating concession before its time.
3109
 He also considered that it was an illusion to 
suppose that monetary compensation alone could remove the confiscatory element from a 
take-over, whether called nationalization or something else. He stated that “Nationalisation, or 
any other form of take-over, is necessarily confiscatory in the sense that, irrespective of the 
wishes of the legal owner, it dispossesses him of his property and transfers it elsewhere. 
Nationalisations may be lawful or unlawful, but the test can never be whether they are 
confiscatory or not: because by virtue of their inherent character, they always are.”3110 As to 
the finding of the majority that the concession changed over the years by reason of the 
conduct of the parties relative to it and, as a result, the stabilization clauses had, by 1977, lost 
their former absolute character, Fitzmaurice stated that, whatever diminution of force the 
concession suffered it was not a diminution of force that touched the stabilization clauses 
since the parties never agreed to any change that would enable the Government to terminate 
                                                 
3104
 Ibid., at 1041 para.178(1) 
3105
 Ibid., at 1041 para.176 
3106
 Ibid., at 1040 para. 171 and 1042 para.178 (5) 
3107
 Ibid., at 1049 para. 19 
3108
 Ibid., at 1051 para. 22 (b) 
3109
 Ibid., at 1051 para. 24 
3110
 Ibid., at 1052 para. 26 
 825 
 
the concession unilaterally.
3111
 Thus, in a dissent of “considerable persuasive force”3112, 
Fitzmaurice concluded that “although the nationalisation of Aminoil's undertaking may 
otherwise have been perfectly lawful, considered simply in its aspect of an act of the State, it 
was nevertheless irreconcilable with the stabilisation clauses of a Concession that was still in 
force at the moment of the take-over.”3113  
 
However, Fitzmaurice was in entire agreement with the operational part of the award, which 
was unanimous, although under his interpretation of the stabilization clauses, the 
nationalization was unlawful due to Kuwait’s violation of the concession itself, since 
according to the principle underlying Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, treaties and, all agreements governed by international law are binding upon the 
parties and must be performed by them in good faith.
3114
 Since his dissent on this point did 
not affect his concurrence in the final sum awarded to Aminoil, it can be argued that, in both 
cases of lawful and unlawful expropriation, the compensation due to Aminoil would have 
comprised the component of lost profits and would have resulted in the same amount. 
Although, the tribunal adopted a distinction between lawful and an unlawful nationalization to 
guide its determination of the applicable standards of compensation, the tribunal did not refer 
to the Chorzow Factory case in the sense that its precedent precluded the investor to claim lost 
profits where the nationalization is lawful, and the tribunal seems to have incorporated 
elements that effectively recognized for loss of profits to reflect the parties’ “legitimate 
expectations”, even though the nationalization was found by the majority to be lawful.3115 
However, since the award deals, in a cursory fashion, with the evidence supplied by 
accountants and other experts on the various methods of valuation and calculation, and states 
certain figures without explaining how those figure were arrived at and how they were related 
to relevant circumstances such as the period of time, value of assets, price of oil, costs of 
production and so forth, it is considered as an instance representing the phenomenon of 
“splitting the difference” between the parties in the context of international arbitration.3116  
 
In the ICSID case of Southern Pacific Properties (SPP) v The Arab Republic of Egypt, the 
lawfulness of the expropriation arguably affected the amount of compensation due to the 
investor in the context of worsening business conditions after the date of expropriation. The 
dispute arose from the agreements concluded in 1974 concerning the development of a tourist 
village on the Pyramid Oasis. Under the agreements, the parties undertook to incorporate an 
Egyptian joint venture company for the project. Subsequently, parliamentary opposition to the 
Pyramids Oasis project developed and culminated in a series of decrees in 1978 that had the 
effect of cancelling the project. The ICSID tribunal found that the decision to cancel the 
project constituted a lawful exercise of the right of eminent domain for a public purpose, 
                                                 
3111
 Ibid., at 1053 para. 28-29 
3112
 Mann, F. A., The Aminoil Arbitration, British Yearbook of International Law, 54-1 (1983), at 213 
3113
 Ad-Hoc-Award, Kuwait v. The American Independent Oil Company (AMINOIL), International Legal 
Materials, 21 (1982), at 1053 para. 30 
3114
 Mann, F. A., The Aminoil Arbitration, British Yearbook of International Law, 54-1 (1983), at 221 
3115
 Hunter, Martin & Anthony Sinclair, Aminoil Revisited: Reflections on a Story of Changing Circumstances, 
in Todd Weiler (ed.), International Law and Arbitration: Leading Cases from the ICSID, NAFTA, Bilateral 
Treaties and Customary International Law, Cameron May, 2005, at 366 
3116
 Mann, F. A., The Aminoil Arbitration, British Yearbook of International Law, 54-1 (1983), at 213-214: “The 
general impression conveyed by the award is that, as so often in arbitrations, strictly legal considerations may 
have been allowed to be pushed aside for the sake of achieving unanimity among the arbitrators and giving 
something to both parties.” 
 826 
 
namely the preservation and protection of antiquities in the area.
3117
 However, the evidence 
showed that no adequate offer of compensation was ever made.
3118
 The claimants argued that 
the measure of compensation for taking of an ongoing enterprise should be equal to the value 
of the enterprise at the time of the taking, and that such value depends on the revenues that the 
enterprise would have generated had the taking not occurred. In quantifying this value, the 
claimants relied primarily on the DCF method.
3119
 The tribunal considered inappropriate to 
use the DCF method for determining the fair compensation because the project was in its 
infancy and there was very little history on which to base projected revenues. The tribunal, 
referring to the Chorzow decision, rejected the DCF method, which would result in awarding 
“possible but contingent and indeterminate damage” in contravention to the settled rules on 
international responsibility of states. As a second ground for rejection, the tribunal considered 
that the DCF method would award lucrum cessans on the assumption that lot sales would 
have continued through the year 1995, although the relevant areas were registered in 1979 
under the UNESCO Convention and lot sales would have been illegal under both international 
law and Egyptian law, so that any profits that might have resulted from such activities from 
1979 forward were consequently non-compensable.
3120
  
 
The tribunal awarded to the claimants their alternative claim for out-of pocket expenses plus 
an amount to compensate the claimants for “the loss of the opportunity to make a commercial 
success of the project”. The tribunal determined that the out-of pocket expenses consisted of 
(i) capital contributions and loans made by the claimant to the joint venture, (ii) the 
development costs, which became irrecoverable losses because these expenses were not 
reimbursed by the joint venture company or by the future profits due to the cancellation of the 
project, and (iii) post cancellation costs for legal and audit work which was relevant or useful 
to the present ICSID proceedings.
3121
 As to the claim for damages for loss of opportunity of 
making a commercial success of the project, the tribunal, while admitting that this 
determination necessarily involved an element of subjectivism and uncertainty, held that the 
fact that damages cannot be assessed with certainty is no reason not to award damages when a 
loss has been incurred. The tribunal was convinced that at the time of project cancellation the 
value of the claimants’ investment exceeded the out-of-pocket expenses. The tribunal 
determined the relevant amount on the basis the actual sales made by the joint venture 
company during the brief period in which the project was in operation. The tribunal used 
those actual sales to determine the minimum value of the loss of commercial opportunity, and 
calculated the difference between the claimants’ expenditures and the portion of imputed 
revenues corresponding to their 60% shareholding in the joint venture company. The tribunal 
awarded that difference as the opportunity of making a commercial success of the project 
since the value of the claimants' investment in 1978 when the project was cancelled exceeded 
their out-of-pocket expenses.
3122
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The compensation of the loss of the opportunity to make a commercial success of the project 
was based on the same data that were considered insufficient for the DCF method. The 
tribunal calculated the value of loss commercial opportunity by estimating the revenue and 
deducting the relevant expenditures, which is similar to the calculation of future profits, the 
difference being that the tribunal did not use projections for the future, but used figures of 
sales already made by the time of project cancellation. In this regard, in relation to the 
argument of the defendant that the reclassification of the land on the Pyramids Plateau was a 
lawful and mitigating factor in the amount of compensation, the tribunal explained that this 
factor was already taken into consideration in the tribunal’s decision not to award 
compensation based on profits that might have accrued to the claimants after the date on 
which areas on the Plateau were registered with the UNESCO. Similarly, in relation to the 
argument of the defendant that the project was located in an area where the claimants should 
have known there was a risk that antiquities would be discovered, the tribunal implied that the 
claimants assumed the said risk, materialization of which eventually deprived the claimants of 
their compensation on profits that might have been earned after the relevant areas were 
registered with UNESCO.
3123
  
 
It can be argued that, had the tribunal found the expropriation unlawful, the risk of subsequent 
events, which led to a decrease in the value of the undertaking after the expropriation, could 
have shifted to the defendant under the Chorzow standard. In such a case, the claimant could 
have been awarded compensation on profits that might have been earned, even after the 
relevant areas were registered with UNESCO, since the first alternative of valuation as of the 
date of expropriation under the Chorzow standard would prevent the state from paying a 
lower compensation, even if the investment would have lost value in the absence of the 
unlawful expropriation, in view of the fact that expropriation prevented the investor from 
exercising the option of selling its investment at arm’s length. However, the negative 
subsequent events that affected the value of the investment after an unlawful expropriation 
may still be taken into account by the decision maker, when the fair market value is the basis 
of compensation, since the effect of such events should be reflected to the amount of 
compensation, to the extent that the market would have absorbed, by the time of unlawful 
expropriation, an expectation as to those events, which then becomes relevant to the 
determination of the value a willing buyer would normally assign to the undertaking, after 
taking into account the circumstances in which it would operate in the future. 
 
It is observed that the approach of many tribunals is based on the consideration that, when the 
investor is granted an exclusive license for a long period, the host state gains by having its 
resources developed for the benefit of the nation and its citizens, while the exclusive licensee 
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gains by a receiving a fair return on its investment as well as making a normal operating 
profit.
3124
 This approach may lead to a balancing exercise between the interests of the parties 
in order to give effect to their reasonable expectations by ensuring that neither party exploits 
the other. In that exercise, the decision maker dealing with state party disputes may utilize the 
established rules of international law in the determination of the amount of compensation due 
to the investor, as described above. When only a small fraction of the anticipated investment 
for the benefit of the state and its citizens had been made by the licensee, the claims of the 
investors for lost profits may be rejected for the lack of certainty of loss thereby avoiding a 
situation, which might contain an element of exploitation on the part of the investor, who 
wishes to make a substantial profit without having to make the investment that was originally 
contemplated. On the other hand, the risk allocation implied by the Chorzow standards 
prevents the exploitation of the economic windfall on the part of the states that have illegally 
imposed measures on investments, whose business conditions turned out to be better than 
expected. 
 
However, regardless of the distinction between lawful and unlawful expropriations and its 
implications as to the recoverable amount of damages, the consideration of the above interests 
in the state party disputes may still reflect differences with regard to the evaluation of 
recoverable damages, as opposed to situation in the private contracts, in such cases that the 
compensation may be due to the investor for the reason that the contract between the state and 
the investor was breached, which in itself leads to the application of principle of full 
compensation, with its components of damnum emergens and lucrum cessans. The effect of 
circumstances surrounding the breach of the state party may require an ex post balancing 
exercise between the interests of the parties by the decision maker in order to ensure that 
neither party exploits the other.  
 
In the case of Himpurna v. PLN, Himpurna entered into a contract with the Indonesian state 
electricity corporation, PLN, to explore and develop geothermal resources in Indonesia, 
including building power plants in the country and selling the power generated to PLN. 
Pursuant to the Energy Sales Contract, PLN was obligated to purchase the electricity 
produced from the plants for a period of thirty years and to pay for it in U.S. dollars. This was 
a "take-or-pay" contract, under which PLN was obligated to make payments for the electricity 
whether or not it took immediate delivery. In 1997 and 1998, three Presidential Decrees were 
issued in the context of the Asian financial crisis. The Decrees meant that PLN could not 
perform its contractual obligations and resulted in the suspension of Himpurna’s investments, 
since PLN did not need the power it had agreed to purchase. As PLN failed to purchase the 
energy Himpurna generated, Himpurna submitted a request for arbitration, claiming that PLN 
breached the Energy Sales Contract. The ad hoc arbitral tribunal found that PLN breached the 
contract by preventing Himpurna from completing the development of additional units and by 
failing to pay invoices and issue standby letters of credit.
3125
 The tribunal also concluded that 
the parties’ relationship was beyond repair, due to PLN's fundamental breach, and declared, 
by its award, the contract to be terminated with immediate effect as between the parties.
3126
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The contract provided that it shall be governed by the laws and regulations of the Republic of 
Indonesia, and that the tribunal need not be bound by strict rules of law where they consider 
the application thereof to particular matters to be inconsistent with the spirit of the contract 
and the underlying intent of the parties.
3127
 The tribunal also noted that the parties’ 
submissions evidenced a tacit common position as to the permissibility of references to 
international precedents.
3128
 Himpurna claimed both damnum emergens, which consisted of 
capital invested and expended plus interest, and lucrum cessans, which assigned a present 
value to the expected future revenue stream; the nominal amounts were decreased by applying 
two discount rates (one reflecting the time value of money and the other a risk premium).
3129
 
The tribunal first considered that, under the Indonesian Civil Code, damages may include the 
loss which the creditor has suffered and the profit he has been made to forego. According to 
the tribunal, it was impossible to establish damages as a matter of scientific certainty, but this 
should not impede the course of justice. The tribunal stated that “Approximations are 
inevitable. Moreover, considerations of fairness enter into the picture, to be assessed - 
inevitably - by reference to particular circumstances. The fact that the Arbitral Tribunal is 
influenced in this respect by equitable factors does not mean that it shirks the discipline of 
deciding on the basis of legal obligations.” In this regard, the tribunal noted that the Sapphire 
award was based on “general principles of law” but nevertheless decided ex aequo et bono 
when assessing damages, and cited the following statement from the Aminoil award: “It is 
well known that any estimate in purely monetary terms of amounts intended to express the 
value of an asset, of an undertaking, of a contract, or of services rendered, must take equitable 
principles into account.” According to the tribunal, “The Sapphire and Aminoil awards were 
on the firm footing of significant international precedents.” 3130 
 
With respect to the evaluation of financial data, the tribunal first stated that “When a DCF 
method for evaluating damages in the context of a contractual breach is followed, any 
comparisons with precedents involving the evaluation of expropriated business ventures must 
be made with great care. In the latter situation, there is generally no basis to apply the 
contractual reliance damages (damnum emergens), but only the expectancy damages (lucrum 
cessans). An undertaking has been expropriated; the prejudice suffered by its former owner is 
simply the worth of the venture as a going concern, which is crystallized in an analysis that 
discounts the future revenue stream of the enterprise to establish its present value.”3131 The 
tribunal considered that, in those cases, had there been no expropriation, past investments 
would have been recovered through subsequent revenues, and since those revenues are fully 
accounted for in the DCF going-concern evaluation, an award of lost investment as well 
would be an unacceptable double recovery. The tribunal stated that, in contractual cases, it is 
usual that claimants seek recoupment of their entire investment as a discrete element of 
compensation. According to the tribunal, while claimants are on solid ground when they ask 
to be reimbursed monies they have actually spent in reliance on the contract, the recovery of 
lost future profits is less certain.
3132
 In this context, the tribunal was of the opinion that the 
quantification of lost profits must result in a lower amount to avoid double counting because 
future net cash flow generally includes all the amortization of investment there will ever be. 
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The tribunal considered that if the DCF method is applied in a contractual scenario to measure 
nothing but net cash flows, there is no room for recovery of wasted costs. Thus, the tribunal 
concluded that when the victim of a breach of contract seeks recovery of sunken costs, 
confident that it is entitled to its damnum, it may seek lost profits only with the proviso that 
its computations reduce future net cash flows by allowing a proper measure of amortization. 
The tribunal was satisfied that what the claimant presented as the “initial project value” 
reflected the alleged value of future cash flows, discounted to the date of valuation, which 
indeed deducted the alleged value, at the same date, of past investments.
3133
 
 
With respect to damnum emergens, the tribunal stated that Himpurna was entitled to 
reimbursement for monies that Himpurna could prove that it spent in reliance on the contract. 
The tribunal considered that if PLN and Himpurna had been engaged in a joint venture on 
behalf of which Himpurna was incurring costs, or if there had been an agreement that 
Himpurna had some right to recover costs from future earnings, one would reasonably expect 
that there would have been an agreed system of approval and verification of costs.
3134
 
However, in the case, Himpurna’s investment was made at its entire risk; “it could incur costs 
in accordance with in own assessment of its obligations, of efficient operations, and of the 
prospects of recovering costs through future earnings.” The tribunal was of the opinion that 
Himpurna made its expenditures in reliance on the contract, and had every incentive to keep 
those costs low, because all savings would be to its own undiluted benefit.
3135
 Thus, the 
tribunal held that Himpurna needed “only to show that it has made expenditures; it [was] for 
PLN to show that they have no reasonable connection with the pursuit of contract 
objectives”.3136 However, PLN broadly failed to do so, albeit with some exceptions. To 
establish the present value of these sunken costs, the tribunal adopted the multiplier used by 
PLNs financial expert, even if that number was unlikely to be rigorously accurate, in the 
absence of information to allow the tribunal to make a re-computation, to reflect the present 
value. Applying this multiplier, the tribunal determined that the recoverable damnum 
emergens was US$ 273,757,306.
3137
  
 
As to the claim for lucrum cessans, the tribunal referred to the applicable law, noting that 
“Article 1246 of the Indonesian Civil Code - echoing its precursor, Article 1149 of the French 
Code civil – provides for the recovery of lost profit… But the Code goes on to set out limiting 
factors which, again, are quite familiar. Article 1247 (congruent with Article 1152 of the Code 
civil) restricts recovery to damages foreseeable at the time of contracting and Article 1248 
(congruent with Article 1284 of the Code civil) requires that damages be the “immediate and 
direct result of the breach”.”3138 The tribunal also noted that in the numerous legal systems 
where these, or similar, rules prevail, the effect of the limiting factors can be seen as a test of 
reasonableness and equity.
3139
 While the expert evidence of PLN attempted to persuade the 
tribunal to take into account that awarding lost profits in very large sums of damages may be a 
heavy burden when the sum claimed is totally out of proportion to the capital invested, the 
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tribunal maintained that lost profits flow directly from the contractual allocation of risks 
including the commercial risks of market share and price fluctuations, currency and inflation 
risks, and the risks of governmental interference, and when these risks are extant, the notion 
of some form of proportionality in the sense of a normal return on invested capital may make 
sense, but the contract in this case explicitly excluded each of these risks.
3140
  
 
According to the tribunal, the significant controversies with respect to lost profits related to 
the quantities that should be deemed to be covered by PLNs take-or-pay obligations, and the 
discount rate that should be applied to the future income stream. The tribunal considered that, 
to the extent the claim was based on production volumes that appeared certain, the issue of 
proportionality to invested capital did not arise, since the lost profit flowed directly from the 
contractual allocation of risk.
3141
 Even so, the tribunal agreed with the figure proposed by 
PLN’s expert that there were only 130 MW of proven reserves, as opposed to the claimant’s 
assumption of a sustainable electricity generation capacity of 245 MW for a period of 30 
years. According to the tribunal, it was possible to accept the evidence of both experts as the 
exercise was one of estimation, where each analysis may be plausible and well founded in its 
own terms. The tribunal preferred the lowest figures put forward by PLN’s expert, given all 
the circumstances of this case in an attempt to be as lenient with PLN as one possibly 
could
3142
, while still respecting the imperatives of contractual reliability, and accepting that 
evaluations of quantum should have an equitable component. In this regard, the tribunal stated 
that “while declining to disregard or amend the Contract on the grounds of changed 
circumstances…., the Arbitral Tribunal as a matter of equity nevertheless gives great weight 
to those circumstances when making the allowance for lost profits.”3143  
 
Moreover, the tribunal noted that Himpurna’s estimate of damages would lead to recovery 
beyond a return on investments actually made, since it would justify hundreds of millions of 
dollars in damages because PLN thwarted a contractual right to make future investments 
which PLN was bound to remunerate at prices ensuring substantial profits.
3144
 Although 
admitting that “damages for the loss of a bargain may in principle be granted even when the 
victim of a breach has not yet incurred significant costs”, the tribunal ultimately refused to 
grant profits on investments that had not been made at the date of breach. The tribunal 
compared the circumstances of the case to those of Sapphire case, where the sole arbitrator, 
fixing the quantum “ex aequo et bono by considering all the circumstances”, awarded the 
claimant a lump sum for its loss of chance due to the defendant’s breach of oil concession 
agreement during an early stage of exploration and before any drilling.
3145
 The tribunal 
considered that, in Sapphire, if the sole arbitrator had not allowed the recovery for loss of 
chance, he would in fact have tolerated a breach with impunity but, in the present case, 
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Himpurna sought to be made whole for all of its expenditures and to recoup a return thereon 
calculated over 30 years, before even getting to the issue of loss of bargain on investments not 
yet made at the date of the breach. Moreover, the tribunal considered that whereas in Sapphire 
the foreign investor had entered into the agreement on the basis of producing oil for export on 
the world markets, in the present case it was explicitly understood that the only purchaser for 
the energy produced would be PLN. According to the tribunal, it was unacceptable to assess 
lost profit as though Himpurna had an unfettered right to create ever-increasing losses for 
Indonesia and its people by generating energy without any regard to whether or not PLN had 
any use for it.
3146
 In this regard, the tribunal relied on the doctrine of “abuse of right”. Thus, 
even if such an unfettered right may be said to derive from explicit contractual terms, the 
tribunal held that the principle of pacta sunt servanda found its limits in this case in the 
concept of abuse of right.
3147
  
 
The tribunal applied the doctrine of abuse of right as an element of overriding substantive law 
proper to the international arbitral process. In the tribunal’s view, this law is not an elaborate 
body of law, limited to a few universal principles, but this fact does not detract from their 
value when used to ensure the legitimacy of the international arbitral process. The tribunal 
observed that the doctrine of abuse of rights has been applied notably when arbitral tribunals 
have upheld the principle of the autonomy of the arbitration or refused to accept that a state 
invoked its internal law as an impediment to its consent to arbitration.
3148
 Then, the tribunal 
expressed its view that if the general principle of abuse of rights may be invoked in favor of 
the foreign investor so as to avoid the result that its legitimate expectations are frustrated by 
unworthy maneuvers, so too, may it be invoked in certain circumstances against claims for 
profit which would tend to impoverish the host state.
3149
 The tribunal believed that this was a 
case “where the doctrine of abuse of right must be applied in favour of PLN to prevent the 
Claimant's undoubtedly legitimate right from being extended beyond tolerable norms, on the 
grounds that it would be intolerable in the present case to uphold claims for lost profits from 
investment not yet incurred.”3150  
 
The tribunal noted that the energy supplied under the contract was not exportable, and to 
oblige PLN, the only purchaser, to compensate for massive future investments would be 
perverse.
3151
 The tribunal also considered the nature of breach, where the purpose and 
consequence of the acts that led to liability were not to replace the claimant in its enjoyment 
of the benefits of an existing or prospective revenue stream and there was no realistic prospect 
of PLN intervening in the immediate wake of the award to implement the investment program 
envisaged under the contract.
3152
 Although admitting that the primary goal of monetary 
compensation in international arbitration is to make the victim whole rather than to prevent 
unjust enrichment, the tribunal concluded that the absence of the prospect of unjust 
enrichment has a moderating effect on a claim for lost profits.
3153
 Thus the arbitral tribunal 
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stated that “To seek to apply the [Energy Sales Contract] so as to permit the Claimant to reap 
pure profit by reference to hypothetical future initiatives in pursuit of an agreement which has 
become an instrument of oppression would be like stepping on the shoulders of a drowning 
man. The Arbitral Tribunal finds that it would be insufferable, and therefore an abuse of 
right”.3154  
 
The tribunal thereby awarded a percentage of lost profits that was proportionate to the 
investment the claimant had actually made.  In order to calculate the recoverable lost profits, 
the tribunal compared the recoverable damnum emergens it had accepted as having been 
incurred by the claimant (US$ 273,757,306) with the amount the claimant had put forward as 
the present value of its projected costs over the life of the contract if it had to be performed 
(US$ 748,564,000).  The tribunal limited the recoverable profits to that proportion, i.e. 36% 
of the total claim of lost profits.
3155
 The tribunal then considered the issue of determining the 
present value of the future net income. The claimant had applied a discount rate of 8.5% to the 
projected revenue stream and to the costs associated with the revenues. The tribunal took into 
account not only the riskier nature of a 30-year venture in Indonesia than in more mature 
economies, but also its adoption of reservoir estimates substantially inferior to the ones 
proposed by PLNs own experts and its refusal to offer compensation on account of profits on 
investments not yet made.
3156
 Accordingly, the tribunal adjusted the discount rate, in their 
equitable assessment of the evidence, and, in the circumstances of the case, resolving all 
doubts in favour of PLN, and found the appropriate rate to be 19%.
3157
 As a result, the 
tribunal took 36% of the claimant’s after-tax net cash flow projections, and discounted it to 
the present value at the rate of 19%, with the resulting amount awarded being US$ 
117,244,000 as lucrum cessans.
3158
 Thus, the tribunal granted Himpurna all of the reliance 
damages (sunken costs, or damnum emergens) that it could prove, but adopted a rigorously 
critical approach in evaluating Himpurna’s evidence, and allowed it to recover for its lost 
profit claim (expectance damages, or lucrum cessans) less than 10% of the amount it put 
forward.
3159
  
 
The approach of the tribunal in Himpurna award is criticized. One of the arbitrators in the 
tribunal, while not dissenting from the result as far as it went, appended a “statement” to the 
award: “The imposition of a concept described as 'abuse of rights' in the absence of findings 
of malicious intent or lack of good faith on the part of the Claimant to further reduce the 
entitlement to damages is in my opinion an inappropriate and unwarranted penalising of the 
Claimant.”3160 It is argued that it is not, as the tribunal stated, a general principle of private 
international law that precludes the awarding of lost profits whenever awarding such profits 
would cause a severe financial hardship to the party that has breached the contract, and if the 
circumstances radically change between the time of contracting and the completion of the 
contract, concepts such as force majeure and hardship would apply to the dispute either 
                                                 
3154
 Ibid., at para. 547 
3155
 Ibid., at para. 551 
3156
 Ibid., at paras. 562, 565, 571 
3157
 Ibid., at para. 575 
3158
 Ibid., at para. 581 
3159
 Ibid., at para. 587 
3160
 Cited by Petrova, Irina, “Stepping on the Shoulders of a Drowning Man” The Doctrine of Abuse of Right as 
a Tool for Reducing Damages for Lost Profits: Troubling Lessons from the Patuha and Himpurna Arbitrations, 
Georgetown Journal of International Law, 35 (2004), at 462-463  
 834 
 
pursuant to the parties' contract or as part of the applicable governing substantive law, rather 
than as a rule of private international law, the substance of which is obligatory in international 
arbitration.
3161
 It is pointed out that the reduction in the amount of damages awarded to 
Himpurna demonstrates the danger inherent in the abuse of right reasoning, since a broad 
formulation of the doctrine allows for a great deal of discretion that may lead to analytically 
strained results and undermine notions of legal certainty. In this regard, it is suggested that the 
factors that may be used in determining whether an abusive exercise of a right has occurred 
should be limited to injurious motive and improper purpose.
3162
 
 
The award in Himpurna case demonstrates the balancing exercise by an arbitral tribunal 
between the interests of the parties in a state party dispute in assessing the amount of 
damages. The tribunal in Himpurna case took into account that the government did not act 
opportunistically in breaching the contract and government would not be able to make full use 
of the investment due to deterioration of the macroeconomic value of the project as of the date 
of award. Those were also taken into consideration in the decision of the ICSID tribunal in the 
case of SPP v the Arab Republic of Egypt, which was referred to in Himpurna award in 
relation to its observation that “the recovery is moderate where the purpose and consequence 
of the acts that led to liability were not to replace the claimant in its enjoyment of the benefit 
of an existing or prospective revenue stream”.3163 Thus, having determined that the breach 
was not opportunistic and considering the severe effect of the crisis on Indonesia, the tribunal 
strived to protect the interests of Indonesia as much as possible by means of the flexibility 
afforded to it in the determination of the quantum of damages and in awarding lucrum 
cessans. However, when it came to the issue of lost profits for the investment that had not 
occurred by the time of breach, the tribunal was “struck by the fact that the Claimant was 
seeking to turn the [Energy Sales Contract] into an astonishing bargain in circumstances when 
performance of the Contract would be ruinous to the Respondent. (A US$ 2.3 billion return - 
including the unpaid invoices - would represent a 630% profit on a US$ 315 million 
investment)”.3164 Thus, the tribunal had differed in its approach from the “international 
precedents” by resorting to the doctrine of abuse of rights in regard to loss of future profits 
from an investment not yet incurred in a case where the defendant did not seek actively to 
dispossess the claimant of valuable contractual rights, but it had suffered helplessly from a 
precipitate deterioration in the macroeconomic value of a project with respect to which it had 
accepted the entire market risk.
3165
  
 
The reference to the doctrine of abuse of rights is open to criticism for the absence of proof 
showing an ill motive or explicit abuse by the claimant in seeking damages for the loss of 
opportunity to make profits, as such proof would be required under many national legal 
systems. For example, in the case of Karaha Bodas Co. (KBC) v. Perusahaan Pertambangan 
Minyak Das Gas Bumi Negara (Pertamina) and PT. PLN, which involved another power 
project subsequently suspended by Indonesia because of the financial crisis in the same 
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period, the tribunal held that Pertamina and PLN had breached the agreements with KBC, and 
were ‘condemned’ to pay US$111.1 million for ‘lost expenditures’ and US$150 million for 
‘loss of profits’ for an investment that had not been completed. The doctrine of abuse of rights 
had not been discussed in the arbitration, but it was raised in the enforcement proceedings by 
Pertamina. Pertamina challenged enforcement of the award in the US federal district court on 
the ground that “enforcement of the damages Award would violate the public policy of the 
United States”. Pertemina argued that “the Award violated the international abuse of rights 
doctrine and punished Pertamina for obeying the Indonesian government's decree.” In the 
appeal, Pertemina argued that “the Award is contrary to public policy because it violated the 
international law abuse of rights doctrine and because the district court's decision holds 
Pertamina liable for complying with Indonesian law.”3166 The US Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit held that an action can only violate the abuse of rights doctrine if one of the 
following three factors is present: (1) the predominant motive for the action is to cause harm; 
(2) the action is totally unreasonable given the lack of any legitimate interest in the exercise of 
the right and its exercise harms another; or (3) the right is exercised for a purpose other than 
that for which it exists. The Court stated that “The abuse of rights doctrine is not established 
in American law and KBC's actions do not meet the factors required to trigger its 
application.” According to the Court, the evidence in the record did not support Pertamina's 
argument that enforcing the award would penalize obedience to a governmental decree. The 
Court noted that the tribunal explained in the award that the relevant contracts between the 
parties shifted the risk of loss resulting from a government-ordered suspension onto Pertamina 
and PLN. In this context, the Court considered that Pertamina was challenging the substance 
of the tribunal's interpretation of the relevant contracts. The Court held that “An arbitration 
tribunal's contract interpretation does not violate public policy unless it "violates the most 
basic notions of morality and justice." The Tribunal's interpretation of the [Joint Operation 
Contract] and [Energy Sales Contract] does not approach this steep threshold.”3167  
 
However, the award of Karaha Bodas is also criticized from the point of view of the 
economists for being likely excessive, due to its failure to reflect the fair market value, which 
should lead to Pareto optimal results: “the party initiating the breach will be better off (the 
Indonesians will not have to pay for unneeded electricity) and the other party (KBC) will not 
be worse off than if the event had not occurred.”3168 It is pointed out that the project, including 
all assets and improvements, would revert free of cost to Pertamina at the end of 30 years, and 
projecting the stream of earnings for 30 years requires some heroic assumptions for a project 
that has not yet been completed. It is argued that the arbitrators in the case double counted in 
determining the amounts owed by Pertamina and PLN by awarding the amount of the 
investment, with no adjustment for the investment that had not been completed, plus the net 
present value of expected cash flows and, thus the resulting sum, which was 2.5 times the 
amount of investment that KBC claims to have made, was far above any reasonable estimate 
of the legitimate fair market value of the uncompleted project.
3169
 It is suggested that such 
excessive awards encourage investment in projects with great political risk, and behavior on 
the part of the investor to engineer an apparent default in order to reap greater profit by not 
performing than it would have earned if it performed, while discouraging government takings, 
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or breach of contract, when such actions are in fact efficient and thus desirable.
3170
 In the end, 
it is noted that KBC assets lied idle while the legal wheels turned for the collection of the 
award from Pertamina's assets in Singapore, Hong Kong, Canada, and the United States, 
whereas Dieng, a part of Himpurna’s former project, was at least generating some 
electricity.
3171
 
  
Moreover, it should be noted that the doctrine of abuse of rights as applied by the tribunal in 
the Himpurna award was distinct from the comparable doctrines that can be found in the 
national legal systems. The tribunal set aside the arguments of the parties as to the 
applicability of Indonesian law: both Article 1338 of the Civil Code that all contracts should 
be performed in good faith and Article 2(1) of the Usury Act of 1938 that a disproportion of 
obligations may entitle a judge to mitigate the obligations or even to declare the contract 
void.
3172
 The tribunal referred to an autonomous doctrine of abuse of rights, which it found in 
the arbitral decisions under the influence of the transnational theory of arbitration, and which 
purported to protect the interests of the foreign investors by preventing the host states from 
invoking their internal laws as an impediment to their consent to arbitration or their 
contractual obligations. It is considered as part of “international public policy” that “the states 
cannot later claim that they could not submit to arbitration due to their own national law.”3173 
The reasoning of the tribunal in the Himpurna award was apparently influenced by the 
consideration that if such an autonomous doctrine is widely accepted as valid when it is 
applied to protect the fundamental interests of the investors, without questioning its validity 
due to its dissimilarities with the comparable doctrines of the national legal systems, it should 
be equally and validly asserted for the protection of the similarly fundamental interests of the 
host state, when those are at stake in the particular circumstances of the case.  
 
In the case, the terms of the contract and the doctrines of force majeure or hardship under the 
applicable law did not allow any limitation of liability for the non-performance of the state 
party despite the grave macroeconomic consequences of awarding damages on the basis of the 
parties’ initial risk allocation. Moreover, the tribunal observed that the established rules have 
also proved insufficient to prevent the conflict between the expectations of the parties. The 
tribunal reached to the limits of ex post balancing exercise between the interests of the parties, 
as provided by the established rules and the flexibility in the estimates and approximations of 
the DCF method. The resulting decision, which was considered as being insufficient to 
protect the interests of the state party, seemed still inconsistent with the order of international 
commerce in the abstract reasoning of the tribunal, as it would directly disturb the internal 
order of Indonesia and, indirectly, the peaceful development of the overall order of 
international commerce. The fundamental question was that which of conflicting expectations 
is to be declared as reasonable, where the decision could not be logically deduced from the 
established rules. The tribunal invoked another established rule, the autonomous doctrine of 
abuse of rights, which so far had a different scope of application, in order to render a decision 
that serves the same order of actions as the other established rules. The tribunal found that the 
rule that allowed the claimant to obtain lost opportunity to make profit, counted on by the 
investor in forming his expectations, was false in the particular circumstances of the case, 
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even though it could be widely accepted and universally approved, because the tribunal 
discovered that in the particular circumstances it clashed with expectations, that could be 
based on the autonomous doctrine of abuse of rights.  
 
In the end, since, in its consideration, any other decision would not have served to enabling 
the correspondence of expectations in the order of international commerce, the tribunal 
eventually modified both rules counted on by the parties. It adopted a preventive approach to 
ensure the observance of good faith in the exercise of rights. The tribunal mentioned Bin 
Cheng's articulation of abuse of right as lack of good faith in the exercise of rights, and cited 
the principle of proscription against abuse of legal forms (ex re sed non ex nomine).
3174
 Cheng 
explains that, ex re sed non ex nomine is a principle of good faith and, inter alia, precludes the 
form of the law being used to cover the commission of what in fact is an unlawful act.
3175
 
Under the autonomous doctrine of abuse of rights, this principle represents the prohibition of 
a state's exercise of its rights to manipulate the regime applicable to legal entities controlled 
by a state for the purpose of evading its obligations.
3176
 Thus, the doctrine, as articulated by 
Cheng, at least requires an improper purpose in the exercise of the rights.
3177
 In this regard, 
the tribunal merely stated that “The Arbitral Tribunal does not believe that either Party has 
committed an abuse of right; rather, it wants to ensure that none occurs.”3178 
 
This preventive approach adopted by the tribunal on the basis of its abstract reasoning can be 
criticized for “opening the door to subjective decision-making”, which, in the tribunal’s own 
words, had to be taken seriously. Even so, the tribunal did not consider it decisive, noting that 
the claimant anticipated a risk of a finding of abuse of rights and argued vehemently against 
it.
3179
 The tribunal stated that “the legal process necessarily depends, to some extent, on the 
personal convictions of the decision-maker. If this were not so, the common law could hardly 
accommodate the notion of implied terms, nor could the civil law give effect to the 
fundamental rule - reflected in Article 1338(3) of the Indonesian Civil Code - that contracts 
must be performed in good faith.”3180 The tribunal concluded, in the award that, in satisfying 
the award PLN will be in a position to profit from the costs of investments, and if the 
Indonesian economy and demand for energy are resurgent, and if the projections put forward 
by the claimant are revealed to be correct, the outcome of the proceedings may have been 
favorable to PLN notwithstanding its breach. The tribunal stated that this was actually the 
premise of the contract as of 1994, “[b]ut the premise succumbed to a bitter wind, and having 
to deal with the circumstances as it found them, the Arbitral Tribunal sought to alleviate 
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PLN's burden as much as possible while respecting the clear contractual entitlements of the 
Claimant under an agreement which by its terms left very little to chance”.3181  
 
The tribunal’s final decision reached by the application of the autonomous doctrine of abuse 
of rights, in order to alleviate the burden of the state party, may seem fair in the particular 
circumstances of the case. The doctrine of abuse of right was invoked, because the claimant 
had a contractual right to make future investments under terms, which would have been 
ruinous to Indonesia, and the enforcement of that executory part of the contract would enable 
the claimant to pursue a program only to collect damages not yet incurred.
3182
 However, the 
decision may still be criticized for its failure to be more explicit and to elaborate on its theory, 
which may be called “anticipatory abuse of rights”. Perhaps for that reason, this unique theory 
has not typically been adopted by the tribunals in the context of international investment 
disputes, and it is considered as “a potentially awkward precedent”.3183  
 
On the other hand, the tribunal’s approach of balancing exercise between those interests by 
utilizing the flexibility afforded by the articulated and established rules is apparent in the 
ICSID case of CMS Gas Transmission Company v The Argentine Republic. CMS Gas, a US 
company, purchased approximately 30% share of TGN, an Argentinean gas transportation 
company.
3184
 Under the regime established by the laws and decrees and by the license granted 
to TGN in the context of Argentine’s privatization of its natural gas transmission and 
distribution companies, tariffs were to be calculated in US dollars, conversion to pesos to be 
effected at the time of billing and tariffs adjusted every six months in accordance with the US 
Producer Price Index (US PPI).
3185
 Towards the end of the 1990s, a serious economic crisis 
began to unfold in Argentina. In 2001, the Government passed emergency decrees and laws, 
under which the right of licensees of public utilities to adjust tariffs according to the US PPI 
and to calculate tariffs in dollars was terminated. The tariffs were redenominated in pesos at 
the rate of one peso to one dollar.
3186
 CMS argued that the guarantees with regard to the basic 
rules governing the license constituted essential conditions for CMS’s investment, and that it 
had an acquired right to the application of the agreed tariff.
3187
 It was further argued that the 
measures adopted were all attributable to the Argentine Government and resulted in the 
violation of all the major investment protections owed to CMS under the Argentina-US 
Bilateral Investment Treaty (the BIT). CMS requested compensation in the amount of US$ 
261 million, which represented the decreased value of its shares in TGN plus interest and 
costs. The Government argued that the license, and the legal and regulatory framework 
governing it, provided only for the right of the licensee to a fair and reasonable tariff and no 
guarantees were offered in respect of convertibility and currency devaluation, and the risk 
inherent to the investment in these respects was expressly brought to the attention of the 
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company.
3188
 The ICISD tribunal rejected CMS’ claims of expropriation under Article IV and 
of discriminatory and arbitrary treatment under Article II(2)(b) of the BIT.
3189
 On the other 
hand it ruled that Argentina had “breached its obligations to accord the investor the fair and 
equitable treatment guaranteed in Article II(2)(a) of the Treaty and to observe the obligations 
entered into with regard to the investment guaranteed in Article II(2)(c) of the Treaty”.3190  
 
In determining the compensation due in the circumstances, the tribunal first considered that 
depending on the circumstances, various methods have been used by the tribunals to 
determine the compensation which should be paid, but the general concept upon which 
commercial valuation of assets is based is that of “fair market value”. The tribunal referred to, 
in its view, “an internationally recognized definition” which reads as “the price, expressed in 
terms of cash equivalents, at which property would change hands between a hypothetical 
willing and able buyer and a hypothetical willing and able seller, acting at arms length in an 
open and unrestricted market, when neither is under compulsion to buy and when both have 
reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts.”3191 However, in the absence of expropriation and 
guidance in the Treaty as to the appropriate measure of damages or compensation relating to 
fair and equitable treatment and other breaches of the standards, the tribunal had to exercise 
its discretion to address the standard of compensation applicable in the circumstances of the 
dispute.
3192
 Exercising its discretion and considering the cumulative nature of the breaches in 
the case and their effect of long-term losses, the tribunal decided to apply the standard of fair 
market value, even if it prominently applies to the cases of expropriation.
3193
 The Tribunal 
selected the DCF method as the most appropriate in the case for the following reasons: (i) the 
shares of TGN were not publicly traded on a stock exchange or any other public market, (ii) 
TGN was a going concern, (iii) DCF techniques had been universally adopted, including by 
numerous tribunals, as an appropriate method for valuating business assets, (iv) there was 
adequate data to make a rational DCF valuation of TGN, and (v) experts from both sides 
agreed that the DCF was the proper method in the case for determining losses that had 
extended through a prolonged period of time.
3194
 
 
The tribunal determined that no damages should be considered beyond the initial period of 35 
years of the license of TGN, ending in 2027. Although TGN was entitled to an additional ten-
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year extension of the license, the tribunal considered that the license was very clear about the 
fact that this right was conditional and subject to a number of steps, both substantive and 
procedural, which might or might not take place, and it would be impossible to establish at the 
time of the award whether these conditions might be met. Thus, the tribunal decided to rely on 
the year 2027 for its determination of damages.
3195
 The tribunal noted the challenges 
associated with the DCF analysis in the case because some of the relevant factors included a 
large degree of uncertainty. The tribunal had to evaluate “not only what the years 2000 to 
2027 would have been like had TGN’s license and regulatory environment remained 
unchanged, but also to foresee what the future held for TGN under the new (and not 
completely known) regulatory environment.”3196 Even so, the tribunal decided that it was still 
possible, with the appropriate methodology and the use of reasonable alternative sets of 
hypotheses, to arrive at “rationally justified” figures that would not be “arbitrary or analogous 
to a shot in the dark”.3197 
 
The tribunal repeatedly stated in the award that the crisis could not be ignored and it had 
specific consequences on the question of appropriate remedy.
3198
 The tribunal even stated that 
it “has the greatest sympathy for the plight of the Argentine people under the circumstances 
and respects its efforts to overcome the situation.”3199 Although, the tribunal did not accept 
the applicability of the doctrines of hardship and state of necessity
3200
, it decided to take into 
account the crisis as a matter of fact, and stated that “facts of course do not eliminate 
compliance with the law but do have a perceptible influence on the manner in which the law 
can be applied.”3201 The tribunal stated that “the Claimant cannot ask to be entirely beyond 
the reach of the abnormal conditions prompted by the crisis”, but “at the same time, it would 
be wholly unjustifiable that the Claimant be overburdened with all the costs of the crisis… in 
light of the subsidization that the Claimant has in effect had to meet in respect of other 
businesses in Argentina, a burden which if necessary has to be born by the Government, at 
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least in part.”3202 In the tribunal’s view, the crisis had in itself a severe impact on the 
claimant's business, but this impact must to some extent be attributed to the business risk the 
Claimant took on when investing in Argentina, this being particularly the case as it related to 
decrease in demand. The tribunal stated that “Such effects cannot be ignored as if business 
had continued as usual. Otherwise, both parties would not be sharing some of the costs of the 
crisis in a reasonable manner and the decision could eventually amount to an insurance policy 
against business risk, an outcome that, as the Respondent has rightly argued, would not be 
justified. On the other hand, a number of the measures adopted did indeed contribute to such 
hardship and the burden of those ought not to be placed on the Claimant alone.”3203  
 
Accordingly, the effect of crisis was taken into account during the DCF analysis when 
projecting the gas demand trends.
3204
 The approach of ‘sharing of costs’ also seems to have 
influenced the way, in which the tribunal accepted or modified various assumptions, which 
were the basis of CMS’s expert report, but those may not be definitely established from the 
text of the award, since the tribunal examined two different DCF scenarios (one in the “no 
regulatory change” context and the other for the post-measures “new regulatory context”)3205, 
and the consequences of mathematical operations that lead to the final figure did not feature in 
the award.
3206
 After those modifications, the tribunal arrived “at a DCF loss valuation of 
US$133.2 million for the Claimant on August 17, 2000, representing the compensation owed 
in that regard by the Respondent to the Claimant at that date”.3207 Thus, it can be argued that 
although deciding that the compensation standard of expropriation cases was found 
appropriate in this particular case of breach and that the date to be relied upon for the 
computation of values would be the date of breach
3208
, the tribunal did not reallocate the risks 
of negative events subsequent to the breach entirely to the Government for its illegal conduct, 
but engaged in a balancing exercise between the interests of the investor and the host state.  
 
3. Concluding Remarks 
 
Under lex mercatoria, the first established rule relevant to the damages for non-performance is 
the principle of full compensation, which requires the decision maker to give effect to the 
expectation of the aggrieved party from the performance of the contract by putting it into as 
good a financial position as that in which it would have been if the contract had been duly 
performed. The determination of the reasonableness of this expectation and, thus, the amount 
of recoverable damages under the principle of full compensation appear, in the first instance, 
as an issue of contextual interpretation and supplementation of the articulated rules in the 
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particular circumstances of the case. For that reason, it is observed that, in the arbitral 
practice, while there is usually a clear winner on the question of liability as a matter of law, 
the ruling on damages is frequently less categorical, and it is argued that the parties feel that if 
they were clearly right, they should have been awarded the full measure of damages 
requested, and perceive arbitrators as too conciliatory, and “splitting the difference”.3209  
 
The matters of fact and law in the determination of the amount of recoverable damages are 
closely intertwined under lex mercatoria, due to the prevalence of the contextual approach to 
the issue of causation in the established limitations to the amount of damages. The decision 
maker applying lex mercatoria should first analyze the causal connections between the alleged 
loss, on the one hand, and the parties’ respective failures to perform their specific and residual 
contractual obligations and such events that are subject to specific or residual risk allocations, 
on the other. Then, the decision maker may rely on estimates and approximations in the 
assessment of the respective weight of all causes and, if necessary, in a subsequent reduction 
in the amount of the alleged loss, as long as the causal connections are reasonably certain, in 
accordance with the established limitation of certainty of damages, rather than all-or-nothing 
solutions of the national legal systems, in order to give effect to the reasonable expectations of 
the parties in a more accurate manner. Thus, the decision maker is required not only to base 
its assessment on the available evidence, but also to ascertain the causes of the loss within the 
framework of the law between the parties, which means the specific or residual contractual 
rights and obligations as well as the specific or residual allocation of risks under the 
transaction. After determining the liability of a party for non-performance, the decision maker 
applying lex mercatoria should establish the existence and extent of the loss incurred by the 
aggrieved party by focusing, in the first instance, on the causes of the loss the aggrieved party 
alleges that it incurred. In this regard, the decision maker should take into account two 
categories of potential causes in order to determine the amount of recoverable damages as 
accurately as possible.  
 
In the first category, the decision maker should take into account certain events that are 
related to the contractual relationship and can be considered as instrumental in giving rise to 
the loss allegedly incurred by the aggrieved party due to the non-performance. Where those 
events are considered as a cause of the alleged loss, they will have the effect of limiting the 
amount of damages, to the extent that the risks of their occurrence are assumed by the 
aggrieved party under the specific or residual allocations of the risks. For instance, the non-
performing party will not be liable to pay for the loss incurred by the aggrieved party as a 
result of non-performance, where such loss was unforeseeable for the non-performing party at 
the time of contracting, since the risk of relevant unforeseeable events that caused the loss 
will be considered as being allocated to the aggrieved party. This risk allocation will be 
derived from the contract terms or the chosen default rules, or from the relevant trade usages, 
the applicable national law or the established rule of foreseeability of loss. Similarly, other 
events that contributed to the loss of the aggrieved party will have the effect of limiting the 
amount of recoverable damages as a matter of causation and interpretation of contract and its 
supplementation with individualized terms, which determine whether such events fall under 
the aggrieved party’s sphere of risk, such as investor’s or contractor’s risk, under the specific 
or residual risk allocations, regardless of whether the applicable default rules recognize such 
concepts as contributory negligence or comparative fault. In the same vein, regardless of the 
position of the relevant national legal system to the issue of mitigation of damages, the risk of 
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prolonged inactivity of the aggrieved party after the non-performance will belong to the 
aggrieved party, if it is not specifically reallocated by the contract, or residually allocated by 
the decision maker to the non-performing party on the basis of the considerations of 
reasonableness and the ordinary course of events in the order of international commerce. 
 
In the second category, the decision maker should consider the effect of the failure of the 
aggrieved party to perform its specific or residual contractual obligations relating to the 
periods relating to both prior and subsequent to the non-performance. Such obligations can be 
found in the terms of the contract or the default rules of national laws chosen by the parties, or 
derived by the decision maker from the established rules in the particular case, such as trade 
usages in the narrow sense, or the default rules determined by the decision maker to be 
applicable. The failure of the aggrieved party to perform such obligations may lead to a 
reduction in the amount of damages, if the failure can be considered as a cause contributing to 
the loss suffered by the aggrieved party. In the period prior to non-performance, the aggrieved 
party will firstly be under an obligation not to interfere with the performance of the other 
party under the basic principle of good faith and fair dealing. In some cases, the contract may 
specifically provide a sequence of obligations, under which one party’s contractual 
obligations are explicitly recognized as a condition for the proper performance by the other 
party. In the period subsequent to the non-performance, the aggrieved party may be under 
specific or residual obligations to request the non-performing party to cure its non-
performance under the contract, or to consider properly an offer made by the non-performing 
party to cure its non-performance, such as where it is provided so in the contract or the 
applicable default rules, or where substitute arrangements would be unreasonable. Thus, such 
obligations generally require the aggrieved party to cooperate with the non-performing party. 
Yet, they may also require the aggrieved party to protect its own interests. In this sense, the 
aggrieved party may be obliged to exercise due diligence during the period of contract 
negotiations in seeking information as to particular risks, which are allocated to it by the 
contract terms or established rules in the particular case, such as trade usages or other 
practices. Similarly, under the principle of foreseeability, where only one of the parties 
foresees a particular loss that may arise from the non-performance of the other party, the 
former party should disclose the risk to the latter before contracting, and pay him to assume it, 
in order to protect its interests in the full compensation of damages.  
 
Thus, in abstract terms, the decision maker applying lex mercatoria to a case of damages for 
non-performance will determine, through a contextual approach, whether or to what extent the 
loss allegedly incurred by the aggrieved party was caused by the non-performance and the 
events attributable to the risk sphere of the non-performing party, and whether or to what 
extent such loss was caused by the failure of the aggrieved party to perform its specific or 
residual obligations and the events attributable to the risk sphere of the aggrieved party. In 
these determinations, the decision maker will evaluate the available evidence, by resorting, if 
necessary, to the test of reasonable persons of the same kind as the parties placed under the 
same circumstances and award damages in accordance with the established rule of certainty of 
damages. Thus, the damages will be awarded only for the loss, which can be considered as 
being directly caused by the non-performance and the events attributable to the risk sphere of 
the non-performing party, provided that the existence of the loss and its causal connections 
can be established with a reasonable degree of certainty. However, such certainty will 
generally not be sought for the extent of loss, since the decision maker will have the discretion 
to set the amount of damages even where such amount cannot be established with a 
reasonable degree of certainty, as long as the existence of loss is sufficiently certain. This 
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discretionary power will be derived from the applicable default rules or from the established 
rule of certainty of damages, which require the exercise of equity infra legem. 
 
In ICC Case No. 9950, the arbitral tribunal aptly referred to and consolidated the law 
applicable to the merits as chosen by the parties in their contract, both the substantive and 
procedural law at the seat of the arbitration, and the UNIDROIT Principles, in order to 
demonstrate that the decision makers have discretion in the assessment of damages, and such 
discretion does not amount to their acting as amiable compositeurs and exercising equity 
contra legem. Under the relevant contract, the defendant, a French company, undertook to 
design and supply equipment for an industrial plant and to supervise the construction of the 
plant. The claimant, an Egyptian company, initiated arbitral proceedings, in which it claimed 
loss of profits, due to the defendant's faulty design and performance, plus various other losses 
and expenses, which led to complex questions as to the quantification of the losses. The 
contract was governed by Egyptian law. The arbitral tribunal was satisfied that the claimant 
suffered substantial losses. The tribunal stated that “An Arbitral Tribunal must not be deterred 
by the complexities of quantification from awarding full compensation to an aggrieved 
party.”3210 In this regard, the tribunal referred to the Egyptian Civil Code, which “places a 
responsibility on a judge to fix the amount of damages” and to the decisions of the Egyptian 
Court of Cassation, which “referred on a number of occasions to the elements of judicial 
discretion in the allocation of damages”. The tribunal also noted that, under Swiss law, the 
law at the place of arbitration, “Article 42 of the Swiss Code of Obligations recognizes an 
element of discretion in cases where exact damages cannot be quantified”. The tribunal found 
further support for such an approach in the statement of the principles for the assessment of 
damages in Articles 7.4.1-7.4.3 of the UNIDROIT Principles. However, the tribunal 
emphasized that the discretion in the assessment of damages operates within the confines of a 
scrupulous examination of the evidence presented by the parties, and it must avoid acting as 
an amiable compositeur. The tribunal also noted that it was required by the terms of reference 
and Swiss law to rule on all of the claims and counterclaims of the parties. The tribunal 
considered that it would fail in its duty to the parties, and arguably leave the award open to 
challenge as infra petita, if it declined to award damages simply on the basis of the 
complexities of their quantification.
3211
 
 
The contextual approach to the issue of causation will prevail in the first instance in the 
determination of the amount of recoverable damages under lex mercatoria, and enable the 
decision maker to pay attention to the articulated or established limitations of foreseeability, 
mitigation and contribution, whether it is called upon to decide under a specific national law 
or not. Then, estimates and approximations of the decision maker will follow in the context of 
actual quantification of recoverable damages through the rule of certainty. Such estimates and 
approximations eventually govern, to a great extent, the determination of the amount of loss 
that can be recoverable by the aggrieved party as damages on the basis of the specific or 
residual contractual obligations and risk allocations. Particularly, they will have an effect on 
the final sum to be awarded as lost profits, an element of the full compensation.  
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The default rules provided by the national legal systems and international instruments provide 
little or no guidance on how lost profits should be calculated, and simply give the decision 
maker broad discretion to fix damages for lost profits. In the context of international 
transactions, training has been available to enable contract negotiators and advisers, as well as 
parties in arbitrations, to deal more effectively with the issues related to damages. In 
arbitrations, costs and damages analysis has been developed and presented by accounting and 
financial professionals. Major accounting and consultancy firms have departments 
specifically versed in the quantification of damages to ensure they are as certain as they can 
be. Most international arbitral tribunals devote the necessary time to assess the evidence 
provided by those specialists in order to establish, with a satisfactory degree of certainty, the 
amount of damages claimed. 
3212
 However, many analyses and methods developed for 
quantification of damages are still based on estimates and approximations. In ADC Affiliate 
Limited and ADC & ADMC Management Limited v. Republic of Hungary, the ICSID 
tribunal underlined its discretionary assessment in arriving at the final sum as the amount of 
damages: “The Tribunal is of course grateful to the experts on both sides for their enormous 
help on the issue of damages.  However the Tribunal feels bound to point out that the 
assessment of damages is not a science. True it is that the experts use a variety of 
methodologies and tools in order to attempt to arrive at the correct figure.  But at the end of 
the day, the Tribunal can stand back and look at the work product and arrive at a figure with 
which it is comfortable in all the circumstances of the case.”3213 The ad hoc tribunal in 
Himpurna case similarly commented that: “To be fair, there is nothing new under the sun. 
Lucrum cessans has always been an inexact science. As the arbitral tribunal put it in the 
Delagoa Bay case almost exactly one century ago: “such a computation made in advance on 
the basis of purely theoretical data cannot hope to be absolutely accurate but only 
comparatively likely”.”3214 Even so, the tribunal added that “There is no reason to apologise 
for the fact that this approach involves approximations; they are inherent and inevitable. Nor 
can it be criticised as unrealistic or unbusinesslike: it is precisely how business executives 
must and do, proceed when they evaluate a going concern. The fact that they use ranges and 
estimates does not imply abandonment of the discipline of economic analysis; nor when 
adopted by the arbitrators does this method imply abandonment of the discipline of assessing 
the evidence before them.”3215 
 
It is observed that while international arbitrators tend to be conservative with respect to lost 
profits, in view of the fact that international contracts are fraught with greater uncertainties 
than domestic ones, they award some measure of damages, if they believe that in the normal 
course of events it was reasonable to anticipate some profits, even if those damages may not 
be proved to a mathematical certainty or by complete documentary proof.
3216
 It can be said 
that the following statement written in 1927 in relation to the international law still preserves 
its validity even in the private disputes. “The border line between direct and indirect damages, 
                                                 
3212
 Gélinas, Paul-A., General Characteristics of Recoverable Damages in International Arbitration, in Yves 
Derains & Richard H. Kreindler, (eds.), Evaluation of Damages in International Arbitration, ICC Publication No. 
668, 2006, at 13 
3213
 ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC & ADMC Management Limited v. Republic of Hungary (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/16) October 2, 2006, at para. 521 
3214
 Ad hoc (UNCITRAL) Case, Himpurna California Energy Ltd (Bermuda) v. PT. (Persero) Perusahaan 
Listruik Negara (Indonesia), Final Award, 4 May 1999, at para. 578 
3215
 Ibid., at para. 580 
3216
 Craig, W. Laurence, William W. Park & Jan Paulsson, International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration, 
Oceana Publications, 3
rd
 ed., 2000, at 659 
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or between prospective and merely speculative profits, is seldom clear, and its determination 
is often dependent upon the subjective estimate of the arbitrator, who is, in fact, guided not so 
much by the technical distinctions between different kinds of damages, as by the wish, 
perfectly justified in law, to afford full redress to the injured. But to maintain that 
international law disregards altogether compensation for lucrum cessans is as repellant to 
justice and common sense, as it is out of accord with the practice of international 
tribunals.”3217 
 
In the context of state party disputes involving expropriations or other breaches of contracts 
by the state party, the claims for lost profits has become particularly problematic, when the 
state party’s actions not only injures the investor’s business, but also destroys it, and the 
tribunal must determine the value of the business lost. The standard of compensation on the 
basis of the fair market value, which determines the price that the hypothetical willing buyer 
would pay the hypothetical willing seller, includes not only the tangible assets of the business 
lost, but also the stream of profits it can be expected to produce over its lifetime. The 
compensation in this context usually requires cash flow projections, which have an element of 
speculation. The element of speculation in the calculation of the investor’s lost profits 
increases with the number of years to which a projection relates, yet the period of time that 
forms the basis of the projections into the future may not be reduced by the decision maker on 
the basis of the rule of mitigation, where the investor cannot be reasonably expected to 
mitigate such loss, to the extent the state’s actions destroy its business. In this context, the 
decision maker should engage in a balancing exercise between the interests of the parties in 
order to ensure that neither party exploits the other. Thus, the claims for lost profits are treated 
differently from the claims for lost profits in the context of private party disputes.  
 
First, the claim of the investor for lost profits in a state party dispute may be denied where 
their amount cannot be established with a sufficient degree of certainty, if the business is not a 
going concern that can be considered as a legally protected interest of sufficient certainty to 
be compensable as lost profits. Particularly, where the relevant investment lacks a sufficient 
history of profits for projecting future profitability, and the post-breach events further render 
the future profitability of business highly speculative, the decision maker may deny a claim 
for lost profits on the ground of uncertainty, even if the prospect of profits can be considered 
as reasonably certain when the investor engaged in the project. The rejection of lost profits for 
the lack of certainty of loss ensures that the investor, which has made only a small fraction of 
the anticipated investment, may not exploit the public funds of the state party by making a 
substantial profit on the basis of an award of damages without having to make the investment 
that was originally contemplated for the benefit of the state and its citizens.  
 
Secondly, in cases of unlawful expropriations, the decision maker may adopt, as the basis of 
compensation, the valuation as of the date of award rather than the date of expropriation, if 
the first valuation results in a greater sum than the second due to the improved business 
conditions during the interim period. This is a residual risk allocation implied by the 
customary international law, and it precludes the state party from arguing that the improved 
business conditions were unforeseeable at the time of expropriation. This risk allocation 
prevents the exploitation of the economic windfall on the part of the states that have illegally 
imposed measures to take over the investments, whose business conditions turned out to be 
                                                 
3217
 Lauterpacht, Hersch, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law: with Special Reference to 
International Arbitration, Lawbook Exchange, 2002, (Originally published: New York: Longmans, Green and 
Co., 1927), at 148-149 
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better than expected. It also implies that the state may not invoke the standard of valuation as 
of the date of award to pay a lower compensation than the standard of valuation as of the date 
of expropriation, where the investment would have lost value in the absence of the unlawful 
expropriation. Thus, the expropriating state is precluded from benefiting its own illegal act, 
which forced the investor to transfer its investment to the state, and prevented it from 
exercising the option of selling the investment at arm’s length when the business conditions 
were better. 
 
Finally, even if the risks of subsequent events that increase the burden of the state party’s 
performance of its obligations, such as financial crises or currency devaluations, are allocated 
to the state party specifically or residually, such burden arising from the materialization of 
those risks may be shared between the parties by the decision maker utilizing the flexibility in 
the estimates and approximations in the calculation of the lost profits of the investor, where 
the imposition of damages awarded on the basis of a calculation of lost profits in total 
disregard of the fact that the effect of subsequent events on the investment would be ruinous 
to the state and its citizenry. However, despite the calculation of damages on that basis, the 
burden on the state party may still appear excessive in relation to the gain to be obtained by 
the investor, where the latter has the contractual right to make further investment and to claim 
damages for its lost opportunity to make profit, thereby increasing the likelihood of 
exploitation on the part of the investor. In this regard, the Himpurna award, which deprived 
the investor for claiming damages for its lost opportunity to make profit, does not seem to set 
a precedent, due to its failure to provide sufficient insight as to the basis of such deprivation, 
i.e. its innovative theory of “anticipatory abuse of rights”. Thus, the decision maker applying 
lex mercatoria should still take into account such loss but, in its quantification, he should 
attempt to utilize the flexibility in the relevant estimates and approximations to share the 
burden between the parties, in order to render an award that would be more lenient with the 
state party, while “respecting the imperatives of contractual reliability”, thereby avoiding 
undue disruption in the internal order of the state party and enabling the peaceful development 
of the overall order of international commerce. This can be considered as the recognition of 
the equitable component in the evaluations of quantum in the context of state party disputes. 
 
Under lex mercatoria, the inevitable persistence of estimates, approximations and equitable 
considerations in the quantification of the damages should not be readily considered as 
prescribing a decision of “splitting the difference” between the parties, since such a decision 
implies a process of conciliatory decision making and an underlying intention on the part of 
the decision maker to satisfy both of the parties by giving something to both parties. As 
outlined above in abstract terms, there are many factual and legal considerations to be taken 
into account by the decision maker in determining the amount of recoverable damages, and 
those clearly indicate an exercise of equity infra legem and the concern for accuracy in 
determining and giving effect to the reasonable expectations of the parties, in an area of 
substantial uncertainty. The parties to a contract may reduce this uncertainty to some extent 
by providing contractual limitations to the amount of damages for non-performance, but even 
such limitations will be subject to the interpretation, supplementation or intervention of the 
decision maker exercising a considerable degree of discretionary power. Thus, the decision 
maker applying lex mercatoria should articulate in the final award, as explicit as possible, its 
abstract reasoning, which has been exercised in applying the articulated or established rules 
and evaluating the available evidence. The decision maker should render an award of 
damages, which clearly shows that the rationale underlying the award is the accuracy, and not 
compromise in a particular case, by expressly resorting to those limitations to the amount of 
recoverable damages, which arise from the causal connections between the loss and the 
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relevant events, articulated rules and established rules in the particular case, in order to enable 
the parties to comment and cooperate in the utilization of the knowledge of the particular 
circumstances of time and place. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
The order of international commerce is complex and spontaneous. In the order of international 
commerce, a multiplicity of elements of various kinds, such as states, businessmen, and 
international governmental or non-governmental organizations, are closely related to each 
other, and none of those elements may claim to assume control on this extended and more 
complex order, in contrast to an internal order of an organization, without interfering with and 
impeding the forces producing its spontaneity and effectiveness. This order is of such 
complexity that can be designed neither as a whole, nor by shaping each part separately 
without regard to the rest, but only by consistently adhering to certain principles that establish 
abstract relations among the multiplicity of those elements. In this order, the knowledge is so 
widely dispersed throughout those elements that no single organization could acquire enough 
of it to articulate and stabilize ex ante the normative expectations of individuals under a 
specific and deliberate purpose. Thus, the actions of individuals owe their effectiveness not 
only to ex ante articulated forms of knowledge governing those actions by known aims or 
known connections between means and ends, but also to the knowledge of the particular 
circumstances of time and place which, practically, puts each individual in an advantageous 
position to pursue his own purpose, over all others. Such knowledge is unique to its 
possessors and its utilization requires that the decisions depending on it are left to them or are 
made with their active cooperation. 
 
In this order, the success of an individual’s actions in achieving his purpose, ultimately, 
depends on his capacity to adapt his actions both to the particular facts which he knows and to 
other facts he does not or cannot know. Such an adaptation occurs through abstractions, 
whereby the individual deals with a reality he cannot fully comprehend. Abstractions form the 
basis of individual’s capacity to act successfully in an order very imperfectly known to him. 
By means of abstractions, the individual in this order understands its basic principles, 
converts his incomplete knowledge into a workable format, and forms reasonable 
expectations on the basis of his knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place 
and the basic principles that the ongoing order of actions rests on. Reasonableness of 
expectations in this order depends on the possibility of maximizing the expectations of the 
elements of the order as a whole being fulfilled and corresponding, in light of the common 
interest of all the elements of the order, which is the ability to make feasible plans for 
particular purposes without impeding the very order providing this ability. The order of 
international commerce arises from the separate knowledge of all its elements, without this 
knowledge ever being universal in its entirety. Consequently, the degree of power of ex ante 
control over the expectations is much smaller than that which could be exercised over an 
internal order of an organization. There are many aspects of the order of international 
commerce over which the elements possess no control at all, since the control in those aspects 
is deferred to the ex post processes, which utilize the dispersed knowledge when confronted 
with a particular constellation of circumstances. If any authority claims to assume ex ante 
control on those aspects, it shall not be able to do so, without interfering with and impeding 
the forces producing the spontaneous order.    
 
The function of law in this order should be the preservation and restoration of this order, 
which consists of a system of abstract relations among various elements, and whose 
abstractness enables the order to persist while all the particular elements it comprise change. 
The order will always be an adaptation to a large number of particular facts which will not be 
known in their totality to anyone. In this order, there will naturally be some rules, which are 
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the products of deliberate design, and there will always be deliberate organizations in which 
groups of individuals will join for the achievement of some particular ends. However, those 
rules and organizations will be integrated into this more comprehensive and spontaneous 
order, and the coordination of the activities of all these separate organizations, as well as of 
the separate individuals, will be brought about by the forces making for a spontaneous order. 
In this order, the law should be the means of enforcing the established manner of doing things 
and tacit knowledge, which can only be traced ex post by means of abstractions that utilize the 
knowledge of particular circumstances of time and place. These established rules indicate the 
correspondence of the expectations of the elements of this order and, thus, they are the 
fundamental means of producing and maintaining a spontaneous order. 
 
Since the sixteenth century, the concept of lex mercatoria have been understood as a response 
to the disturbances in this spontaneous order, because the political authorities, who tend to try 
to turn their domain into an organization, have attempted to make laws without taking into 
account the basic principles on which this order rests and by substituting their knowledge 
articulated in their laws for the knowledge of particular circumstances of time and place 
possessed by the parties to a particular commercial contract. In the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, the proponents of lex mercatoria tried to protect the capacity for abstractions of the 
medieval mercantile courts, which took into account the knowledge of the parties to a 
particular dispute, applied such rules that were not developed with any deliberate purpose, but 
served to maintain and improve the order of actions, which the already existing rules made 
possible and in which the individual merchants were able to make feasible plans. In the 
nineteenth century of Germany, the lawyers thought that the use of Roman law displacing 
customary law that grew out of the soul of the Volk similarly restricted the utilization of 
knowledge of particular circumstances of time and place through the capacity of ex post 
decision makers for abstractions, and they argued, on the basis of the concept of lex 
mercatoria that, in commercial matters, judges must be able to use their common sense and to 
disregard all juristic notions arising from Roman law in order properly to grasp and master the 
nature of the commercial transactions. Similarly, some lawyers from common law tradition 
opposed to its constricting formalism during the late nineteenth century and early twentieth 
century, and promoted lex mercatoria as the customary law discovered by the sound instincts 
of decision makers specialized in commercial matters. 
 
In the twentieth century, the modern lex mercatoria doctrine emerged for the restoration of the 
liberal and spontaneous order of international commerce, which was disturbed by the political 
divisions and conflicts between the states. The traditional conflict of laws regime was 
indifferent to these issues in the determination of the applicable law to the international 
transactions. In this context, the spontaneous order of international commerce was most 
obviously attacked when some states attempted to repudiate their contractual obligations 
towards foreign investors in contravention to the liberal principles of contract law. These host 
states claimed the application of the laws made by their own organizations in an attempt to 
overcome those liberal principles, which bound them to freely undertaken contractual 
obligations. The arbitral tribunals resolved the disputes between those states and private 
parties on the basis of an abstract reasoning and applied general principles of law, 
disregarding the traditional conflict of laws regime and the collective actions of some states to 
change the existing order profoundly. The gradual recognition by the states of this practice of 
transnational arbitration indicated the capacity of arbitrators to render valid decisions on the 
basis of an abstract reasoning, and constituted one of the pillars of the theories of the first 
generation of the proponents of modern lex mercatoria doctrine. The first generation 
purported to extend the capacity for abstractions in ex post judicial processes to the resolution 
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of contractual disputes between private parties, through their ideas of an autonomous legal 
system for the international merchants coming from different jurisdictions and legal cultures, 
in the context of political division between North and South on the one hand, and between 
East and West on the other. Later, the second generation understood lex mercatoria as a 
method for decision making whereby the idiosyncratic or outdated rules of law found in a 
national law can be disregarded by ex post the decision maker in order to preserve the 
spontaneous order of international commerce. 
 
The dissertation has suggested a new theory of lex mercatoria, which accounts for the 
complex and spontaneous order of international commerce. This theory differs from the 
majority of theories discussed so far in the modern doctrine of lex mercatoria, which has 
failed to provide a proper reflection of the abstract relations in the order of international 
commerce, due to their search for such mechanisms that may ironically turn the domain of 
this order into a form of organization, similar to the national legal systems. The modern lex 
mercatoria doctrine, representing it either as a legal system or as a method of decision 
making, has implicitly set the stabilization of expectations as an aim for lex mercatoria to 
have an ex ante effect on the incentives and behaviors of international merchants as well as 
their contracts, similar to the effect of national laws on their subjects. Therefore, the concept 
of lex mercatoria has always been closely connected to the harmonization and unification of 
the national laws. However, such an approach rendered the modern lex mercatoria doctrine 
vulnerable to the attacks of its opponents due to the lack of precision and completeness of lex 
mercatoria. Thus, it is strongly argued by the opponents that lex mercatoria, because of its 
inherent uncertainty, fails to provide the international merchants with a set of rules, which is 
sufficiently accessible and certain to permit the efficient conduct of their transactions, and 
leads to doubts about its claim that it is more appropriate, in its content or methodology, than 
national legal systems, for the resolution of disputes arising from international contracts. 
Under the traditional understanding, lex mercatoria increases the likelihood of an 
unreasonable and uncertain application of the law governing the contractual disputes, while 
the wide acceptance of the principle of party autonomy by national legal systems is essentially 
aimed at reducing the uncertainty created by the territoriality of institutions in the order of 
international commerce. 
 
The issue of uncertainty should be examined in the light of the nature of the order of 
international commerce, which is distinct from the internal orders of the national legal 
systems. This distinct nature requires an understanding of the concept of lex mercatoria as a 
different method from the national legal systems in dealing with legal uncertainty. An 
important function of any legal regulation is to deal with legal uncertainty, which arises from 
the imperfect knowledge of individuals about when and under what conditions the coercive 
power of the law is exercised. However, there is an undeniable tension between reducing legal 
uncertainty and providing justice in a particular case. Thus, the national legal systems consist 
of rules and standards. The rules arise from the formal consolidations of similar instances, on 
the basis of usage, custom or case law, in accordance with the position of authorities in the 
legal system, following a particular purpose. The rules are articulated forms of the knowledge 
of particular circumstances of time and place in the internal order of the legal system. 
Standards in a legal system authorize the decision makers to exercise abstract reasoning, and 
give legal character to their own consolidations of relevant materials on the basis of their 
specialization. The decision maker gives content to those standards ex post by weighing all 
essential facts, interests and expectations of the parties to a particular case and ascertaining 
justice in each individual case. Since the tension between legal certainty and justice in a 
particular case is mainly related to the adaptation to changes in the particular circumstances of 
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time and place, standards leave the ultimate decisions to the ex post decision makers, who are 
in a position to obtain the knowledge of the relevant changes and of the sources available to 
meet them when confronted with particular cases.  
 
However, the national legal systems tend to deal with legal uncertainty mainly on the basis of 
formal consolidations, thereby converting legal uncertainty as much as possible into legal 
risks. Formal consolidations achieve ex ante stabilization of expectations through certain legal 
structures, such as legislation, or case law, and the emerging ex ante effect turns uncertainty 
into risk. The conversion of legal uncertainty into legal risk forms an obstacle in the ex post 
decision making process to the utilization of the parties’ knowledge of the particular 
circumstances of time and place, most of which is dispersed and tacit in the order of 
international commerce. Under the national legal systems, such expectations, which can be 
considered as reasonable from the ex post perspective of abstract reasoning, utilizing the 
knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place, may exceptionally be given 
effect to, despite the existence of formal consolidations, when the application of those legal 
structures results in grave and evident injustice in a particular case. However, injustice in this 
sense means that such an application must result in a great disturbance in the internal order of 
the system. In those situations, most of the national legal systems allow the decision maker to 
use his power of discretion within their framework and decide in accordance with the 
standards of that system, thereby utilizing the tacit knowledge that is instrumental in keeping 
a society together. The decision maker is forced to transcend the law by using his power of 
discretion within the framework of the legal system in order to achieve justice in a particular 
case, and to translate this experience into legal decisions for the self-referential structure of 
the legal system. 
 
As far as the control of legal uncertainty is concerned, lex mercatoria represents an alternative 
to a legal system in dealing with legal uncertainty, to the extent that lex mercatoria depends 
on the national legal systems for the coercive enforcement of legal rules. It provides the 
opportunity to turn legal uncertainty into a gain in the sense of restoration of the spontaneous 
order of actions in the context of international commerce, which has been disturbed by the 
contractual dispute, but not into a risk for other transactions, since there is no organization in 
the order of international commerce, whose task is to provide formal consolidations and to 
ensure that each ex post decision maker translates his experience with legal uncertainty into 
some legal structures so as to turn lex mercatoria into a legal system stabilizing expectations. 
Even in a legal system, there is always a need for such mechanisms involving the techniques 
of flexibility and adaptability that allows the ex post decision maker to utilize the tacit 
component in the knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place possessed by 
the parties, for the adaptation of the legal system to the ongoing order of actions that take 
place in any society of individuals. This need is simply greater in the order of international 
commerce, since the amount of knowledge that is common to the elements constituting the 
order is much more limited, in the absence of an organization collecting and directing the 
necessary knowledge. Thus, throughout the centuries, lex mercatoria has always been 
providing international merchants with an appropriate method of dealing with legal 
uncertainty in the order of international commerce, on the basis of the flexibility and 
adaptability in the ex post judicial resolution of contractual disputes, which recognizes the 
significance of the individual case and utilizes the knowledge of the particular circumstances 
of time and place, by putting the emphasis on the specialization in the decision making. 
 
Due to the absence of an organization, which could acquire enough of the dispersed 
knowledge in the order of international commerce to provide legal structures establishing 
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formal consolidations, the ex post and specialized consolidations of the decision makers on 
the basis of an abstract reasoning become integral to the control of legal uncertainty in the 
order of international commerce. Before the individual act, lex mercatoria is in the form of a 
few basic principles, which constitutes the basis of the going order of international commerce. 
It does not manifest itself in already articulated forms, but it has to be discovered and 
articulated by the ex post decision maker through specialized consolidations that utilize the 
knowledge of circumstances of time and place possessed by the parties to a particular dispute 
and reconstruct its tacit aspect in accordance with those basic principles. The constant 
necessity of articulating rules ex post in order to ascertain and give effect to the reasonable 
expectations of the parties to a particular dispute requires of the decision maker a capacity for 
abstract reasoning to utilize the knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place. 
In this context, the elements in the order of international commerce are confronted with the 
abstract nature of lex mercatoria, and the capacity of the ex post decision maker for exercising 
an abstract reasoning in the specialized consolidations that are required for the maintenance 
and restoration of this order. Thus, lex mercatoria is an alternative to the national legal 
systems, to the extent that the elements of the order of international commerce express their 
confidence in the specialization of the individual decision makers controlling legal 
uncertainty, in accordance with the common interest of those elements in the maintenance and 
development of the ongoing order on the basis of its basic principles. 
 
Absent an ulterior guiding authority that provides confidence for the elements of the order of 
international commerce through the mechanism of formal consolidations, the question for the 
decision maker applying lex mercatoria should not be whether his actions are appropriate 
from some higher point of view, or served a particular result desired by an authority. The only 
public good with which the decision maker applying lex mercatoria can be concerned is the 
observance of the established rules that the individuals could reasonably count on for the 
successful pursuit of their purposes. His reasoning should not involve any ulterior purpose 
which somebody may have intended the rules to serve. The decision maker applying lex 
mercatoria serves to maintain and restore a going order that is not the deliberate design of 
anybody, and that is not based on the elements doing anybody’s will, but on their expectations 
becoming mutually adjusted and corresponding. Lex mercatoria serves to enhance the 
stability of expectations not by determining a particular concrete state of things, but on the 
basis of an abstract order, which enables its members to derive from the particulars known to 
them expectations that have a good chance of being reasonable. The efforts of the decision 
makers applying lex mercatoria are part of the process of adaptation of the order of 
international commerce to the particular circumstances.  
 
Thus, historically, lex mercatoria has always been associated with the flexibility and 
adaptability in the ex post judicial processes controlling legal uncertainty, as required by the 
spontaneous order of cross-border commerce, on the basis of the specialization of the decision 
maker in making use of knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place, as an 
alternative to formal consolidations of the legal systems. In this understanding, the legal 
uncertainty is inherent in the concept of lex mercatoria. Unlike modern lex mercatoria 
doctrine, which commonly tries to provide tools to convert legal uncertainty into legal risk, 
this new theory of lex mercatoria embraces legal uncertainty and conceives it as a means for 
achieving fair and just outcomes in the disputes arising from international contracts. In this 
context, the fairness and justice mean the restoration of the order of international commerce, 
which has been disturbed by a particular dispute, and require the resolution of that dispute in a 
manner that maximizes the expectations of the elements of that order, which enables them to 
make feasible plans for the achievement of their individual purposes. In this understanding, 
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lex mercatoria is the law of adjudication on the basis of a few basic principles, which apply to 
the procedure of the decision making, the conflict of law analyses and the substance of the 
contractual disputes, leading to the application of a body of more specific rules appropriate for 
a particular bargain. These rules are derived from the tacit knowledge of the parties by means 
of specialized consolidations on the basis of the abstract reasoning of the decision maker, and 
they indicate the reasonable expectations of parties to a particular contract. The legality of 
those rules depends on the recognition of the freedom of contract as the presupposed basic 
norm of the spontaneous and liberal order of international commerce by the national legal 
systems providing legal enforcement, whereby the authorities will only be concerned about 
the outcome and procedural aspects of the ex post process of judicial decision making, but not 
the content of decision, which arises from lex mercatoria as a technique of thought that 
requires specialization. 
 
As a result of its emphasis on the imperfect and tacit knowledge, lex mercatoria as the law of 
principled adjudication deals with the incompleteness of the rules articulated by the 
contracting parties on the basis of their knowledge of particular circumstances of time and 
place. Articulated rules consist of the contractual clauses and the default rules chosen by the 
parties to govern their contract, and create specific contractual rights and obligations as well 
as specific allocations of risks relating to the contractual relationship between the parties, to 
the extent that the parties are willing to incur transaction costs at the stage of contracting. Lex 
mercatoria mainly applies to the resolution of the disputes over the residual contractual rights, 
obligations and risk allocations. Those residual issues arise when the contractual terms or the 
default rules chosen by the parties contain standards, or they do not cover the particular issues 
in dispute due to their exactness. Some characteristics of transactions indicate the parties’ 
preferences for the method of allocation of the residual contractual rights, obligations and 
risks, i.e. the method of dealing with legal uncertainty; in this regard, the preference for 
specialization over formal consolidations enables the application of lex mercatoria.  
 
The dissertation has made a basic distinction between transactions governed through legal risk 
and transactions governed trough legal uncertainty. The transactions governed through legal 
risk comprise discrete and short term contracts, where such contingencies that are not covered 
by the articulated rules are truly exceptional. These contracts are well suited to the formal 
consolidations provided for an internal order of an organization, as they do not necessarily 
require tailor-made solutions by virtue of the typicality of needs and expectations. The issues 
of residual contractual rights, obligations and risk allocations hardly arise in such transactions. 
In the transactions governed through legal risk, by choosing default rules provided for the 
internal order of an organization, the parties are able to foresee the applicability and possible 
outcomes of the application of such rules, and they can make legal risk assessments. The 
parties to such transactions accept that chosen default rules will apply, when they have failed 
to contract out those rules, namely when the legal risk materializes, unless there is an 
exceptional discrepancy between the rule and the situation, which requires the decision maker 
to transcend the articulated rules. Only in the unlikely case of the latter, lex mercatoria will be 
relevant to such transactions provided that the parties have not expressed their confidence in 
the system of an organization providing rules for the resolution of such discrepancy and the 
control of resulting legal uncertainty. 
 
The transactions governed through legal uncertainty usually have a longer duration, for the 
longer the contractual duration is, the more questions of residual contractual rights, 
obligations, and risk allocations appear. Their structures or purposes are usually more 
complex or innovative. While the simple and common needs of individuals are the most 
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stable and predictable for an authority providing the formal consolidations for an internal 
order of an organization, as complexity or innovation increases, the uncertainty connected 
with foreseeing needs and satisfying them becomes greater. This complexity or innovation 
may likely be required by the circumstances surrounding the transactions, such as when many 
legal systems are involved in the scope of transaction, by the status of the parties, such as 
when there is a contract between a private individual and a state or state enterprise, or by the 
atypical form of the transaction, which have increased in number particularly after the change 
in the theory and practice of business organization and the recent move towards externalized 
business relationships in the order of international commerce. These long-term, complex or 
innovative business transactions, despite commonly involving long and detailed documents 
under the influence of Anglo-American contracting practices, usually contain gaps or include 
contractual clauses in the form of standards, and require the decision maker to give them 
content ex post by taking into account the knowledge of particular circumstances of time and 
place. The appropriate rules for the transactions governed through legal uncertainty should 
enable more than a mere transformation of legal uncertainty into legal risk. Such rules should 
arise from ex post processes, where specialization of the decision maker prevails over the 
formal consolidations of an organization, to produce some gain in the form of fair and just 
results for a particular case. Thus, lex mercatoria is mainly applicable to the international 
contracts governed through legal uncertainty. 
 
While the disputes over residual contractual rights, obligations and risk allocations indicate 
that the transaction is to be governed through the conditions of legal uncertainty and they 
constitute the preliminary requirement for the applicability of lex mercatoria, its application 
ultimately depends on the parties’ delegation of the control of legal uncertainty to the 
specialized decision maker, and the capacity of the decision maker to assume such a 
delegation. Moreover, when there is such a delegation, lex mercatoria is applicable, regardless 
of the characteristics of the transactions, in the determination of the limits of the parties’ 
freedom of contract, through public policy considerations for the preservation and restoration 
of the order of international commerce. The delegation exists when the parties express their 
confidence in the specialization of the decision maker exercising an abstract reasoning in ex 
post consolidations for revealing the tacit knowledge of the parties that meets the deficit in 
their articulated knowledge, by discovering the established rules, on which the reasonable 
expectations of the parties rests. Whether the parties have expressed their confidence in the 
specialization of the decision maker can be determined on the basis of the institutional choice 
of the parties for the ex post judicial process and the capacity of the chosen decision maker for 
the abstractions. There are two types of judicial process from which the parties to 
international contracts are to choose, and their choice indicates their preference between 
specialization and formal consolidations in meeting legal uncertainty. Those are litigation 
before national courts, which indicates the preference for formal consolidations, and 
arbitration before international tribunals, which indicates the preference for specialization.  
 
The national courts, whose jurisdictional power is derived from a national legal system, have 
a limited capacity to assume the delegation from the parties of the task of controlling legal 
uncertainty through their specialization. They do not have the sufficient capacity for abstract 
reasoning in ex post consolidations that are required for the application of lex mercatoria and 
for maximizing the possibility of correspondence of expectations of the elements in the order 
of international commerce. The national courts constantly attempt to ensure that the residual 
rights, obligations and risks arising from transactions governed through uncertainty are 
allocated by the guidance, direction or formal consolidations of a national legal system. They 
are required to apply the conflict of laws rules of their national legal systems, which 
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invariably lead to the application of a national law, and prevent the parties from excluding the 
application of any national law through a “negative choice of law” or from choosing non-
national rules as the governing law. Almost all legal systems require the national courts to 
apply the applicable foreign law in the same manner as in its country of origin. In the case of 
failure to ascertain the contents of the applicable foreign law, from which residual questions 
emerge, most of the national legal systems require the national courts to apply the law of the 
forum as a last resort. Thus, if the parties prefer their contractual disputes to be adjudicated by 
a national court, the applicability of lex mercatoria, as the law of principled adjudication will 
be at minimum. 
 
In such a context, the application of lex mercatoria by the national courts ultimately depends 
on the position of the higher authorities in a national legal system to the issue of meeting legal 
uncertainty. First, it is applicable in exceptional cases, where those authorities acknowledge 
that the justice in a particular case may require the court to decide outside the self-referential 
structure of the legal system, such as through the extensive interpretation for filling the 
contractual gaps on the basis of the presumed intentions of parties, or resorting to “equity 
infra legem” in the assessment of the relief that a party is entitled to. However, even in such 
exceptional cases, the judge’s judicial behavior in exercising abstract reasoning will mostly be 
characterized by his specialization as to the internal order of the relevant legal system due to 
his concentration on domestic cases. Secondly, lex mercatoria may be relevant in the context 
of a national court to the extent that the authorities in the relevant national legal system are 
receptive to the idea of developing the internal order of the legal system in line with the 
spontaneous order of international commerce. The national courts, as the organ of a legal 
system, necessarily have a concern for the development of the internal order of the relevant 
legal system. This concern is particularly apparent in the manner of application of the 
international restatements of contract principles in the context of a national court, which 
depends on the position of the authority, whose power is directed towards the generality of 
actions in the internal order of the legal system, rather than the specialization exercised by the 
judge in a particular case. Thus, the national courts refrain from relying on abstract reasoning 
in considering the applicable law, trade usages or customs, and from referring to the 
international restatements of contract principles for those purposes. 
 
The international arbitrators, whose jurisdictional power is derived entirely from the parties’ 
agreement, have the ability to fully assume the delegation from the parties of the task of 
controlling legal uncertainty through their specialization. The finality of arbitral awards and 
the “general pro-enforcement bias” under the New York Convention and modern arbitration 
laws indicate the confidence of the states in the specialization of the arbitrators to render 
decisions, which are conducive to maintaining and improving the spontaneous order of 
international commerce. The national legal systems enable the international arbitrators to 
approach to the issue of conflict of laws as a matter of giving effect to the reasonable 
expectations of the parties. This approach has also effects on the ascertainment of the law or 
rules of law governing the substance of the dispute, whereby the arbitrators ascertain the 
content of the applicable law by having regard to the direct or indirect will of the parties, in 
the absence of which they follow the rules of their choice. The national legal systems 
generally recognize that the arbitrators have neither mandate nor function in the development 
of any national legal system, and their decisions will not become a part of the self-referential 
structure of any national legal system. Thus, even when the arbitrators apply a national law, 
they have the capacity to apply that law on the basis of the reasonable expectations of the 
parties to a particular dispute, and they are under no obligation to apply the law in exactly the 
same manner as a national court would do in the country of that law.  
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It is generally accepted that an international arbitral tribunal is not an organ of a legal system 
and it does not have a lex fori. This implies the absence of an organized hierarchy of a legal 
system, which could provide an effective appeal mechanism focusing on and ensuring the full 
compliance of a decision with the decision maker’s lex fori. Thus, in the context of 
international arbitration, when proceedings for the enforcement of arbitral awards are brought 
in the national courts, the national court may not re-litigate the case. The national court 
reviewing an international arbitral award may not be motivated by a desire of integrating the 
award into its own legal system. Accordingly, the national courts increasingly refrain from 
focusing on which law was applied and how it was applied to the merits of the case by the 
arbitral tribunal. Their review of arbitral awards mainly focuses on two issues: whether the 
procedural manner in which the arbitral award is rendered is in compliance with the parties’ 
intentions and the procedural public policy, and whether the enforcement of the award creates 
a situation that is unacceptable for the substantive public policy in the relevant legal system.  
 
Thus, the arbitrators have the capacity for abstractions that are required for the application of 
lex mercatoria. In the context of international arbitration, the capacity for abstract reasoning is 
not dependent upon the position of any higher authority in a legal system to the problem of 
legal uncertainty. The arbitral tribunals are freed from the formal consolidations, which 
determine the nature, functions and applicability of trade usages, customs and general 
principles of law in the interpretation, supplementation and correction of the contract or its 
default rules. For instance, the arbitral tribunals have relied entirely on their specialization 
when deciding the applicability of international restatements of contract principles in assisting 
their specialized consolidations on the basis of an abstract reasoning for discovering the 
established rules, and evaluating their persuasive authority as indications of trade usages or 
general principles of law, or both. Moreover, in many cases, despite the confusion as to the 
concept arising from the complications of the modern lex mercatoria doctrine, the arbitral 
tribunals actually apply lex mercatoria, as the law of principled adjudication, as a result of 
their concern for giving effect to the reasonable expectations of the parties to a particular 
contract, by utilizing the finality of their decisions and the flexibility of decision making, 
provided by the arbitration laws and rules, with regard to the determination of the applicable 
law, the ascertainment of its content and the manner of its application to a particular dispute.  
 
However, the fact that international arbitrators have the sufficient capacity to apply lex 
mercatoria does not mean that they will always utilize their capacity for abstract reasoning to 
maximize the possibility of correspondence of the expectations of the elements in the order of 
international commerce. In the exercise of such an increased capacity for providing justice in 
a particular case, the reasoning of arbitral tribunals, which determines the distinction between 
specific and residual contractual rights, obligations and risks, and their allocation in a 
particular dispute, sometimes seems unprincipled in the practice of international arbitration. 
Consequently, the parties to arbitration proceedings may sometimes have difficulties in 
predicting the substantive outcome of the dispute. This leads to speculations as to the factors, 
which potentially become influential on the judicial behavior of the arbitrators, such as their 
reputation in the arbitration market, the prospect of future reappointments, and the personal, 
financial or business relationships between the arbitrator and a party, its counsel, major law 
firms, circle of arbitrators, arbitral institutions or political powers. Indeed, although, in all 
cases, the duty of impartiality in terms of treating the parties with equality and giving each 
party a full opportunity of presenting his case remains intact, the types of situations in which 
issues of independence and impartiality arise are extremely varied and subtle, thereby leaving 
room for the personal or professional factors to exert an influence on the arbitrator’s judicial 
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behavior. In this context, the arbitral tribunals’ judicial behavior arguably reflects a tendency 
to “split the difference” between the parties under the influence of personal or professional 
connections, collegial decision making within the tribunals, or concerns for reappointment or 
reputation in the arbitration world. 
 
The phenomenon of splitting the difference results from the arbitrators’ increased capacity for 
abstract reasoning in relation to the particularities of an individual transaction, which is 
considerably freed from the rigidities of national legal systems. Thus, it is ultimately an 
impression arising from such an understanding that legal uncertainty can only be controlled 
by means of formal consolidations. In this context, the criticisms of splitting the difference in 
terms of compromise and unpredictable awards make sense only when the arbitral tribunals 
are not clear in their awards as to their legal reasoning, particularly on the issues of why the 
purpose of arbitration is to give effect to the reasonable expectations of the parties to a 
particular dispute and how this purpose is achieved by means of their solutions. However, 
they cannot be clear on those issues if their reasoning is in fact motivated by their self-
interest, such as their connections and reputation in the arbitration world or the prospect of 
future reappointment. 
 
The theory of lex mercatoria, as suggested in this dissertation, may help the arbitrators to 
motivate their judicial behavior with the reason why the accurate determination and 
enforcement of reasonable expectations of the parties to a particular contractual dispute 
matters in the spontaneous order of international commerce, and guide them in achieving such 
accuracy through a more principled decision making in accordance with the abstract relations 
between the elements in the order of international commerce. In particular, lex mercatoria 
allows for a more refined exercise of “splitting the difference”, since it ensures that whenever 
the decision maker reduces the original claim amount by an equitable percentage, such 
reduction results from an exercise of equity infra legem, in the sense of an authorization by 
the articulated or established rules in the particular case, but not from an exercise of equity 
contra legem, seeking just to find a compromise between the claims of the parties and to 
satisfy both of them, even if it is in contravention of the law.  
 
However, there is a conceivable tendency of arbitrators to refrain from referring to lex 
mercatoria explicitly due to the misconceptions about lex mercatoria, which are created by the 
modern legal doctrine presenting it as an autonomous body of non-national legal rules, 
directly applying to the substance of a contractual dispute either in lieu of national laws or in a 
supplementary manner. While lex mercatoria is not an autonomous legal system in the order 
of international commerce, it is not a method of substantive decision making either, because 
such an understanding ascribes only a default meaning to lex mercatoria and neglects its 
application in choice of law analyses and public policy considerations. The concept of lex 
mercatoria should not be merely related to a question of applicable law to an international 
contract in the sense of a choice between a national law and transnational law as the 
governing law of the contract, although it has been traditionally understood as being so, but, 
in more general terms, how a dispute arising from an international contract should be 
resolved, with a view to maintaining and improving the spontaneous order of international 
commerce on the basis of an accurate determination of reasonable expectations of the parties 
to a particular dispute, regardless of the application of national or non-national legal sources.  
 
Lex mercatoria is an alternative to the national legal systems in meeting legal uncertainty in 
the adjudication of contractual disputes, and this understanding implies a far greater 
significance for lex mercatoria in the order of international commerce than what would 
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otherwise be expected from a mere option in the choice of law analyses. Lex mercatoria 
requires the decision maker to allocate the residual contractual rights, obligations and risks, 
which arise from the incompleteness of both contractual terms and applicable default rules, in 
accordance with the reasonable expectations of the parties, which rest on their knowledge of 
the particular circumstances of time and place, by maximizing the correspondence of the 
expectations of the elements in the spontaneous order of international commerce. Lex 
mercatoria theoretically reveals that the reasonable expectations of the parties matter, as a 
result of the importance of the knowledge of particular circumstances of time and place and 
the abstract relations among the elements of the spontaneous order of international commerce 
for its functioning. This understanding should motivate the reasoning of arbitral tribunals 
rather than their reputation, income or personal connections to the certain circles, law firms or 
arbitral institutions. The arbitrators should be aware of the function of lex mercatoria in the 
preservation and restoration of the order of international commerce and, thus, follow its basic 
principles. 
 
The basic principles of lex mercatoria constitute the abstract schemata of thought that guides 
the decision maker resolving disputes arising from international contracts. The basic principle 
of freedom of contract under lex mercatoria allows the parties to structure and articulate their 
transaction to follow their individual purposes on the basis of their knowledge of the 
particular circumstances of time and place. The freedom of contract mainly has mainly two 
functions: freedom to contract and freedom from contract. The freedom to contract enables 
the parties to allocate contractual rights, obligations and risks on the basis of their knowledge 
of the particular circumstances of time and place, through contractual clauses and by choosing 
a set of default rules, which can be in the form of a national law, international restatements of 
contract principles or codified trade usages. The freedom from contract requires the ex post 
decision maker to enforce the articulated rules comprising both the contractual clauses and the 
chosen default rules, and to refrain from imposing a different contract on the parties by 
substituting his own ideas of what the parties intended for the specific allocations of 
contractual rights, obligations and risks, to the extent they are ascertainable by the choices of 
the parties.  
 
The freedom of contract as the basic principle of lex mercatoria also implies the ability of the 
parties to delegate the task of controlling the legal uncertainty to the ex post decision maker, 
and the decision maker applying lex mercatoria should observe the terms of that delegation. 
Thus, if the decision maker totally disregards the contractual clauses or default rules chosen 
by the parties, in ascertaining the specific contractual rights, obligations and risks, or in 
exercising abstract reasoning on the basis of his specialization to resolve the disputes over the 
allocation of residual rights, obligations and risks, the resulting decision would be in excess of 
the scope of the parties’ delegation to the decision maker of controlling legal uncertainty, and 
become invalid. 
 
The basic principle of sanctity of contracts requires the decision maker to ascertain the 
meaning of the articulated rules through interpretation in order to reveal the law between the 
parties and to enforce the specific contractual rights, obligations and risk allocations. This 
principle, as a requirement for international commerce, is a distinct rule from national laws, 
and dictates that violation of the articulated rules will have consequences, unless it is excused 
under certain circumstances. Under lex mercatoria, the principle of sanctity of contract is 
mainly a presumption leaning against the existence of any right of unilateral termination or 
modification of the contract by the parties. In principle, modification or termination of the 
contract should be allowed by the mutual subsequent agreement of the parties to that effect. 
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Such an agreement can be explicit or tacit depending on the circumstances of the case. 
Modification or termination without subsequent agreement can be admitted only when it is in 
conformity with the articulated rules, or on the basis of the qualifying function of the basic 
principle of good faith and fair dealing.  
 
While the parties’ consent to be legally bound is a necessary condition of the contractual 
rights and obligations, the basic principles of freedom of contract and sanctity of contracts not 
only denote the binding force of specific allocations of contractual rights, obligations and 
risks that have been made by the contracting parties through contractual clauses and the 
chosen set of default rules, but they also relate to the consent to the jurisdiction of some 
adjudication and enforcement mechanism, as a result of the alternatives available to the 
parties in the order of international commerce. Thus, in the order of international commerce, 
not only the articulated rules, but also the established rules constitute the law between the 
parties, who have manifested their consent to be legally bound by a particular contract and by 
the ex post decisions that resolve the disputes arising from that contract. By invoking the 
system of legal enforcement, the parties accept they are bound by both articulated and 
established rules in the particular case.  
 
In this context, the basic principle of good faith and fair dealing under lex mercatoria implies 
the binding force of residual allocations of contractual rights, obligations and risks within the 
scope of the relevant contract, which will be determined by the ex post decision maker 
through the established rules. The principle requires the contracting parties to take into 
account the knowledge and interests of the elements of the legal order in which they operate, 
so as to enable the correspondence of their expectations with those of other elements of the 
order, on which the parties’ plans are based. Under the basic principle of good faith and fair 
dealing, by becoming part of the contracting parties’ cost of enabling the correspondence of 
expectations in the order, the knowledge of the established rules is brought to bear on the 
allocational ex post decision with regard to the residual contractual rights, obligations and 
risks. The contracting parties are compelled to take that knowledge into account, even if they 
do not have actually direct access to the necessary knowledge, provided that it is possible for 
the parties to be in a position to adapt their conduct to their ignorance of such knowledge 
through abstractions. Accordingly, the principle of good faith and fair dealing requires the ex 
post decision maker to mentally reconstruct this tacit knowledge of the parties through a 
contextual approach in the interpretation, supplementation and the correction of the 
articulated rules, and to tell them what ought to have guided their expectations by revealing 
the established rules in the particular circumstances, which they ought to have known and 
which become applicable as a result of the conclusion of their particular contract.  
 
The basic principle of good faith and fair dealing is the substantive framework for principled 
adjudication and qualifies the basic principles of freedom of contract and sanctity of contracts. 
Therefore, the principle of good faith and fair dealing is the main means for the decision 
maker applying lex mercatoria to give effect to those expectations, which should be protected 
in order to maximize the fulfillment of expectations of the elements of the spontaneous order 
of international commerce as a whole. The principle of good faith and fair dealing requires the 
decision maker to exercise an abstract reasoning in specialized consolidations in order to 
decide in a manner which will correspond to what the reasonable people of the same kind as 
the actual parties would have expected in the same circumstances. It requires the decision 
maker to give effect to the reasonable expectations of the parties by explicitly referring to the 
subjective aspects of the contractual relationship, such as its purpose, nature, and internal 
context, in combination with the established rules in a particular case, which are derived on 
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the basis of an abstract reasoning through the specialized consolidations of national laws, 
trade usages or contracting practices, and a balancing exercise of various interests of elements 
of the order of international commerce involved in a particular case. Particularly, under the 
principle of good faith and fair dealing, the decision maker cannot tolerate the situations 
where the enforcement of the contract results in the violation of the public policy forming a 
part of parties’ reasonable expectations through a balancing of relevant interests of the 
elements of the order of international commerce. 
 
The basic principles of lex mercatoria include some procedural safeguards arising from the 
public policy considerations and the mandate of the decision maker in the context of 
international arbitration. Those safeguards ensure the meaningful utilization of the knowledge 
of particular circumstances of time and place, and the accuracy in giving effect to the 
reasonable expectations of the parties in a particular case. The procedural safeguards include 
the prohibition of fraud, corruption or perjured evidence, and the principle of due process, 
which mainly consists of the parties’ rights to a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to 
equal treatment. The right to an equal opportunity for presentation of one’s case implies the 
decision makers’ duty to provide an equal opportunity for the parties to comment on the legal 
considerations. Thus, in discovering the established rules and ascertaining the articulated rules 
that are applicable in a particular case, the decision maker applying lex mercatoria should 
submit the relevant materials to the parties for their comments and arguments prior to 
rendering a final decision, and refrain from rendering such a decision, which both parties may 
be surprised by the legal reasons put forward. The decision maker, who incorporates into the 
final decision such rules not argued and expected by the parties runs, the risk of exceeding his 
mandate, unless the application of the relevant rule is prescribed by the agreement or terms of 
reference, or it is so general that it must be considered to be implicitly included in the 
pleadings of the parties. The decision maker’s duty to comply with his mandate, in most 
cases, also includes his duty to render a reasoned award. This duty is particularly important 
for the decision maker applying lex mercatoria, who consolidates various materials by 
exercising his abstract reasoning, since it prevents the decision maker from pronouncing any 
rule he likes, and reduces the possibility of arbitrariness in the exercise of his specialization.   
 
On the basis of these basic principles, lex mercatoria, as the law of principled adjudication, is 
applicable not only to the substance of the disputes, but also to the choice of law analyses of 
the decision maker. In the choice of law analyses, lex mercatoria may serve as a lex fori for 
the international arbitral tribunals and address the specific difficulties relating to the conflict 
of laws in the context of international arbitration, such as lack of proof of the relevant rule in 
the applicable law, the interpretation of a rule of the applicable law, a gap in the applicable 
law, the problems of interpretation of the intentions of the parties as to the applicable law. 
There are four possible situations in the choice of law analyses, where lex mercatoria can be 
applied in international arbitration as lex fori for giving effect to the reasonable expectations 
of the parties. 
 
First, where parties have expressly selected a national law to govern the substance of the 
dispute, which is the most common scenario in the context of international arbitration, the 
decision maker should apply the chosen national law as a part of the bargain underlying the 
contract, pursuant to the basic principles of freedom of contract and pacta sunt servanda. In 
the abstract reasoning of the decision maker applying lex mercatoria, the contracting parties 
can be presumed to have diligently investigated, before entering into the contract, the contents 
of the national law of their choice, and have assumed the legal risks arising from the 
application of its rules. Thus, once the parties agree on an identifiable set of national rules, 
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those become part of the bargain that was contemplated under the contract, and the parties or 
the decision maker cannot refer to materials other than the contract and the chosen default 
rules, in contravention to the basic principles of lex mercatoria, in order to reallocate those 
risks that have already been assumed by the parties under those rules. Thus, the rules of the 
chosen national law can be overridden mainly by the contractual clauses, which are to be 
ascertained by interpretation, or by the implied intentions of the parties through specific 
supplementation, in accordance with the chosen national law.  
 
The decision maker applying lex mercatoria is bound to apply even the idiosyncratic rules in 
the chosen national law, as part of the bargain contemplated under the contract between the 
parties when they are clear and not overridden explicitly or implicitly by the terms of the 
contract, or by trade usages, in the sense of commercial practices observed in a certain sector 
over a sufficient period of time. Trade usages in this narrow sense add a layer of contractual 
relationship in question rather than defeat a choice of national law by the parties. In 
determining the relevance of such trade usages to the resolution of disputes, the decision 
maker should refer to the specific rules on trade usages that can be found in arbitration laws 
and rules, rather than the requirements of the chosen national law in this regard. The decision 
makers may also refer to the broader understanding of trade usages, or the general principles 
of law, which corresponds to the concept of the established rules in the order of international 
commerce, when they are in conformity with the chosen national law, in order to 
accommodate the pleadings of both parties, by showing that the relevant national rule is an 
established one, and to underline that they are not an organ of a national legal system, by 
involving into their legal reasoning such materials that may not be considered as important 
and appropriate in the application of the national law by the authorities in the relevant legal 
system. However, when the chosen national law is clear on the disputed issue, the decision 
maker should not allow a party to escape from the resulting specific contractual obligations on 
the basis of the broader understanding of trade usages or other conceptions of the general 
principles of law in contravention to the basic principle of pacta sunt servanda. In such cases, 
in order to deviate from the specific rules of the chosen national law, the decision maker 
should only rely on the explicit or implicit intentions of the parties or trade usages in the 
narrow sense, which add a layer to the contractual relationship. 
 
Where the parties agree on a national law as applicable to the contract, lex mercatoria in the 
interpretation and supplementation of the articulated rules will be relevant, when both the 
relevant contractual clause and the rule of chosen national law are ambiguous, and when there 
is a gap in both the contract and the chosen national law, which gives rise to the questions of 
residual allocation of contractual rights, obligations and risks. When the chosen national law 
is ambiguous or it does not cover the contingency that has become the disputed issue, the 
decision makers should resort to lex mercatoria in order to give effect to the reasonable 
expectations of the parties in a particular case thereby preserving or restoring the spontaneous 
order of international commerce, rather than attempting to act as an organ of the relevant 
national legal system, given that their decisions will neither be relevant to the development of 
that system, nor in any way contribute to the self-referential structures of that legal system. 
However, only after getting the chosen national law right on the basis of a legal research to be 
conducted in cooperation with the parties, and concluding that the chosen national law does 
not cover the disputed issue or recognizes a margin of discretionary power, the decision 
maker should resort to lex mercatoria in giving effect to the reasonable expectations of the 
parties.  
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Secondly, where the parties have agreed to the application of lex mercatoria, if 
unaccompanied by a particular national law in the choice of law clauses, the decision maker 
should interpret this clause to the effect that no particular national law indicates the 
reasonable expectations of the parties and should become part of the bargain contemplated 
under the contract. Thus, the decision maker should not engage into any form of choice of law 
analyses. Such clauses allow the decision maker to apply lex mercatoria and exercise his 
abstract reasoning in the specialized consolidations with regard to the merits of the dispute to 
the exclusion of any particular national law. When the choice of a national law is combined 
with the choice of lex mercatoria, the decision maker should carefully analyze the intention of 
the parties as to the extent of the incorporation of the chosen national law into the agreed 
bargain under the contract and its consideration as the articulated rules. The reference to the 
national law in such choices should not be rendered meaningless, while the decision maker 
should not treat the rules of the national law as incorporated into the agreed bargain under the 
contract, to the extent that they reflect the isolated position of the relevant legal system in the 
order of international commerce.  
 
In those cases, the decision maker should take into account the intentions of the parties as to 
how the decision maker applying lex mercatoria should consolidate the relevant materials 
through his abstract reasoning in giving effect to their reasonable expectations. Such 
intentions must take precedence, pursuant to the basic principle of freedom of contract. They 
may include a specified hierarchy between various sources, or instructions as to the applicable 
legal norms. For instance, in the context of cases governed by the second sentence of Article 
42(1) of the ICSID convention, since the reference is made merely to “international law” in 
addition to the law of the host state, the rules and principles of host state law should be 
applied by the decision maker to the extent that they are not in violation of the transnational 
public policy, or international law is not sufficiently clear to cover the lacunae in the host state 
law, in order to avoid subjective judgments and arbitrary decisions as to the position of 
international law in relation to the disputed issue. Nevertheless, even if the international law is 
unclear on the relevant issue, the decision maker should apply the principles of host state law 
to fill the lacunae in the host state law, by consolidating them with the general principles of 
law as a source of international law and lex mercatoria, in order to avoid speculations about 
how the national court of that legal system would decide the issue. 
 
Thirdly, where the parties have not agreed on an applicable law, the application of lex 
mercatoria at the conflict of laws stage requires the decision maker to search for the 
established rules of conflict by means of indirect choice methods. There are two indirect 
methods: (1) cumulative application of the rules of conflict of laws of the national laws 
related to the dispute, and (2) recourse to general principles of conflict of laws. The indirect 
methods necessarily result in the application of a national law to the substance of the dispute. 
By means of indirect methods, the decision maker will determine the national law that is 
designated by the established rules of conflict as the applicable law and act on the 
presumption that the individual provisions of that national law indicate the reasonable 
expectations of the parties in the context of a particular transaction. This presumption may be 
rebutted when those provisions are in conflict with the express or implied intentions of the 
parties, which will be determined through interpretation and supplementation according to the 
basic principles of lex mercatoria, or when those rules reflect the isolated position of the 
authorities in the relevant national legal system and, no longer, indicate the reasonable 
expectations of the parties to a particular contract. In the latter case, those provisions may be 
overridden by the established rules in the order of international commerce since, in the 
absence of an express choice, it is not possible to consider those national rules as part of the 
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bargain contemplated under the contract. The decision maker may also fill in any lacunae in 
the applicable national laws by applying lex mercatoria, as the law of principled adjudication. 
 
However, in order to disregard a national rule, which is found to be applicable pursuant to an 
established rule of conflict, for being idiosyncratic, the decision maker should at least be able 
to discover an established rule in the order of international commerce. There are many areas 
of law where the approaches of national legal systems diverge significantly. If the decision 
maker in a particular case confronts such a divergence among the national laws that are 
considered in the specialized consolidations to discover an established rule, the relevant rules 
of the applicable national law cannot be disregarded by the decision maker on the ground that 
those rules are idiosyncratic, since such a decision would be arbitrary: it would reflect the 
subjective reasoning of the decision maker about the expectations of the parties, despite the 
availability of objective considerations through the established rules of conflict. The decision 
maker should only consider itself competent to resort to its subjective reasoning in controlling 
the legal uncertainty arising from such divergences, where there are no established rules of 
conflict that designate a national law, or where the parties intended to avoid the application of 
any particular national law, i.e. in the cases of the application of lex mercatoria to the 
substance of the dispute to the exclusion of any particular national law.  
 
The decision maker may resort to the direct choice method, when a satisfactory solution 
cannot be found through the indirect methods. The materials that can be utilized by the 
decision maker, resorting to the direct choice method in the search for established rules of 
conflict, are not limited to the conflict of laws rules of the national legal systems, but include 
the context of the contract and the relevant contracting or arbitral practices. Unlike the 
indirect methods, the direct choice method can be completely free of the constraints of the 
national conflict of law regimes. However, under the basic principles of lex mercatoria as the 
law of principled adjudication, the decision maker is not liberated from the duty to give a 
reasoned award, which implies that reasons should be stated for choosing the substantive law 
in question even if the choice seems obvious to the decision maker. The decision maker 
should not rely on the direct choice method without an attempt to demonstrate to the parties 
that they could not reasonably expect the application of any law other than the one finally 
determined. In contrast to the indirect methods, the determination of the applicable law 
through direct method may lead to the application of a national law and/or lex mercatoria to 
the substance of the dispute and, thus, raise the questions of lex mercatoria as the substantive 
law exclusively governing the dispute. Under the direct choice method, the context and 
contents of a particular contract are the main factors determining in which manner lex 
mercatoria should govern the substance of the dispute in the absence of choice of law by the 
parties. However, in most cases, a mere absence of choice of law should not lead to the 
exclusive application of lex mercatoria to the substance of the dispute by means of the direct 
choice method. 
 
When there is an established rule of conflict designating a particular national law as 
applicable, and in the absence of indications that enable the recourse to direct choice method, 
the application of lex mercatoria to the exclusion of any particular national law depends on 
the implied common intention of the parties to avoid the ex post consideration of the rules of 
any particular national law as indicating their reasonable expectations: in other words, the 
decision maker should find an implied negative choice of national laws, for the exclusive 
application of lex mercatoria in those cases. The decision maker applying lex mercatoria, as 
the law of principled adjudication, should carefully interpret the contractual intentions of the 
parties through a contextual approach as required by the basic principle of good faith and fair 
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dealing in order to decide whether or not he should apply lex mercatoria exclusively. In such 
an interpretation, the parties’ history of negotiations and their pleadings with respect to the 
applicable law during the proceedings are mainly the determinant factors that should be taken 
into account by the decision maker in deciding on this issue. However, the decision maker 
should not act solely on the basis of the consideration that each party invoking the application 
of its own national law in the proceedings indicates that the application of national law of one 
of the parties would disturb the equilibrium established under the bargain between the parties. 
Any rule that is applied ex post by the decision maker may potentially affect the initial 
bargain, regardless of whether it is a general principle of law or a rule of the national law of 
either party. The rules that can be considered appropriate for a particular bargain should 
merely reflect the reasonable expectations of the parties in the particular case. Thus, the 
decision maker should not hesitate to apply one of the national laws of the parties when it is 
applicable pursuant to an established rule of conflict.  
 
While the exclusive application of lex mercatoria should not be based on the mere fact that 
each party pleads the application of its own national law in the proceedings, the explicit or 
implicit intentions of the parties as to the neutrality of the applicable substantive law may 
indicate an implied negative choice of the national laws, and lead to the exclusive application 
of lex mercatoria to the substance of the dispute, due to the speculative nature of designating a 
third country law as the neutral law. Moreover, in a situation where there is evidence of the 
intentions of the parties as to the exclusion of the national laws of the parties, and where one 
of those laws could be designated to be applicable by the established rules of conflict, the 
decision maker should not reject the exclusive application of lex mercatoria to the substance 
of the dispute, without considering whether the application of the designated national law 
would amount to holding one of the parties to a bargain, which he specifically attempted to 
avoid and managed to persuade the other party to defer the issue until the time of dispute for a 
more satisfactory solution. In such a situation, the decision maker may interpret, in 
accordance with the basic principle of good faith and fair dealing, the absence of choice to the 
effect that parties have agreed to exclude the application of any given national law, including 
even that of a third, neutral country, while being unable to agree on any satisfactory 
alternative or positive formula.  
 
Fourthly, where the decision maker has been authorized by the parties to act as amiable 
compositeur or to decide ex aequo et bono, lex mercatoria can be relevant to the decision 
maker’s considerations of equity and help him to deliver a reasoned award that accurately 
gives effect to the reasonable expectations of the parties in a particular case. The distinction 
between lex mercatoria on the one hand and the amiable compositeur and the arbitration in 
equity on the other has been problematic in the doctrine. Such a distinction can be made on 
the basis that decision makers, in the latter cases, can resort entirely to their sense of equity 
which is a form of abstract reasoning, without consolidating any materials, in giving effect to 
the reasonable expectations of the parties. Thus, amiable composition and arbitration in equity 
denote a wider delegation by the parties to the specialized decision maker in the control of 
legal uncertainty. While lex mercatoria would involve the application of the established rules 
in a particular case that should be discovered by means of the specialized consolidations of 
the decision maker exercising an abstract reasoning, amiable composition or arbitration ex 
aequo et bono would authorize arbitrators to depart from any established rule and to look to 
the fairness of their decision on the basis of a purely abstract reasoning. Thus, a decision 
maker’s capacity to act as amiable compositeur or to decide ex aequo et bono give implies a 
decision on the basis of “absolute equity” and the power to act contra legem, through abstract 
reasoning and without any specialized consolidations, when the enforcement of articulated or 
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established rules lead to an inequitable result according to the sense of equity of the decision 
maker.  
 
Lex mercatoria has still relevance to those decision makers empowered to act as amiable 
compositeurs or to decide ex aequo et bono, through public policy considerations and 
procedural safeguards, particularly pursuant to the duty to give a reasoned award. Moreover, 
the basic principle of sanctity of contracts under lex mercatoria should also be inherent to the 
equity considerations of such decision makers, even if they understand that equity in the sense 
of contra legem allows them to disregard the contract terms. Thus, in order to depart from the 
contract terms, the decision makers acting as amiable composituers or deciding ex aequo et 
bono, rather than entirely relying on equity contra legem, may consider the basic principle of 
good faith and fair dealing under lex mercatoria thereby drawing inspiration from such 
established rules as rebus sic stantibus or abuse of rights. Although, the amiable compositeurs 
or arbitrators in equity are not obliged to discover and apply the established rules in a 
particular case, their reasoning can be more accurate in giving effect to the reasonable 
expectations of the parties, if they reveal some abstract connections between the facts and the 
established rules, in explicating their analyses as to why they should disregard or adjust the 
contractual clauses, since such an approach may allow the parties to the dispute to comment 
on the reasoning of the decision makers, and better serve the procedural integrity of the 
proceedings by enabling the cooperation of the parties for the purposes of accurate 
determination and giving effect to their reasonable expectations. Therefore, although amiable 
composition or ex aequo et bono implies the possibility of equity contra legem, a reasoning 
that draws some inspiration from lex mercatoria as the law of principled adjudication may 
result in a more objective and accurate decision. 
 
The application of lex mercatoria to the substance of the dispute denotes three activities of the 
decision maker: interpretation, supplementation and correction of the contract. In these 
activities, the reasonable expectations of the parties to a particular contract become the single 
source of their contractual rights, obligations and risk allocations. Thus, when interpreting or 
supplementing the contract through a contextual approach or intervening in the contract on the 
basis of public policy considerations, the decision maker applying lex mercatoria interprets, 
supplements and corrects not only the terms of the contract, but also the national laws 
applicable to the contract, in the process, not for the purpose of the development of the 
particular national legal systems, but for maximizing the possibility of expectations of the 
elements of the order being fulfilled, matched and not conflicting, in accordance with the 
basic principles of lex mercatoria. 
 
Under lex mercatoria, the decision maker interprets the contract through a contextual 
approach under the guidance of the basic principles in order to determine and ascertain its 
meaning and to enforce the specific contractual rights, obligations and risk allocations of the 
parties. The basic principle of freedom of contract requires that the primary object of 
interpretation is giving effect to the common intention of the parties. However, where the 
contract contains clear and express provisions, those provisions should be respected and 
enforced in their natural meaning. Any consideration of reasonable expectations on the basis 
of specialized consolidations, which may transform the ascertainable meaning of the contract 
on the basis of its text into a factor of secondary importance, is contrary to the basic principle 
of sanctity of contracts under lex mercatoria. In determining to what extent the evidence 
relating to the common intentions of the parties that indicates a divergence from the plain 
meaning of the text is admissible, the decision maker should act on the view that, in availing 
themselves of the faculty of entering into a contract, the parties intend to pursue a purpose 
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which, in accordance with the basic principles of lex mercatoria, the contract must be 
considered to fulfill. The principle of good faith and fair dealing implies that if a party 
attempts to abuse that faculty by relying on the plain meaning of the contract thereby reducing 
it to the level of a device to act opportunistically and dishonestly during adjudication and to 
gain benefits not arising from that purpose, he cannot rule out the contingency that the 
decision maker will adopt a contextual approach to the interpretation in order to reflect the 
common intentions of the parties. 
 
Under the contextual approach of lex mercatoria, the decision maker should first resort to the 
internal context of the contract by considering the text of the contract as whole together with 
its nature and purpose. Since the nature and purpose of the contract, in some cases, can only 
be determined on the basis of external context of the contract and, thus, they may relate to 
both subjective and objective considerations, the focus on the nature and purpose of legal 
arrangements should generally prevail in all stages of interpretation of contract under lex 
mercatoria. If the meaning may not be ascertained solely on the basis of internal context of the 
contract, the recognition of the significance of the individual case and the knowledge of 
particular circumstances of time and place under lex mercatoria should require the priority of 
the extrinsic evidence relating to the subjective considerations, such as preliminary 
negotiations between the parties, practices which the parties have established between 
themselves, and the conduct of the parties subsequent to the conclusion of the contract. The 
established rules of interpretation in the order of international commerce allow the decision 
maker to take into account the evidence of such considerations in the interpretation of the 
contract and, thus, those established rules may supersede the idiosyncratic rules of national 
laws, when they are applicable pursuant to the established rules of conflict. On the other hand, 
the use of extrinsic evidence relating to subjective considerations in the interpretation of 
contract may be barred by the parties with explicit contractual clauses, or by their choice of 
default rules, or as a result of their common intentions determined through a contextual 
approach, to the extent that their enforcement in the particular circumstances of the case does 
not result in a violation of the basic principle of good faith and fair dealing.  
 
Where the decision maker cannot determine the common intentions of the parties solely on 
the basis of the subjective considerations, he should resort to the objective considerations and 
combine them with the text, nature and purpose of the contract as a whole, and extraneous 
factors relating to subjective elements, to the extent that they are available, in order to 
ascertain the specific contractual rights, obligations and risk allocations. Such objective 
considerations will mostly be characterized by the reasonableness test of the decision maker. 
This test enables the decision maker to exercise an abstract reasoning about the tacit 
knowledge of a party and to use imperfect knowledge creatively through his specialization, in 
the context of the heterogeneous society of the order of international commerce. When there 
is still doubt with regard to the common intentions of the parties and the use of extrinsic 
factors and reasonableness test does not provide conclusive results about the meaning to be 
attached to the terms of contract in dispute, the decision maker may resort to the interpretative 
presumptions in the form of established rules, which aid the interpretation of the contract. 
 
Under lex mercatoria, when there are some contingencies that are not covered by the 
ascertainable meaning of the contract, the decision maker supplements the contract with 
implied terms, which prevail over the default rules that are chosen by the parties or found to 
be applicable by means of the established rules of conflict. The decision makers applying lex 
mercatoria do not have to follow the requirements of the national legal systems for the 
supplementation of the contract on the basis of the implied intentions of the parties, but may 
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search for established rules that guide them in supplementing the contract with individualized 
terms, unless the national law chosen by the parties imposes such requirements, which the 
decision makers then have to apply as articulated rules and part of the bargain. In the 
supplementation of the contract with individualized terms, the activity of the decision maker 
shifts from the ascertainment of the meaning of the contract to the ascertainment of the 
content of contract. Such terms may precede all forms of default rules that address the 
generality of actions, regardless of whether they are applicable as established rules or on the 
basis of the choice of law analyses. 
 
In the supplementation of the contract with individualized terms under lex mercatoria, the 
decision maker will consider the relevant materials that indicate the reasonable expectations 
of the parties within the internal and external context of the contract. This activity can be 
conceived as extending the contextual approach, which governs the interpretation of the 
contract, to the supplementation of contract on the basis of the same materials that are related 
to the reasonable expectations of the parties to a particular dispute. Thus, the contextual 
approach is a characteristic of lex mercatoria, as the law of principled adjudication, which is 
based on the idea of meaningful utilization of the knowledge of particular circumstances of 
time and place. In this regard, trade usages in the narrow sense are another means for the 
supplementation of the contract under lex mercatoria in a manner that precedes the application 
of the default rules, which are chosen by the parties or found to be applicable by means of the 
established rules of conflict. The particular provisions in the arbitration rules and laws, which 
require that arbitrators consider trade usages, underline the objective of providing 
international commercial disputes in a manner which accords with commercial expectations 
and practices and release the arbitrators from the requirements for the relevance of trade 
usages established by the national legal systems, even if a national law is chosen by the 
parties to govern the substance of the dispute. Since those provisions do not guide the 
arbitrators as to which practices constitute trade usages in the narrow sense, the decision 
maker applying lex mercatoria may consider the CISG and the international restatements of 
contract principles as reflecting the established rules under lex mercatoria for determining the 
relevance of such trade usages, which supplement the contract and even prevail over the 
default rules of a national law chosen by the parties as the applicable law.  
 
Thus, the materials indicating the reasonable expectations of the parties, for the purposes of 
supplementation of the contract with implied terms under lex mercatoria, include the nature 
and purpose of the contract, prior negotiations, subsequent conduct of the parties, course of 
dealing established between the parties, trade usages in the narrow sense, and the abstract 
reasoning of the decision maker with regard to the test of reasonableness. The parties may 
prevent the decision maker from using certain extrinsic factors to supplement the contract, 
through contractual clauses or their choice of default rules, in accordance with basic principle 
of freedom of contract. However, those contractual preferences cannot eliminate entirely the 
effect of basic principles of lex mercatoria. The parties cannot oust the process of contextual 
approach of the decision maker utilizing all sorts of factors and his specialization, which are 
based on the basic principle of good faith and fair dealing, if the actions of one of the parties 
at the enforcement stage amounts to the abuse of contractual rights. The clauses or the chosen 
default rules, which limit the relevance of extrinsic factors in the supplementation of the 
contract under lex mercatoria, may then operate as a presumption which increases the burden 
of proof for the party attempting to refute. 
 
Under lex mercatoria, the decision maker intervenes in the contract and determines the limits 
of the principle of freedom of contract in the order of international commerce on the basis of 
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the established rules. Lex mercatoria enables such an intervention without impairing the 
confidence of the elements of the order of international commerce in the specialization of the 
decision maker in dealing with the legal uncertainty. In the order of international commerce, 
except for the limited and uncertain contents of the transnational public policy, there are no 
directly and effectively applicable legal structures, that limit the freedom of contract of the 
parties, and become immanently binding for the decision makers to carry out a mandate, as an 
organ of a legal system, with regard to the enforceability of a contractual term. Thus, in this 
context, it is almost impossible to make a clear distinction between the concepts of public 
policy and mandatory rules. Under lex mercatoria, a mandatory rule or standard that limit the 
parties’ freedom of contract can be described as those reflecting a public policy interest so 
commanding that its violation cannot be tolerated in the context of peaceful development of 
international commerce, and it may be applied even if the contract provides otherwise and the 
general body of law to which such a rule or standard belongs is not competent by application 
pursuant to the parties’ choice or the conflict of laws rules in the absence of choice. 
 
Lex mercatoria requires the decision maker to determine the conditions of illegality in the 
international contracts in a manner which maximizes the possibility of correspondence of 
expectations in the order of international commerce. Thus, the decision maker applying lex 
mercatoria should search for some form of correspondence between the actions that are taken 
by various national legal systems for the purpose of protecting their internal orders or the 
order of international commerce, which can be considered as having permeated the 
knowledge and expectations of the parties and become a source of lex mercatoria under the 
basic principle of good faith and fair dealing. The capacity of the decision maker applying lex 
mercatoria in searching for such a correspondence that potentially influences the 
characterization of the reasonable expectations of the parties can be based on an established 
rule of private international law that certain mandatory national laws may qualify as 
overriding or international mandatory rules and apply notwithstanding the parties’ choice of 
law. An established rule on this issue can be derived from the cumulative application of such 
rules under the private international laws of the countries relevant to the dispute, or a general 
principle of law relating to the overriding applicability of international mandatory rules. This 
established rule is not only relevant to the determination of the applicability of the “foreign” 
mandatory rules, but also to that of the mandatory rules of the national law chosen by the 
parties to the extent they contradict with the terms or purpose of the contract, since all 
mandatory rules of concerned national legal systems have the same value and rank on the 
same level for the decision maker applying lex mercatoria.  
 
This established rule enables a balancing exercise, which can be made in a particular case on 
the basis of an abstract consideration of the mandatory rules and public policy standards of the 
legal systems of the countries, where the award is made, where the contract is performed, of 
which the parties are citizens and alike. In this balancing exercise, the decision maker should 
initially consider whether the relevant mandatory rule or standard is within the expectations of 
the parties as to its applicability thereby taking into account the interests of the parties in the 
enforcement of their contract. The decision maker should consider the extent of the 
transaction’s connection with the national legal systems containing mandatory rules or public 
policy standards relevant to the case. The strength of this connection indicates that illegality 
can be treated as an issue of risk allocation, to the extent that both parties can be considered as 
aware of it when entering into the transaction. Thus, the closer the contact to the national legal 
system enacting the mandatory rule or claiming a public policy value, the more relevant will 
be the protected interest to the decision maker’s consideration for intervention in the 
articulated rules. This is because such an interest will be influential on the considerations of 
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reasonable expectations of the parties, and because the violation of that rule or value will 
more likely have the expected detrimental consequences in the relevant internal order. 
 
Subsequently, the decision maker should consider the expectations within the state having 
enacted the relevant norm thereby taking into account the interest of the internal order of the 
relevant legal system against the enforcement of the contract. The decision maker should take 
into account both whether the mandatory rule or public policy standard being considered is an 
international one from the perspective of the state enacting it, and whether the application of 
the international mandatory rule or public policy standard, in respect of the issue at stake, is 
consistent with the established rules of policy in the order of international commerce. In this 
regard, to the extent that the interests to be protected by the mandatory rule or public policy 
standard claiming application are more uniformly recognized as worthy of protection by the 
national legal systems relevant to the dispute, the decision maker will more readily intervene 
by applying such rule or standard and giving precedence to that over the contract and its 
applicable substantive law. 
 
The correspondence of the national legal systems on the understanding of an activity as a 
violation of mandatory rules or public policy standards should be sought in the protected 
interest, but not in the method adopted by the protecting rule or standard, which might 
significantly vary in different national legal systems due to the diverse nature of their internal 
orders. As long as the relevant interest is protected by the established rules of policy and there 
is sufficient connection between the contract and the national legal system, the particular 
method adopted by the authorities in that national legal system should be presumed to further 
such interests and enforced by the decision maker, given that those authorities are in a better 
position to obtain the necessary knowledge for the regulation of their internal orders. The 
particular method adopted by a national legal system for furthering the interests protected by 
the established rules of policy may be disregarded by the decision maker applying lex 
mercatoria, if its enforcement results in a violation of the contents of transnational public 
policy. In this regard, the decision maker should consider the transnational public policy in a 
negative sense to determine whether the relevant mandatory rules, although sufficiently 
connected to the contract, would violate fundamental moral or ethical principles or universally 
recognized human rights, or universally accepted public international law principles. The 
considerations of transnational public policy may also have a positive meaning thereby 
affirmatively and directly imposing the application of certain principles prohibiting certain 
activities, such as bribery or smuggling, or commanding specific solutions, such as where a 
state relies on its own law to evade from its contractual obligations towards a private party. 
Thus, even if the mandatory rule or public policy standard of the relevant national legal 
system does not qualify for the intervention under the balancing exercise, the decision maker 
applying lex mercatoria should weigh the facts of the case in the light of the concept of 
transnational public policy in a positive sense, before finally deciding whether or not to 
intervene in the contract.  
 
The considerations of transnational public policy are not issues of moral or political choice of 
the decision maker. The concept of transnational public policy should not be resorted to in a 
manner that disrupts the peaceful development of the spontaneous order of international 
commerce. Essentially, the transnational public policy requires respect for the knowledge and 
capacity of the authorities in national legal systems for regulating their internal orders, and it 
can be considered as an interest protected by the established rules of policy that ex post 
judicial processes should not become a means for disturbing such orders that are directly and 
clearly affected by a particular transaction. Thus, the decision maker applying lex mercatoria 
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should take into account that there is a universally recognized interest for the general 
protection of the public in a state, that the authorities in national legal systems are in a better 
position to regulate the actions of the elements of their internal orders, and that the methods 
adopted by those regulations should be respected to the extent that their underlying interests 
are protected by the established rules of policy, when an international contract is closely 
connected to the jurisdiction enacting the relevant rule or standard. These considerations 
imply that, on the one hand, absolute and unlimited freedom for the parties to regulate their 
transactions is not a part of transnational public policy in the order of international commerce 
and, on the other hand, the deliberate actions of authorities in the national legal systems that 
are taken for the restoration or improvement of their internal orders or the order of 
international commerce should not destroy the balance, but respect the abstract relations 
constituting the order of international commerce and the possibility of the correspondence of 
the expectations of its elements without any conflict. 
 
The consequences of intervention of the decision maker in the contract should, in principle, be 
governed by the method prescribed under the mandatory rule or public policy standard, which 
has been found to be applicable under lex mercatoria. In this regard, the decision maker 
should consider the possibility of partial illegality, and exercise his abstract reasoning as to 
the applicability of mandatory rules or public policy standards, to ascertain the specific 
aspects of the contract he considers to be contrary to relevant public policy considerations. 
Where the consequences of illegality are not expressly prescribed by the applicable 
mandatory rule or public policy standard, such as the contents of transnational public policy, 
the decision maker may extend the exercise of balancing the relevant interests to the 
determination of the consequences of the found instances of illegality. In such cases, to 
account for the particularities, the decision maker may resort to the restitutionary remedies. 
However, restitution in cases of illegality should be available to the extent the applicable 
mandatory rule or public policy standard does not deny it. Thus, only where the denial of 
restitution is not explicit or implicit in the sense of a necessity to discourage certain activities 
in the order of international commerce, the decision maker applying lex mercatoria can extend 
his abstract reasoning in the determination of the conditions of illegality to the determination 
of the restitutionary consequences of the found instances of illegality. 
 
By means of the activities of interpretation, supplementation and intervention, the decision 
maker applying lex mercatoria reveals and enforces the law between the parties to a particular 
contract, which includes the articulated and established rules. The application of lex 
mercatoria to the substance of the dispute enables the decision maker to accurately give effect 
to the reasonable expectations of the parties to a particular case by exercising an abstract 
reasoning in the specialized consolidations to find those established rules, without being 
bound by the formal consolidations under the national legal systems, unless they are 
incorporated by the parties into the articulated rules through a choice of law clause, or they 
indicate the reasonable expectations of the parties in a particular case pursuant to the 
established rules of conflict, in such areas of law where the approaches of national legal 
systems diverge significantly. While the materials subject to the specialized consolidations of 
the decision maker vary from case to case, the element of abstract reasoning in the specialized 
consolidations should always follow the abstract relations constituting the spontaneous order 
of international commerce in order to maximize the possibility of expectations of the elements 
of the order being fulfilled, matched and not conflicting. 
 
The dissertation has identified three sources for abstractions that should motivate the 
reasoning of the decision maker in reconstructing the tacit knowledge of the parties and in 
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applying to the substance of the dispute whatever rules or standards of contractual, national or 
transnational origin. These sources are national contract laws, international instruments 
relating to international commercial contracts, and contracting practices in the order of 
international commerce. The abstractions from these sources usually, but not necessarily, 
indicate the established rules in the order of international commerce. Even if the decision 
maker cannot articulate an established rule in the order of international commerce through 
such abstractions, the abstract reasoning is still important since it constitutes the background 
for the decision making on the basis of the application of lex mercatoria to the substance of 
the dispute either as lex fori or lex contractus. Thus, the abstractions need not be articulated 
by the decision maker in the final award in each instance, but it should form the basis of 
specialized consolidations and the decision making under lex mercatoria. In the dissertation, 
the abstract reasoning and the principled decision making under lex mercatoria have been 
examined in relation to some selected issues that concern the substance of the disputes arising 
from international contracts: (i) duty of cooperation, (ii) duty to achieve a specific result and 
duty of best effort, (iii) force majeure, (iv) hardship, (v) right to terminate the contract, and 
(vi) damages for non-performance. 
 
The duty to cooperate under lex mercatoria appears as a general implied term covering many 
instances of good faith duties, enabling the decision maker to exercise an abstract reasoning 
that forms the basis of his specialized consolidations about the required cooperative behavior 
of parties in a particular case. Where the parties may not be able to provide contractual 
clauses for each instance of required cooperation, the decision maker at the enforcement stage 
deals with the resulting legal uncertainty by supplementing the contract with such duties to 
cooperate that allocate the residual obligations in accordance with the underlying bargain and 
the established rules discovered through the principle of good faith and fair dealing. Those 
duties mainly arise from the standard of good faith in the default rules chosen by the parties 
and abstract considerations of the closer confidence generated between the parties throughout 
the contractual relationship, the successful performance of contractual obligations, and the 
purpose of the contract. However, the decision maker applying lex mercatoria should not 
solely rely on the abstract concept of good faith in supplementing the contract with various 
duties of cooperation, in a manner similar to an amiable composituer or arbitrator in equity, 
which runs the risk of exceeding the scope of the parties’ delegation to the decision maker of 
controlling legal uncertainty. In supplementing the contract with duties of cooperation, the 
decision maker applying lex mercatoria should adopt a contextual approach in evaluating the 
required behavior from the parties to a particular contract in order not to disturb the 
contractual equilibrium. The costs of the supplementing duty must be reasonable and 
appropriate for the underlying bargain, purpose and nature of the transaction, and the decision 
maker should take into account that the extent of a party’s duty of cooperation may be limited 
by the other’s corresponding duty of diligence in the particular circumstances of the case.  
 
Under lex mercatoria, the consideration of the distinction between the duties to achieve a 
specific result and the duties of best effort may precede the liability regime of the default rules 
chosen by the parties or found to be applicable pursuant to the established rules of conflict, as 
a matter of interpretation of the contract or supplementation of it with individualized terms. 
The distinction enables the decision maker to determine the conditions of liability and burden 
of proof, through an accurate reflection of the reasonable expectations of the parties in a 
particular case. If the parties’ reasonable expectations require the decision maker to 
characterize an articulated or residual obligation, as one of “best efforts”, the promisee will 
have the burden of proving that the promisor has not satisfied the requirements of its 
obligation, so that the liability of the promisor may appear as fault-based, regardless of the 
 873 
 
liability regime of the applicable default rules. In determining the degree of required efforts, 
the decision maker applying lex mercatoria should consider that, under a “best efforts” 
obligation, the promisor obtains some autonomy of judgment within the scope of its 
obligation. The promisee should prove that the promisor have failed in the exercise of this 
autonomy through incompetence or abuse, and the decision maker should examine the 
evidence relating to such a failure by taking into account the nature and purpose of the 
contract, as well as objective and subjective factors surrounding the contract through a 
contextual approach. Thus, the decision maker will focus on the degree of efforts as would be 
made by a reasonable person of the same kind in the same circumstances, while emphasizing 
the subjective competence of the promisor, contractual context and the pleadings of parties in 
giving practical substance to the required degree of efforts. If the decision maker interpreting 
or supplementing the contract concludes that the obligation breached is an undertaking to 
achieve a certain result, then the promisee will only have to prove that the result have not 
taken place, and the promisor will bear the risks relating to its failure to perform the 
obligation, as though he has strict liability since he may not plead that he had done his best, 
subject to whether the default rules chosen by the parties or applicable pursuant to the 
established rules of conflict provide a rebuttable presumption of fault. 
 
Regardless of whether its undertaking is characterized as one of best efforts or achieving a 
certain result, the promisor may be excused from liability for its non-performance due to a 
force majeure event. The promisor invoking the excuse should prove that two basic 
requirements of the force majeure excuse have been fulfilled in the particular case, unless 
otherwise specifically provided by the parties in the terms of the contract or by the applicable 
default rules. Firstly, the alleged event of force majeure must prevent the promisor from 
performing any of its obligations in accordance with the underlying bargain. This requirement 
will usually depend on the existence of a legal, factual or physical impossibility in an 
objective sense. However, the subjective impossibility may also satisfy this basic requirement, 
where the contract strictly requires the promisor to perform its obligations personally or 
through its own organization, and the supervening event renders such performance 
impossible. Economic impossibility or impracticability may also excuse the non-performance 
of the contractual obligations on the basis of the articulated rules or the default rules 
applicable pursuant to the established rules of conflict. Secondly, the effect of the alleged 
event of force majeure on the contractual obligations must be outside of the control of the 
promisor. This requirement implies that the event must be both unforeseeable and 
unavoidable for the promisor. The determination of the existence of the unforeseeability and 
unavoidability depends on the contract and the presumptions about the parties’ competences, 
which will be determined on the basis of the test of reasonable persons of the same kind as the 
parties placed under the same circumstances, through the contextual approach of the decision 
maker. The decision maker applying lex mercatoria will presume that the promisor has or 
should have exercised the foresight expected from a reasonable person of the same kind in the 
same circumstances, and assumed the costs of such efforts as would be made by a reasonable 
person of the same kind in the same circumstances, to avoid the effect of the alleged event of 
force majeure on the performance of its obligations.  
 
The decision maker applying lex mercatoria should approach the issues of force majeure as a 
matter of risk allocation between the parties. Thus, the basic requirements of force majeure 
excuse essentially determine whether or not there is a gap in the risk allocation under a 
particular bargain. If the promisor is prevented from performing by an event whose 
occurrence, according to the intentions or expectations of the parties, is at neither party’s risk, 
then there is a gap in the risk allocation. Thus, the force majeure excuse, when successfully 
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invoked by the promisor, requires the decision maker to allocate the relevant rights and 
obligations arising residually from such a gap on the basis of an abstract reasoning that takes 
into account the contractual clauses and the default rules, which are applicable as a result of 
the parties’ choice or pursuant to the established rules of conflict. The force majeure excuse 
initially suspends the performance of the contractual obligation, unless the contractual clauses 
or the default rules chosen by the parties explicitly deny such a suspension. If a force majeure 
event is permanent in its duration or in its effects on the performance of obligations as agreed 
under the contract, then the contract will be terminated. In such cases, the force majeure 
releases both parties from their obligations to perform and receive future performance as of 
the date of termination, which will be determined by the decision maker.  
 
In principle, the termination of the contract in cases of force majeure implies that “the loss lay 
where it fell”. This result is subject to the decision maker’s discretion to allocate any such 
losses in proportion to the extent the contract was performed by the date of termination in 
accordance with the underlying bargain, as long as the contract or the applicable default rules 
do not explicitly deny a restitutionary flexibility in cases of force majeure. Although the 
flexibility to apportion loss in consequence of force majeure excuse may be perceived as an 
instance of the impression of “splitting the difference” between the parties, such an 
allocational decision is almost necessarily an instance of the decision maker’s exercise of 
equity infra legem arising from the applicable default rules or established rules in the 
particular case, and should not be motivated by an idea of satisfying both parties by giving 
them something, but relate to the decision makers’ concern for reflecting accurately the 
reasonable expectations of the parties in such a residual allocation. 
 
While the force majeure excuse requires the temporary or permanent impossibility to perform 
contractual obligations, the issue of hardship covers situations, which totally modify the 
economical balance of the contract into the future, and raises the question of a new agreement 
through renegotiation and adaptation. However, the conflicting approaches of the national 
legal systems and the great variety of the hardship clauses in the international contracting 
practices preclude the decision maker applying lex mercatoria to discover such established 
rules in the order of international commerce, which could constitute a doctrine of hardship. 
Nevertheless, the abstractions from the national legal systems and international restatements 
support the view that it is one of the concerns in the different approaches to the issue of 
hardship that the parties should resolve themselves through cooperation the problems arising 
from an unforeseeable contingency, which does not render the performance of the contract 
impossible, but disturbs the equilibrium of the contract by increasing the cost of performance. 
Such a concern is also appropriate in the spontaneous order of international commerce, due to 
the importance of the utilization of the knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and 
place, of which beneficial use can be made only if the decisions depending on it are left to the 
parties or are made with their active cooperation. Thus, the decision maker, applying lex 
mercatoria, should be willing to encourage and direct the parties to renegotiate for adjusting 
their contracts, in the change of circumstances, which render performance excessively 
onerous, by creating costs which have been neither contemplated nor allocated by the parties 
through the articulated rules. However, the unconditional acceptance of judicial adaptation in 
hardship cases may lead to a dangerous degree of discretionary power whereby the specific 
contractual rights and obligations of the parties come under the judicial review through the 
principle of good faith and fair dealing for the sole reason that the circumstances are 
materially modified and generate significant imbalance between the respective obligations of 
the parties.  
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Under lex mercatoria, before considering the adaptation in the contract due to unforeseen 
contingencies that make the performance excessively onerous, on the basis of the applicable 
default mechanisms, the decision maker should consider the possibility of making 
adjustments in the determination of the risk assessments. The decision maker may account for 
the incompleteness in the specification of the risks explicitly allocated by the parties in their 
narrow frame by adjusting the probability assessment of the more broadly framed risk on the 
basis of the test of reasonable persons of the same kind as the parties placed under the same 
circumstances. Thus, the examination of the issue of hardship under lex mercatoria should not 
start from the default mechanisms of the relevant doctrines. Only if there are no explicit or 
implicit indications as to the risk allocation agreed between the parties and the parties fail to 
agree on a solution through renegotiation, these risks must be allocated by the decision maker 
in such a way that upholds the underlying bargain and the reasonable expectations of the 
parties to a particular contract. In such cases, the decision maker should refer to the 
mechanisms provided by the terms of the contract, or the default rules chosen by the parties or 
applicable pursuant to the established rules of conflict. The issue of idiosyncrasy in the 
applicable national rules will not arise in this respect due to the divergence of approaches in 
the default mechanisms of the relevant doctrines. Those default mechanisms would eventually 
require the decision maker to adopt one of the three solutions: termination, preservation or 
adaptation of the original contract.  
 
In this context, the decision maker’s capacity to adapt the contract due to a hardship event 
should be derived from a contractual term, a trade usage in the narrow sense, or a national 
default rule applicable to the substance of the dispute. In cases where lex mercatoria governs 
the substance of the dispute to the exclusion of any national law, the solution of adaptation 
should be covered by either party’s petitions or evidence, so that the issue comes under the 
scope of the parties’ delegation to the decision maker of controlling legal uncertainty. In such 
cases, the decision maker should not adapt the contract to the change of circumstances, if 
neither party requests for adaptation, since the ex officio adaptation of the contract by the 
decision maker requires an authorization from the articulated or established rules in the 
particular case, but there is no established rule in the order of international commerce that 
grants such an authority to the decision maker unconditionally. Moreover, where a party 
requests for adaptation, but the decision maker is not given sufficient indications as to how 
the alternative terms should be determined, he may have to dismiss the claim for adaptation, 
and turn to determining the conditions of termination and its possible consequences. Thus, the 
decision maker applying lex mercatoria should not engage in an exercise of adaptation of the 
contract due to hardship in the absence of sufficient indications in the evidence of 
negotiations or the parties’ pleadings as to the alternative terms, when lex mercatoria governs 
the substance of the dispute exclusively, or without having regard to the specific requirements 
of judicial adaptation, when the articulated or established rules in the particular case address 
the issue of hardship, since such an exercise of adaptation can be considered as an instance of 
equity contra legem and of splitting the difference, which may never serve the aim of 
accuracy in reflecting the reasonable expectations of the parties. 
 
The parties’ right to terminate the contract under lex mercatoria requires the decision maker to 
focus on the contract and the default rules chosen by the parties pursuant to the basic 
principles of freedom of contract and sanctity of contracts. To the extent there are gaps or 
standards in the articulated rules in relation to the specific issues of termination raised in the 
proceedings, the abstract reasoning of the decision maker should be motivated by the 
consideration that certain circumstances, whether it is non-performance of express or implied 
obligations, or another unforeseen or foreseen event, may justify the exercise of the right to 
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terminate the contract by a party, and affect the process of termination set out by the 
articulated rules, to the extent such a party cannot be reasonably expected to continue with the 
contractual relationship under such circumstances. Under lex mercatoria, the termination of 
contract is an inherent part of the contractual relationship and, thus, a matter of interpretation 
and supplementation of the contract. The decision maker applying lex mercatoria should 
determine through a contextual approach whether such circumstances have attained a 
sufficient degree of seriousness so as to enable a party to leave the bond of pacta sunt 
servanda and to terminate the contract without strictly following the process of termination set 
out by the articulated rules, by considering, at an abstract level, the international contracting 
practices of drafting termination clauses in terms of risk allocations, which provide a mixture 
of various termination grounds, and in terms of problem solutions, which incorporate such 
mechanisms as notice period, Nachfrist and cure by the non-performing party. 
 
Under lex mercatoria, the termination of the contract has mainly a prospective effect, 
discharging the parties from their obligations of future performance, since transactions 
governed through legal uncertainty will usually arise from long-term contractual relationships, 
where imposing a retrospective regime of mutual restitution may be inappropriate or 
impossible. It is an established rule in the order of international commerce that the termination 
of contract does not preclude the aggrieved party from claiming damages for non-
performance, or from invoking such contractual clauses that are intended to operate even after 
termination, unless termination has resulted from a gap in the risk allocation with regard to 
such unforeseen events that excused the non-performance. In cases where the decision maker 
is required to give effect to the retrospective effect of termination, the decision maker should 
examine the restitutionary consequences of termination within the context of the competing 
interests of the parties, and contractual risk allocations, which are to be determined and 
ascertained through interpretation or supplementation, to the extent that the decision maker is 
enabled to exercise his abstract reasoning on the basis of these considerations by the 
flexibility of the default rules that are applicable to the substance of the dispute, pursuant to 
the choice of the parties or the established rules of conflict.  
 
The remedy of damages for non-performance under lex mercatoria is a substitutionary relief, 
which the aggrieved party may claim, either in conjunction with or as an alternative to its 
right to terminate the contract. The decision maker, applying lex mercatoria, may derive many 
established rules as to the issue of damages for non-performance in the order of international 
commerce from the national legal systems and international instruments, through the 
specialized consolidations on the basis of an abstract reasoning. In this regard, the first 
established rule in the order of international commerce is the principle of full compensation, 
which requires the decision maker to give effect to the expectation of the aggrieved party 
from the performance of the contract by putting it into as good a financial position as that in 
which it would have been if the contract had been duly performed. Unless required by the 
default rules chosen by the parties or determined as governing the contract by means of the 
application of lex mercatoria at the stage of conflict of laws, the decision maker applying lex 
mercatoria does not have to discuss the distinction made by the national legal systems 
between expectation (positive) interest and reliance (negative) interest, according to which the 
latter interest is generally awarded when it is not possible to establish lost profits with a 
reasonable degree of certainty. The decision maker may instead adopt the simpler solution 
that can be derived from the international instruments, under which the loss consists of the 
accrued losses (damnum emergens), and the lost profits (lucrum cessans), while taking into 
account any gain resulting to the aggrieved party from the non-performance, and damages can 
be rejected whenever the existence of loss cannot be established with reasonable certainty. 
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The determination of the reasonableness of the expectations of the aggrieved party under the 
principle of full compensation and, thus, the amount of recoverable damages appear, in the 
first instance, as an issue of contextual interpretation and supplementation of the articulated 
rules in the particular circumstances of the case. The decision maker is required to examine 
specific and residual contractual rights, obligations and risk allocations, and, on that basis, 
determine the causal connections, i.e. whether or to what extent the loss allegedly incurred by 
the aggrieved party was caused by the non-performance and the events attributable to the risk 
sphere of the non-performing party, and whether or to what extent such loss was caused by 
the failure of the aggrieved party to perform its obligations and the events attributable to the 
risk sphere of the aggrieved party. In these determinations, the decision maker will evaluate 
the available evidence, by resorting, if necessary, to the test of reasonable persons of the same 
kind as the parties placed under the same circumstances, and award damages in accordance 
with the established rule of certainty of damages. Thus, the damages will be awarded only for 
the loss, which can be considered as being directly caused by the non-performance and the 
events attributable to the risk sphere of the non-performing party, provided that the existence 
of the loss and its causal connections can be established with a reasonable degree of certainty.  
 
Even if the share of the non-performance and the events attributable to the risk sphere of the 
non-performing party in the alleged loss cannot be determined with mathematical precision, 
the concern for accuracy under lex mercatoria requires a discretionary assessment of the 
respective weight of all causes and, if necessary, a subsequent reduction in the amount of the 
alleged loss, rather than all-or-nothing solutions. This discretionary power can be derived 
from the applicable default rules or from the established rule of certainty of damages, and it is 
an exercise of equity infra legem, which is recognized by most of the national legal systems 
with regard to the assessment of damages. Under the rule of certainty, the decision maker will 
have the discretion to set the amount of damages on the basis of estimates, approximations 
and equitable considerations, since the requirement of reasonable certainty will generally not 
be sought for the extent of loss, as long as the existence of loss is sufficiently certain. The 
contextual approach of causation and discretionary assessment under the rule of certainty may 
precede, as a matter of interpretation of contract and its supplementation with individualized 
terms, the approach of national legal systems, which mainly apply the principle of causation 
as a means for either establishing liability for non-performance or excusing the party from the 
liability for non-performance. 
 
Under lex mercatoria, the inevitable persistence of estimates, approximations and equitable 
considerations in the assessment of the damages should not be readily considered as 
prescribing a decision of “splitting the difference” between the parties, since such a decision 
implies a process of conciliatory decision making and an underlying intention on the part of 
the decision maker to satisfy both of the parties by giving something to both parties. The 
decision maker applying lex mercatoria should render an award of damages, which clearly 
shows that the rationale underlying the award is the accuracy and the exercise of equity infra 
legem, and not compromise in the sense of equity contra legem. Thus, the decision maker 
should articulate in the final award, as explicit as possible, his abstract reasoning, which has 
been exercised in applying the articulated or established rules and evaluating the available 
evidence, and which has influenced his estimates, approximations and equitable 
considerations, as well as the final sum awarded as recoverable damages. In particular, the 
decision maker should expressly mention those limitations to the amount of recoverable 
damages, which arise from the causal connections between the loss and the relevant events, 
articulated rules and established rules in the particular case, in order to enable the parties to 
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comment and cooperate in the utilization of the knowledge of the particular circumstances of 
time and place. To the extent the decision maker succeeds in this endeavor, it can be argued 
that the application of lex mercatoria may alleviate the misperceptions in relation to the 
institution of arbitration as a mechanism of compromise and uncertainty, and create an 
understanding that it is the means of maximizing the possibility of correspondence of 
expectations in the order of international commerce through the accuracy of ex post decisions. 
 
In the modern lex mercatoria doctrine, many aspects of these selected issues of substantive 
application of lex mercatoria are considered as subject to emerging or existing autonomous 
rules in the order of international commerce. It is argued that the duty of cooperation 
represents an emerging general principle of law, and the needs of international commerce 
impose cooperation in good faith upon the parties whose scope exceeds that normally required 
by national legal systems in relation to the their internal orders. The “best efforts” clauses in 
international contracts are considered as the common denominator between the opposing 
national legal systems and smoothing away the opposition between strict and fault-based 
liability in contract law. It is suggested that the theory of lex mercatoria was initially 
formulated around the concept of force majeure, whereby the international merchants have 
developed private solutions, better articulated than those offered by national legal systems, 
and the repeated use of certain analytical criteria in arbitral awards dealing with force majeure 
recognize a standard of behavior for international merchants, which is conducive to 
establishing authoritative customary rules of lex mercatoria. As to hardship, it is submitted 
that the interrelated doctrines of pacta sunt servanda and rebus sic stantubis are often relevant 
to the international arbitration, where the clausula rebus sic stantubis is usually considered as 
a rule of lex mercatoria. It is argued that arbitrators treat a party’s right to terminate the 
contract for other party’s failure to perform or lack of proper performance as a general 
principle of law. In relation to damages for non-performance, it is maintained that, the arbitral 
tribunals recognize the principles of full compensation, foreseeability and mitigation of loss, 
and the recoverability of lost profits as general principles of law with an international scope. 
 
Although some of those arguments have been verified by the dissertation as indicating the 
established rules in the order of international commerce, or relevant to the abstract reasoning 
of the decision maker, they should not be treated as constituting an autonomous body of rules 
under the concept of lex mercatoria in the sense of a method of substantive decision making 
or a legal system, capable of resolving any contractual disputes in the order of international 
commerce. The claim that such autonomous rules directly and decisively govern the substance 
of the contractual disputes overlooks the scope of the parties’ delegation to the decision maker 
of controlling legal uncertainty within the complex and spontaneous order of international 
commerce, and motivates an ex post decision making process on the basis of equity contra 
legem, to the extent it disregards national laws when they constitute a part of the bargain 
underlying the contract or indicate the reasonable expectations of the parties. The decision 
maker applying lex mercatoria has to ensure that whenever he exercises his abstract 
reasoning, such an exercise is capable of revealing itself as an instance of equity infra legem 
or praeter legem within the context of articulated and established rules in the particular case. 
This exercise of abstract reasoning defines lex mercatoria, as the law of principled 
adjudication, which is based on the idea of meaningful utilization of the knowledge of 
particular circumstances of time and place, and characterized by a contextual approach. The 
contextual approach under lex mercatoria is ultimately capable of determining, within the 
decision maker’s capacity of controlling legal uncertainty, the law applicable to the substance 
of the dispute, the interpretation, supplementation or correction of the contract and the 
applicable default rules and, more specifically, the parties’ duties of cooperation, the 
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conditions of liability for non-performance, the gaps in the risk allocations whereby the 
liability is excused due to force majeure and hardship, the conditions, process and 
consequences of termination, and the recoverable amount of damages for non-performance. 
 
The ultimate purpose of the decision maker applying lex mercatoria should be to determine 
the specific allocations of contractual rights, obligations, and risks under the articulated rules, 
which consists of terms of the contract and default rules chosen by the parties, pursuant to its 
basic principles of freedom of contract and sanctity of contracts, and to discover the 
established rules, which can be in the form of conflict of laws rules, default rules or 
mandatory rules, for the allocation of residual contractual rights, obligations and risks, 
pursuant to the basic principle of good faith and fair dealing. In international arbitration, 
where no national law constitutes the lex fori of the arbitral tribunal insofar as its decisions 
are not made on behalf of a national legal system, this understanding of lex mercatoria may 
serve as lex fori. Lex mercatoria will not be relevant in this sense only to those cases where 
the arbitral tribunal, either on its own motion or as required by the parties, actively rejects to 
apply lex mercatoria as the law of principled adjudication and to assume the task of 
controlling legal uncertainty, by referring to the conflict of laws of the seat of arbitration in 
order to determine, ascertain and supplement the applicable national law, and applying the 
national law in the manner a national court would apply, without the increased concern for the 
reasonable expectations of the parties to a particular case. As this is an unlikely case in the 
context of international arbitration, the application of lex mercatoria, as the law of principled 
adjudication, can be considered as more common in arbitral practice than the modern lex 
mercatoria doctrine suggests, even if the arbitrators do not consider themselves as applying it 
in most of the cases, when dealing with the issues of conflict of laws and substance. 
 
Lex mercatoria should not be considered as aggravating the problems of uncertain, arbitrary 
or capricious decision making in the context of international arbitration, since it is possible for 
the arbitrators to apply any law arbitrarily or capriciously without ever thinking or mentioning 
lex mercatoria or similar concepts insofar as any law is inherently incomplete and, in most of 
the cases, there is no competent authority to correct the wrongful application of any law by an 
arbitral tribunal. The dissertation has suggested that lex mercatoria in international arbitration 
can be understood as an opportunity of remedying those problems through principled decision 
making and by taking the reasonable expectations of the parties to the center of the dispute 
resolution process, as required in the order of international commerce. Under such an 
understanding, control mechanisms of various organizations may focus on the manifest 
disregard of the reasonable expectations of the parties by ensuring the integrity of proceedings 
in the light of the basic procedural principles and by safeguarding the relevant public policy 
contents, rather than allowing the re-litigation of the entire dispute and examining the content 
of an arbitral award, which is motivated under lex mercatoria by a concern for accuracy in 
resolving a particular dispute in a manner that maximizes the possibility of correspondence of 
expectations among the elements in the spontaneous and complex order of international 
commerce.
 881 
 
7. BIBLIOGRAPHY  
 
Abbott, Kenneth W., & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation Through 
Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, Vanderbilt 
Journal of Transnational Law, 42 (2009), p. 501 
Abdala, Manuel A., & Pablo T. Spiller, Chorzów’s Standard Rejuvenated Assessing Damages 
in Investment Treaty Arbitrations Chorzów’s Standard Rejuvenated, Journal of 
International Arbitration, 25-1 (2008), p. 103 
Adams, Kenneth A., A Legal-usage Analysis of “Material Adverse Change” Provisions, 
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law, 10 (2004), p. 9 
Alberti, Christian P., Iura Novit Curia in International Commercial Arbitration: How Much 
Justice Do You Want?, in Stefan Kröll, Loukas A. Mistelis, P. Perales Viscasillas, & 
V. Rogers (eds.), International Arbitration and International Commercial Law: 
Synergy Convergence and Evolution, Kluwer Law International,  2011 
Atiyah, P. S., An Introduction to the Law of Contract, Clarendon Express (Oxford), 5
th
 ed., 
1995 
Audit, Bernard, The Vienna Sales Convention and the Lex Mercatoria, in Thomas E. 
Carbonneau (ed.), Lex mercatoria and arbitration: a discussion of the new law 
merchant, Kluwer Law International, Rev. ed., 1998 
Bainbridge, Stephen, Trade Usages in International Sales of Goods: An Analysis of the 1964 
and 1980 Sales Conventions, Virginia Journal of International Law, 24 (1984), p. 
619 
Bainbridge, Stephen M., The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, Vanderbilt 
Law Review, 57-1 (2004), p. 83 
Baker, John H., Law Merchant and the Common Law before 1700, Cambridge Law Journal, 
38 (1979), p. 295 
Balch, Thomas Willing, Arbitration as a Term of International Law, Columbia Law Review, 
15 (1915), p. 590 
Ball, M., Structuring the Arbitration in Advance - The Arbitration Clause in an International 
Development Agreement, in Julian D. M. Lew (ed.), Contemporary Problems in 
International Arbitration, London, 1986 
Ball, M., The Essential Judge: the Role of the Courts in a System of National and 
International Commercial Arbitration, Arbitration International, 22-1 (2006), p. 73 
Barnett, Randy E., The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, Virginia 
Law Review, 78-4 (May, 1992), p. 821 
Baron, Paula, Robyn Carroll & Aviva Freilich, Implied Terms: Central Exchange Ltd v. 
Anaconda Nickel Ltd., University of Western Australia Law Review, 31 (2003), p. 
293 
Barraclough, Andrew & Jeff Waincymer, Mandatory Rules of Law in International 
Commercial Arbitration, Melbourne Journal of International Law (2005), p. 205 
Basile, Mary E., Jane F. Bestor, Daniel R. Coquillette & Charles Donahue, Lex Mercatoria 
and Legal Pluralism: A Late Thirteenth-Century Treatise and its Afterlife, The Ames 
Foundation of Harvard Law School, 1
st
 ed., 1998 
 882 
 
Beale, Hugh G., Remedies: Termination, in Arthur Hartkamp, Martijn Hesselink, Ewoud 
Hondius, Carla Joustra & Edgar du Perron (eds.), Towards A European Civil Code, 
Kluwer Law International, 2
nd
 ed., 1998 
Beale, Hugh. G., Remedies for Breach of Contract, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1980  
Beale, Hugh, Denis Tallon, Stefan Vogenauer, Jacobien W. Rutgers & Bénédicte Fauvarque-
Cosson, Contract Law (Ius Commune Casebooks for the Common Law of Europe): 
5, Hart Publishing; 2
nd
 Revised edition, 2010 
Beatson, Jack, Anson's Law of Contract, Oxford University Press, 27
th
 ed., 1998 
Beck, Ulrich, World Risk Society, Cambridge: Polity, 1999 
Bedjaoui, Mohammed, The Arbitrator: One Man - Three Roles: Some Independent 
Comments on the Ethical and Legal Obligations of an Arbitrator, Journal of 
International Arbitration, 5-1 (1988), p. 7 
Beffa, Luca, Challenge of International Arbitration Awards in Switzerland for Lack of 
Independence and/or Impartiality of an Arbitrator – Is it Time to Change the 
Approach?, Considerations, thoughts and suggestions further to the article of 
Matthias Leemann, and the exchange of correspondence and views concerning Art. 
190(2) PILS, ASA Bulletin, 29-3 (September 2011), p. 598 
Bell, John, Sophie Boyron & Simon Whittaker, Principles of French law, Oxford University 
Press, 2
nd
 ed., 2008 
Benson, Bruce L., The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law, Southern Economic 
Journal, 55-3 (Jan., 1989), p. 644 
Benson, Bruce L., Justice without Government: The Merchant Courts of Medieval Europe 
and their Modern Counterparts, in David T. Beito, Peter Gordon, and Alexander 
Tabarrok (eds.), The voluntary city: choice, community, and civil society, Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002 
Berger, Klaus Peter, Arbitration and Act of State: Exchange Control Regulations, in Karl-
Heinz Böckstiegel (ed.), Arbitration and Act of State, DIS/CEPANI/NAI, 1997 
Berger, Klaus Peter, International Arbitral Practice and the UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts, American Journal of Comparative Law, 46-1 
(1998), p. 129 
Berger, Klaus Peter, The Creeping Codification of the Lex Mercatoria, Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, 1999 
Berger, Klaus Peter, Harmonization of European Contract law the Influence of Comparative 
law, International & Comparative Law Quarterly, 50-4 (2001), p.877 
Berger, Klaus Peter, The New Law Merchant and the Global Market Place - A 21st Century 
View of Transnational Commercial Law in Klaus Peter Berger, The practice of 
transnational law, The Hague; Boston: Kluwer Law International, 2001 
Berger, Klaus Peter, Renegotiation and Adaptation of International Investment Contracts: The 
Role of Contract Drafters and Arbitrators, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 
36 (2003), p. 1347 
Berman, Harold J., Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition, 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983 
 883 
 
Berman, Kaufman, The Law of International Transactions (Lex Mercatoria), Harvard 
International Law Journal, 19 (1978), p. 221 
Bermann, George A., Mandatory Rules of Law in International Arbitration, in Franco Ferrari 
& Stefan Kröll (eds.), Conflict of Laws in International Arbitration, Sellier, European 
Law Publishers, 2011 
Bernardini, Piero. Is the Duty to Cooperate in Long-Term Contracts a Substantive 
Transnational Rule in International Commercial Arbitration?, in Emmanuel Gaillard 
(ed.), Transnational Rules in International Commercial Arbitration, ICC Publication 
No. 480/4, Paris 1993 
Bernardini, Piero, Arbitral Justice, Courts and Legislation, in Special Supplement, ICC 
International Court of Arbitration Bulletin: Arbitration in the Next Decade: 
Proceedings of the International Court of Arbitration's 75th Anniversary Conference, 
ICC Publication No. 612, May 1999, p. 13 
Bernstein, Lisa E., Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for 
Immanent Business Norms, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 144-5 (1996), 
p. 1765  
Bernstein, Peter L., Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk, J. Wiley, 1996 
Bertrand, Edouard, Amiable Composition: Report of ICC France Working Group, 
International Business Law Journal, (2005), p. 753 
Betto, Jean-Georges., International Arbitration and Projects Finance: The Viewpoint of 
Practitioners, International Business Law Journal, (2003) p. 831 
Bewes, Wyndham A., The Romance of the Law Merchant, Being an Introduction to the Study 
of International and Commercial Law with Some Account of the Commerce and 
Fairs of the Middle Ages, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1923 
Bianca, C. Massimo & Michael Joachim Bonell (eds.), Commentary on the International 
Sales Law: the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention, Milan, Giuffrè, 1987  
Bishop, Doak & Lucy Reed, Practical Guidelines for Interviewing, Selecting and Challenging 
Party-Appointed Arbitrators in International Commercial Arbitration, Arbitration 
International, 14 (1998), p. 395 
Blase, Friedrich, & Philipp Höttler, Claiming Damages in Export Trade, On Recent 
Developments of Uniform Law, Review of the Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (CISG): 2004-2005, Pace International Law Review, 
Sellier European Law Publishers, 2006 
Blessing, Marc, The New International Arbitration Law in Switzerland, Journal of 
International Arbitration, 5-2 (1988), p. 9 
Blessing, Marc, Choice of Substantive Law in International Arbitration, Journal of 
International Arbitration, 14-2 (1997), p. 39 
Blessing, Marc, Mandatory Rules of Law versus Party Autonomy in International Arbitration, 
Journal of International Arbitration, 14-4 (1997), p. 23 
Böckstiegel, Karl-Heinz, Arbitration of Disputes between States and Private Enterprises in the 
International Chamber of Commerce, American Journal of International Law, 59  
(1965), p. 579 
 884 
 
Böckstiegel, Karl-Heinz, Arbitration and State Enterprises: a Survey on the National and 
International State of Law and Practice, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1984 
Böckstiegel, Karl-Heinz, Major Criteria for International Arbitrators in Shaping an Efficient 
Procedure, in Special Supplement, ICC International Court of Arbitration Bulletin: 
Arbitration in the Next Decade: Proceedings of the International Court of 
Arbitration's 75th Anniversary Conference, ICC Publication No. 612, May 1999, p. 
49 
Boeglin, Marcus C., The Use of Arbitration Clauses in the Field of Banking and Finance, 
Journal of International Arbitration, 15-3 (1998), p.19 
Boele-Woelki, Katharina, Principles and Private International Law, Uniform Law Review, 
(1996), p. 652 
Bonell, Michael Joachim, The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 
and CISG - Alternatives or Complementary Instruments?, Uniform Law Review 
(1996), p. 26 
Bonell, Michael Joachim, The UNIDROIT Principles in Practice: The Experience of the First 
Two Years, Uniform Law Review, (1997), p. 34 
Bonell, Michael Joachim, A Significant Recognition of the UNIDROIT Principles by an 
United States Court, Uniform Law Review, (1999), p. 651 
Bonell, Michael Joachim, A ‘Global’ arbitration decided on the basis of the UNIDROIT 
Principles: In re Andersen Consulting Business Unit Member Firms v. Arthur 
Andersen Business Unit Member Firms and Andersen Worldwide Société 
Coopérative, Arbitration International 17 (2001), p. 249 
Bonell, Michael Joachim, An International Restatement of Contract Law: the UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts, Transnational Publishers, 3
rd
 ed., 
2005 
Bonell, Michael Joachim, The UNIDROIT Principles and CISG – Sources of Inspiration for 
English Courts?, Pace International Law Review, 19 (Spring 2007/1), p. 9 
Bonell, Michael Joachim, The New Provisions on Illegality in the UNIDROIT Principles 
2010, Uniform Law Review, (2011), p. 517 
Born, Gary B., International Commercial Arbitration, Vol. II, Kluwer Law International, 
Alphen aan den Rijn, 2009 
Bortolotti, Fabio, (ed.), The ICC Agency Model Contract, A Commentary, ICC Publication 
No. 512, Paris, 1993 
Bortolotti, Fabio, Towards a New Lex Mercatoria regarding International Commercial 
Agency: The ICC Model Commercial Agency Contract, International Business Law 
Journal, (1995), p. 685 
Bortolotti, Fabio, International Commercial Agency Agreements and ICC Arbitration, ICC 
International Court of Arbitration Bulletin, 12-1 (2001), p. 48 
Bortolotti, Fabio, Drafting and Negotiating International Commercial Contracts: A Practical 
Guide, Paris: ICC Publication no. 671, 2008 
Bourdieu, Pierre, In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology, Oxford: Polity 
Press, 1990 
 885 
 
Braucher, Robert, Interpretation and Legal Effect in the Second "Restatement of Contracts", 
Columbia Law Review, 81-1 (Jan., 1981), p. 13 
Bridge, Michael, The International Sale of Goods: Law and Practice, Oxford University Press, 
2
nd
 ed. 2007 
Brown, Neville, General Principles of Law and the English Legal System, in Mauro 
Cappeletti (ed.), New Perspectives for a Common Law of Europe, Leyden: Sijthoff, 
1978 
Brownlie, Ian, Principles of public international law, Oxford University Press, 7
th
 ed., 2008 
Brownsword, Roger, Contract Law, Co-operation, and Good Faith: the Movement from Static 
to Dynamic Market Individualism, in Simon Deakin and Jonathan Michie (eds.) 
Contracts, Co-operation, and Competition: Studies in Economics, Management, and 
Law, Oxford University Press, 1997 
Brunetti, Maurizio, The Lex Mercatoria in Practice: The Experience of the Iran- United States 
Claims Tribunal, Arbitration International, 18 (2002), p. 355 
Brunner, Christoph, Force majeure and Hardship under General Contract Principles: 
Exemption for Non-Performance in International Arbitration, Kluwer Law 
International, 2009 
Bunni N.G., The FIDIC Forms of Contract: the Fourth Edition of the Red Book, 1992, the 
1996 Supplement, the 1999 Red Book, the 1999 Yellow Book, the 1999 Silver Book, 
Blackwell Pub., 3
rd
 ed., 2005 
Burrows, J. F., Contractual Co-operation and the Implied Term, Modern Law Review, 31 
(1968), p. 390 
Cafaggi, Fabrizio, Creditor’s Fault: In Search of a Comparative Frame, EUI Working Papers 
Law No. 2009/15, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1551825 
Calliess, Gralf-Peter & Moritz C. Renner, Between Law and Social Norms: The Evolution of 
Global Governance, Ratio Juris, 22 (2009), p. 260 
Calliess Gralf-Peter & Jens Mertens, Transnational Corporations, Global Competition Policy, 
and the Shortcomings of Private International Law, Indiana Journal of Global Legal 
Studies, 18-2 (Summer 2011), p. 843 
Cameron, James, & Kevin R. Gray, Principles of International Law in the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 50-2 (Apr., 2001), 
p. 248 
Canaris, Claus-Wilhelm, & Hans Christoph Grigoleit, Interpretation of Contracts, in A.S. 
Hartkamp, E.H. Hondius, M.W. Hesselink,.E. du Perron & M. Veldman, (eds.), 
Towards A European Civil Code, Kluwer Law International, 2004 
Carbonneau Thomas E., A Definition of and Perspective upon the Lex Mercatoria Debate, in 
Thomas E. Carbonneau (ed.), Lex mercatoria and arbitration: a discussion of the new 
law merchant, Kluwer Law International, Rev. ed., 1998 
Carter, J.W., Classification of Contractual Terms: the New Orthodoxy?, Cambridge Law 
Journal, 40 (1981), p. 219 
Cartwright, John, Protecting Legitimate Expectations and Estoppel in English Law, Electronic 
Journal of Comparative Law, 10.3 (December 2006), available at 
http://www.ejcl.org/103/article103-6.pdf  
 886 
 
Castellane, Beatrice, The New French Law on International Arbitration, Journal of 
International Arbitration, 28-4 (2011), p. 371 
Chappuis, Christine, Provisions for Best Efforts, Reasonable Care, Due Diligence and 
Standard Practice in International Contracts, International Business Law Journal, 
(2002), p. 281 
Chatterjee, Charles, The Use of the Discounted Cash Flow Method in the Assessment of 
Compensation, Comments on the Recent World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment 
of Foreign Direct Investment, Journal of International Arbitration, 10 (1993), p. 19 
Chen, Annie, The Doctrine of Manifest Disregard of the Law After Hall Street: Implications 
for Judicial Review of International Arbitrations in U. S. Courts, Fordham 
International Law Journal, 32 (2009), p. 1872 
Cheng, Bin, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, 
Cambridge: Grotius Publications, 1987 
Chitty, Joseph, & Hugh Beale, Chitty on Contracts, Vol. 1 General Principles, London: Sweet 
& Maxwell, 29
th
 ed., 2004 
Chong, Adeline, The Public Policy and Mandatory Rules of Third Countries in International 
Contracts, Journal of Private International Law, 44 (April 2006), p. 27 
Chuah, Jason, The Factual Matrix In The Construction Of Commercial Contracts – The 
House Of Lords Clarifies, International Company and Commercial Law Review, 12 
(2001), p. 294 
CISG-AC Opinion No. 3, Parol Evidence Rule, Plain Meaning Rule, Contractual Merger 
Clause and the CISG, Rapporteur: Professor Richard Hyland, Rutgers Law School, 
Camden, NJ, USA, 2004 
CISG-AC Opinion No. 6, Calculation of Damages under CISG Article 74. Rapporteur: 
Professor John Y. Gotanda, Villanova University School of Law, Villanova, 
Pennsylvania, USA, 2006 
CISG-AC Opinion No. 7, Exemption of Liability for Damages under Article 79 of the CISG, 
Rapporteur: Professor Alejandro M. Garro, Columbia University School of Law, 
New York, N.Y., USA, 2007 
CISG-AC Opinion No. 8, Calculation of Damages under CISG Articles 75 and 76. 
Rapporteur: Professor John Y. Gotanda, Villanova University School of Law, 
Villanova, Pennsylvania, USA, 2008 
Coase, Ronald Harry, The Nature of the Firm (1937), in Oliver E. Williamson & Sidney G. 
Winter (eds.), The Nature of the Firm: origins, evolution, and development, Oxford 
University Press, 1991 
Coester-Waltjen, Dagmar, The New Approach to Breach of Contract in German Law, in Nili 
Cohen & Ewan McKendrick (eds.), Comparative Remedies For Breach of Contract, 
Oxford: Hart, 2005 
Collins, Hugh, Regulating Contracts, Oxford University Press, 1999 
Constable, Marianne, The Law of the Other: The Mixed Jury and Changing Conceptions of 
Citizenship, Law, and Knowledge, University Of Chicago Press; 1
st
 ed., 1994 
Cooter, Robert D., The Objectives of Private and Public Judges, Public Choice, 41 (1983), p. 
107 
 887 
 
Cooter, Robert and Melvin A. Eisenberg, Damages for Breach of Contract, California Law 
Review, 73-5 (Oct., 1985), p. 1432 
Cordes, Albrecht, The search for a medieval Lex mercatoria, Oxford University Comparative 
Law Forum, 5 (2003), at ouclf.iuscomp.org 
Cordes, Albrecht, The search for a medieval Lex mercatoria, Vito Piergiovanni (ed.), From 
Lex Mercatoria to Commercial Law, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2005 
Craig, W. Laurence, William W. Park & Jan Paulsson, International Chamber of Commerce 
Arbitration, Oceana Publications, 3
rd
 ed., 2000 
Craswell, Richard, Do Trade Customs Exist?, in Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt, The 
Jurisprudential Foundations of Corporate And Commercial Law, Cambridge 
University Press, 1999, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=184988 
Cremades, Bernardo M., Practitioners’ Notebook: The Impact of International Arbitration on 
the Development of Business Law, American Journal of Comparative Law, 31 
(1983), p. 526 
Cremades, Bernardo M., Liquidated Damages, Penalty Clauses and Punitive Damages within 
International Contracts, International Business Law Journal, (2002), p. 329 
Cremades, Bernardo M., & David J.A. Cairns, Trans-national Public Policy in International 
Arbitral Decision-Making: The Cases of Bribery, Money Laundering and Fraud, in 
Dossier of the ICC Institute of World Business Law: Arbitration - Money 
Laundering, Corruption and Fraud, ICC Publication No. 651, 2003, p. 65 
Crook, John R., Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration: The Iran-US-
Claims Tribunal Experience, American Journal of International Law, 83 (1989), p. 
278 
Dalhuisen, J.H., Custom and its Revival in Transnational Private Law, Duke Journal of 
Comparative and International Law, 18 (2008), p. 339 
Dammann, Jens & Henry Hansmann, Globalizing Commercial Litigation, Cornell Law 
Review, 94 (2008), p. 1 
Darwazeh, Nadia & Baptiste Rigaudeau, Clues to Construing the New French Arbitration 
Law - An ICC Perspective on Procedural Efficiency, Good Faith, and Independence, 
Journal of International Arbitration, 28-4 (2011), p. 381 
Dasser, Felix, International Arbitration and Setting Aside Proceedings in Switzerland – An 
Updated Statistical Analysis, ASA Bulletin, 28-1 (March 2010), p. 82 
David Rene, The International Unification of Private Law, International Encyclopedia of 
Comparative Law, Vol. 2, Ch. 5, Tubingen: Mohr, 1971 
David, Rene & John E.C. Brierley, Major Legal Systems in the World Today: An 
Introduction to the Comparative Study of Law, London: Stevens, 3
rd
 ed., 1985 
De Ly Filip, International business law and lex mercatoria, T.M.C. Asser Instituut, 1992 
De Ly Filip, Divorce Clauses in International Joint Venture Contracts, International Business 
Law Journal, (1995), p. 279 
Delaume, Georges, The Proper Law of State Contracts and the Lex Mercatoria: a Reappraisal, 
ICSID Review—Foreign Investment Law Journal, 3 (1984), p. 79 
 888 
 
Derains, Yves, Public Policy and the Law Applicable to the Dispute in International 
Arbitration,  in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed.), Comparative Arbitration Practice and 
Public Policy in Arbitration, ICCA Congress Series No. 3, Kluwer Law International, 
1987 
Derains, Yves, Application of European Law by Arbitrators — Analysis of Case Law, in 
CEPANI (ed.) Arbitration and European Law , Brussels, Bruylant, 1997 
Derains, Yves, State Courts and Arbitrators, in Special Supplement, ICC International Court 
of Arbitration Bulletin: Arbitration in the Next Decade: Proceedings of the 
International Court of Arbitration's 75th Anniversary Conference, ICC Publication 
No. 612, May 1999, p. 27 
Derains, Yves, The Role of the UNIDROIT Principles in International Commercial 
Arbitration (1): A European Perspective, in Special Supplement, ICC International 
Court of Arbitration Bulletin: UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts: Reflections on their Use in International Arbitration, 2002, p. 9 
Derains, Yves & Eric A. Schwartz, A Guide to the New ICC Rules of Arbitration, Kluwer 
Law International, 2
nd
 ed.,  2005 
Desai, Vyapak & Sahil Kanuga, Delhi High Court Upholds Enforcement of ICC Arbitration 
Award, India Law Journal, 4-2 (April-June, 2011) 
Dezalay, Yves & Bryant G. Garth, Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial Arbitration 
and the Construction of a Transnational Legal Order, University of Chicago Press, 
1996 
Dimolitsa, Antonias, The Equivocal Power of the Arbitrators to Introduce Ex Officio New 
Issues of Law, ASA Bulletin, 27-3 (2009), p. 426 
Dimsey, Mariel, The resolution of international investment disputes: challenges and solutions, 
Eleven International Publishing, 2008 
Donahue Jr., Charles, Medieval and Early Modern Lex Mercatoria: An Attempt at the 
Probatio Diabolica, Chicago Journal of International Law, 5 (2004-2005), p. 21 
Donahue, Jr., Charles, Benvenuto Stracca’s De Mercatura: Was There a Lex Mercatoria in 
Sixteenth-Century Italy?, Vito Piergiovanni (ed.), From Lex Mercatoria to 
Commercial Law, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2005 
Donahue Jr., Charles, Private Law without the State and During its Formation, American 
Journal of Comparative Law, 56 (2008), p. 541 
Draetta, Ugo, The Notion of Consequential Damages in the International Trade Practice: A 
Merger of Common Law and Civil Law Concepts, International Business Law 
Journal, (1991), p. 487 
Draetta, Ugo, Force Majeure Clauses in International Trade Practice, International Business 
Law Journal, (1996), p. 547 
Drahozal, Christopher R., Codifying Manifest Disregard, Nevada Law Journal, 8 (2007), p. 
234 
Drobnig, Ulrich, General Report: The Use of Comparative Law by Courts, in Ulrich Drobnig 
& Sjef Van Erp (eds.), The Use of Comparative Law by Courts: XIVth International 
Congress of Comparative Law, Kluwer Law International, 1999 
Du Plessis, Paul J., Borkowski's Textbook on Roman Law, OUP Oxford, 4
th
 ed., 2010 
 889 
 
Dubroff, Harold, The Implied Covenant of Good Faith in Contract Interpretation and Gap-
Filling: Reviling a Revered Relic, St. John's Law Review, 80 (Spring 2006), p. 559 
Duffy, J.P., Hall Street One Year Later: The Manifest Disregard Debate Continues, American 
Review of International Arbitration, 19 (2008), p. 193 
Dugan, Christopher F., Don Wallace, Jr., Noah D. Rubins & Borzu Sabahi, Investor-State 
Arbitration, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008 
Ehle, B. D., Arbitration as a Disputes Resolution Mechanism in Mergers and Acquisitions, 
Comparative Law Yearbook of International Business, (2005), p. 287 
Eiselen, Sieg, Proving the Quantum of Damages, Journal of Law and Commerce, 25-1 (2005), 
p. 375 
Eisenberg, Melvin A., Relational Contracts, in Jack Beatson and Daniel Friedmann (ed.) 
Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law, Oxford University Press, 1995 
Eisenberg, Melvin A., Impossibility, Impracticability, and Frustration, Journal of Legal 
Analysis, 1-1 (2009), p. 207 
El-Kosheri, Ahmed S. & Karim Y. Youssef, The Independence of International Arbitrators: 
An Arbitrator's Perspective, Special Supplement, ICC International Court of 
Arbitration Bulletin: Independence of Arbitrators, ICC International Court of 
Arbitration Bulletin, 2007, p. 43  
Elland-Goldsmith, Michael, Comfort letters in English law and practice, International 
Business Law Journal, (1994), p. 527 
Ellington, Paul R., Termination of Contracts under English Law, International Business Law 
Journal, (1997), p. 857 
Enderlein, Fritz & Dietrich Maskow, International Sales Law: United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: Convention on the Limitation Period 
in the International Sale of Goods: Commentary, Oceana Publications, 1992 
Eörsi, Gyula, A Propos the 1980 Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods, American Journal of Comparative Law, 31 (1983), p. 333 
Epstein, Louis, Arbitrator Independence and Bias: The View of a Corporate In-House 
Counsel, Special Supplement, ICC International Court of Arbitration Bulletin: 
Independence of Arbitrators, 2007, p. 55 
Ewald, F., The Return of Descartes’s Malicious Demon: An Outline of a Philosophy of 
Precaution, in T. Baker and J. Simon (eds.), Embracing Risk: The Changing Culture 
of Insurance and Responsibility, University of Chicago Press, 2002 
Farnsworth, E.A., Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness under the 
Uniform Commercial Code, University of Chicago Law Review, 30-4 (1963), p. 666 
Farnsworth, E.A., Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, Columbia Law Review, 70-7 
(Nov., 1970), p. 1145 
Farnsworth, E.A., On Trying to Keep One's Promises: The Duty of Best Efforts In Contract 
Law, University of Pittsburgh Law Review, 46 (Fall 1984), p. 1 
Farnsworth, E.A., Closing Remarks, American Journal of Comparative Law, 40 (1992), p. 
699 
 890 
 
Farnsworth, E.A., Good Faith in Contract Performance, in Jack Beatson and Daniel 
Friedmann (ed.) Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law, Oxford University Press, 
1995 
Farnsworth, E.A., The American Provenance of the UNIDROIT Principles, Tulane Law 
Review, 72 (1998), p. 1985 
Farnsworth E.A., The Interpretation of International Contracts and the Use of Preambles, 
International Business Law Journal, (2002), p. 271 
Farnsworth E.A., Farnsworth on Contracts, Aspen Publishers, 3
rd
 ed., 2004 
Fassberg, Celia Wasserstein, The Empirical and Theoretical Underpinnings of the Law 
Merchant: Lex Mercatoria--Hoist with Its Own Petard?, Chicago Journal of 
International Law, 5 (2004), p. 67 
Fei, Lanfang, Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards: A 
Review of the Chinese Approach, Arbitration International, 26-2 (2010), p. 301 
Felemegas, John (ed.), An International Approach to the Interpretation of the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1980) as Uniform Sales 
Law, Cambridge University Press, 2006 
Ferrari, Franco, Uniform Interpretation of the 1980 Uniform Sales Law, Georgia Journal of 
International and Comparative Law, 24 (1994), p. 183 
Ferrari, Franco, General Principles and International Uniform Commercial Law Conventions: 
A Study of the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention and the 1988 UNIDROIT 
Conventions, Uniform Law Review, (1997), p. 451 
Ferrari, Franco, What Sources of Law for Contracts for the International Sale of Goods? Why 
One Has to Look Beyond the CISG, International Review of Law and Economics, 25 
(September 2005), p. 314 
Fontaine, Marcel, Content and Performance, American Journal of Comparative Law, 40 
(1992), p. 645 
Fontaine, Marcel, The UNIDROIT Principles: An Expression of Current Contract Practice?, 
Special Supplement, ICC International Court of Arbitration Bulletin: UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts: Reflections on their Use in 
International Arbitration, 2002, p. 95 
Fontaine, Marcel & Filip De Ly, Drafting International Contracts: An Analysis of Contract 
Clauses, Brill Academic Publishers, 2009 
Fortier, L. Yves, The Minimum Requirements of Due Process in Taking Measures Against 
Dilatory Tactics: Arbitral Discretion in International Commercial Arbitration: “A 
Few Plain Rules and a Few Strong Instincts”, in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed.), 
Improving the Efficiency of Arbitration Agreements and Awards: 40 Years of 
Application of the New York Convention, ICCA Congress Series No. 9, Kluwer Law 
International, 1999 
Fortunati, Maura, The Fairs between Lex Mercatoria and Ius Mercatorum, in Vito 
Piergiovanni (ed.), From Lex Mercatoria to Commercial Law, Berlin: Duncker & 
Humblot, 2005 
Fouchard, Philippe, Chairman, Final Report on the Status of the Arbitrator, ICC International 
Court of Arbitration Bulletin, 7-1, (1996), p. 27 
 891 
 
Frick, Joachim G., Arbitration and Complex International Contracts: with special emphasis on 
the determination of the applicable substantive law and on the adaptation of contracts 
to changed circumstances, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2001 
Friedland, P., & E. Wong, Measuring Damages for the Deprivation of Income-Producing 
Assets: ICSID Case Studies, ICSID Review—Foreign Investment Law Journal, 6 
(1991), p. 400 
Friedmann, Daniel, Rights and Remedies, in Nili Cohen & Ewan McKendrick (eds.), 
Comparative Remedies for Breach of Contract, Oxford: Hart, 2005 
Frilet, Marc, Terms and Conditions of Contract: the Civil Law Approach and the European 
Contract Law, International Business Law Journal, (2007), p. 57 
Fucci, Frederick R., Hardship and Changed Circumstances as Grounds for Adjustment or 
Non-Performance of Contracts, Practical Considerations in International 
Infrastructure Investment and Finance, American Bar Association, Section of 
International Law, Spring Meeting (April 2006) available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/fucci.html 
Fuller, L. L., & William R Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, Yale 
Law Journal, 46 (1936), p. 52 
Gaillard, Emmanuel, Thirty Years of Lex Mercatoria: Towards the Selective Application of 
Transnational Rules, ICSID Review—Foreign Investment Law Journal, 10 (1995), p. 
208 
Gaillard, Emmanuel, The Enforcement of Awards Set Aside in the Country of Origin, ICSID 
Review—Foreign Investment Law Journal, 14 (1999), p. 16 
Gaillard, Emmanuel, Transnational Law: A Legal System or a Method of Decision-Making, 
in Klaus Peter Berger, The Practice of Transnational Law, Kluwer Law International, 
2001 
Gaillard, Emmanuel, The Meaning of ‘and’ in Article 42(1): The Role of International Law in 
the ICSID Choice of Law Process, ICSID Review—Foreign Investment Law 
Journal, 18-2 (2003), p. 375 
Gaillard, Emmanuel & John Savage (eds.), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International 
Commercial Arbitration, Kluwer Law International, 1999 
Garro, Alejandro M., The Gap-Filling Role of the UNIDROIT Principles in International 
Sales Law: Some Comments on the Interplay Between the Principles and CISG, 
Tulane Law Review, 69 (1995), p. 1149 
Gebauer, Martin, Uniform Law, General Principles and Autonomous Interpretation, Uniform 
Law Review, (2000), p. 683 
Geeroms, Sofie, Foreign law in Civil Litigation: A Comparative and Functional Analysis, 
Oxford University Press, 2004 
Gegan, Bernard E., In Defense of Restitution: A Comment on Mather, Restitution as a 
Remedy for Breach of Contract, The Case of the Partially Performing Seller, 
Southern California Law Review, 57 (1983-1984), p. 723 
Gélinas, Paul-A., General Characteristics of Recoverable Damages in International 
Arbitration, in Yves Derains & Richard H. Kreindler, (eds.), Evaluation of Damages 
in International Arbitration, ICC Publication No. 668, 2006, p. 11 
 892 
 
Gergen, Mark P., The Law’s Response to Exit and Loyalty in Contract Disputes, in Nili 
Cohen & Ewan McKendrick, Comparative Remedies for Breach of Contract, 
Oxford: Hart, 2005 
Gessner, Volkmar, Globalization and Legal Certainty, in Volkmar Gessner & Ali Cem Budak 
(eds.), Emerging Legal Certainty: Empirical Studies on the Globalization of Law, 
Ashgate, 1998 
Giddens, Anthony, The Third Way and Its Critics, Cambridge; Polity, 2000 
Gillette, Clayton P., Commercial Rationality and the Duty to Adjust Long-Term Contracts, 
Minnesota Law Review, 69 (1984-1985), p. 521 
Gilson, Ronald, The Law and Finance of Corporate Acquisitions, Mineola, NY: Foundation 
Press, 1986 
Glenn, H. Patrick, Legal traditions of the world: sustainable diversity in law, Oxford; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2
nd
 ed., 2004  
Glover, Jeremy, Simon Hughes, & Christopher Thomas, Understanding the New FIDIC Red 
Book: A Clause by Clause Commentary, Sweet & Maxwell, 2006 
Goetz, Charles J., & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, Virginia Law 
Review, 67-6 (1981), p. 1089 
Goldberg, Victor P., Great Contracts Cases: In Search of Best Efforts: Reinterpreting Bloor v. 
Falstaff, Saint Louis University Law Journal, 44 (Fall 2000), p. 1465 
Goldman, Berthold, Lex mercatoria, Forum Internationale No. 3, Deventer, November 1983 
Goldman, Berthold, The Applicable Law: General Principles of Law - the Lex Mercatoria, in 
Julian D. M. Lew (ed.), Contemporary Problems in International Arbitration, 
London, 1986 
Goode, Roy, The concept of "Good Faith" in English law, Centro di Studi e Ricerche di 
Diritto Comparato e Straniero, Saggi, conferenze e seminari 2, Rome, 1992  
Goode, Roy, Usage and its Reception in Transnational Commercial Law, International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, 46-1 (1997), p.1 
Goode, Roy, Rule, Practice and Pragmatism in Transnational Commercial Law, International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly, 54-3 (2005), p. 539 
Gordley, James, An American Perspective on the Unidroit Principles, Centro di Studi e 
Ricerche di Diritto Comparato e Straniero, Saggi, conferenze e seminari; 22, Rome, 
1996  
Gordley, James, The Foreseeability Limitation on Liability in Contract, in A.S. Hartkamp, 
E.H. Hondius, M.W. Hesselink, C.E. du Perron & M. Veldman, (eds.), Towards A 
European Civil Code, Kluwer Law International, 2004 
Gotanda, John Y., Recovering Lost Profits in International Disputes, Georgetown Journal of 
International Law, 36 (Fall 2004), p. 61 
Gotanda, John Y., Damages in private international law, Receuil des Cours, 326 (2007) 
Greenawalt, Alexander K.A., Does International Arbitration Need a Mandatory Rules 
Method?, American Review of International Arbitration, 18 (2007), p. 103 
Grigera Naón, Horacio A., Choice of Law Problems in International Commercial Arbitration, 
Recueil des Cours, 289 (2001)  
 893 
 
Grigera Naón, Horacio A., International Commercial Arbitration – The Law Applicable to the 
Substance of the Dispute: Present Trends, in Patrick J. Borchers & Joachim Zekoll 
(eds.) International conflict of laws for the third millennium: essays in honor of 
Friedrich K. Juenger, Transnational Publishers, 2001  
Gross, Charles, The Court of Piepowder, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 20-2 (1906), p. 
231 
Gross, Charles (ed.), Select Cases Concerning the Law Merchant A.D. 1270-1638, Vol. I, 
Local Courts, London: B. Quaritch, Selden Society 23, 1908 
Grundmann, Stefan, the Fault Principle as the Chameleon of Contract Law: a Market 
Function Approach, Michigan Law Review, 107 (June 2009), p. 1583 
Hacking, David, Ethics, Elitism, Eligibility: A Response, What happens if the Icelandic 
Arbitrator falls through the Ice?, Journal of International Arbitration 15-4 (1998), p. 
73  
Hadjiyannakis, Helen, The Parol Evidence Rule and Implied Terms: The Sounds of Silence, 
Fordham Law Review, 54 (1985), p. 35 
Hart, Oliver D., Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm, in Oliver E. Williamson & 
Sidney G. Winter (eds.), The Nature of the Firm: origins, evolution, and 
development, Oxford University Press, 1991 
Hartkamp, Arthur, The Concept of Good Faith in the UNIDROIT Principles for International 
Commercial Contracts, Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law, 3 
(1995) p. 65 
Hascher, Dominique, ICC Practice in Relation to the Appointment, Confirmation, Challenge 
and Replacement of Arbitrators, ICC International Court of Arbitration Bulletin, 6-2 
(1996), p. 4 
Haugeneder, F., The New Austrian Arbitration Act and the European Convention on 
International Commercial Arbitration, Arbitration International, 23-4 (2007), p. 645 
Hayek, Friedrich A. von, The Use of Knowledge in Society, American Economic Review, 35-
4 (Sep., 1945), p. 519 
Hayek, Friedrich A. von, Law, Legislation and Liberty: A New Statement of the Liberal 
Principles of Justice and Political Economy, Vol. 1: Rules and Order, London: 
Routledge, 1998 
Hesselink, Martijn W., The Concept of Good Faith, in A.S. Hartkamp, E.H. Hondius, M.W. 
Hesselink, C.E. du Perron & M. Veldman, (eds.), Towards A European Civil Code, 
Kluwer Law International, 2004 
Highet, Keith, The Enigma of the Lex Mercatoria, Tulane Law Review, 63 (1989), p. 613 
Hillman, Robert A., Court Adjustment of Long-Term Contracts: An Analysis under Modern 
Contract Law, Duke Law Journal, 1 (1987), p. 1 
Hillman, Robert A., Article 29(2) of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods: A New Effort at Clarifying the Legal Effect of "No Oral 
Modification" Clauses, Cornell International Law Journal, 21 (1988), p. 449 
Hochstrasser Daniel, Choice of Law and 'Foreign' Mandatory Rules in International 
Arbitration, Journal of International Arbitration, 11-1 (1994), p. 57 
Hoffmann, Leonard, Causation, Law Quarterly Review, 121 (October 2005), p. 592 
 894 
 
Honnold, John O., Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 United Nations 
Convention, Kluwer Law International, 3
rd
 ed., 1999 
Horn, Norbert, Changes in Circumstances and the Revision of Contracts in Some European 
Laws and in International Law, in Norbert Horn (ed.), Adaptation and Renegotiation 
of Contracts in International Trade and Finance, Antwerp, Boston, London, 
Frankfurt, Kluwer, 1985 
Horn, Norbert, The Development of Arbitration in International Financial Transactions, 
Arbitration International, 16 (2000), p. 279 
Huber, Peter, Some introductory remarks on the CISG, Internationales Handelsrecht, 
(2006/6), p. 228 
Huber, Peter, & Alastair Mullis, The CISG: A New Textbook for Students and Practitioners, 
Sellier European Law Publishers, 2007 
Hunter, Martin & Gui Conde e Silva, Transnational Public Policy and its Application in 
Investment Arbitrations, Journal of World Investment, 3 (2003), p. 367 
Hunter, Martin & Anthony Sinclair, Aminoil Revisited: Reflections on a Story of Changing 
Circumstances, in Todd Weiler (ed.), International Law and Arbitration: Leading 
Cases from the ICSID, NAFTA, Bilateral Treaties and Customary International Law, 
Cameron May, 2005 
Husserl, G., Public Policy and Ordre Public, Virginia Law Review, 25-1 (Nov. 1938), p. 37 
Hutton, Sally J., Restitution after Breach of Contract: Rethinking the Conventional 
Jurisprudence, Acta Juridica, (1997), p. 201 
Hyland, R., On Setting Forth the Law of Contract: A Foreword, American Journal of 
Comparative Law, 40 (1992), p. 541 
International Law Association, Committee on International Commercial Arbitration, Report 
on the Applicability of Transnational Rules in International Commercial Arbitration, 
64
th
 Conference, Broadbeach, Queensland, Australia (August 1990), International 
Law Association Reports of Conferences, London, 1991 
International Law Association, Committee on Transnational Rules in International 
Commercial Arbitration, Report of the 65
th
 Conference, Cairo, (21 to 26 April 1992), 
International Law Association Reports of Conferences, London, 1993 
International Law Association, Committee on International Commercial Arbitration, Final 
Report on Ascertaining the Content of the Applicable Law in International 
Commercial Arbitration, 73
rd
 Conference, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (August 2008)  
Isaacs, Nathan, The Merchant and His Law, Journal of Political Economy, 23 (1915), p. 529 
Jaeger, Axel-Volkmar, & Götz-Sebastian Hök, FIDIC - A Guide for Practitioners, Springer-
Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2009 
Jänterä-Jareborg, Maarit, Foreign Law in National Courts: A Comparative Perspective, 
Recueil des Cours, 304 (2003) 
Jarvin, Sigvard, The Sources and Limits of the Arbitrator's Powers, Arbitration International, 
2 (1986), p. 140 
Jaynes, Gordon L., Termination, Risk and Force Majeure, Paper presented at the Seminar 
“FIDIC Global Conditions of Contract”, New Delhi, January 2001, available at 
http://www1.fidic.org/resources/contracts/jaynes_A.asp 
 895 
 
Jennings, R. Y., State Contracts in International Law, British Yearbook of International Law, 
37 (1961), p. 156 
Johnston, David, Roman Law in Context, Key Themes in Ancient History, Cambridge 
University Press, 1999 
Jolivet, Emmanuel, L'harmonisation du droit OHADA des contrats: l'influence des Principes 
d'UNIDROIT en matière de pratique contractuelle et d'arbitrage, Uniform Law 
Review, (2008), p. 127 
Joskow, Paul J., Vertical Integration and Long-term Contracts: the Case of Coal-Burning 
Electric Generating Plants, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 1-1 (1985), 
p. 33 
Kapeliuk, Daphna, The Repeat Appointment Factor: Exploring Decision Patterns of Elite 
Investment Arbitrators, Cornell Law Review, 96 (2010), p. 47 
Kaplow, Louis, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, Duke Law Journal, 42  
(December, 1992), p. 557 
Katz, Avery W., The Economics of Form and Substance in Contract Interpretation, Columbia 
Law Review, 104-2 (2004), p. 496 
Kaufmann-Kohler, Gabrielle, Globalization of Arbitral Procedure, Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law, 36 (2003), p. 1313 
Kaufmann-Kohler, Gabrielle, The Arbitrator and the Law: Does He/She Know It? Apply It? 
How? And a Few More Questions, Arbitration International, 21-4 (2005), p. 631 
Keer, Stephanie E. & Richard W. Naimark, Arbitrators Do Not "Split the Baby"--Empirical 
Evidence from International Business Arbitration, Journal of International 
Arbitration, 18 (2001), p. 573 
Kelsen, Hans, Pure Theory of Law, Translated from the Second (Revised and Enlarged) 
German Edition by Max Knight, University of California Press, 1967, the Lawbook 
Exchange Edition, 2009   
Kerr, Charles, The Origin and Development of the Law Merchant, Virginia Law Review, 15-4 
(Feb. 1929), p. 350 
Kessedjian, Catherine, Competing Approaches to Force Majeure and Hardship, International 
Review of Law and Economics, 25 (September 2005), p. 415 
Kessedjian, Catherine, Mandatory Rules of Law in International Arbitration: What are 
Mandatory Rules?, American Review of International Arbitration, 18 (2007), p. 147 
Kessedjian, Catherine, Public Order in European Law, Erasmus Law Review, 1-1 (2007), p. 
25 
Kessedjian, Catherine, Transnational Public Policy, in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed.), 
International Arbitration 2006: Back To Basics?, ICCA Congress Series No. 13, 
Kluwer Law International, 2007 
Kiffer, Laurence, Amiable Composition and ICC Arbitration, ICC International Court of 
Arbitration Bulletin, 18-1 (2007), p. 51 
Knight, Frank H., Risk, uncertainty and profit, University of Chicago Press, (1971), Reprint 
of the 1921 ed. 
 896 
 
Komarov, Alexander S., Mitigation of Damages, in Yves Derains & Richard H. Kreindler, 
(eds.), Evaluation of Damages in International Arbitration, ICC Publication No. 668, 
2006, p. 37 
Koopmans, T., Comparative Law and the Courts, International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, 45-3 (July 1996), p. 545 
Kornet, Nicole, Contract Interpretation and Gap Filling: Comparative and Theoretical 
Perspectives, Intersentia, 2006 
Kötz, Hein, & Axel Flessner, European Contract Law, Vol. 1, Formation, validity, and 
content of contracts, Contract and third parties, Oxford University Press, 1997 
Kraft, Walter, Termination of Contracts under German Law, International Business Law 
Journal, (1997), p. 891 
Kreindler, Richard H., Approaches to the Application of Transnational Public Policy by 
Arbitrators, Journal of World Investment, 4-2 (April 2003), p. 239 
Kreindler, Richard H., Standards of Procedural International Public Policy, Stockholm 
International Arbitration Review, (2008:2), p. 143 
Kroll, Stefan, Contractual Gap-Filling by Arbitration Tribunals, International Arbitration Law 
Review, 2 (1999), p. 9 
Kronke, Herbert, The UN Sales Convention, The UNIDROIT Contract Principles and the 
Way Beyond, Journal of Law and Commerce, 25 (2005-2006), p. 451 
Kuney, George W., To the Best of Whose Knowledge?, California Business Law Practitioner, 
(Spring 2007), p. 58 
Kurkela, Matti, ‘Jura novit curia' and the burden of education in international arbitration – a 
Nordic perspective, ASA Bulletin, 21-3 (2003), p. 486 
Laithier, Yves-Marie, Comparative Reflections on the French Law of Remedies for Breach of 
Contract, in Nili Cohen & Ewan McKendrick, Comparative Remedies for Breach Of 
Contract, Oxford: Hart, 2005 
Lalive, Pierre, The UNIDROIT Principles as Lex Contractus, With or Without an Explicit or 
Tacit Choice of Law: An Arbitrator's Perspective, Special Supplement, ICC 
International Court of Arbitration Bulletin: UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts: Reflections on their Use in International Arbitration, 2002, p. 
77 
Lando, Ole, The Lex Mercatoria in International Commercial Arbitration, International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, 34 (1985), p. 747 
Lando, Ole, Some Issues Relating to the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, King’s 
College Law Journal, 7 (1996-1997), p. 55 
Lando Ole, The Role of Party Autonomy and the Relevance of Usages, in Michael Joachim 
Bonell & Franco Bonelli (eds.), Contratti commerciali internazionali e Principi 
UNIDROIT, Giuffré, Milano 1997 
Lando, Ole, Non-Performance (Breach) of Contracts, in in A.S. Hartkamp, E.H. Hondius, 
M.W. Hesselink,.E. du Perron & M. Veldman, (eds.), Towards A European Civil 
Code, Kluwer Law International, 2004 
Lando, Ole, CISG and Its Followers: A Proposal to Adopt Some International Principles of 
Contract Law, in: American Journal of Comparative Law, 53 (2005), p. 379 
 897 
 
Lando, Ole, Is Good Faith an Over-Arching General Clause in the Principles of European 
Contract Law?, European Review of Private Law, 6 (2007), p. 841 
Lando Ole, Termination for Breach of Contract in the CISG, the Principles of European 
contract law, the UNIDROIT Principles of international commercial contracts, in K. 
Boele-Woelki and F.W. Grosheide (eds), The Future of European Contract Law, 
Liber Amicorum E.H. Hondius, Kluwer International, 2007 
Lando, Ole & Hugh Beale (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Parts I and II, Kluwer 
Law International, 2000 
Lando, Ole, Eric Clive, Andre Priim & Reinhard Zimmermann (eds.), Principles of European 
contract law. Part III, Kluwer Law International, 2003 
Lando, Ole & Peter Arnt Nielsen, The Rome I Regulation, Common Market Law Review, 45 
(2008), p. 1687 
Landolt, Philip, The IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration: An 
Overview, Journal of International Arbitration, (2005), p. 409 
Langbein, John, Comparative Civil Procedure and the Style of Complex Contracts, 35 
American Journal of Comparative Law, (1987), p. 381 
Langen, Eugen, Transnational Commercial Law, A. W. Sijthoff, 1973 
Langlois, Richard N. & Metin M. Cosgel, Frank Knight on Risk, Uncertainty, And the Firm: 
A New Interpretation, Economic Inquiry, 31 (July 1993), p. 456 
Lauterpacht, Hersch, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law: with Special 
Reference to International Arbitration, Lawbook Exchange, 2002, (Originally 
published: New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1927) 
Lauterpacht, Hersch, Restrictive Interpretation and the Principle of Effectiveness in the 
Interpretation of Treaties, British Year Book of International Law, 6 (1949), p. 48 
Lawson, David A., Impartiality and Independence of International Arbitrators, Commentary 
on the 2004 IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, 
ASA Bulletin, 23-1 (2005), p. 25 
Le Pautremat, Solène, Mitigation of Damages: A French Perspective, International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, 55-1 (Jan., 2006), p. 205 
Leboulanger, Philippe, Some Issues in ICC Awards Relating to State Contracts, ICC 
International Court of Arbitration Bulletin, 15-2 (2004), p. 93 
Leemann, Matthias, Challenging International Arbitration Awards in Switzerland on the 
Ground of a Lack of Independence and Impartiality of an Arbitrator, ASA Bulletin, 
29-1 (March 2011), p. 10 
Lew, Julian D. M., Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration: A Study in 
Commercial Arbitration Awards, Oceana, 1978 
Lew, Julian D.M., The UNIDROIT Principles as Lex Contractus Chosen by the Parties and 
Without an Explicit Choice of-Law Clause: The Perspective of Counsel, Special 
Supplement, ICC International Court of Arbitration Bulletin: UNIDROIT Principles 
of International Commercial Contracts: Reflections on their Use in International 
Arbitration, 2002, p. 85 
 898 
 
Lew, Julian D. M., Iura Novit Curia and Due Process, Queen Mary School of Law Legal 
Studies Research Paper No., 72 (2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1733531 
Lew, Julian D. M., Loukas Mistelis L. A., & Stefan M. Kröll, Comparative International 
Commercial Arbitration, Kluwer Law International, 2003 
Liebscher, Christoph, European Public Policy, A Black Box?, Journal of International 
Arbitration 17-3 (2000), p. 73 
Llewellyn, Karl N., What price contract? An essay in perspective, Yale Law Journal, 40 
(1931), p. 704 
Long, Lawrence S., Best Efforts as Diligence Insurance: In Defense of "Profit Uber Alles", 
Columbia Law Review, 86-8 (Dec., 1986), p. 1728 
Lookofsky, Joseph, The Limits of Commercial Contract Freedom: Under the UNIDROIT 
"Restatement" and Danish Law, American Journal of Comparative Law, 46 (1998), 
p. 485 
Lookofsky, J. & K. Hertz, Transnational Litigation and Commercial Arbitration: An Analysis 
of American, European, and International Law, DJØF Pub., 2nd ed., 2004 
López Rodríguez, Ana M., Lex Mercatoria and Harmonization of Contract Law in the EU, 
Copenhagen: DJØF Pub., 2003 
Lowenfeld, Andreas F., Lex Mercatoria: An Arbitrator's View, Arbitration International, 
(1990), p. 133 
Lowenfeld, Andreas F., The Party-Appointed Arbitrator in International Controversies: Some 
Reflections, Texas International Law Journal, 30 (1995), p. 59 
Macneil, Ian R., The Many Futures of Contracts, Southern California Law Review, 47 (1974), 
p. 691 
MacQueen, H. L., Illegality and Immorality in Contracts: Towards European Principles, in 
A.S. Hartkamp, E.H. Hondius, M.W. Hesselink,.E. du Perron & M. Veldman, (eds.), 
Towards A European Civil Code, Kluwer Law International, 2004 
Majeed, Nudrat B., Commentary on the Hubco Judgment, Arbitration International, 16-4 
(2000), p. 431 
Majeed, Nudrat, Good Faith and Due Process: Lessons from the Shari'ah, Arbitration 
International 20-1 (2004), p. 97 
Malanczuk, Peter, Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law, Routledge, 7
th
 rev. 
ed., 1997 
Malmgren, H. B., Information, Expectations and the Theory of the Firm, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 75-3 (Aug., 1961), p. 399 
Maniruzzaman, A. F. M., The Arbitrator’s Prudence in Lex Mercatoria: Amiable Composition 
and Ex Aequo et Bono in Decision Making, Mealey's International Arbitration 
Report, 18-12 (December 2003), p. 1 
Mann, F. A., Lex Facit Arbitrum, in Pieter Sanders (ed.) International arbitration, Liber 
amicorum for Martin Domke, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1967 
Mann, F. A., State Contracts and International Arbitration, British Year Book of International 
Law, 42 (1967), p. 1 
 899 
 
Mann, F.A., Fusion of the Legal Profession, Law Quarterly Review, 93 (1977), p. 367 
Mann, F. A., The Aminoil Arbitration, British Yearbook of International Law, 54-1 (1983), p. 
213 
Mann, F.A., England Rejects ‘Delocalized’ Contracts and Arbitration, International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, 33 (1984), p. 193 
Mantilla-Serrano, Fernando, Towards a Transnational Procedural Public Policy, Arbitration 
International, 20-4 (2004), p. 333 
Markesinis, B. S, Always on the Same Path: Essays On Foreign Law and Comparative 
Methodology, Volume II, Oxford: Hart, 2001 
Markesinis, B.S., W. Lorenz & G. Dannemann, The German Law of Obligations, Vol. I, The 
Law of Contracts and Restitution: a Comparative Introduction, Clarendon Press 
(Oxford), 1997 (2001 reprinted) 
Marmursztejn, Muriel, Force Majeure Clauses of an Oil Company's Upstream Agreements: a 
Review, International Business Law Journal, (1998), p. 781  
Marrin, John, Concurrent delay, Construction Law Journal, 18-6 (2002), p. 436 
Mayer, Pierre, Mandatory Rules of Law in International Arbitration, Arbitration International, 
2 (1986), p. 274 
Mayer, Pierre, The Role of the UNIDROIT Principles in ICC Arbitration Practice, in Special 
Supplement, ICC International Court of Arbitration Bulletin: UNIDROIT Principles 
of International Commercial Contracts: Reflections on their Use in International 
Arbitration, 2002, p. 105 
Mayer, Pierre & Audley Sheppard, Final ILA Report on Public Policy as a Bar to 
Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards, Arbitration International, 19-2 (2003), 
p. 249 
McKendrick, Ewan, Contract law, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007 
McKendrick, Ewan, Force Majeure Clauses: The Gap between Doctrine and Practice, in A. 
Burrows & E. Peel, (eds.), Contract Terms, Oxford University Press, 2007 
McMeel, G., Prior Negotiations and Subsequent Conduct – the Next Step forward for 
Contractual Interpretation, Law Quarterly Review, 119 (2003), p. 272 
McMeel, G.P., Unjust Enrichment, Discharge for Breach, and the Primacy of Contract, in 
Andrew Burrows & Lord Rodger of Earlsferry (Eds.), Mapping the Law: Essays in 
Memory of Peter Birks, Oxford University Press, 2006 
Mehren, A. T. von, To What Extent is International Commercial Arbitration Autonomous? in 
Le droit des relations économiques internationales. Etudes offertes à Berthold 
Goldman, Paris: Litec, 1982, p. 217 
Mehren, Robert B. von, Concluding Remarks, in Special Supplement, ICC International Court 
of Arbitration Bulletin: The Status of the Arbitrator, 1995, p. 126 
Melis, Werner, Force Majeure and Hardship Clauses in International Commercial Contracts in 
View of the Practices of the ICC Court of Arbitration, Journal of International 
Arbitration 1 (1984), p. 213 
Mercadal, Barthélémy, Termination of Contracts under French Law, International Business 
Law Journal, (1997), p. 869 
 900 
 
Mertens, H.J., Lex Mercatoria: A Self-applying System Beyond National Law?, in Gunther 
Teubner (ed.), Global Law Without a State, Dartmouth, 1997 
Michaels, Ralf, the True Lex Mercatoria: Private Law Beyond the State, Indiana Journal of 
Global Legal Studies, 14 (2007), p. 447 
Milgrom, Paul R., Douglas C. North & Barry R. Weingast, The Role of Institutions in the 
Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges and the Champagne Fair 
Courts, Economics and Politics, 2-1 (1990), p. 1 
Mistelis, Loukas, Unidroit Principles Applied as "Most Appropriate Rules of Law" in a 
Swedish Arbitral Award, Uniform Law Review, (2003), p. 631 
Mistelis, Loukas, International arbitration, Corporate Attitudes and Practices, 12 Perceptions 
Tested: Myths, Data and Analysis Research Report, American Review of 
International Arbitration, 15 (2004), p. 525  
Mitchell, Catherine, Interpretation of Contracts: Current Controversies in Law, Routledge-
Cavendish, 2007 
Mitchell, William, An essay on the early history of the law merchant, New York: Franklin, 
(Originally published Cambridge, 1904) 1976 
Mohs, Florian, & Bruno Zeller, Commentary: Penalty and Liquidated Damages Clauses in 
CISG Contracts Revisited, Mealey's International Arbitration Report, 21-6 (June 
2006), p. 1 
Molineaux, Charles, Moving Toward a Lex Mercatoria - A Lex Constructionis, Journal of 
International Arbitration, 14-1 (1997), p. 55 
Mosk, Richard, The Role of Party-Appointed Arbitrators in International Arbitration: The 
Experience of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, The Transnational Lawyer, 1 
(1981), p. 253 
Moss, Giuditta Cordero, International Contracts between Common Law and Civil Law: Is 
Non-state Law to Be Preferred? The Difficulty of Interpreting Legal Standards Such 
as Good Faith, Global Jurist, 7-1 (2007), Available at: 
http://www.bepress.com/gj/vol7/iss1/art3 
Mourre, Alexis &, Luca G. Radicati di Brozolo, Towards Finality of Arbitral Awards: Two 
Steps Forward and One Step Back, Journal of International Arbitration, 23-2 (2006), 
p. 171 
Muchlinski, Peter, ‘Caveat Investor’? The Relevance of the Conduct of the Investor under the 
Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard, International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, 55 (2006), p. 527 
Mustill, Michael, Transnational Arbitration and English Law, Current Legal Problems, 
(1984), p. 133 
Mustill, Michael, The New Lex Mercatoria: The First Twenty-five Years, Arbitration 
International, (1988), p.86 
Nacimiento, Patricia and Alexey Barnashov Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards 
in Russia, Journal of International Arbitration, 27-3 (2010), p. 295 
Naimark, Richard W. & Stephanie E. Keer, International Private Commercial Arbitration: 
Expectations and Perceptions of Attorneys and Business People – A Forced-Rank 
Analysis, International Business Lawyer, (May 2002), p. 203 
 901 
 
Nassar, Nagla, Sanctity of Contracts Revisited : a Study in the Theory and Practice of Long-
Term International Commercial Transactions, M. Nijhoff, 1995 
Neumann, Thomas, Shared Responsibility under Article 80 CISG, Nordic Journal of 
Commercial Law (2/2009), p. 1 
Nicholas, Barry, Impracticability and Impossibility in the U.N. Convention on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods, in Nina M. Galston & Hans Smit (eds.), 
International Sales: The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods, Matthew Bender 1984 
Nicholas, Barry, The French law of contract, Oxford University Press, 1992 
Nicholas, Geoff & Constantine Partasides, LCIA Court Decisions on Challenges to 
Arbitrators: A Proposal to Publish, Arbitration International, 23-1 (2007), p. 1 
Niggemann, Friedrich, The ICSID Klöckner v. Cameroon Award: The Dissenting Opinion, 
Journal of International Arbitration, (1984), p. 331 
Nikiforov, Ilya, Interpretation of Article V of the New York Convention by Russian Courts: 
Due Process, Arbitrability and Public Policy Grounds for Non-Enforcement, Journal 
of International Arbitration, 25-6 (2008), p. 787 
Nouel, Philippe, ‘Cartesian Pragmatism’: Looking for Common Principles in French and 
English Law, International Business Lawyer, 24 (January 1996), p. 22 
Nussbaum, Arthur, The Arbitration between the Lena Goldfields, Ltd. and the Soviet 
Government, Cornell Law Quarterly, 36 (1950), p. 31 
Nygh, Peter E., The Reasonable Expectations of the Parties as a Guide to the Choice of Law 
in Contract and in Tort, Recueil des Cours, 251 (1995) 
Oguz, Fuat, Hayek on tacit knowledge, Journal of Institutional Economics, 6-2 (2010), p. 145 
O'Malley, Pat, Risk, Uncertainty, and Government, GlassHouse, 2004 
Pamboukis, Ch., The Concept and Function of Usages in the United Nations, Convention on 
the International Sale of Goods, Journal of Law and Commerce, 25 (2005-2006), p. 
107 
Park, William W., Arbitration in Banking and Finance, Annual Review of Banking Law, 17 
(1998), p. 213 
Park, William W., Control Mechanisms in the Development of a Modern Lex Mercatoria, in 
Thomas E. Carbonneau (ed.), Lex mercatoria and arbitration: a discussion of the new 
law merchant, Kluwer Law International, Rev. ed., 1998 
Park, William W., “Framing the Case on Quantum” in Damages in International Arbitration, 
World Arbitration & Mediation Review, 2 (2008), p. 59 
Park, William W., Arbitrators and Accuracy, Journal of International Dispute Settlement, 1-1 
(2010), p. 25 
Park, William W., The Specificity of International Arbitration: The Case for FAA Reform, 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 36 (2003), p. 1241 
Patterson, Edwin W., Constructive Conditions in Contracts, Columbia Law Review, 42 
(1942), p. 903 
 902 
 
Paulsson, Jan, The ICSID Klöckner v. Cameroon Award: The Duties of Partners in North-
South Economic Development Agreements, Journal of International Arbitration, 
(1984), p. 145 
Paulsson, Jan, Ethics, Elitism, Eligibility, Journal of International Arbitration, 14-4 (1997), p. 
13  
Paulsson, Jan, the Expectation Model, in Yves Derains & Richard H. Kreindler, (eds.), 
Evaluation of Damages in International Arbitration, ICC Publication No. 668, 2006, 
p. 57 
Pauly, Clemens, The Concept of Fundamental Breach as an International Principle to Create 
Uniformity of Commercial Law, Journal of Law and Commerce, (2000), p. 221 
Peden, Elisabeth, & John Carter, Entire Agreement – and Similar – Clauses, Journal of 
Contract Law, 22-1 (2006), p. 1 
Perillo Joseph M., Restitution in the Second Restatement of Contracts, Columbia Law 
Review, (January 1981), p. 37 
Perillo, Joseph M., UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts The Black 
Letter Text and a Review, Fordham Law Review, 63 (1994), p. 281 
Perillo, Joseph M., Force Majeure and Hardship under the UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts, in Contratación internacional, Comentarios a 
los Principios sobre los Contratos Comerciales Internacionales del Unidroit, 
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México - Universidad Panamericana, 1998, p. 
111 
Perillo, Joseph M., Calamari and Perillo on Contracts, St. Paul, Minn.: Thomson/West, 5
th
 ed., 
2003 
Peter, Wolfgang, Arbitration of Mergers and Acquisitions: Purchase Price Adjustment 
Disputes, Arbitration International, 19-4 (2003), p. 491 
Peters, Thomas J, Thriving on Chaos, Perennial, 1988 
Petrochilos, Georgios, Procedural law in International Arbitration, Oxford University Press, 
2004 
Petrova, Irina, “Stepping on the Shoulders of a Drowning Man” The Doctrine of Abuse of 
Right as a Tool for Reducing Damages for Lost Profits: Troubling Lessons from the 
Patuha and Himpurna Arbitrations, Georgetown Journal of International Law, 35 
(2004), p. 455 
Posner, Eric, The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the Principles of 
Contractual Interpretation, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 146 (1998), p. 
533 
Posner, Richard A., Economic Analysis of Law, Little, Brown, 2
nd
 ed., 1977 
Posner, Richard A, Law, Pragmatism and Democracy, Harvard University Press, 2003 
Posner, Richard A., Hayek, Law, and Cognition, NYU Journal of Law & Liberty, 1 (2005), p. 
147 
Posner, Richard. A., Judicial Behavior and Performance: An Economic Approach, Florida 
State University Law Review, 32 (2005), p. 1259 
 903 
 
Poudret, Jean-Francois & Sebastien Besson, Comparative Law of International Arbitration, 
London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2
nd
 ed., 2007 
Pound, R., A Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, Harvard Law Review 44 (1931), p. 697  
Prechal, S. & N. Shelkoplyas, National Procedures, Public Policy and EC Law, From Van 
Schijndel to Eco Swiss and Beyond, European Review of Private Law, 5 (2004), p. 
589 
Pryles, Michael, Reflections on Transnational Public Policy, Journal of International 
Arbitration, 24-1 (2007), p. 1 
Puelinckx, A.H., Frustration, Hardship, Force Majeure, Imprévision, Wegfall der 
Geschäftsgrundlage, Unmöglichkeit, Changed Circumstances, Journal of 
International Arbitration, 3-2 (1986), p. 47 
Radicati Di Brozolo, Luca G., Arbitration and Competition Law: The Position of the Courts 
and of Arbitrators, Arbitration International, 27-1 (2011), p. 1 
Raeschke-Kessler, Hilmar, The UNIDROIT Principles in Contemporary Contract Practice, 
Special Supplement, ICC International Court of Arbitration Bulletin: UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts: Reflections on their Use in 
International Arbitration, 2002, p. 99 
Raeschke-Kessler, Hilmar, Corrupt Practices in the Foreign Investment Context: Contractual 
and Procedural Aspects, in Norbert Horn & Stefan Kröll (eds.), Arbitrating Foreign 
Investment Disputes, Kluwer Law International, 2004 
Raeschke-Kessler, Hilmar, & Dorothee Gottwald, Corruption in Foreign Investment - 
Contracts and Dispute Settlement between Investors, States, and Agents, Journal of 
World Investment & Trade, 9-1 (February 2008), p. 1 
Ramsey, Vivian, Problems of Delay and Disruption Damages in International Construction 
Arbitration, in Yves Derains & Richard H. Kreindler, (eds.), Evaluation of Damages 
in International Arbitration, ICC Publication No. 668, 2006, p. 193 
Ray, Jr., George W., Some Reasons for the Binding Force of Development Contracts between 
States and Foreign Nationals, The Business Lawyer, 16 (1961), p. 942 
Raz, Joseph, Legal Principles and the Limits of Law, Yale Law Journal, 81 (1972), p. 823 
Redfern, Alan, Comments on Commercial Arbitration and Transnational Public Policy, in 
Albert Jan van den Berg (ed.), International Arbitration 2006: Back To Basics?, 
ICCA Congress Series No. 13, Kluwer Law International, 2007 
Redfern, Alan & Martin Hunter with Nigel Blackaby and Constantine Partasides, Law and 
Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 4
th
 ed. 
Student version, 2004 
Reimann, Mathias & Joachim Zekoll, Introduction to German law, Kluwer Law International, 
2
nd
 ed., 2005 
Reisman, W. Michael, The Regime for Lacunae in the ICSID Choice of Law Provision and 
the Question of its Threshold, ICSID Review—Foreign Investment Law Journal, 15 
(2000), p. 362 
Reisman, W. Michael, & R.D. Sloane, Indirect Expropriation and its Valuation in the BIT 
Generation, British Yearbook of International Law, 74 (2003), p. 115 
 904 
 
Riesenhuber, Karl, Damages for Non-Performance and the Fault Principle, European Review 
of Contract Law, 4 (2008), p. 119 
Rimke, Joern, Force majeure and Hardship: Application in International Trade Practice with 
specific regard to the CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts, Pace Review of the Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods, (1999-2000), p. 197 
Ripinsky, Sergey, & Kevin Williams, Damages in International Investment Law, London: 
British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2008 
Rivkin, David R., Lex Mercatoria and Force majeure, in Emmanuel Gaillard (ed.), 
Transnational Rules in International Commercial Arbitration, ICC Publication No. 
480/4, Paris, 1993 
Rivkin, David W., Enforceability of Arbitral Awards Based on Lex Mercatoria, Arbitration 
International, (1993), p. 67 
Robertson Jr., R.J., The Right to Demand Adequate Assurance of Due Performance: Uniform 
Commercial Code Section 2-609 and Restatement (Second) of Contracts Section 
251, Drake Law Review, 38 (1988-1989), p. 305 
Robin, Guy, The Principle of Good Faith in International Contracts, International Business 
Law Journal, (2005), p. 695 
Rösler, Hannes, Hardship in German Codified Private Law – In Comparative Perspective to 
English, French and International Contract Law, European Review of Private Law, 
15-4 (2007), p. 483 
Rowley, Keith A., A Brief History of Anticipatory Repudiation in American Contract Law, 
University of Cincinnati Law Review, 69 (Winter 2001), p. 565 
Rowley, Keith A., The Often Imitated, But (Still) Not Yet Duplicated, Revised UCC Article 
1, UNLV William S. Boyd School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08-17, 
(May 15, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1123744 
Rubino-Sammartano, Mauro, Amiable Compositeur (Joint Mandate to Settle) and Ex Bono et 
Aequo (Discretional Authority to Mitigate Strict Law), Journal of International 
Arbitration, 9-1 (1992), p. 5 
Rubino-Sammartano, Mauro, International Arbitration Law and Practice, Kluwer Law 
International, 2
nd
 rev. ed., 2001 
Rubinstein, Javier H., International Commercial Arbitration: Reflections at the Crossroads of 
the Common Law and Civil Law Traditions, Chicago Journal of International Law, 5 
(2004-2005), p. 303 
Ruggie, Gerard, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda, American 
Journal of International Law, 101 (2007), p. 819 
Sachs, Klaus, Time and Money, in Loukas Mistelis & Julian D. M. Lew (eds.), Pervasive 
Problems in International Arbitration, Kluwer Law International, 2006 
Sachs, Stephen E., From St. Ives to Cyberspace: The Modern Distortion of the Medieval ‘Law 
Merchant’, American University International Law Review, 21 (2006), p. 685 
Saidov, Djakhongir, Anticipatory Non-Performance and Underlying Values of the 
UNIDROIT Principles, Uniform Law Review (2006), p. 795 
 905 
 
Saidov, Djakhongir, Causation in Damages: The Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods, the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts, the Principles of European Contract Law,  Review of the Convention on 
Contracts for International Sale of Goods (CISG): 2004-2005, Pace International 
Law Review, München: Sellier, 2006, p. 225 
Sally, Razeen, Classical Liberalism and International Economic Order: Studies in Theory and 
Intellectual History, Routledge, 1998 
Sanders, Pieter, Commentary on UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Yearbook Commercial 
Arbitration, 2 (1977), p. 172 
Sanders, Pieter, Quo Vadis Arbitration?: Sixty Years of Arbitration Practice: a Comparative 
Study, Kluwer Law International, 1999 
Sandrock, Otto, Is International Arbitration Inept to Solve Disputes Arising out of 
International Loan Agreements?, Journal of International Arbitration, 11-3 (1994), p. 
33 
Scherer, Matthias, Circumstantial Evidence in Corruption before International Tribunals, 
International Arbitration Law Review, 5-2 (2002), p. 29 
Schlechtriem, Peter, Uniform Sales Law: The UN-Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods, Manz, Vienna, 1986 
Schlechtriem, Peter, Good Faith in German Law and in International Uniform Laws, Centro 
di Studi e Ricerche di Diritto Comparato e Straniero, Saggi, conferenze e seminari 
24, Rome, 1997 
Schlechtriem, Peter, Termination of Contracts under the Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts, in Michael Joachim Bonell & Franco Bonelli (eds.), Contratti 
commerciali internazionali e Principi UNIDROIT, Giuffré, Milano 1997 
Schlechtriem, Peter, Termination and Adjustment of Contracts  [Under the UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts], European Journal of Law Reform, 
1-3 (1999), p. 305 
Schlechtriem, Peter, The German Act to Modernize the Law of Obligations in the Context of 
Common Principles and Structures of the Law of Obligations in Europe, Oxford U 
Comparative L Forum, 2 (2002), at ouclf.iuscomp.org 
Schmitthoff, Clive M, The Science of Comparative Law, The Cambridge Law Journal, 7 
(1939), p. 94 
Schmitthoff, Clive M., Finality of Arbitral Awards and Judicial Review, in Julian D. M. Lew 
(ed.), Contemporary Problems in International Arbitration, London, 1986 
Schmitthoff, Clive M., International Trade Usages, Institute of International Business Law 
and Practice Newsletter, Special Issue, ICC Publication 440/4, Paris 1987 
Schmitthoff', Clive M., Hardship and Intervener Clauses, in Chia-Jui Cheng (ed.), Clive M. 
Schmitthoff's Select Essays on International Trade Law, Graham & Trotman, 1988 
Schmitthoff, Clive M., International Trade Law and Private International Law, in Chia-Jui 
Cheng (ed.), Clive M. Schmitthoff's Select Essays on International Trade Law, 
Graham & Trotman, 1988 
 906 
 
Schmitthoff, Clive M., Nature and Evolution of the Transnational Law of Commercial 
Transactions, in Chia-Jui Cheng (ed.), Clive M. Schmitthoff's Select Essays on 
International Trade Law, Graham & Trotman, 1988 
Schmitthoff, Clive M., The Law of International Trade, in Chia-Jui Cheng (ed.), Clive M. 
Schmitthoff's Select Essays on International Trade Law, Graham & Trotman, 1988 
Schmitthoff, Clive M., The Law of International Trade, Its Growth, Formulation and 
Operation, in Chia-Jui Cheng (ed.), Clive M. Schmitthoff's Select Essays on 
International Trade Law, Graham & Trotman, 1988 
Schmitthoff, Clive M., The New Sources of the Law of International Trade, in Chia-Jui 
Cheng (ed.), Clive M. Schmitthoff's Select Essays on International Trade Law, 
Graham & Trotman, 1988 
Schmitthoff, Clive M., The Unification of the Law of International Trade, in Chia-Jui Cheng 
(ed.), Clive M. Schmitthoff's Select Essays on International Trade Law, Graham & 
Trotman, 1988 
Schmitthoff, Clive M., The Unification or Harmonization of Law By Means of Standard 
Contracts and General Conditions, in Chia-Jui Cheng (ed.), Clive M. Schmitthoff's 
Select Essays on International Trade Law, Graham & Trotman, 1988 
Schwartz, Alan & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, Yale 
Law Journal, 113 (Nov/Dec 2003), p. 541 
Schwebel, Stephen M., The Alsing Case, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 8 
(1959), p. 320 
Schwenzer, Ingeborg & Simon Manner, The Pot Calling the Kettle Black: The Impact of the 
Non-Breaching Party's (Non-) Behaviour on its CISG-Remedies, in Camilla B. 
Andersen & Ulrich G. Schroeter (eds.), Sharing International Commercial Law 
across National Boundaries: Festschrift for Albert H. Kritzer, Wildy, Simmonds & 
Hill Publishing, 2008 
Scott, Robert E., Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, California Law Review, 
75-6 (Dec., 1987), p. 2005 
Scott, Robert E., In (Partial) Defense of Strict Liability in Contract, Michigan Law Review, 
107 (June 2009), p. 1381 
Scott, Robert E. & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, Yale Law 
Journal, 115 (2006), p. 814 
Seppälä, Christopher R., International Construction Contract Disputes: Commentary on ICC 
Awards Dealing with the FIDIC International Conditions of Contract, ICC 
International Court of Arbitration Bulletin, 9-2 (1998), p. 32 
Seppälä, Christopher R., International Construction Contract Disputes: Commentary on ICC 
Awards Dealing with the FIDIC International Conditions of Contract, International 
Business Law Journal, (1999), p. 700 
Seppälä, Christopher R., Contractor's Claims Under The FIDIC Contracts (1999 Edition), 
available at 
http://www1.fidic.org/resources/contracts/icc_apr04/icc01_chistopher_seppala.asp 
Seppälä, Christopher R., FIDIC's New Standard Forms of Contract – Risks, Force Majeure, 
Claims and Termination, International Business Law Journal, (2000), p. 1013 
 907 
 
Seppälä, Christopher R., International Construction Contract Disputes: Second Commentary 
on ICC Awards Dealing Primarily with FIDIC Contracts, ICC International Court of 
Arbitration Bulletin, 19-2 (2008), p. 41 
Shapiro, Martin, Globalization of the Freedom of Contract, in Harry N. Scheiber (ed.), The 
State and Freedom of Contract (Making of Modern Freedom), Stanford University 
Press, 1998 
Shell, G. Richard, Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel Effects of Commercial Arbitration, 
UCLA Law Review, 35 (1988), p. 623 
Sheppard, Audley, Interim ILA Report on Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement of 
International Arbitral Awards, Arbitration International, 19-2 (2003), p. 217 
Sheppard, B. H., A New Era of Arbitrator Ethics for the United States: The 2004 Revision to 
the AAA/ABA Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, Arbitration 
International, 21-1 (2005), p. 91 
Shore, Laurence, Applying Mandatory Rules of Law in International Commercial Arbitration, 
American Review of International Arbitration, 18 (2007), p. 91 
Slaoui, Fatima-Zahra, The Rising Issue of “Repeat Arbitrators”: A Call for Clarification, 
Arbitration International, 25 (2009), p. 103 
Smit, Hans, Dissenting Opinions in Arbitration, ICC International Court of Arbitration 
Bulletin 15-1 (2004), p. 37 
Smits, Jan M., Comparative Law and its Influence on National Legal Systems, in Mathias 
Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann (eds.), The Oxford Handbook Of Comparative 
Law, Oxford, 2006, pp. 477-512, Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=965389 
Sornarajah, M., The International Law on Foreign Investment, Cambridge University Press; 
3
rd
 ed., 2010 
Steyn, Johan, Contract Law: Fulfilling the Reasonable Expectations of Honest Men, Law 
Quarterly Review, 113 (1997), p. 433 
Steyn, Johan, England: the Independence and/or Impartiality of Arbitrators in International 
Commercial Arbitration, Special Supplement, ICC International Court of Arbitration 
Bulletin: Independence of Arbitrators, 2007, p. 91 
Stone, Richard, & Ralph Cunnington, Text, Cases & Materials on Contract Law, Routledge-
Cavendish, 2007 
Summers, Robert S., “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, Virginia Law Review, 54 (1968), p. 195 
Summers, Robert S., The Conceptualization of Good Faith in American Contract Law: A 
General Account, in Reinhard Zimmermann & Simon Whittaker (eds.) Good faith in 
European contract law, Cambridge University Press, 2000 
Tallon, Denis, Damages, Exemption Clauses, and Penalties, American Journal of 
Comparative Law, 40 (1992), p. 675 
Tallon, Denis, Hardship, in Arthur Hartkamp, Martijn Hesselink, Ewoud Hondius, Carla 
Joustra & Edgar du Perron (eds.), Towards A European Civil Code, Kluwer Law 
International, 2
nd
 ed., 1998 
 908 
 
Terray, Jacques, Letters of Comfort in French Law, International Financial Law Review, 1 
(1982), p. 35 
Tetley, William, The General Maritime Law - The Lex Maritima, Syracuse Journal of 
International Law and Commerce, 20 (1994), p. 105 
Teubner, Gunther, Self-subversive Justice: Contingency or Transcendence Formula of Law?, 
Modern Law Review, 72-1 (January 2009), p. 1 
Teubner, Gunther, Self-Constitutionalizing TNCs? On the Linkage of 'Private" and 'Public" 
Corporate Codes of Conduct, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 18 (2011), p. 
617 
Torsello, Marco, Remedies for Breach of Contract, in Jan Smits (ed.), Elgar Encyclopedia of 
Comparative Law, Edgar Elgar Publisher, Aldershot, 2006 
Totterdill, B.W., FIDIC Users’ Guide: A Practical Guide to the 1999 Red and Yellow Books: 
Incorporating Changes and Additions to the 2005 MDB Harmonised Edition, ICE 
Publishing; Rev. ed., 2006 
Trakman, Leon E., The evolution of The Law Merchant: Our Commercial Heritage (Part I), 
Journal of Maritime Law & Commerce, 12 (1980), p.1 
Trakman, Leon E., Winner Take Some: Loss Sharing and Commercial Impracticability, 
Minnesota Law Review, 69 (1985), p. 471 
Trakman, Leon E., From the Medieval Law Merchant to E-Merchant Law, The University of 
Toronto Law Journal, 53-3 (Summer, 2003), p. 265 
Treitel, G.H., Remedies for Breach of Contract (Courses of Action Open to a Party 
Aggrieved), International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Vol. 7 Ch. 16, 
Tubingen: Mohr, 1976 
Treitel, G. H, Fault in the Common Law of Contract, in Maarten Bos & Ian Brownlie (eds.) 
Liber amicorum for the Rt. Hon. Lord Wilberforce, Oxford University Press, 1987 
Treitel, G.H., Remedies for Breach of Contract: A Comparative Account, Clarendon Press, 
1988 
Treitel, G. H., Frustration and Force Majeure, London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1994 
Treitel, G. H, The Law of Contract, Thomson/Sweet & Maxwell, 11
th
 ed., 2003 
Triantis, George, Contractual Allocations of Unknown Risks: A Critique of the Doctrine of 
Commercial Impracticability, University of Toronto Law Journal, 42-4 (1992), p. 
450 
Trías, Encarnación Roca & Beatriz Fernández Gregoraci, The Modern Law of Obligations in 
the Spanish High Court, European Review of Contract Law, 5-1 (March 2009), p. 45 
Van Den Berg, Albert Jan, The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958, Towards a 
Uniform Judicial Interpretation, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1981 
Van Den Berg, Albert Jan, Why Are Some Awards Not Enforceable?, in Albert Jan van den 
Berg (ed.), New horizons in International Commercial Arbitration and Beyond, 
ICCA Congress Series No. 12, Kluwer Law International, 2005 
Van Den Berg, Albert Jan, An Overview of theNew York Convention of 1958, (2008), 
available at http://www.arbitration-icca.org/articles.html 
 909 
 
Van Den Berg, Albert Jan, Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Annulled in Russia – Case 
Comment on Court of Appeal of Amsterdam, April 28, 2009, Journal of International 
Arbitration, 27-2 (2010), p. 179 
Van Houtte, Hans, Changed Circumstances and Pacta Sund Servanda, in Emmanuel Gaillard 
(ed.), Transnational Rules in International Commercial Arbitration, ICC Publication 
No. 480/4, Paris, 1993 
Van Houtte, Hans, ICC Model Contracts, International Business Law Journal, (2003), p. 253 
Van Vuuren, Elbi Janse, Termination of International Commercial Contracts for Breach of 
Contract: The Provisions of [South African  Contract Law, U.S. Contract Law, 
German Contract Law and] the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts, Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law, 15 (1998), p. 583 
Vandomme, Laurent, Negotiating International Contracts, International Business Law 
Journal, (2003), p. 487 
Varcoe-Cocks, M.D., Best Endeavours, The Law Society’s Gazette, (1986), p. 1992 
Vargas, V. Pérez & D. Pérez Umana, The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts in Costa Rican Arbitral Practice, Uniform Law Review, (2006), p. 181 
Veeder, V. V., The Lena Goldfields Arbitration: The Historical Root of Three Ideas, 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 47 (1998), p. 747 
Veneziano, Anna, UNIDROIT Principles and CISG: Change of Circumstances and Duty to 
Renegotiate according to the Belgian Supreme Court, Uniform Law Review, (2010), 
p. 137 
Vischer, Frank, The Antagonism between Legal Security and the Search for Justice in the 
Field of Contracts., Recueil des Cours, 142 (1974) 
Vischer, Frank, General Course on Private International Law, Recueil des Cours, 232 (1992) 
Vogenauer, Stefan, Interpretation of Contracts: Concluding Comparative Observations, 
Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 7/2007, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=984074 
Vogenauer, Stefan & Jan Kleinheisterkamp (eds.), Commentary on the UNIDROIT Principles 
of International Commercial Contracts (PICC), Oxford University Press, 2009 
Volckart, Oliver and Antje Mangels, Are the Roots of the Modern Lex Mercatoria Really 
Medieval?, Southern Economic Journal, 65-3 (1999), p. 427 
Voser, Nathalie, Mandatory Rules of Law as a Limitation on the Law Applicable in 
International Commercial Arbitration, American Review of International Arbitration, 
7 (1996), p. 319 
Waincymer, Jeff, International Arbitration and the Duty to Know the Law, Journal of 
International Arbitration, 28-3 (2011), p. 201 
Wehberg, Hans, Pacta Sunt Servanda, American Journal of International Law, 53 (1959), p. 
775 
Weinberg, Karyn S., Equity in International Arbitration: How Fair is “Fair”: A Study of Lex 
Mercatoria and Amiable Composition, Boston University International Law Journal, 
12 (1994), p. 227 
 910 
 
Weisburg, Henry, & Christopher Ryan, Means to be Made Whole: Damages in the Context of 
International Investment Arbitration, in Yves Derains & Richard H. Kreindler, (eds.), 
Evaluation of Damages in International Arbitration, ICC Publication No. 668, 2006, 
p. 165 
Wells, Louis T., Double Dipping in Arbitration Awards? An Economist Questions Damages 
Awarded to Karaha Bodas Company in Indonesia, Arbitration International, 19-4 
(2003), p. 471 
Wetter, J. Gillis, Issues of Corruption Before International Arbitral Tribunal: the Authentic 
Text and True Meaning of Judge Gunnar Lagergren's 1963 Award in ICC Case 
No.1110, Arbitration International, 10-3 (1994), p. 277 
Whincup, Michael H., Contract Law and Practice: the English System and Continental 
Comparisons, Kluwer Law International, 4
th
 rev. and enl. ed., 2001 
Whitesell, Anne Marie, Independence in ICC Arbitration: ICC Court Practice concerning the 
Appointment, Confirmation, Challenge and Replacement of Arbitrators, Special 
Supplement, ICC International Court of Arbitration Bulletin: Independence of 
Arbitrators, 2007, p. 7 
Whitman, James, Commercial Law and the American Volk: A Note on Llewellyn’s German 
Sources for the Uniform Commercial Code, Yale Law Journal, 97 (1987), p. 156 
Whittaker, Simon, How Does French Law Deal with Anticipatory Breaches of Contract?, 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 45-3 (Jul., 1996), p. 662 
Whittaker, Simon, Contributory Fault and Mitigation; Rights and Reasonableness: 
Comparisons between English and French Law, in L. Tich (ed.), Causation in Law, 
Univerzita Karlova v Praze, 2007 
Whittaker, Simon, 'Termination' for Contractual Non-performance and its Consequences: 
French Law Reviewed in the Light of the Avant-projet de reforme, in J. Cartwrigh, 
S. Vogenauer, & S. Whittaker (eds), Reforming the French Law of Obligations: 
Comparative Reflections on the Avant-projet de réforme du droit des obligations et 
de la prescription ('the Avant-projet Catala'), Hart, 2009 
Whittaker, Simon & Reinhard Zimmermann, Good faith in European Contract Law: 
Surveying the Legal Landscape, in Reinhard Zimmermann and Simon Whittaker 
(eds.), Good faith in European Contract Law, Cambridge University Press, 2000 
Wiegand, Wolfgang, Americanization of Law – Reception or Convergence, in Lawrence M. 
Friedmann & Harry N. Scheiber, Legal Culture and the Legal Profession, Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1996 
Williams, Chris, The Search for Bases of Decision in Commercial Law: Llewellyn Redux, 
Harvard Law Review, 97 (1984), p. 1495 
Williamson, Oliver E., Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete 
Structural Alternatives, Administrative Science Quarterly, 36-2 (Jun., 1991), p. 269 
Williamson, Oliver E., Transaction Cost Economics, in Claude Menard and Mary M. Shirley 
(eds.), Handbook of New Institutional Economics, Dordrecht: Springer, 2005 
Wilske, Stephan, & Todd J. Fox, Corruption in International Arbitration and Problems with 
Standard of Proof: Baseless Allegations or Prima Facie Evidence?, in Stefan Kroll, 
Loukas A. Mistelis, Viscasillas P. Perales, and  V. Rogers (eds.) International 
 911 
 
Arbitration and International Commercial Law: Synergy Convergence and Evolution 
- Liber Amicorum Eric Bergsten, Kluwer Law International, 2011 
Windbichler, Christine, Lex Mercatoria, in Neil J. Smelser, Paul B. Baltes (eds.) International 
Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, Oxford, UK; New York: 
Elsevier, Vol. 13, 2001 
Wiseman, Zipporah Batshaw, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules, 
Harvard Law Review, 100-3 (1987), p. 465 
Witz, Claude, & Thomas M. Bopp, Bests Efforts, Reasonable Care: Considérations de droit 
allemande, International Business Law Journal, (1988), p. 1029 
Wühler, Norbert, Application of General Principles of Law, in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed.), 
Planning efficient Arbitration Proceedings - The Law Applicable in International 
Arbitration, ICCA Congress Series No. 7, Kluwer Law International 1999 
Yackee, Jason W., Pacta Sunt Servanda and State Promises to Foreign Investors Before 
Bilateral Investment Treaties: Myth and Reality, Fordham International Law Journal, 
32-5 (2008), p. 1550 
Yntema, Hessel E., Equity in the Civil Law and the Common Law, American Journal of 
Comparative Law, 15-1/2 (1966-1967), p. 60 
Yovel, Jonathan, Cure after date for delivery: Comparison between provisions of the CISG 
(seller's right to remedy failure to perform: Article 48) and the counterpart provisions 
of the Principles of European Contract Law (Articles 8:104 and 9:303), in John 
Felemegas (ed.), An International Approach to the Interpretation of the United 
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1980) as 
Uniform Sales Law, Cambridge University Press, 2007 
Zajtay, Imre, The Application of Foreign Law, International Encyclopedia of Comparative 
Law, Vol. 3, Ch. 14, Tubingen: Mohr, 1972 
Zeller, Bruno, Determining the Contractual Intent of Parties under the CISG and Common 
Law-- A Comparative Analysis, European Journal of Law Reform, 4-4 (2002), p. 
629 
Zimmermann, Reinhard, Breach of Contract and Remedies Under the New German Law of 
Obligations, Centro di Studi e Ricerche di Diritto Comparato e Straniero, Saggi, 
conferenze e seminari 48, Rome, 2002 
Zimmermann, Reinhard, Restitutio in Integrum: The Unwinding of Failed Contracts under the 
Principles of European Contract Law, the UNIDROIT Principles and the Avant-
projet d'un Code Europeen des Contrats, Uniform Law Review, (2005), p. 719 
Zimmermann, Reinhard, The New German Law of Obligations: Historical and Comparative 
Perspectives, Oxford University Press, 2005 
Zimmerman, Reinhard, The Unwinding of Failed Contracts in the UNIDROIT Principles 
2010, Uniform Law Review, (2011), p. 563 
Zweigert, Konrad & Hein Koetz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, translated by Tony 
Weir, Oxford University Press, 3
rd
 rev. ed., 1998 
 
